Conspiratoria - the Internet and the Logic of Conspiracy Theory by Ballinger, Dean Ross
 
 
 
http://researchcommons.waikato.ac.nz/ 
 
 
Research Commons at the University of Waikato 
 
Copyright Statement: 
The digital copy of this thesis is protected by the Copyright Act 1994 (New Zealand). 
The thesis may be consulted by you, provided you comply with the provisions of the 
Act and the following conditions of use:  
 Any use you make of these documents or images must be for research or private 
study purposes only, and you may not make them available to any other person.  
 Authors control the copyright of their thesis. You will recognise the author’s right 
to be identified as the author of the thesis, and due acknowledgement will be 
made to the author where appropriate.  
 You will obtain the author’s permission before publishing any material from the 
thesis.  
 
Conspiratoria – the Internet and the Logic  
of Conspiracy Theory 
 
 
A thesis submitted in fulfilment  
of the requirements for the degree of 
 
Doctor of Philosophy 
in 
Screen and Media Studies 
at 
The University of Waikato 
by 
Dean Ballinger 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2011  
i 
 
ABSTRACT 
_______________________________________________________ 
 
 
     This thesis is a theoretical investigation of the relationships between the logic of 
conspiracy theory and the Internet. It argues that the Internet can be conceptualised 
as a technocultural space conducive to the development of conspiracy belief and 
practice. Critical discourses regarding the relationships between mainstream media 
and the Internet are discussed as constituting the main points of connection between 
conspiracy theory and the Internet.  
     With reference to radical discourses of media power, the study first considers 
conspiracy theorist‘s conceptions of mainstream media as a site of conspiratorial 
control, and their configuration of the Internet as a medium which operates as a 
countervailing influence to mainstream media power. The study then considers 
cyber-cultural discourses, such as those of the second media age, that articulate the 
Internet as a site of democratic empowerment, and how these resonate with the 
democratic ideas that, in distorted forms, constitute key aspects of conspiracist belief.  
These two major discursive themes – the Internet as a counteractive force to 
mainstream media power, and the Internet as a site of democratic empowerment – 
are then discussed as forming the basis for radical configurations of the Internet as an 
alternative medium. The study then shifts into an examination of the Internet‘s 
configuration as an alternative public sphere, and argues that this configuration 
constitutes the most significant point of connection between the Internet and the 
logic of conspiracy theory as the alternative principles of opposition to mainstream 
media and radical democratic activity correspond to central ideas of conspiracist 
thought. This argument is developed further through a discussion of alternative news 
practices, and the ways in which conspiracy theorists appropriate such practices as a 
means of legitimating their extremist beliefs within the alternative public sphere. A 
case study of the conspiracy news site Rense.com is then presented as an illustration 
of this appropriation-legitimation dynamic in action. The study concludes by arguing 
that the Internet does constitute a ‗conspiratorium‘ for conspiracy theorists in relation 
to the ideas outlined above, and that conspiracy theory can – ironically – be seen as a 
major embodiment of the dominant technologically deterministic discourses that 
articulate the Internet as a ‗revolutionary‘ technology.  
     The arguments presented in this study are developed with reference to direct 
examples of online conspiracy theory beliefs and practices. Major theoretical bases 
for the study include the work of Atton (2004) on alternative media; Curran‘s (2002) 
discussions of media power; Holmes‘ (2005) and Mosco‘s (2004) overviews of the 
cyber-utopian perspectives that have shaped the development of the Internet; and 
Keane‘s (1991) work on the media and democracy.  
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CHAPTER 1 - INTRODUCTION 
__________________________________________________________________ 
 
1.1 Ideas of this study 
 
     This study is concerned with investigating the relationships between two of the 
most influential phenomena of millennial Western culture - the Internet and 
conspiracy theories. Or, to put it in the critical terms of media studies, the 
relationships between a particular communication technology and a particular 
form of political and cultural discourse. My specific take on this relationship is to 
examine it from the perspective of the logic of conspiracy theory – the beliefs and 
principles that underlie conspiracist thought and practice. In this study I will argue 
that there are profound points of connection between the technocultural discourses 
that have shaped the ways in which the Internet operates within contemporary 
Western society, and the logic of what I term classical conspiracy theories. These 
connections render the Internet a medium of considerable importance to classical 
conspiracy theorists.  The technocultural discourses and capacities of the Internet 
can be seen to serve as a means of empowering conspiracy theorists in relation to 
their beliefs and their information practices. Most significantly, it can be argued 
that the discursive frameworks of the Internet empower conspiracy theorists by 
providing the basis for information practices through which conspiracy theorists 
attempt to legitimate their ideas in relation to the democratic structures of 
contemporary Western society. In these respects I will argue that the Internet can 
be considered a ‗conspiratoria‘ – a medium that constitutes a cultural ‗space‘ 
conducive to the development of conspiracy thought and practice.
1
 
     My intention with this work is to contribute to the field of academic research 
on conspiracy theories and conspiracy culture, which constitutes a small but 
growing area of interest within the humanities and social sciences. While many 
scholars have pointed out that there appear to be important relationships between 
conspiracy theorising and the Internet, critical discussion of the links between the 
two has been under-examined and poorly theorised. In most academic works on 
conspiracy theory, discussion of the Internet is limited to a few pages at best, with 
the arguments presented as to the relationship between conspiracy theory and the 
                                                 
1
 Please consult appendices 1 and 2 for a delineation of the use of terminology in this study related 
to the subject areas of conspiracy theory and the Internet.  
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Internet revolving around the formal properties of Internet communication. For 
example, many of these arguments revolve around analogies between the 
perceived structures of conspiracist thought and the information systems of the 
Net. Since the Internet (as considered in terms of its most visible application, the 
World Wide Web) operates by connecting different pieces of information together 
through ‗non-linear‘ means (such as hypertext), and since the non-linear 
connection of pieces of information can also be used to describe the nature and 
practices of conspiracy theorising, so the Internet is a medium that appears 
eminently suited to the practices of conspiracy theorising.  
     While I do not disagree with the basic premise behind these arguments – that 
the Internet is a medium that organises and disseminates information in 
communicative forms well-suited to conspiracy theorising - I think that these 
formal factors are better understood as manifestations of more complex 
relationships between Internet technology and conspiracy culture; in particular, 
that the ways in which the Internet organises information – which shape the ways 
in which people relate to and use such information - are resonant with certain 
political and critical perspectives concerning the status of media systems as 
organs of power within contemporary Western society. This resonance has led to 
the Internet being configured as a technocultural embodiment of the complex 
relationships between the public and institutions of power. It is this role that 
makes the Internet particularly significant to conspiracy theorists both in terms of 
their ideological beliefs and the communicative practices by which these beliefs 
are disseminated and developed. In these respects the Internet can be considered 
as a ‗conspiratoria‘ – a technocultural framework that provides the political and 
cultural ‗space‘ for the actualisation of conspiracy thought and practice within 
Western society.  
     As the above comments indicate, my focus on the relationship between the 
Internet and conspiracy theory is one best situated in relation to critical debates 
within media studies, especially in the field of public communication – the 
relationships between media systems and the operation of democracy. The 
political content and ideological background of conspiracy theories is of central 
importance to my arguments. In this respect my study differs from much of the 
existing scholarship on the subject, particularly those from media studies 
backgrounds, which tend to discuss conspiracy theories in relation to postmodern 
ideas of cultural politics. Here the political content of conspiracy theories is 
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considered as something of metaphorical importance - symbolic cultural 
expressions of the psychosocial realities of particular identity positions. Again, 
while I do not disagree with this approach, and touch on these perspectives in the 
course of my discussion, I found the more direct or traditional emphasis on 
politics inherent in the public communication perspectives to be more relevant 
and conducive to understanding the relationship between the Internet and 
conspiracy theory in relation to my research into online conspiracy culture. This is 
particularly so given that the worldview of contemporary conspiracy theory and 
the significance of the Internet as a global communication system are both directly 
engaged with the socio-political changes of the early 21
st
 century. The Internet 
can be argued to be one of the major drivers of such change; conspiracy theory 
one of the major forms of commentary about it.  
     The sense of agency attributed to the Internet in this statement as the major 
‗facilitator‘ of conspiracy theorising should not be taken to indicate that my 
approach here is one based upon a technologically deterministic perspective in 
which the Internet is the major shaping force on conspiracy theorising.  As 
political and cultural discourses, many of the key ideas that shape the 
contemporary conspiracist worldview have a long and complex history within 
Western societies that far precedes the development of the Internet. Furthermore, 
conspiracy theories are rendered ‗visible‘ and ‗influential‘ within the wider 
culture by courtesy of the ways they are communicated to the members of that 
culture through a wide variety of different media – not just the Internet. However, 
as I will argue in this study, the Internet can be said to be a major factor in terms 
of the visibility and influence of conspiracy theory within 21
st
 century Western 
culture in that it provides a brace of technocultural resources for conspiracy 
theorists to communicate their ideas in sometimes new and sometimes more 
sophisticated ways (sophisticated both in terms of the ways in which conspiracy 
ideas are presented as media content and in the associations made between 
conspiracy theorising and the ethos of ‗free‘ information that is central to the 
ways in which the Internet has become incorporated into 21
st
 century everyday 
life). In this respect the Internet can be seen to provide a key means by which 
broad ideas of conspiracism have become more prevalent in Western culture and 
by which specific conspiracy theories have become more noticeable and – in some 
cases (such as 9/11 conspiracy theories)– more persuasive.  
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1.2 Approach to subject matter 
 
     My approach to investigating the relationships between conspiracy theory and 
the Internet has been to try to understand the conspiracist concepts that appear to 
underlie the ways in which conspiracy theorists relate to and utilise the Internet. 
This ‗direct‘ approach seemed to me to be the most effective way of developing 
an in-depth understanding of online conspiracy culture relevant to the major 
question driving this study - how do conspiracy theorists conceptualise, and 
utilise, the Internet in relation to their conspiracy beliefs?  I have therefore taken 
what conspiracy theorists have said about the Internet and done with the Internet 
as the basis for potential answers to this question. My proposed answers can be 
considered in terms of theory and practice.  In terms of theory, I present  critical 
discussions of what I take to be the major frameworks of ideas - ideological, 
political, and cultural - that lie behind the ways in which conspiracy theorists 
conceptualise and utilise the Internet. In terms of practice, I undertake an 
examination of how these attitudes are expressed through the online information 
practices of conspiracy theorists and the beliefs and themes evident in online 
conspiracist content. In terms of the socio-cultural background of conspiracy 
theories, my focus is on contemporary conspiracy theory within a 
Western/English-speaking context. My research into the history of Western 
conspiracism and observations of online Western conspiracism indicate that 
contemporary conspiracy theory is heavily Amerocentric in terms of the socio-
cultural background of the conspiracy theorists who create and disseminate it (the 
majority of whom are American) and the conspiratorial view of the world which it 
suggests (in which the takeover of America appears to be the major goal or 
motivation of the conspiratorial plan in question). This approach should not, 
however, be taken to imply that conspiracy theory is a solely American 
phenomenon, as it is also has a long historical pedigree in a wide variety of 
cultures from around the world (e.g. Pipes 1996: West and Sanders 2003).  
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1.3 Chapter Overview 
 
A detailed breakdown of the overall structure of this thesis is as follows. 
 
Chapter 2 – Literature Review.  
     This is an overview of the major scholarship in the areas of conspiracy theory 
which provides the contextual background for the positioning of my own 
approach in this study. The literature overview here is constructed around what I 
consider to be the two  main critical approaches to the subject – the pathological 
and the allegorical perspectives. The pathological approach is the oldest and most-
established critical approach to conspiracy theory and is predominantly associated 
with fields such as political science and psychology. Here conspiracy theories are 
regarded as manifestations of extremist ideologies and/or irrational thinking. 
Scholarship in this field is largely concerned with critically dissecting and 
debunking conspiracist beliefs as a means of neutralising their potentially 
deleterious impacts within the wider political and cultural landscapes. The 
allegorical approach is a more recent take on conspiracy culture with roots in the 
postmodern and poststructuralist frameworks of fields such as cultural studies and 
literary theory. Here conspiracy theories are considered as metaphorical and 
narrative embodiments of the epistemological shifts and identity politics within 
Western culture in the fin de siecle/millennial eras. I identify two major critical 
perspectives within this allegorical position. The first is the paralogical approach, 
in which conspiracy theories are configured in cultural studies terms as populist 
narratives that challenge dominant ideas of knowledge and power. The second is 
the cognitive mapping approach in which conspiracy theories are considered in 
neo-Marxist terms as symbolic expressions of the nature of late capitalism. I 
discuss what I consider to be the strengths and weaknesses of these two main 
approaches in relation to conspiracy theory as a political and cultural discourse. 
This in turn serves as the basis for an outline of my own critical approach to 
conspiracy theory, a syncretic approach between both pathological and allegorical 
positions that I describe as ‗modified cognitive mapping‘.  
     An important issue raised in the literature review concerns the problematic 
nature of the ways in which ideas of conspiracy theory are conceptualised in the 
existing academic literature on the subject. Scholars in both the pathological and 
allegorical traditions tend to discuss conspiracy theory as a singular critical object, 
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an approach which overlooks the diverse range of ideas and beliefs that are 
articulated within the general concept of ‗conspiracy‘ itself. This chapter seeks to 
address these issues via the development of a ‗typology‘ of conspiracy theories. 
This typology is an attempt to delineate the broad ideological beliefs and 
worldviews that serve as the thematic and epistemological base for a wide range 
of specific conspiracy theories. My intention is to establish a more critically 
robust framework for understanding conspiracy theory that will aid the 
development of my later arguments regarding the relationships between 
conspiracy theory and the Internet.   
 
Chapter 3 – Theory and Methodology. 
     This chapter establishes the theoretical and methodological frameworks for this 
study. In terms of theoretical frameworks I discuss public communication as the 
major media studies framework in which this study is positioned. The influence of 
ideas from the fields of medium theory and cultural politics is also discussed here. 
In terms of methodological approaches, I first outline the interpretive frameworks 
by which I am examining online conspiracy practices. This outline is broken 
down into macro and micro levels. On the macro level, I position the study within 
parameters of qualitative media research. On the micro level, I discuss my 
research activities in terms of the traditions of hermeneutic analysis, relating my 
observational research method to the specific hermeneutic-based research 
approach of cultural interpretation. Second, I outline the analytic methods by 
which I am approaching researching content on the Internet. The concept of the 
web sphere is discussed as the analytic framework within which I am examining 
conspiracy theory online. This is followed by an outline of the factors involved in 
sampling online conspiracy material for research purposes, such as the various 
forms of websites (news sites, blogs), and the technical parameters that affect the 
ways in which information is mediated online. Finally, I discuss the ways in 
which I undertake a content analysis of the material presented on conspiracy 
websites.  
 
Chapter 4 – Conspiracy Theory and Information Freedom. 
     Chapters 4 and 5  constitute a macro-level examination of the ‗logics‘ of both 
conspiracy theory and the Internet, and  indicate points of connection between 
these structures that will be developed further in chapters 7,8, and 9.  
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     Chapter 4 delineates the logic of conspiracist attitudes towards established 
media systems and discusses how such logic informs conspiracist attitudes 
towards the Internet. This discussion is divided into two parts. The first part 
considers the centrality of ideas of control and freedom to classical conspiracy 
thought, and how conspiracy theorists conceptualise mainstream media as major 
systems of conspiratorial control in ways akin to radical/critical approaches to 
media power. With reference to conspiracy theory texts, I argue that such 
conceptions serve as the basis for conspiracist configurations of the Internet as a 
medium which is ‗free‘ of the power structures of mainstream media. The second 
part outlines the democratic political ideals that, in distorted forms, constitute key 
aspects of conspiracist attitudes towards power and freedom. These ideas include 
civil liberties, public service media, populism, and libertarianism. Such ideas form 
the basis for arguments regarding Net/conspiracy relationships developed in the 
following chapters.  
 
Chapter 5 – The Internet and Information Freedom. 
     This chapter delineates cyber-cultural discourses that have been particularly 
influential in terms of configuring the relationships between the Internet and 
Western society, and argues that these are integral points of connection between 
the Internet and the logic of conspiracy theory. This discussion has two main 
parts. The first part considers cyber-cultural discourses of the 'second media age' 
which articulate the Internet in technologically deterministic terms as a 
‗revolutionary‘ force for democratic empowerment. It also discusses the ethos of 
the ‗digital sublime‘ which underlies such cyber-utopian discourses, which serves 
to configure the Internet in mythic terms as a medium that enables users to 
transcend the limitations of mainstream social reality. I then argue that these 
discursive frameworks constitute integral points of connection with the logic of 
classical conspiracy theory because they configure the Net as a ‗radical‘ force for 
democratic empowerment in a manner resonant with the ostensibly ‗radical‘ 
principles of conspiracy theory, and because they articulate the Net as a medium 
which transcends the conspiratorial control structures of mainstream media. 
    The second part expands upon these ideas by showing how notions of the Net 
as a radical democratic medium were articulated by American cyber-theorists in 
relation to the libertarian ideals that constitute a distinct aspect of American 
democracy. I argue that these libertarian associations further strengthen 
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conspiracist conceptions of the Internet as a medium which embodies radical 
democratic ideals because they resonate strongly with the Amerocentric 
libertarian perspectives that constitutes a key aspect of conspiracist logic.  
 
Chapter 6 – Alternative Media and the Internet. 
     Chapters 6, 7, and 8 develop the macro-level ideas introduced in chapters 4 and 
5 through a micro-level focus on configurations of the Internet as an alternative 
medium, and arguments that the Net‘s role as an ‗alternative public sphere‘ 
constitutes the most significant point of connection between the Net and 
conspiracy theory.  
     Chapter 6 has two main parts. The first part outlines the theoretical precepts of 
the public sphere as the major theoretical basis for notions of alternative media, 
and discusses the technocultural capacities of the Internet as a prospective 
realisation of public sphere principles. The second part defines ‗alternative media‘ 
as a media ethos and set of media practices intended as an alternative to the poor 
realisation of public sphere principles in most contemporary mainstream Western 
news media. I then argue that the resulting configuration of the Internet as an 
alternative public sphere serves as the major point of connection between the 
Internet and the logic of conspiracy theory, particularly because it provides a 
critical framework which conspiracy theorists can use to legitimate their ideas. 
 
Chapter 7 – Alternative News and Conspiracy Theory.  
          Further developing the alternative public sphere arguments presented in 
chapter 6, Chapter 7 discusses news as a key component of the Internet‘s 
configuration as an alternative public sphere, and how notions of alternative 
online news are appropriated by conspiracy theorists as a means of legitimating 
their conspiracist ideas in relation to the alternative public sphere. This discussion 
has two main parts. The first part delineates the integral role news plays in 
conceptions of the public sphere, and the critical arguments regarding the failure 
of mainstream news to realise these public sphere principles. The configuration of 
the Internet as an alternative news site is then discussed as a means of addressing 
the public sphere inadequacies of mainstream news. The second part considers the 
ways in which alternative online news practices have been appropriated to operate 
as legitimating frameworks for classical conspiracy theory. 
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Chapter 8 – Rense.com case study 
     This chapter presents empirical evidence for the ideas discussed in chapters 6 
and 7 through a case study of the conspiracist news site, Rense.com. The focus of 
the case study is in how Rense.com appropriates concepts of alternative media and 
alternative news practice as a means of legitimating its classical conspiracy 
content within the alternative public sphere of the Internet. Background 
information on the Rense.com site is presented, followed by a discussion of the 
methodology involved in sampling and interpreting news content from the site. 
The data gathered from the news sample is presented and then analysed in relation 
to the ideas that alternative news practice serves as a legitimating framework for 
conspiracy theory. The analysis is conducted in relation to three main topics: the 
types of news source used; the formats of the news items presented; and the types 
of subject matter that form the content of the news items.  
 
Chapter 9 – Conclusion 
The ideas and arguments presented in this study are summed up and discussed in 
terms of their critical significance to an understanding of the relationships 
between the Internet and conspiracy theory. The strengths and weaknesses of my 
arguments and approaches are acknowledged, and a range of other critical topics 
related to the ideas of this study are discussed as prospective areas for further 
investigation. A concluding discussion is presented related to the central argument 
of the study – that conspiracy theorists configure the Internet as a medium that 
empowers conspiracist thought and practice. 
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CHAPTER 2 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
_________________________________________________ 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
     This literature review has two major intentions. The first is to situate this study 
within the broader field of existing scholarship on the subject of conspiracy 
theory. The second is to discuss some of the conceptual problems involved in 
these academic approaches to conspiracy theory that I suggest are not adequately 
addressed within the existing academic frameworks on the subject.  These 
problems form the context for my own critical position on conspiracy theory in 
this study, and also form the basis for my attempt to rectify some of these 
problems via the development of a typology of conspiracy theories (which will be 
discussed in chapter 3). 
     This chapter is organised into three main sections. The first is an overview of 
the major theoretical approaches to the subject of conspiracy theories within 
Western academia. As part of this overview I will highlight existing scholarly  
perspectives regarding the relationships between conspiracy theory and the 
Internet.  The second is a discussion of the problematic aspects of these 
approaches.  The third is an articulation of this thesis‘ critical position on the 
subject. 
 
 
2.2 Critical approaches - pathological 
 
     What I refer to as the ‗pathological mode‘ of academic engagement with 
conspiracy theory is predominantly rooted in the fields of political science and 
history. I would also posit that the arguments regarding conspiracy theory 
developed in relation to these fields are those most influential in relation to the 
largely pejorative perceptions of conspiracy theory and theorists that are the 
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dominant mode for mainstream consideration of conspiracy theories as political 
discourses. 
 
 
2.21 Pathological approaches – Hofstadter 
 
     My starting point for a review of academic literature that adopts a pathological 
approach to conspiracy theory is American political historian Richard 
Hofstadter‘s post-war essay ‗The Paranoid Style in American Politics‘ 
(Hofstadter 1966).  Hofstadter was a member of a post WWII American 
intelligentsia concerned with normalising pluralist and consensus conceptions of 
democracy as integral aspects of American political practice and cultural identity. 
This milieu regarded conspiracy theories as forms of ‗political paranoia‘, a form 
of psychosocial ―pathology suffered by those existing outside of the pluralistic 
consensus who promoted fears of conspiracy‖ (Fenster 1999:3). The irrationality 
and ideological extremism of such political paranoia was regarded as posing a 
threat to these democratic norms. 
     Hofstadter‘s essay can be regarded as a seminal text for subsequent 
scholarship in the subject of conspiracy theory for two main reasons. Firstly, 
because of his outline of ‗political paranoia‘ as a distinctive strain of American 
(and, by extension, international) political thought, an ―old and recurrent mode of 
expression‖ in public life that has ―frequently been linked to movements of 
suspicious discontent and whose content remains much the same even when it is 
adopted  by men of distinctly different purposes‖ (Hofstadter 1966: 6).  Such 
paranoia is identified as being more prevalent and prominent in periods of social, 
political, and economic change (ibid: 39). 
     The essay's second main area of significance is in Hofstadter's delineation of 
the ‗paranoid style‘ – the conspiracist ―way of seeing the world and of expressing 
oneself‖ (ibid: 4).  Hofstadter is concerned with delineating ―the way in which 
[conspiracist] ideas are believed and advocated rather than with the truth or falsity 
of their content‖ (ibid: 5). I will present Hofstadter‘s outline of the  characteristics 
of the ‗paranoid style‘ here in full since they have proven influential on 
subsequent conspiracy scholarship and are still relevant summations of 
conspiracy thought and practice. This does not, however, mean that I subscribe to 
Hofstadter‘s psychopathological take on conspiracy culture. 
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A – a universal, historical scope. ―The distinguishing thing about the paranoid 
style is not that its exponents see conspiracies or plots here and there in history, 
but that they regard a ‗vast‘ or ‗gigantic‘ conspiracy as the motive force in 
historical events. History is a conspiracy, set in motion by demonic forces of 
almost transcendent power, and what is felt to be needed to defeat it is not the 
usual methods of political give-and-take, but an all-out crusade‖ (ibid: 29). 
B – an apocalyptic worldview. ―The paranoid spokesman sees the fate of this 
conspiracy in apocalyptic terms – he traffics in the birth and death of whole 
worlds, whole political orders, whole systems of human values. He is always 
manning the barricades of civilization. He constantly lives at a turning point: it is 
now or never in organizing resistance to conspiracy. Time is forever just running 
out‖ (ibid: 29-30). 
C – a tone of urgency and activism. ―…the paranoid is a militant leader. He 
does not see social conflict as something to be mediated and compromised, in the 
manner of the working politician. Since what is at stake is always a conflict 
between absolute good and absolute evil, the quality needed is not a willingness 
to compromise but the will to fight things out to a finish. Nothing but complete 
victory will do. Since the enemy is thought of as being totally evil and totally 
unappeasable, he must be totally eliminated – if not from the world, at least from 
the theatre of operations to which the paranoid directs his attention‖ (ibid: 31) 
D – an emphasis on the omnipotence of the conspiratorial agents. ―[The 
enemy] is a free, active, demonic agent. He wills, indeed he manufactures, the 
mechanism of history himself, or deflects the normal course of history in an evil 
way….The paranoid‘s interpretation of history is in this sense distinctly personal: 
decisive events are not taken as part of the stream of history, but as the 
consequences of someone‘s will‖ (ibid: 32). 
E – a pedantic emphasis on ‘evidence’. ―The typical procedure of higher 
paranoid scholarship is to start with such defensible assumptions and with a 
careful accumulation of facts, or at least of what appear to be facts, and to marshal 
these facts towards an overwhelming ‗proof‘ of the particular conspiracy that is to 
be established. It is nothing if not coherent – in fact, the paranoid mentality is far 
more coherent than the real world, since it leaves no room for mistakes, failures, 
or ambiguities‖ (ibid: 36). 
 13 
F – a seemingly ‘logical’ premise that allows for excessive interpretations. 
―What distinguishes the paranoid style is not, then, the absence of verifiable facts 
(though it is occasionally true that in his extravagant passion for facts the 
paranoid occasionally manufactures them), but rather the curious leap in 
imagination that is always made at some critical point in the recital of 
events….The plausibility the paranoid style has for those who find it plausible 
lies, in good measure, in this appearance of the most careful, conscientious, and 
seemingly coherent application to detail the laborious accumulation of what can 
be taken as convincing evidence for the most fantastic conclusions, the careful 
preparation for the big leap from the undeniable to the unbelievable‖ (ibid: 37-
38). 
 
The themes and techniques of the paranoid style, such as the emphasis placed 
upon evidence for the conspiracy (what Hofstadter refers to as ‗pseudo-
scholarship‘),2 can be seen as key factors in the ongoing appeal of belief in 
conspiracy theories. 
 
 
2.22 Later pathological studies 
 
     Hofstadter‘s configuration of conspiracy theory as a psychologically and 
ideologically ‗pathological‘ form of political expression that can be ‗diagnosed‘ 
by virtue of the ‗paranoid style‘ and thence contained from damaging the 
consensus ‗bodypolitic‘ has served as a template for much subsequent academic 
discussion of conspiracy theory, particularly for American scholars.  I regard 
these pathological studies as adopting two main approaches to the subjects of 
conspiracy theory and conspiracy culture. Firstly, studies of ‗political paranoia‘ 
                                                 
2
 It is worth outlining Hofstadter‘s description of the techniques of paranoid scholarship in more 
detail as such techniques can be seen as particularly relevant in relation to online conspiracist 
practices. A conspiracy theorist begins from factually ―defensible assumptions‖, accumulating 
facts ―or at least what appear to be facts‖ towards ‗proof‘ of the conspiracy in question (Hofstadter 
1966: 36). The interpretation and presentation of such evidence as proof has three main 
characteristics: a highly ‗coherent‘ view of the world of the conspirators that ―leaves no room for 
mistakes, failures, and ambiguities‖; a ‗rationalistic‘ tendency to try and explain ―all of reality in 
one overreaching, consistent theory‖; and a use of scholarly techniques in the writing and 
presentation of ideas, such as reference to conspiracy ―experts, study groups, monographs, 
footnotes, and bibliographies‖ (ibid: 36-37).  
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that focus on the psychosocial aspects of conspiracy theory; secondly, historical 
overviews of conspiracy theories within American political and social history. 
     ‗Political paranoia‘ studies include Graumann and Moscovici‘s Changing 
Conceptions of Conspiracy (1987); Elaine Showalter‘s Hystories: Hysterical 
Epidemics and Modern Media (1997); Robins & Post‘s Political Paranoia: The 
Psychopolitics of Hatred (1997); and Daniel Pipes‘ Conspiracy: How the 
Paranoid Style Flourishes and Where It Comes From (1999), and journal articles 
such as Lieber (2003) and Swami et al. (2009).  These studies tend to offer 
directly ‗pathological‘ readings of conspiracy culture in their emphasis on 
conspiracy theories as examples of ‗diseased‘ thought, a mixture of extremist 
ideological beliefs and individual psychosis that represents a potentially serious 
threat to modern democracies. For example, Showalter discusses conspiracy 
theories in relation to ideas of ‗hysteria‘ - personal and group anxieties that have 
been transformed by the sensationalist ethos of modern media culture into cultural 
movements that have a negative impact on many aspects of contemporary life. 
Such movements include claims of ‗satanic ritual abuse‘ and alien abductions. 
     Studies in the historical school of pathological research include Curry & 
Brown‘s Conspiracy: The Fear of Subversion in American History (1972); 
Gregory Johnson‘s Architects of Fear: Conspiracy Theories and Paranoia in 
American Politics (1983); Robert Alan Goldberg‘s Enemies Within: The Culture 
of Conspiracy in Modern America (2001); and Michael Barkun‘s A Culture of 
Conspiracy: Apocalyptic Visions in Contemporary America (2003).  The 
emphasis in these works is a forensic one, seeking to ―consider conspiracy 
imaging in its historical, social, and political environment(s)‖ (Goldberg 2001: 
xii). This wider scope enables such studies to  avoid the reductionist tendencies of 
the ‗political paranoia‘ approach. For example, Barkun‘s study looks at how 
seemingly disparate historical influences, such as European anti-Semitism, 
American new-age thought, and ufology have combined in the millennial climate 
of the fin-de-siecle period to form ‗superconspiracy‘ narratives such as the ‗New 
World Order‘ conspiracy.3 
     A central concern of pathological studies from the 1990s onwards is that 
conspiracy theories have shifted from the margins to the mainstream of American 
political and cultural life. This shift has potentially 'pathological' consequences 
                                                 
3
 ‗New World Order‘ superconspiracies are typically predicated on a mixture of Illuminati 
conspiracy theories, Zionist conspiracy theories, and Masonic conspiracy theories.  
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for American politics and society and the institutional and epistemological 
foundations of the modern West, including democracy and science (Showalter 
1997: Pipes 1997: Goldberg 2001: Barkun 2003). For example, Goldberg 
concludes that ―conspiracy thinking has moved Americans beyond a healthy 
skepticism of authority. Lacking public confidence, core institutions become 
unstable and lose their ability to govern. The cancer of conspiracism has begun to 
metastasize. Without a new awareness of its character and quick intervention, 
countersubversion may soon overwhelm the body politic‖(Goldberg 2001: 260). 
     Much of the responsibility for this millennial ‗mainstreaming‘ of conspiracy 
theories is placed upon the media. Two aspects of modern media systems are 
singled out here as of particular significance. The first is the ‗familiarisation‘ of 
conspiracy theories as forms of popular entertainment in films such as JFK 
(1991), TV shows such as The X-Files (1990s) and novels/films such as The Da 
Vinci Code (2002).  The second is the development of the Internet as a major 
‗mass‘ or ‗domestic‘ medium. I will outline Barkun‘s (2003) comments here as a 
respresentative example of this tendency. Barkun argues that the relationship 
between conspiracy theorists and the mainstream media has been one of tension. 
The mainstream media serves a gatekeeping role in terms of deeming certain 
types of knowledge important or suitable for the broad purposes of ‗mass‘ 
populations. In this context the ideas propagated by most conspiracy theorists 
generally come across as too extremist or ridiculous, so that mainstream media 
generally treat them with ‗contempt‘ and consign them to the fringes of the 
mainstream culture.  The Internet here becomes attractive because of factors such 
as ―its large potential audience‖, ―the low investment required for its use‖, ―the 
absence of gatekeepers who might censor the content of messages‖, and the 
ability to develop ‗virtual conspiracy communities‘(Barkun 2003: 12-13). In other 
words, the Net provides a cultural context in which the ‗paranoid style‘ of 
conspiracy theorising can be expressed unfettered by the ideological restrictions 
of traditional media. In combination with the use of conspiracy themes in popular 
entertainment media, the result is the establishment of a mainstream cultural 
environment that is much more receptive to conspiracy theories and conspiracist 
modes of thought. 
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2.3 Critical approaches – allegorical 
 
     What I refer to as the allegorical approach to conspiracy theory scholarship is 
distinguished from the pathological approach by its consideration of conspiracy 
theory in relation to postmodern cultural theory rather than political science, 
history and psychology. The emphasis is less on the ideological dangers of 
conspiracy theories as political discourses than on the symbolic significance of 
conspiracy theories as cultural discourses. The complex beliefs and paranoid 
worldviews of conspiracy theorists are considered as allegories – metaphorical 
narratives for the relationships between society and the self within particular 
cultural and historical contexts. 
     Since Hofstadter‘s essay on the paranoid style can be regarded  as a template 
for the pathological approach to conspiracy theories, I posit Jean-Francois 
Lyotard‘s epistemological framework of ‗paralogic‘ vs ‗grand‘ narratives and 
Fredric Jameson‘s configuration of conspiracy theories as forms of ‗cognitive 
mapping‘ as the two templates for allegorical discussions of conspiracy theory. 
 
 
2.31 Allegorical approaches – Lyotard 
 
     Lyotard‘s ideas, as outlined in works such as The Postmodern Condition 
(1979),  are central to the development of postmodernism as a major post-WWII 
theoretical framework within the humanities and social sciences. I will here outline 
those aspects of Lyotard‘s postmodern philosophy that inform many of the 
allegorical approaches to conspiracy theory. 
     Lyotard argues that modernity is  pivoted upon particular 'metanarratives' – 
dominant ‗ways of seeing‘ the world that have been effectively 'naturalised' as the 
conceptual frameworks upon which Western civilization operates. Metanarratives 
such as rationality, freedom, and progress underpin Western conceptions of 
science, politics, and the self. However, such metanarratives can be regarded as 
‗totalising‘ epistemological and social frameworks. They assume that certain 
ways of understanding reality are ‗correct‘ or ‗true‘, and that people who occupy 
social roles related to the perpetuation of such understandings, such as  
academically ordained 'experts', have cultural power as arbiters as to what can be 
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considered 'truth'.  ―Simplifying to the extreme‖, Lyotard defines the postmodern 
condition ―as incredulity towards metanarratives‖ (Lyotard 1984: xxiv). This 
incredulity is based upon the philosophical recognition that our views of the 
world and reality are almost entirely shaped by the languages we use to describe 
and conceptualise them. As argued by poststructuralist philosophy, the meanings 
of language are not 'fixed' but unstable in accordance with factors such as the 
cultural background of the percipient and the nature of sign systems.  The 
'postmodern condition' is an epistemological and ontological perspective in which 
the homogeneous worldviews of totalities and essences typical of modernist 
thought are giving way to heterogeneous worldviews of difference and instability 
related to this awareness of the  play of meaning inherent in language.  The 
'world' constructed by these heterogeneous elements is not one of the totalising 
metanarratives but a multiplicity of small-scale, local, fluctuating narratives and 
ways of being (ibid: xxiv). Lyotard uses the term 'paralogy' to refer to these 
heterogeneous ‗little narratives‘ that are suppressed by totalising metanarratives.  
A 'celebration' of paralogies can serve as a practical means of opening up the 
instabilities within metanarratives and challenging their totalising nature. 
 
 
2.32 Paralogical studies 
 
     The configuration of conspiracy theories as ‗paralogies‘ has proven influential 
for many postmodern academics interested in conspiracy theory. In this 
perspective conspiracy theories are ‗little narratives‘ that derive from diverse 
individuals or groups and that explain reality in ways which directly challenge 
ideas such as 'trust' and 'rationality' which are integral to the metanarratives of 
fields such as government and science. In so doing they are typically regarded as 
'illegitimate' forms of knowledge and consigned to the margins of society and 
culture. Paralogical discussions of conspiracy theories therefore tend to discuss 
conspiracy theories as allegories for the postmodern condition itself, in particular 
as oppositional narratives that question the epistemological certainties that drive 
the metanarratives of capitalist/modernist society. Such studies include Jodi 
Dean‘s Aliens In America: Conspiracy Cultures from Outerspace to Cyberspace 
(1998) and Publicity’s Secret: How Technoculture Capitalizes on Democracy 
(2002);  Clare Birchall's Knowledge Goes Pop: From Conspiracy Theory to 
 18 
Gossip (2006); Jack Bratich‘s Conspiracy Panics: Political Rationality and 
Popular Culture (2008); many of the essays in the anthology Conspiracy Nation: 
The Politics of Paranoia in Postwar America (2002, ed. Peter Knight) (all three 
authors mentioned above being contributors to this volume); and a plethora of 
journal articles (Keeley 1999; Dean 2000, 2001; Birchall 2001; Dorsey 2002; 
Bratich 2004; Walton 2007) For example, Walton (2007) summarises Birchall‘s 
work in explicitly paralogical terms: 
 
Birchall argues that popular knowledges like conspiracy theory provide 
‗paralogic moves‘ which can help create ‗dissensus‘ (as opposed to 
‗consensus‘) which in the end will force ‗athetic‘ processes ( a term 
Derrida used to suggest a process of moving ‗beyond‘ the current theory 
or position) to occur in society. Thus, when a reader is forced to make 
deliberate decisions about the knowledge she encounters, she is involved 
in an ‗athetic‘ process that in the end can result in a positive move 
forward – a process that can be described as a kind of ‗politics‘….So, 
even if these discursive formations foment ‗latent insurrection‘ through 
‗dissensus‘, they are positive because they defamiliarize entrenched 
‗epistemic‘ power structures and move society forward toward justice 
and freedom through ‗athetic‘ processes (Walton 2007). 
 
     The Internet is discussed as a key factor in the paralogical effects of 
contemporary conspiracy theory. For instance, Dean (2002) argues that the 
democratic ideal of the media as the ‗public sphere‘ has been irrevocably co-
opted as part of the ‗totalising‘ metanarratives of late capitalism. The 
technocultural capacities of the Internet provide the basis for the development of 
paralogical forms of ‗publicity‘, such as conspiracy theories, that challenge the 
totalising myths of the public sphere. For example, the ways in which conspiracy 
theorists have traditionally gathered evidence for their claims - linking together of 
disparate pieces of information into revelations of hidden conspiratorial truths – 
have traditionally been deemed ‗illegitimate‘ as a basis for knowledge. However, 
the networked and decentered nature of the Net, which is predicated upon non-
linear links between pieces of information in the form of information structures 
such as hypertext, can be seen to provide a media environment that legitimates 
such conspiracist information practices as forms of publicity. Online conspiracism 
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thus helps to configure the Net as a paralogical ‗object‘ that is ―politically 
threatening, bringing with [it] risks of fragmentation, the legitimation of 
marginalized and extreme political positions, and the de-authorization of the 
traditional and mainstream information sources‖ (Dean 2000: 77). Birchall briefly 
notes that a major part of the cultural history of the Net is its association with 
'hacker' culture which has helped imbue the Net with an 'underground' ethos that 
suits those engaged in 'radical' or paralogical cultural activity, such as conspiracy 
theorists (Birchall 2006: 46-47). Bratich uses debates about the effects of the 
Internet on institutional journalism to articulate online conspiracism as a 
combination of cultural anxieties regarding conspiracy theories as paralogical 
challenges to consensus politics with ―a broader cultural anxiety over the 
disruptive effects of new technologies‖ such as the Internet itself (Bratich: 94). In 
the face of the democratic potential of the Net as a site of ‗citizen journalism‘ in 
forms such as blogs, mainstream journalists have attempted to preserve their elite 
position as information ‗gatekeepers‘ by developing a ‗conspiracy panic‘ in which 
online information is critiqued as being derived from inherently untrustworthy 
amateur sources such as conspiracy theorists (Bratich 2008: 79-95). 
 
 
2.33 Allegorical approaches – Jameson 
 
     The importance of Jameson‘s take on postmodernity and academic approaches 
to   conspiracy theory derive from his 1988 essay ‗Cognitive Mapping‘ and are 
developed in more detail in later works such as The Geopolitical Aesthetic 
(Jameson 1992). My discussion of these ideas is indebted to  Fran Mason‘s (2002) 
essay on cognitive mapping and conspiracy theory.  Central to this relationship 
are Jameson‘s views of late capitalism as a ‗totalising‘ system. The ongoing 
establishment of the large-scale, trans-national material and cultural forces of 
globalisation has overwhelmed the sense of ‗the local‘ that serves as the basis for 
most people‘s experience of individual and community identity: ―in the corporate 
multinational global economy of late capitalism, the multiple informational and 
sign systems that are made available cannot be synthesized by the individual 
subject or consciousness, a situation that also occurred in modernity, but which is 
exaggerated and intensified in late capital‖ (Mason 2002: 41). To use a 
topographical metaphor, the social and cultural ‗map‘ of late capitalism is so vast 
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and dense that the boundaries between local and global identities have become 
blurred. The inability for individuals to adequately ‗map‘ themselves in on a local 
scale is contributing to individual and collective senses of alienation. These 
senses,  of what Mason calls ―disconnection and fragmentation‖ (Mason 2002: 
41), in turn help neuter the potentials of individuals and communities to 
effectively challenge and critique the power of late capitalism in relation to 
identity positions such as class, race and gender. 
     Jameson here posits ‗cognitive mapping‘ as ―a means to achieve an 
understanding of the complexities of the social relations that exist‖ in the 
globalised world of late capitalism (Mason 2002: 40).  ‗Cognitive mapping‘ 
delineates  ―a means by which the individual subject can locate and structure 
perceptions of social and class relations in a world where the local no longer 
drives social, political, and cultural structures or allows the individual subject to 
make sense of his or her environment‖ (Mason 2002: 41). The ‗means‘ by which 
cognitive mapping takes place is identified with the realms of the cultural 
(beliefs) and the aesthetic (art). Jameson suggests that certain types of popular 
belief systems, such as conspiracy theories, and artistic activities, such as 
‗postmodern‘ art, represent attempts to encapsulate the totalising realities of late 
capitalism due to their capacities for rendering totality and complexity explicable 
through the use of metaphorical themes. However, Jameson also argues that both 
of these activities ultimately fail to accurately convey the nature of late capitalism 
and therefore to serve as a basis for criticism and resistance to its totalising 
nature. Conspiracy theory can be seen as ―the poor person‘s cognitive mapping in 
the postmodern age; it is a degraded figure of the total logic of late capital, a 
desperate attempt to represent the latter‘s system, whose failure is marked by its 
slippage into sheer theme and content‖ (Jameson 1988: 356). 
     In this respect conspiracy theories stop being perceived as allegorical maps of 
late capitalism but instead become literal ‗truths‘ in their own right.  As a basis 
for critiquing late capitalism, therefore, conspiracy theories are inadequate in that 
they focus on cultural fantasies rather than the ‗real world‘ of political economy. 
The highly conservative, often extremely right-wing worldviews espoused in such 
conspiracy theories further the critical inadequacy of conspiracy theory since they 
promote highly regressive and divisive social relations (e.g. racism, sexism, and 
the like) – divisions that serve to perpetuate late capitalism by preventing 
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different groups of people from uniting together in challenge against the late 
capitalist totality. 
     The cognitive mapping approach to conspiracy theory can be considered as 
something of a ‗middle ground‘ between the pathological and paralogical 
approaches. By acknowledging that conspiracy theories represent genuine 
attempts by people to make sense of  the nature of late capitalism and their 
individual and cultural relation to it, it doesn‘t take the reductionist approach, 
typical of the pathological theorists, and argue that conspiracy theories are 
inherently destructive forms of political and cultural discourse. However, by 
recognising the failure of conspiracy theories to successfully realise their critiques 
of late capitalism, and by noting the potentially deleterious political consequences 
of the extremist ideologies that underlie conspiracist beliefs, nor does it take the 
radical approach of the paralogical theorists and argue that conspiracy theories are 
potentially ‗progressive‘ forms of cultural politics.4 
 
 
2.34 Cognitive mapping studies 
 
     Theorists utilising the cognitive map approach discuss conspiracy theories as 
culturally significant but politically problematic allegories for contemporary 
political trends, particularly those of globalisation and late capitalism. Studies in 
the cognitive mapping vein include Mark Fenster‘s Conspiracy Theories: Secrecy 
and Power in American Culture (1999); Timothy Melley's Empire of Conspiracy: 
The Culture of Paranoia in Postwar America (2000); and West and Sanders‘ 
Transparency and Conspiracy: Ethnographies of Suspicion in the New World 
Order (2003). For example, Fenster notes the paralogical potential of conspiracy 
theories as symbolising a populist ―resistance to power that implicitly imagines a 
better, collective future‖ (Fenster 1999: xiii). Conspiracy theories implicitly 
reflect popular feelings of political disempowerment, their signifying practices 
(such as the constant search for evidence that will uncover the conspiratorial plot) 
serving as an erstwhile form of cognitive mapping that symbolises citizens' ―sense 
of political insignificance‖ (Fenster 1999: xiv). However, the populist sensibility 
                                                 
4
 Jameson‘s adherence to the ‗metanarrative‘ stance of  neo-Marxist criticism and his apparently 
‗unreconstituted‘ cultural politics (as in the un-PC phrase ‗poor man‘s cognitive mapping‘) have 
led to his cognitive mapping ideas being attacked by scholars in the paralogic tradition:, e.g. Spark 
(1997), Mason (2002).  
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inherent in most conspiracy culture is presented as one that articulates itself in a 
pathological sense, drawing on ―the most simplistic, disabling, and dangerous 
interpretations of political order, including fascism, totalitarianism, racism, and 
anti-Semitism‖ (Fenster 1999: xiii). This needs to be understood if what is 
valuable about conspiracy theory – its 'signifying practices' about the nature of 
power – are to be appropriated for use within what Fenster terms ―the evocative, 
emancipatory politics‖ of ―a truly progressive populism‖ (Fenster 1999: xiv). 
     Of these studies, Fenster‘s work provides the major discussion of the possible 
significance of the Internet to contemporary conspiracy theory. In a discussion of 
early 1990s American conspiracy theories such as the ‗Octopus‘ narrative5,  
Fenster argues that conspiracy theorists were early adopters of the Internet ―not 
merely to distribute information and ideas, but also as a forum for the formulation 
of political and social practice‖ (Fenster 1999: 197). Although not elaborated, the 
implication is that the Net enables conspiracy theorists to present conspiracism as 
a collective, alternative political 'movement'  rather than a mass of contradictory, 
competing discourses. 
 
 
2.35 Anthologies and general studies 
 
     There are also several anthologies and general studies of conspiracy theory 
across a range of subject areas which discuss conspiracy theory from both 
paralogical and cognitive mapping perspectives.  Anthologies include George 
Marcus‘s Paranoia Within Reason: A Casebook of Conspiracy in Postwar 
America (1999), Parish and Martin's The Age of Anxiety: Conspiracy Theory and 
the Social Sciences (2001), both of which consider conspiracy theory from a 
sociological perspective, and Peter Knight‘s cultural studies themed Conspiracy 
Nation: The Politics of Paranoia in Postwar America (2002). Knight is also the 
author of Conspiracy Culture: From Kennedy to the X-Files (2001), a cultural 
history of conspiracy theories in post WWII American culture and society. 
                                                 
5
 The ‗Octopus‘ conspiracy theory was a superconspiracy narrative that linked together most of the 
American counter-culture conspiracy theories that had developed regarding the anti-democratic 
and imperialist activities of the US intelligence agencies (such as the Iran-Contra scandal or the 
aborted Bay of Pigs invasion of Cuba) under the unifying device of a computer ‗super-program‘ 
named PROMIS that was alleged to endow the US intelligence agencies with the ability to 
implement Orwellian control over US citizen‘s private information and to manipulate the likes of 
global financial markets for their own sinister ends. See McConnachie & Tudge 2005: 128-130.  
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     The major discussion of online conspiracism in the anthologies is Nigel James‘ 
essay 'Militias, the Patriot Movement, and the Internet: the Ideology of 
Conspiracism' in Parish and Parker (2001: 63-92). In a discussion of the 
conspiracy beliefs and practices of  right-wing American nationalists,  James 
argues that the ‗computer mediated communication‘ (CMC) capacities of the Net,  
such as those of newsgroups and bulletin boards, has led to the development of 
virtual communities of nationalist groups which help codify and bolster their real-
life counterparts. Knight‘s cultural history of American conspiracism contains a 
number of important observations about the nature of the relationship between 
conspiracy studies and the Internet. Knight argues that notions of connectivity 
constitute a metaphorical bond between the Net and conspiracy theory. He 
postulates that ―the assumption that everything is connected has been one of the 
guiding principles of conspiracy theory. The hope – but also the fear – is that 
every seemingly insignificant fact or detail might turn out to be a clue to a larger 
plot, if only one could see the hidden connections‖ (Knight 2001: 204). The Net is 
a medium to which similar ideas of the interconnections between pieces of 
information are also central. In the decentered and networked information 
structures of the Net, ― every [web]page is linked to at least one other, and so, in 
theory if rarely in practice, it is possible to click endlessly from one site to any 
other at will‖ (Knight 2001: 210).  In this respect the connectivity of the Net 
makes it a medium well-suited to the creation and dissemination of conspiracy 
theory.  Knight here describes the wider socio-political concerns that have 
developed regarding these correspondences between the Net and conspiracy 
theory. The ―insatiable connectivity‖ of information on line is seen to encourage 
―paranoid cross-referencing‖ and the ―circulation of conspiracist rumors‖ on a 
scale large enough for them to ―reach a critical mass of acceptance‖ (Knight 
2001: 210). Knight also presents a general outline of how the technocultural 
capacities of the Internet can facilitate conspiracist practices: 
 
The user-friendly Web permits a widespread and virtually free netcast 
of alternative ideas that is potentially untraceable and uncensored. 
Unlike previous forms of conspiracy culture, the Web allows anyone 
to put forward to a potentially huge audience whatever views they like, 
crackpot or otherwise, with no overheads, no quality control, and no 
legal comeback. Since it is easy to cut and paste from other pages and 
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documents, conspiracy sites can quickly take on a baroque complexity, 
as each minor conspiracy theory is linked to all the others. More than 
anything, the Web encourages viewers to make links and trace the 
hidden conspiracies (Knight 2001: 211). 
 
This summary touches on several ideas of significance to considerations of the 
relationships between conspiracy theory and the Internet. One is the association 
between the Web and ideas of freedom. The Web facilitates freedom of 
expression (―uncensored‖ and ―alternative‖ ideas) and is also relatively free to use 
in an economic sense (―no overheads‖). Another is the user-friendly nature of the 
medium. The Web favours amateur content in that there is ―no quality control‖ 
determining what can be posted online, and in that it is easy for users to use the 
existing information online for their own purposes, as in cutting and pasting 
information from other pages and documents. A corollary of this is the way in 
which the connectivity of the Net potentially interpellates the user in the 
conspiracist mentality of interconnection, ―encouraging viewers to make links‖ 
between different pieces of online information in order to bring out their hidden 
conspiratorial meanings. 
 
 
2.4 Overview of critical approaches 
 
     In this section I will discuss what I regard as the useful and problematic 
aspects of the critical approaches outlined above. This will form the basis for the 
positioning of this study within existing academic approaches to the subject area 
of conspiracy theory. 
 
 
2.41 Pathological approaches – strengths and weaknesses 
 
     To recap, there are two major tendencies of the pathological approach. The 
first is the treatment of conspiracy theories as the expressions and embodiments 
of particular political and ideological beliefs, in which the content of conspiracy 
narratives tends to be interpreted literally rather than metaphorically. The second 
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is the labelling of conspiracy beliefs as something intrinsically dangerous to 
social and political order. Conspiracy theories are perceived as expressions of 
worldviews based on ideological premises that are to a large extent opposed to 
those of modern, pluralist, consensus-oriented societies. An understanding of 
conspiracy theories is therefore necessary if they are to be successfully dismissed 
in the political realm.  The pathological approach can therefore be seen as one that 
is critically and culturally conservative in that it seeks to protect existing political, 
cultural and epistemological structures from the challenges embodied in 
conspiracist beliefs. 
     The pathological portrayal of conspiracy theory as a resolutely negative and 
dangerous subject is understandable given the historical associations between 
conspiracist ideas, regimes of terror and acts of destruction. The 20
th
 century saw 
particularly traumatic examples of these in the likes of the Holocaust and Stalinist 
Russia.
6
 In this respect I regard the strengths of the pathological approach as 
residing in its intensive historical overviews of the roots of conspiracist thought 
and awareness of the socio-political implications of conspiracy theories. This 
emphasis provides a degree of historical and political insight and depth often 
lacking in allegorical studies of conspiracy theory. Both the paralogical and 
cognitive map schools tend to discuss conspiracy theories as a manifestation of 
postmodern American society, with the historical context under investigation 
limited to the post-WWII era, particularly the fin-de-siecle period of the 1980s 
and 1990s.  This can give the misleading impression that conspiracy theories are 
little more than a postmodern cultural movement flowering in the  zeitgeist of the 
millennial shift to the 21
st
 century.
7
 
     The major problem with the pathological perspective is that it reinforces a  
reductionist view of conspiracy theories as forms of political paranoia, a 
perspective which generally fails to consider the critical and symbolic 
significance of conspiracy theories in relation to the multifarious facets of social 
and cultural life that collectively constitute Western civilization. The nadir of this 
                                                 
6
 More directly affective examples of this tendency for American scholars include the 1995 
bombing of the Murrah federal building in Oklahoma City by domestic terrorists whose 'patriot' 
worldviews perceived the federal government as the pivot of a conspiratorial ‗New World Order‘ 
(McConnachie & Tudge 2005: 212–216), and the 9/11 terror attacks of 2001 which were 
predicated on the extremist worldviews of Islamic fundamentalism.  
 
7
 This impression of 'zeitgeist scholarship' is reinforced by the fact that the bulk of the studies in 
the allegorical approach  appeared either side of the year 2000 e.g.  Dean 1998; Fenster 1999; 
Marcus 1999; Dean 2000; Melley 2000; Knight 2001; Parish and Parker 2001; Knight 2002; West 
and Sanders 2003; Birchall 2005.  
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perspective is reached in the tendency for many of these critics to portray the 
relationship between conspiracy theory and mainstream American society as an 
epistemological and ideological struggle between the forces of ‗good and evil‘. 
Such arguments have the ironic effect of making pathological scholars appear as 
apocalyptic and paranoid as those of the conspiracy theorists they are warning 
against.
8
 
     The lack of discussion of the wider critical and theoretical significance of 
conspiracy theories also evokes a sense of academic stagnation. The emphasis on 
conspiracy theory as something to be debunked and dismissed can appear as 
something of a defensive gesture, in which existing paradigms of rational thought 
must be protected and preserved from contamination by the conspiratorial ‗other‘. 
This may be at the expense of the development of such paradigms in relation to 
the wider socio-cultural implications of conspiracy theories. 
 
 
2.42 Allegorical approaches – strengths and weaknesses:  
paralogy 
 
     I see the major strengths of paralogical approaches to conspiracy theory as 
residing in their emphasis on conspiracy theories as cultural practices – something 
that ordinary people do as part of daily life.
9
 Such discussion of the complexity of 
the social environments within which conspiracy theories are implicated are 
important in relation to many key critical questions about conspiracy culture, such 
as the possible reasons for the persistence of conspiracist ideas  in Western 
culture and the ostensible prominence of conspiracy theory in this millennial era. 
This emphasis on conspiracy theory as cultural practice can be seen as a 
corrective to the focus on the political implications of conspiracist discourses 
typical of pathological studies, and a complement to the treatment of conspiracy 
theories as ‗ideological metaphors‘ typical of studies in the cognitive mapping 
vein. 
                                                 
8
 For example, Goldberg‘s conclusions that conspiracist ―countersubversion may soon overwhelm 
the body politic‖(Goldberg 2001: 260);  and Barkun‘s configuration of conspiracy theory as ―a 
fighting faith‖ that ―must obliterate its adversaries‖ (Barkun 2003).  
 
9
 For example, Birchall‘s (2006) discussion of conspiracy theories as ‗popular knowledges‘; 
Dean‘s (1998) discussion of  the alien abductee subculture; Bratich‘s (2008) interest in the 
‗grassroots‘ nature of the  9/11 truth movement.  
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     However, it is the examination of conspiracy theories as cultural practices 
embodying postmodern ideas of cultural politics that I feel render the paralogical 
approach particularly problematic. By treating conspiracy theories symbolically 
as radical oppositional narratives, paralogical theorists run the risk of bestowing 
some kind of critical legitimacy upon the extremist far-right ideological 
perspectives that constitute the content of most conspiracy theory. In this respect 
the paralogical approach can be seen as the inverse of the pathological approach. 
The pathological approach focuses on conspiracy theories as dangerous 
ideologies without considering their wider socio-cultural significance; the 
paralogical approach focuses on conspiracy theories as radical forms of cultural 
politics without considering the ideological implications of the actual conspiracist 
ideas presented.
10
 
     I will here discuss Bratich (2008) as an exemplar of this disjunction between 
conspiracy theory as cultural politics form and conspiracy theory as ideological 
content.  Bratich seeks to reclaim conspiracy theory as a form of popular 
knowledge with ―radical democratic potential‖ (Bratich 2008: 207). Conspiracist 
'skepticism' regarding the ‗truth‘ of official knowledges signifies the radical status 
of conspiracy theories as ―counterhegemonic‖ discourses which articulate 
populist dissent against  the totalising forces of globalisation and mainstream 
society (ibid:126). In this respect Bratich states that 
 
one can see this counterhegemonic possibility at work in the way 
conspiracy theories foreground social, political, and economic 
inequality in their research. While not always presented in a 
traditionally leftist framework, conspiratorial research places 
inequities (and quite often explictly classed ones) as a crucial 
component of its analysis. Distinctions between the powerful (at times 
omnipotent) and the powerless, the oppressors/oppressed, the elites 
                                                 
10
 Fenster (1999) also recognises this problem  in discussing the importance of popular culture to 
the ―project of cultural studies and its amorphous, interdisciplinary, politically progressive 
project‖ (Fenster 1999: 222). As  he states, ―the populism of popular culture – embodied both in 
its more transgressive cultural texts and in the most active practices of reception of its audiences – 
is almost necessarily disruptive of dominant power structures, opposed to the ―dominant‖ of 
―high‖ or ―bourgeois‖ art, and , when pleasurable, an ―empowering‖ experience. What happens, 
however, when this disruption, opposition, and empowerment are employed in the service of a 
genocidal racism, when ―the people‖ is defined as an exclusionary and violent group?‖ (Fenster 
1999: 222).  
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and the people are presented as both the object of study and the very 
motivation for doing conspiratology in the first place (ibid). 
 
     Bratich discusses the New World Order conspiracies that are an integral part 
of the American far-right militia/patriot movements as examples of such 
‗counterhegemonic‘ cultural politics in action. He acknowledges that these 
movements have been marginalised within the political arena because of their 
extremist worldviews: ―It is true that dominant, conservative forces were at work 
within the militia movement and thus articulated NWO [narratives] in racist and 
anti-Semitic ways (e.g., when narrative elements like Zionist Occupational 
Government, race mixing, anti-immigration, and Christian Identity were central)‖ 
(ibid: 125). However, he then goes on to argue that ―the fixation on the right-wing 
elements of militias and NWO theories ignores the more pervasive anti-elitist, 
populist forces that comprised them and brackets the politics of articulation for a 
politics of fixed identities‖ (ibid: 125-126). In other words, Bratich acknowledges 
that  New World Order conspiracy theories are closely associated with extremist 
ideologies,  but argues that such content is secondary to the counter-hegemonic 
potential inherent in  the suspicion of institutionalised or elite authority that is 
integral to the New World Order worldview. This paralogical approach places 
Bratich in an ethically problematic and critically paradoxical position, in which 
the postmodern ideal of a non-totalising material and cultural politics is 
apparently realised through the critical legitimation of conspiracy worldviews 
rooted in the highly totalising ideoscape of the American far-right. 
     This critical position is further reflected in Bratich‘s use of conspiracy theories 
to critique mainstream liberal political perspectives. The liberal press and 
intelligensia are presented as cultural elites who function as ‗gatekeepers‘ of  
critical debate, articulating criticisms of power within a narrow set of liberal 
socio-political concerns. In this respect conspiracy theories such as those of the 
9/11 truth movement, that potentially offer genuinely radical critiques of power, 
are marginalised within the Left because of their populist provenance and ethos 
(ibid: 140-142). The critical implication is that the Left has become part of the 
establishment, leaving the likes of conspiracy theories such as those surrounding 
the events of 9/11as one of the few remaining cultural sites of popular radical or 
transgressive political activity. However, nowhere does Bratich provide a detailed 
overview of the actual conspiracy claims asserted by the 9/11 truth movement. 
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9/11 conspiracy theories almost all centre around the belief that forces within the 
US government secretly staged the attacks on the World Trade Centre and the 
Pentagon in order to further the establishment of a conspiratorial New World 
Order. In the truther milieu the Islamic hijackers were either operatives or dupes 
for US intelligence agencies; the collapse of the World Trade Centre buildings 
was not due to the damage caused by the plane impacts but to demolition charges 
secretly planted by the government within the buildings; the Pentagon was not hit 
by a plane but by a US military missile (McConnachie & Tudge 2005: 360-370). 
Of course these claims strain credulity to the utmost. The logistics involved in 
order for such scenarios to be carried out border in the realms of the materially 
impossible: needless to say no scientifically plausible evidence has appeared to 
validate them outside of the exegesis of conspiracy theorists, almost all of which 
is based upon interpretations of documentary footage of the buildings‘ collapse 
rather than scientific analysis.
11
  In these respects it can be postulated that a more 
obvious reason for the marginalisation of 9/11 conspiracy theories by the 
American left is not because of the cultural politics of gatekeeping but because 
the 9/11 conspiracy claims are so fantastical as to cast the credibility of any 
groups who espouse them into serious disrepute.
12
  The ‗radicalism‘ Bratich 
attributes to 9/11 conspiracy theories also overlooks the fact that plenty of other 
individuals and groups have used the 9/11 attacks as means to ‗radically‘ critique 
the totalizing narratives of American hegemony and globalization without 
recourse to the ideological extremism of conspiracist perspectives (e.g. Chomsky 
2001). The paralogical emphasis on the cultural politics of conspiracy theory can 
again be seen as highly problematic in that it downplays or excuses the extremist 
ideological beliefs inherent to most conspiracist worldviews. Conspiracy theories 
                                                 
11
 Conspiracist imaginings of 9/11 truth quickly took on baroque and grotesque dimensions, such 
as claims that the planes were actually holographic projections designed to disguise the 'controlled 
demolitions' of the twin towers, or that the attacks were a Zionist plot undertaken by Mossad 
(McConnachie & Tudge 2005: 360-370). 
 
12
 Bratich also tries to argue away the far-right slant of much 9/11 conspiracy theory in 
paralogical terms: ―At other times, right-wing sources have been cited by 9/11 skeptics. Most 
contentious has been the use of anti-Semitic and/or anti-Zionist narratives. Far from being 
seduced by right-wing narratives (as if belief in a 9/11 inside job is a ―gateway theory‖ to anti-
Semitism) the quarrelsome character of the 9/11 skeptics milieu forces the source's perspective to 
be foregrounded. However, the sources aren't considered poisoned just because their articulations 
presume a different, even repellant, context. A disagreeable source does not prevent the facts 
from being usable (undergoing similar filtering processes as agreeable ones). Articulation here is 
a practice involving parsing out bits, thus it refrains from a wholesale dismissal of an account 
because of its teller‖ (Bratich 2008: 145).  
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are therefore – ironically – ‗legitimated‘ as vehicles of radical progressive 
thought.
13
 
 
 
2.43 Allegorical approaches – strengths and weaknesses: cognitive 
mapping 
 
     As already indicated in section 2.33 above, the cognitive mapping approach 
can be seen as a middle ground between the critical polarities presented by the 
pathological and paralogical perspectives, in that it combines an awareness of the 
political/ideological content of conspiracy theory, typical of pathological 
perspectives, with an emphasis on the cultural/symbolic significance of 
conspiracy theory, typical of paralogical perspectives.  I regard this synthesis as 
constituting the main critical strengths of the cognitive mapping approach. The 
cognitive mapping perspective recognises that conspiracy theories are symbolic 
manifestations by disempowered groups within society of the ‗totalising‘ 
metanarratives of dominant power structures such as those of late capitalism. In 
this sense conspiracy theories can be construed as possessing a paralogical 
function in that their articulation of dominant power structures as agents of the 
conspiracy enables individuals and groups to identify themselves with 
oppositional or alternative positions. However, it also acknowledges the 
pathological nature of conspiracy theorising in that these oppositional or 
alternative positions are usually articulated via extremist ideologies such as anti-
Semitism. Conspiracy theories therefore fail as discourses or worldviews which 
embody genuinely progressive alternatives to totalising forces such as late 
capitalism. 
     However, I regard the major critical weakness of the cognitive mapping 
approach as residing in a reductionist tendency to perceive conspiracy theories 
solely as metaphors for existing socio-political conditions. Conspiracy theories 
are treated as epiphenomenal manifestations of social and political contexts rather 
than socio-cultural phenomena in their own right. This can lead to other 
perspectives on the cultural and epistemological significance of conspiracy 
                                                 
13
 My views here should not be taken as evidence of a critical animus towards cultural studies per 
se – merely as criticism of this particular application of cultural studies ideas in relation to  
conspiracy theory.  
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culture (something evident in the cultural studies background of the paralogical 
approach) being ignored or overlooked.  For example, the conspiracist emphasis 
on the apocalyptic goals of the conspirators bears the direct influence of 
fundamentalist religious thought; while the thematic tension in contemporary 
conspiracy culture being a conspiratorially corrupt modernity and an idealised 
pre-modern past suggests strong ties between conspiracy thought and 
romanticism.
14
 In this respect the cognitive mapping approach may need to be 
ameliorated by a deeper recognition of the sociological and cultural aspects of 
conspiracy theory that are more evident in the paralogical approach with its 
emphasis on popular cultural contexts. The configuration of conspiracy theories 
as symbols of contemporary political and economic power structures – as in 
Jameson‘s treatment of them as allegories for the alienating effects of late 
capitalism –can also exhibit a lack of  awareness of the historical background of 
conspiracy theory. As is shown by the historical studies related to the pathological 
approach, contemporary conspiracy theories are not cultural by-products of late 
modernity and postmodernity but are usually better understood as current 
manifestations of ‗paranoid‘ mindsets, extremist ideologies and fringe beliefs 
whose cultural roots often go back centuries.
15
 The tendency to overlook the 
historical contexts of contemporary conspiracy culture may therefore result in 
cognitive mapping approaches giving a narrow or distorted understanding of the 
political and cultural dimensions of conspiracy theory. 
 
 
2.5  Critical position of this study 
 
My theoretical take on conspiracy theories in this study is a syncretic one utilising 
elements from all three of the major theoretical approaches discussed. While I 
disagree with the pathological dismissal or contempt for conspiracy theory per se, 
                                                 
14
 This tension is a notable undercurrent of post-war American conspiracism, in which the early 
American era of the Constitution and the founding of the American republic is portrayed as the 
American ideal of freedom from which America has been led astray by conspiratorial  forces.  See 
the overview of nationalist conspiracy theories in chapter 2, section 2.51. The likes of Hofstadter 
(1966), Curry and Brown (1972), and Goldberg (2001) also provide in-depth historical overviews 
of the development of strand of conspiracist discourse in American political life. 
 
15
 Notable examples here include anti-Semitic conspiracy theories, which stretch back to the early 
Christian era (Perry & Schweitzer 2002) and anti-Masonic conspiracy theories, which begin to 
flourish in Western culture in the late Middle Ages  and Enlightenment eras (Goldberg 2001: 
McConnachie & Tudge 2005).  
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it is clearly evident from my background research into the conspiracy theories 
prevalent on the Internet that most are the expressions of extremist and far-right 
ideological perspectives rooted in American political and social contexts. I, 
therefore, share the pathological schools‘ concern with the highly negative socio-
political implications of the content of such conspiracy theories. It is this 
awareness of the regressive and potentially destructive worldview implicit in most 
conspiracy theories that leads me to find the paralogical configuration of 
conspiracy theories, as ‗radical‘ forms of cultural politics, an ethically dubious 
approach to adopt in relation to the subject. However, my observations of online 
conspiracy culture shall illustrate that many conspiracy theorists perceive and 
present themselves in paralogical terms as thinkers and activists who are 
concerned with directly challenging the dominant epistemological and political 
structures of modern Western society. In this respect paralogical ideas - such as 
conspiracy theories constituting a radical ‗alternative‘ to mainstream culture – 
have proven a vital influence on the present work regarding  the relationships 
between conspiracy theory and the Internet. 
     It is also readily apparent from my background research that conspiracy 
theories also function in the cognitive mapping sense as allegories for the 
contemporary workings of power. Events in the political and economic realms, 
such as the 9/11 attacks or the 2007 - 2008 American finance sector crisis, form 
the backbone for the bulk of the conspiracy theories currently circulating on the 
Internet. In such respects the content of many conspiracy theories can readily be 
seen as attempts, by individuals and groups, to conceptualise and make sense of 
the complex workings of power (such as globalization and American hyperpower) 
through ideological frameworks that reconstitute such complexities in simplified 
forms. This perspective can be seen to overlap with the pathological and 
paralogical positions in that, while the ideological frameworks involved are 
usually based in extremist and far-right beliefs – thereby rendering such 
conspiracist ‗maps‘ of power socially and politically ineffectual – they can still 
have cultural potency as the basis for such individuals and groups to ‗empower‘ 
themselves against the anxieties and alienation inherent in such power structures. 
This does not, however, mean that I am approaching  conspiracy theories purely as 
socio-political allegories. For example, although the 9/11 terror attacks of 2001 
spawned a vast range of conspiracy theories, it is evident that most of these 
theories are not based on a sui generis view of 9/11 as conspiracy event but are 
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extensions of already existing conspiracy perspectives with complex historical, 
cultural, and ideological pedigrees. The main basis of the 9/11 conspiracy theories 
– that it was a ‗false flag‘ attack undertaken by the US government itself – can be 
seen as a contemporary manifestation of a perennial strain of American 
conspiracism that perceives  the federal government as an institution which is 
conspiratorially working against the constitutional liberties of the American 
people.
16
 In light of the above views, and my positioning of the cognitive mapping 
perspective as a middle ground between the pathological and paralogical 
perspectives, I set up the thesis‘ approach to conspiracy theory as one of ‗modified 
cognitive mapping‘, with a possible reference point in the work of  Fenster (1999) 
which I think successfully combined pathological, paralogical, and cognitive 
mapping perspectives. 
     This syncretic approach is also useful in developing further theoretical 
considerations of the relationships between conspiracy theory and the Internet. All 
three theoretical perspectives consider the unregulated and decentered nature of 
the Internet to be the key point of connection with the beliefs and practices of 
conspiracy theory. For pathological theorists such as Pipes (1997) and Barkun 
(2003), these aspects of the Net make conspiracy theories more potentially 
dangerous as conspiracy theorists are able to use the Net to avoid the established 
epistemological structures that traditionally work to determine the validity of 
information within society (such as science, academia and much institutional 
journalism) and present their conspiracist ideas to large audiences as prospectively 
truthful pieces of information. For example, the vast amounts of information 
available on the Net can be seen to provide an invaluable resource for conspiracist 
practices of ‗pseudo-scholarship‘. In relation to the concerns of this study, the 
pathological view provides insights into how conspiracy theorists can use the 
Internet to contextualise their ideas within the wider culture as valid or legitimate 
forms of information. 
     For paralogical theorists such as Birchall (2006) and Bratich (2008), 
conceptions of the Net as an unregulated and decentered medium are central to the 
articulation of conspiracy theories as ‗oppositional narratives‘ in that they 
constitute the Net as a medium with radical ‗democratic‘ potential that is well-
                                                 
16
 Previous manifestations of this strain include the 19th century American nativist and populist 
movements (Hofstadter 1966), the far-right John Birch Society of the 1950s and 1960s (Goldberg 
2001), and (in a leftist form) the 1960s counterculture (Knight 2001).  
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matched with the ‗radical populist‘ discourses of conspiracy theory. In this respect 
this paralogical perspective is useful to this study in that it considers the ways in 
which conspiracy theorists use the technocultural capacities of the Internet to 
present themselves as purveyors of socially and politically ‗radical‘ information, as 
in their identification with socio-political configurations of the Net as an 
‗alternative‘ medium. 
 
 
2.51 A typology of conspiracy theories 
 
     Another problematic aspect of existing theoretical approaches to conspiracy 
theory is the tendency to delineate the latter as a singular theoretical ‗object‘. 
Almost all of the existing theoretical studies to date discuss conspiracy theories as 
if they all subscribe to the same sets of ideological beliefs and derive from the 
same social, cultural, and political contexts. This theoretical impression will be 
soon dispelled by observation of online conspiracy theories, which indicate wide 
differences across conspiracy theories in terms of factors such as ideological 
beliefs, cultural context, tone, etc.  In other words, the dominant theoretical 
approach is to focus on the formal properties of conspiracy theory – the thematic 
and structural characteristics that distinguish  conspiracy theory as a particular 
kind of cultural or political discourse (for example, the central conspiracist idea 
that there is a sinister plot being undertaken by some special ‗group‘ to enhance 
their socio-political power). This focus on conspiracy theory as a ‗form‘ of 
expression overlooks the diversity of conspiracist content, which indicates that 
ideas of conspiracy have resonance with, or are derived from, a wide range of 
socio-political perspectives. I will address this conceptual difficulty by briefly 
outlining ideas for a ‗typology‘ of conspiracy theories that attempts to take into 
account the major  contextual factors shaping conspiracy content in order to 
provide a more robust basis for my approach to the subject.  
     I hypothesize two major ‗types‘ of conspiracy theory. The first is ‗realpolitik‘ 
conspiracy theory, which views conspiracy in ‗hard‘ political terms as part of the 
workings of existing political and economic structures without recourse to 
extremist or fantastical explanations. In this regard scholars such as Goshorn 
(2002) and Bale (2007) have criticised the dominant academic approaches to 
conspiracy theory discussed above for failing to adequately acknowledge the 
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reality of conspiratorial activities within contemporary structures of power. To use 
some recent American examples, the CIA‘s MK-ULTRA intelligence program in 
the 1960s, the Iran-Contra affair in the 1980s, and the 9/11 attacks (i.e. the official 
explanation) in 2001 could all be considered examples of ‗realpolitik‘ 
conspiratorial activities in that they were enacted in relation to institutional and 
geopolitical trends such as the Cold War, US hegemony in Latin America, and the 
politicisation of fundamentalist Islamic culture (McConnachie & Tudge 2005). 
17
 
     The second type are ‗classical‘ conspiracy theories, which conceptualise the 
conspiracy in terms of identity politics rooted in extremist far-right ideologies 
and/or occult beliefs. My research acknowledges that conspiracy theories are also 
expressed on the political left. However, I would argue that the vast bulk of 
conspiracy theories are predicated on far-right ideological beliefs, and that left-
wing conspiracy theories are usually linked with realpolitik contexts. I therefore 
consider the critical assumption that conspiracy theories are expressions of 
extremist far-right thought to be generally accurate.
18
 I use the appellation 
‗classical‘ to connote the fact that such theories are those most commonly thought 
of or visible in terms of popular conceptions of conspiracies, and that such 
theories usually have a long ideological pedigree within Western culture (e.g. 
anti-Masonic and anti-Semitic conspiracy theories). I delineate three main ‗sub-
categories‘ within the classical type. The first sub-category, and the one with the 
longest historical pedigree within Western culture, are fundamentalist conspiracy 
theories in which the conspiracy worldview is rooted in fundamentalist religious 
ideology (for theoretical discussions of fundamentalism see Antoun 2001; 
Ruthven 2004; Frey 2007). In terms of Western conspiracism, this fundamentalist 
perspective is invariably a Protestant one and is usually expressed in terms of 
                                                 
17
 The American academic Noam Chomsky and Australian journalist John Pilger could be 
considered examples of ‗realpolitikal‘ conspiracy theorists in their discussions of the hidden 
geopolitical machinations of American imperialism and Western capitalism. For example, 
Chomsky 1992: Pilger 2002.  
 
18
 Certain conspiracy theories, such as those claiming that 9/11 was a ‗inside job‘ by the US 
government, are often articulated on both the left and the right because the conspiracist 
connotations appeal to both left and right critiques of government. For example, the events of  9/11 
are directly bound up with multiple areas of leftist/radical critique, such as the invasions of Iraq 
and Afghanistan, the ‗war on terror‘, and the neo-Conservative/hard right administration of 
President George W. Bush  (2000 – 2008). ‗Inside job‘ conspiracy theories have therefore been 
expressed by some in the radical American left. These leftist conspiracy theories of 9/11 tend to 
explain the ‗inside job‘ premise in realpolitikal terms as residing with neo-conservative factions 
within the US government, rather than identifying the conspirators as Illuminati, ‗Zionist‘ Jews, 
Communists, or  other ideological bogeymen typical of the American right. 
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American evangelism.
19
 The conspiracy is perceived to be a plot to undermine 
‗true‘ Protestant Christianity and the social and cultural structures that are 
associated with it (such as patriarchy, or American hyperpower as an expression 
of divinely ordained ‗manifest destiny‘). The conspirators are configured in 
relation to identity positions which represent challenges and alternatives to the 
fundamentalist worldview, such as Jews, Masons, Catholics, Jesuits, secular 
humanists, gays, and feminists. 
     The second sub-category are nationalist conspiracy theories predicated upon 
essentialist ideologies of national and racial identity (for theoretical discussions of 
nationalism see Calhoun 1997; Grosby 2005). Contemporary expressions of this 
perspective are invariably Amerocentric in nature. These conspiracies can be 
summarised in the catchphrase ‗the plot against America‘. In this conspiracist 
worldview, America is conceived as the mythic embodiment of the grand ideals of 
Western civilization, such as democracy, individual liberty, free market capitalism, 
and Protestant Christianity. These essential aspects of American identity are seen 
to be under threat by conspiratorial forces which seek to take over America and 
implement a society that is the mythic opposite of American ‗freedoms‘, such as a 
totalitarian ‗one-world government‘. Such nationalist conspiracy theories tend to 
conceptualise the identity of the conspirators in three major forms. The first is with 
racial and cultural identity positions that are different to the ‗white Anglo-Saxon 
Protestant‘ identity position that is held up as the basis of ‗true Americanness‘, 
such as Jews and Hispanics. The second is with ideologies that present alternatives 
to American socio-political ideals, such as communism and socialism. The third 
form is that of political and economic organisations that present alternatives to 
American hyperpower through principles such as internationalism, such as the UN 
and the Trilateral Commission (McConnachie & Tudge 2005). 
     The third sub-category are New Age conspiracy theories. These are predicated 
upon the beliefs and worldviews of the many occult and alternative spiritual 
traditions that constitute what has have collectively been termed New Age thought 
and religion (for theoretical discussions of New Age beliefs see Heelas 1996; 
Kemp 2004; Kemp & Lewis 2007). These conspiracy ideas are more modern than 
fundamentalist and nationalist conspiracy theories, having developed alongside the 
                                                 
19
 While this study is focussing on the Western cultural contexts of conspiracy theory,  it is 
important to note in this regard that conspiracy theories are also a hallmark of fundamentalist 
Islam and Hinduism. See Pipes‘ (1997) study of Islamic conspiracism, and Antoun‘s (2001) global 
overview of fundamentalist movements.  
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rise of New Age thought in Western culture after World War II, and generally 
constitute the source of the more fantastical and bizarre conspiracy ideas. New 
Age conspiracy theories generally hypothesise that the human race is being 
prevented from developing into a more spiritually and socially advanced future by 
conspiratorial forces associated with degraded aspects of human nature such as 
materialism and scientism. This future-looking worldview is different from that of 
fundamentalist and nationalist conspiracy theories, which configure the actions of 
the conspirators as designed to prevent society returning to the values and lifestyle 
of an idealised religious and nationalist past. Identity positions typical of New Age 
conspiracy theories frequently identify the conspirators with ‗un-human‘ forces 
such as aliens or ‗inter-dimensional intelligences‘. 
     While I have outlined these sub-categories as distinct areas of conspiracy 
thought, most contemporary conspiracy theories use ideas from all three categories 
in a variety of ways. A particularly common trend in millennial conspiracy theory 
is the ‗superconspiracy‘ narrative that combines fundamentalist, nationalist, and 
New Age conspiracy beliefs together (Barkun 2003: see Appendix One for further 
explication of this concept). The Illuminati New World Order is a contemporary 
conspiracy framework that functions in this superconspiracy fashion. The close 
socio-cultural ties between religious and national identity mean that fundamentalist 
and nationalist conspiracy themes are often closely intertwined with each other 
(e.g. anti-Semitic conspiracy beliefs that Zionists are plotting to both  undermine 
true Protestant values and politically ‗take over‘ America simultaneously). 
Conversely, there can be tension between fundamentalist and New Age conspiracy 
beliefs due to the wildly different spiritual outlook of both. Fundamentalist 
Christians see New Age faiths as ‗false religions‘ that are part of the evil 
conspiracy to lead people away from their ‗true faith‘; New Agers often portray 
fundamentalist and institutional Christianity as one of the conspiratorial control 
systems that has perpetually kept people  and society locked into a ‗negative 
spiritual state‘. From my research I will argue that nationalist conspiracy 
perspectives tend to be the most dominant in terms of contemporary conspiracy 
theory, with the religious and spiritual ideas of fundamentalist and  New Age 
conspiracy perspectives often being used to reinforce nationalist identity in these 
contexts.  For example, most expressions of the Illuminati superconspiracy tend to 
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have as their central focus the Illuminati‘s attempts to ‗take over America‘.20 
Fundamentalist and New Age ideas serve as the basis for subsidiary explications 
of this central nationalist focus, such as the Illuminati attempt to destroy American 
Protestantism as a means of undermining ‗true‘ American identity and freedom, or 
the Illuminati using evil occult forces or alien technology to establish totalitarian 
control over the USA.
21
 
     I am focussing on classical conspiracy theories in this study for three main 
reasons. The first reason is that the extreme and fantastical nature of such 
conspiracy theories has made them the main focus of academic works on 
conspiracy theory. For example, nationalist and fundamentalist conspiracy theories 
are a major focal point for scholars concerned about the politically ‗pathological‘ 
effects of conspiracy theory or for those interested in conspiracy theories as 
metaphors for the ideological upheavals of the modern West (see sections 2.2 – 
2.22). The second reason is that these conspiracy theories are often highly visible 
in Western culture since the controversial and extremist nature of their beliefs 
renders them culturally ‗spectacular‘ discourses. The third reason is that the 
extremist nature of classical conspiracy beliefs relegates such theories to the 
fringes of mainstream culture. Classical conspiracy theorists are therefore more 
likely to conceptualise and use the technocultural capacities of the Internet  as a 
means of overcoming such marginalisation and legitimating their conspiracist 
ideas in relation to mainstream culture. 
 
                                                 
20
 A good example of such arguments is the conspiracist beliefs of the American-Canadian 
conspiracy theorist Henry Makow: http://www.savethemales.ca/ 
 
21
 An extreme but clear illustration of such beliefs is the website Educate Yourself: http://educate-
yourself.org/ 
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CHAPTER 3 
THEORY AND METHODOLOGY 
__________________________________________________________________ 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
     This chapter will outline the theoretical and methodological aspects of this 
study. It is divided into three sections. The first section provides a macro-focus 
outline of the theoretical contexts related to media studies that informed my 
approaches to investigating the relationships between conspiracy theory (as 
introduced in chapter 2) and the Internet. The second section outlines the 
methodological frameworks within which I conducted my research into 
conspiracy theory online. The third section describes the practical undertaking of 
my research and analysis, such as the sampling of online conspiracy content.  
 
 
Section 1 –Theoretical contexts  
 
Academic research in the field of media has traditionally been undertaken in 
relation to two major disciplines –  media studies and communication studies. 
While there are notable similarities and cross-fertilisation of ideas between these 
disciplines, there are also significant differences in intent and approach that serve 
to distinguish each. In the interests of clarity, I will begin this section with a brief 
outline to delineate this study as one positioned within media rather than 
communication studies.   In exploring the relationships between the ideological 
and epistemological aspects of conspiracy theory and the technocultural properties 
of the Internet,   I am adopting an approach typical of media studies research: a 
discussion of the social and cultural meanings of media content and media 
technologies, as expressed in relation to theoretical perspectives such as ideology 
and subjectivity (Littlejohn 2002: Hesmondhalgh & Toynbee 2008).  This 
emphasis on the interpretive and critical frameworks distinguishes media studies 
from communication studies, in which the media are more typically analysed in 
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relation to the largely positivist traditions of social science research (Reinard 
1998).                           
     The following delineation of the three major perspectives in media studies that 
constitute the theoretical context for this study is generalised  as  my intention 
here is functional rather than critical. By this I mean to broadly position my ideas 
in relation to existing media studies perspectives for methodological purposes, 
and to introduce some key concepts from these perspectives that will be engaged 
with more specifically in the research sections. 
 
 
3.21  Public communication  
 
   The major theoretical perspective from media studies that has shaped my 
examination of conspiracy theory on the Internet is that of public communication. 
As outlined by McQuail (1992), public communication deals with democratic 
notions of the public in relation to the operation of media systems. The public is 
configured here as the collective body of individual citizens within a democratic 
society. The constitutents of this body ―share and pursue objectives and interests, 
especially in respect of forming opinion and advocating policy‖ (McQuail 1992: 
2). In relation to the democratic ethos, the term ‗public‘ connotes ―what is open 
rather than closed, what is freely available rather than private in terms of access 
and ownership, what is collective and held in common rather than what is 
individual and personal‖ (ibid). ‗Public communication‘ thereby ―refers to the 
intricate web of informational, expressive and solidaristic transactions which take 
place in the ‗public sphere‘ or public space of any society‖ (ibid). McQuail 
delineates three major components to public communication. The first is the 
ability of the public to access ―the channels and networks of mass 
communication‖ (ibid). The second is ―the time and space reserved in the media 
for attention to matters of general public concern‖ (ibid). The third is the 
presentation ―of subject matter of general interest, about which it is relevant and 
legitimate to communicate openly and freely‖ (ibid). As McQuail‘s outline 
suggests, public communication as a theoretical perspective entails a focus on 
ideas such as the media as a public sphere which operates in the public interest 
and on those media practices and media content relevant to the effective working 
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of democracy, such as news and journalism (these ideas are central to chapters 6-
8).  
     The public communication focus on the political functions and socio-political 
effects of media systems appeared to me to be particularly pertinent to 
understanding how conspiracy theorists conceptualised and used the Internet. 
Integral to the very idea of conspiracy is the political relationship between 
publicity and secrecy. The democratic ideal is that the public should be kept 
informed regarding the workings of power – that political activity is made public 
or ‗publicised‘ (Dean 2002). Conspiracy theorists might then argue that 
conspiratorial forces in positions of power violate this ideal by keeping 
information ‗hidden‘ from the public or by presenting information in a distorted 
manner so as to further their conspiratorial machinations. A key theme of the 
conspiracist worldview is, therefore, that the traditional media systems of public 
communication are failing in their responsibilities to effectively inform the public 
regarding the practices of power. The Net is a new medium that represents an 
improved and alternative form of public communication, particularly through its 
technocultural capacities to present more supposedly ‗truthful‘ information on 
grounds such as those presented by conspiracy theorists (this theme will be 
discussed in more detail in chapter 4). 
 
 
3.22  Medium theory  
 
     A second theoretical perspective from media studies that has influenced this 
study is that of medium theory. Medium theory is concerned with ―the 
communicative features and transformative potential of media technologies 
themselves‖ (Moores 2005: 42). The central premise here is that media 
technologies, by their very existence, operate as transformative agents upon social 
and cultural structures and behaviours.  As Ronald Deibert notes, ―at the heart of 
medium theory is the argument that changes in modes of communication – such 
as the shift from primitive orality to writing of the shift from print to electronic 
communications – have an important effect on the trajectory of social evolution‖ 
(Deibert 1997, in Macnamara 2010: 66).  
    Medium theory ideas can be seen to be manifest in a variety of generic 
assumptions that underpin the field of media studies. As outlined by McQuail 
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(2002), the first of these is that ―newly invented communication technologies 
make possible more efficient production and distribution‖ of media content. The 
second is that ―the application of the technologies [including the forms of 
organization involved] inevitably leads to new uses and forms of communication, 
as well as to more communication‖. In this respect new media technologies can be 
regarded as having cultural and psychological effects in that they produce ―new 
kinds of sense experience and media use behaviours‖, as well as socio-political 
effects in that the coalescing of new uses and forms of communication ―changes 
the relations between (media) ‗senders‘ and ‗receivers‘‖, such as enabling 
‗receivers‘ to have more influence over the information content provided by those 
in the ‗sending‘ position. New media technologies can therefore be seen as 
important in that they facilitate changes in ―the power relations between different 
‗communicators‘ and between them and other agents of power in the society‖ 
(McQuail 2002: 16-17). 
     In more applied forms, medium theory has proven to be a critically contentious 
perspective within media studies due to what many scholars perceive to be its 
implicit tendencies towards technologically deterministic understandings of the 
media, in which changes in media technologies are configured as arbiters of 
radical ‗paradigm shifts‘ shaping the development of human consciousness and 
society.  As Jim Macnamara states, ―medium theory as often advanced attributes 
changes in society to media alone, reducing multiple inter-related influences to a 
single alleged cause [changes in communication technologies] and assuming that 
technological innovation drives change rather than the opposite possibility – that 
change in society, economics, politics or culture drives technological innovation‖ 
(Macnamara 2010: 66). The popular expostulation of such ideas in the 1960s and 
1970s by Canadian media scholar Marshall McLuhan has led (somewhat unfairly) 
to the development of the appellation 'McLuhanism' as a signifier for 
technolgically deterministic medium theory perspectives (McLuhan & Zingrone 
1997: McLuhan 2001). 
22
  
     These medium theory perspectives underlie many of the existing academic 
approaches to conspiracy theory (as discussed in chapter 2) and also complement 
my main theoretical focus on the Net as a site of public communication. For 
instance, generic medium theory ideas that the Net enables ―more efficient 
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 McLuhan‘s ideas were themselves derived from the formative influence of his mentor and 
fellow Canadian scholar Harold Innis, as expressed in works such as Empire and Communications 
(1950).  
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production and distribution‖ of conspiracy content, and that the sensory 
experience of the Net somehow makes conspiracy content more ‗believable‘ or 
‗acceptable‘  are central to pathological treatments of conspiracy theory (e.g. 
Pipes 1997: Barkun 2003). Similarly, arguments that the Net can alter the ―power 
relations‖ between conspiracy theorists ―and other agents of power in the society‖ 
are integral to paralogical conceptualisations of conspiracy theory (e.g. Dean 
2002: Birchall 2006: Bratich 2008).  
     'McLuhanesque' perspectives on digital media as constituting a radical 
paradigm shift in human society are important to consider as a major 
philosophical underpinning to early cyber-utopian conceptions of the internet.  As 
discussed in chapter 5, not only can such conceptions be argued to have 
established particularly influential discursive frameworks for popular 
understandings of the relationships between the internet and society, but also as 
shaping the ways in which conspiracy theorists perceive and utilise the internet as  
an 'alternative public sphere'. A major theme of the study is that conspiracy 
theorists conceptualise the  Net as a potentially radical alternative to the existing 
media of public communication because of its technocultural capacities for  
facilitating ―more efficient production and distribution‖ of  information in the 
public interest (this being the type of information that conspiracy theorists 
consider themselves to be presenting).  
     While technologically deterministic approaches to the net constitute a major 
subtext to this study in that I believe they are highly important to understanding 
how conspiracy theorists engage with the internet, it is not my intention to 
advocate such perspectives in relation to net culture. Some concluding criticisms 
of such approaches are presented in chapter 9.  
 
 
3.23 Cultural politics 
 
     A third theoretical perspective related to media studies that is pertinent to this 
study (and one that tends toward reconfiguring aspects of the first two) is that of 
cultural politics. As outlined by Jordan and Weedon (1994), cultural politics 
explores how ideas of power are irrevocably implicated with ideas of culture. 
Culture here refers to ―a set of material practices (such as interpersonal behaviour, 
language usage, media product consumption) which constitute meanings, values, 
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and subjectivities‖ (Jordan and Weedon 1994: 8).  Culture is not merely a separate 
‗sphere‘ of human life (as in the artistic and creative activities of different 
peoples) but is regarded as a ―dimension of all institutions – economic, social, and 
political‖ (ibid). In this respect cultural changes can lead to changes on this 
institutional level (e.g. the ‗counter-culture‘ movements of the 1960s),  while 
changes in the economic, social and political spheres may in turn lead to changes 
to cultural  practices, products and perceptions (e.g. the association of free market 
economic theories with cultural notions of ‗individuality‘ and ‗freedom‘).  
    Building on these conceptions of culture, cultural politics is concerned with the 
meanings of the cultural practices that constitute society and ―which groups and 
individuals have the power to define these meanings‖ via their communication in 
forms such as news and entertainment media (ibid: 5). Cultural politics thus 
functions as a counter-discourse to the technological determinist perspectives of 
medium theory positions, and present a major reconfiguration of the simplistic 
‗sender-message-receiver‘ models of communication which often form a default 
position in terms of theoretical conceptions of public communication and medium 
theory.  These concerns with structures of cultural power are usually expressed 
through discussions of the relationships between social identity and inequality.  
Power is regarded as being directly implicated with particular identity positions or 
subjectivities, such as class, gender, and ethnicity. The privileging of particular 
identity positions over others leads to a ―social relations of inequality‖ (ibid) that, 
unless challenged, usually becomes naturalised or hegemonic as the dominant 
mindset within which ideas of the individual and society are formulated and 
enacted. Cultural politics sees culture as a dynamic system in which dominant 
cultural practices and beliefs are constantly being challenged by those from 
oppressed or marginalised groups – a process which can result in the modification 
of social power structures towards a more equitable state (e.g. the success of 
feminist and anti-racist movements). The nature of ―social power‖ is therefore 
seen as manifesting itself ―in competing discourses‖ (ibid: 14).  
     A key aspect of cultural politics perspectives is an emphasis on the cultural 
practices that support structures of cultural power and inequality. Jordan and 
Weedon identify several types of cultural practice that are particularly significant 
in this context. The first is ―the power to name‖. Here terms are used to reinforce 
power inequalities by connoting particular groups as inferior or unequal to others. 
The second is ―the power to represent common sense‖. Here basic notions and 
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values that underlie a society are embodied and articulated in ways that promote 
the power of certain groups over others. The third is ―the power to create official 
versions‖. Here certain groups are able to control the institutional structures that 
determine what we take to be ‗official‘ or ‗definitive‘ views on subjects to create 
official versions of the world that naturalise their positions of power. The last is 
―the power to legitimate the social world‖. Here certain groups have the ―power to 
speak on behalf of respectable, decent society‖ and present their identity positions 
as the legitimate standard against which others are judged (ibid:13).  
     Conceptual sensitivity to these cultural practices was vital in contemplating a 
key aspect of online conspiracism - how conspiracy theorists conceptualised and 
used the Net to challenge mainstream knowledge through the construction and 
presentation of their ideas. Both the technocultural capacities of the Net, and the 
technocultural discourses which surround the Net (such as those of information 
freedom, discussed in chapter 5), provided epistemological and cultural contexts 
in which conspiracy theorists could prospectively overcome the pejorative 
associations of the term ‗conspiracy theory‘ and present their ideas as being 
legitimate takes on the social world which challenged the official versions of 
events and the common sense values that underpin the existing systems of social 
power. A disclaimer is necessary here also. While these cultural politics ideas of 
‗cultural practices‘ were useful in thinking about how conspiracy theorists use the 
Internet, my application of them does not mean that I advocate or support the 
cultural politics of conspiracy theory – a cultural politics that is, for the most part, 
entwined with far-right and extremist ideologies (as discussed in chapter 2, 
section 2.42).  
 
 
Section 2 – Methodological frameworks 
 
This study is my attempt to develop a framework of critical ideas from a variety 
of fields in the humanities – media studies, cultural studies, and politics - that I 
think important for helping to understand and explain the ways in which 
conspiracy theorists conceptualise and utilise the internet. I am thus presenting 
and arguing for this framework as an appropriate and insightful approach for 
interpreting the relationships between conspiracy theory and the net.  Whilst a 
standard approach in the humanities, an interpretive study of this sort is loose in 
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terms of research methodology by comparison with the standards of social 
sciences research (techniques of which are also used within media studies work).  
The following sections will outline how this study may be positioned within broad 
paradigms of qualitative research;  an interpretive research method is manifest in 
the study through  the likes of hermeneutic approaches to the subject matter in 
question.  – as one which inform study in the humanities and much of the social 
sciences. 
 
 
3.31 Qualitative paradigms 
 
     As Wimmer & Dominick discuss, there is no set definition of qualitative 
research, with the term qualitative being used ―to refer to (1) a broad philosophy 
and approach to research, (2) a research methodology, and (3) a specific set of 
research techniques‖ (Wimmer & Dominick 2003: 108). I will here discuss how 
this study relates to the first category – qualitative research as a broad philosophy 
and research approach. 
     Qualitative research approaches are often defined in relation to the objectivist -
positivist paradigms of quantitative research as associated with the sciences.  A 
key aim of such research is to generate empirical  data from objectively controlled 
studies (such as surveys and experiments) that can then be used as objective proof 
to validate an hypothesis regarding a particular topic under investigation. By 
contrast, qualitative research is seen to be concerned with generating frameworks 
of interpretation – ―to understand how people in everyday natural settings create 
meaning and interpret the events of their world‖ (Wimmer & Dominick 2003: 
108). As such, it is generally associated with more subjective forms of research in 
which the researcher implicates themselves as part of the research process and/or 
attempts to develop their own frameworks for understanding such processes of 
interpretation in relation to specific social groups or trends.  As Gomm (2004) 
states, the traditional  approach towards understanding how people create 
interpretive structures for generating meaning can be labelled ‗the mind-reading 
approach‘.  The aim of such research ―is to produce descriptions of…what is in 
people‘s minds‖ that shapes their ways of interpreting and understanding the 
world.  Such research ―usually goes on to explain how people got their minds 
made up that way, and what are the consequences of people having the minds they 
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do‖ (Gomm 2004: 9). Such  interpretive structures may be related to concepts  
such as ―the distribution of power in society and political ideology‖ (Wimmer & 
Dominick 2003: 108). In these respects this study can be situated within this 
qualitative/interpretive paradigm in that I am attempting to understand how 
conspiracy theorists conceptualise the internet in relation to their interpretive 
frameworks of politics and society. These conspiracist frameworks in turn have 
their roots in critical concerns about the ways in which power is constructed in 
society and extremist ideologies.  
     In terms of research practices, Wimmer & Dominick identify five major 
differences between positivist (quantitative) and interpretive (qualitative) 
approaches: 
23
  
1.  Role of the researcher. The positivist researcher strives for objectivity 
and is separated from the data. The interpretive researcher is an integral part of the 
data; in fact, without the active participation of the researcher, no data exist. 
2. Design. For a positivist, the design of a study is determined before it 
begins. In interpretive research, the design evolves during the research; it can be 
adjusted or changed as the research progresses. 
3. Setting. The positivist researcher tries to limit contaminating and 
confounding variables by conducting investigations in controlled settings. The 
interpretive researcher conducts studies in the field, in natural surroundings, trying 
to capture the normal flow of events without controlling extraneous variables. 
4. Measurement instruments. In positivist research, measurement 
instruments exist apart from the researcher; another party could use the 
instruments to collect data in the researcher‘s absence. In interpretive research, the 
researcher is the instrument; no other individual can substitute. 
5. Theory building. Where the positivist researcher uses research to test, 
support, or reject theory, the interpretive researcher develops theories as part of 
the research process – theory is ―data driven‖ and emerges as part of the research 
process, evolving from the data as they are collected (ibid:109).  
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   It should be noted here that this interpretive approach encompasses a wide range of research 
methods and perspectives. As Gomm (2004) points out in overview of quantitative and qualitative 
paradigms, interpretive research  can manifest in forms such ‗phenomenology, interpretivism, 
symbolic interactionism, interactionism, hermeneutics and ethnomethodology‘. Some of these 
have wide applications across different disciplines and fields (such as hermeneutics, which I am 
using in this study – see section 3.32 below)); others are usually used more specifically (e.g. 
ethnomethodology).  
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     Again, I consider my research in this study to reflect the interpretive research 
practices outlined here. In relation to point 1, I have actively selected certain types 
of conspiracy theory and specific websites as key focal points for my researches 
into online conspiracism. Regarding point 2, the design of my study changed 
according to various factors that became apparent from ongoing observation of 
online conspiracy material (such as the links between conspiracy theory and ideas 
of alternative media). In terms of point 3, while my studies have not been ‗field 
research‘ in the ethnographic sense of directly observing or interviewing 
conspiracy theorists, I have treated the web as the ‗natural media surroundings‘ 
within which much conspiracy discourse is presented as part of the ‗normal flows‘ 
of information and cultural expression online. My selection of particular online 
conspiracy texts and sites as representative of online conspiracism overall 
positions me in a subjective interpretive position typical of point 4. Regarding 
point 5, my theories about the relationships between conspiracy theory and the 
Internet were definitely ‗data driven‘ in that they developed out of my 
observations of online conspiracist thought and practice.  
     In relation to the hermeneutic framework discussed in the following section, in 
this study I use  particular conspiracy texts as representative examples of broader 
conspiracist beliefs and practices that I considered integral to developing an 
understanding of the relationships between conspiracy theory and the internet.  
Most of these texts take the form of conspiracist essays or articles sourced from 
particular websites. However, in chapter 9 the conspiracist text that is used as 
illustration is the conspiracy news site Rense.com. My discussion of this website 
includes content analyses of trends associated with the news content on 
Rense.com, which are expressed in the form of statistic tables.  While the use of 
statistics is often associated with quantitative research approaches,  it is not 
mutually exclusive with qualitative approaches. As Glesne (2005) states in her 
overview of research approaches,  there is often overlap between quantitative and 
qualitative research methods. However, it is usually clear in the course of the 
study that ―the dominant mode of gathering data‖, along with the intentions and 
focus of the study,  identifies it as operating within  quantitative or qualitative 
research paradigms.  For example, ―if doing ethnography, I might include a 
quantifiable survey in my study, but most of my methods would be qualitative‖ 
(Glesne 2005: 8). The statistics tables presented in chapter 9 are a useful method 
for presenting what I consider to be significant qualities of the news practices  
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typical of Rense.com, rather than representations of quantitative analysis (which 
would require a much more wide-ranging and rigorously controlled survey of 
conspiracist news sites).  
      
 
3.32 Hermeneutic approaches 
 
     In terms of more specific discussion of qualitative/interpretive research 
methods, this study takes a hermeneutic  approach to the study of online 
conspiracy theory. 
 Hermeneutics has two main applications as a research approach.  Firstly, it 
encapsulates a particular type of analytical approach based on a process of 
examination and interpretation. This process is referred to as the ‗hermeneutic 
circle‘. A researcher looks ―at a specific text in terms of a general idea of what 
that text may mean‖, then modifies ―the general idea based on the examination of 
the specifics of the text‖ to come to a greater understanding of the text and the 
contexts within which it operates (Littlejohn 2002: 188). Secondly, it is used in a 
more specific sense to refer to an analysis of particular objects of study. These 
take two main forms:  text hermeneutics, that seek to interpret the meanings of 
texts such as novels or films; and social or cultural hermeneutics which are 
interested in interpreting the actions and practices of people and communities 
(ibid: 187).  
     In this hermeneutic context, texts are ―any artefacts that can be examined and 
interpreted…A text is essentially a recording, whether written, electronic, 
photographic, or preserved by some other means. Even actions can be viewed as 
texts, but more often, the term designates written documents and other records‖ 
(ibid: 187). Therefore,  texts include ―films, television programmes, radio 
programmes, newspaper articles, websites, magazines, pop music and so on‖ 
(Bertrand & Hughes 2005: 173). Notions of  text must therefore consider the ways 
in which information is presented in different media. The emphasis in this study is 
on websites as texts.  A website is an information space that contains within it 
many individual ‗pages‘ of content. Since each of the pages can be accessed and 
downloaded as a discreet media object, ‗text‘ may be used to refer to an individual 
web page as well as an overall web site. ‗Text‘ can also be used in a much more 
literal sense to refer to the dominant role of words and writing in the content of 
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websites. Since the bulk of people‘s interactions with computers and cyber-media 
like the Net is enacted through a keypad in which information is presented online 
in the form of writing,  written text can be considered ―probably the most 
important part of most webpages‖ (Whittaker 2004: 205).  
     My method for examining online conspiracy theory as a means for developing 
ideas about the relationships between conspiracy theory and the Internet made use 
of both the hermeneutic circle and text/social hermeneutic approaches. In  relation 
to the general analytic approach of the hermeneutic circle, I considered  online 
conspiracy texts in terms of general theoretical ideas about both conspiracy theory 
and the Internet, then used specific aspects of those texts – such as conspiracist 
comments about the Internet, or the ways in which evidence for the conspiracy 
was presented to the reader – to further develop ideas regarding the relationships 
between conspiracy theory and the Internet.  
    In relation to the specifics of text and social/cultural hermeneutics, I examined 
conspiracy websites in order to develop interpretations of conspiracy thought (for 
instance through the actual ideas presented in written form by conspiracy 
theorists) and conspiracy practice (such as the ways in which conspiracy websites 
present conspiracy theories as forms of news). For example, in chapter 4 I present 
textual analyses of essays posted online by conspiracy theorists as illustrations of 
the ethos of ‗information freedom‘ that I argue is integral to contemporary 
conspiracy thought. The analysis of the Rense.com website in chapter 9 is done in 
relation to the social/cultural hermeneutics approach, as there I am interested in 
specific information practices of the site, such as its presentation of conspiracist 
information alongside mainstream news stories.  
   
 
3.33 Cultural interpretation  
 
     A particular variant  of social/cultural hermeneutics that is particularly relevant 
as a research framework for this study is the approach termed ‗cultural 
interpretation‘.  As Littlejohn (2002) notes, ―this kind of hermeneutics requires 
observing and describing the actions of a group, just as one might examine a 
written text, and trying to figure out what they mean‖ (Littlejohn 2002: 192). The 
researcher observes the activities of a particular group in order to build up an 
understanding of the inner workings of the group and the systems of meaning that 
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hold the group together.  Cultural interpretation is outlined as a four-part research 
process. First, ―a basic orientation to the subject‖ in which the researcher ― 
assesses his or her own assumptions about culture and its manifestations‖. For 
example, some researchers may ―identify communication as central to 
culture…and decide to focus on various aspects of communication‖ (ibid:193). 
Second, defining the ―classes or kinds of activity that will be observed‖.  Thirdly, 
theorizing ―about the specific culture under investigation‖. This may involve 
‗interpreting certain activities within the context of the culture itself‖ (ibid: 193).  
Fourth, returning back to the external perspective of the ‗hermeneutic circle‘ and 
comparing specific cases that have been examined with ―the general theory of 
culture‖ that has been operative (ibid: 193).  
     In relation to these precepts of cultural interpretation, my basic orientation in 
studying online conspiracism was related to the theoretical assumption that the 
Internet is a medium of particular significance to contemporary conspiracy 
culture. Secondly, I defined conspiracy websites as the ‗kinds of activity‘ that 
would be observed, with particular emphasis placed upon those conspiracy 
websites whose content is typical of ‗classical‘ conspiracy theory (see chapter 2, 
section 2.51). Thirdly, I interpreted certain activities or ideas which I observe on 
conspiracy websites in relation to what I understand about the wider cultural and 
ideological contexts of conspiracy theory. Finally, I correlated my observations of 
specific conspiracy websites with my basic theoretical assumptions regarding the 
significance of the Net to web culture.  
 
 
Section 3 – Web research practices 
 
In this section I will outline some of the specific methods by which I researched 
online conspiracy content, in relation to the hermeneutic and cultural 
interpretation methodological frameworks outlined above.  
 
 
3.41 Data-gathering – non-participant observation 
 
     In order to understand how conspiracy theorists think about the world,  as the 
basis for  ascertaining how conspiracy theorists engage with the internet, I 
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adopted a straightforward data-gathering approach of non-participant observation 
of conspiracy websites.  While I regularly observed the content of conspiracy 
websites, I did not engage with the conspiracy theorists on these sites or 
participate directly in online conspiracist activity. Non-participant observation is a 
specific approach within a broader context of naturalistic observation, in which 
the researcher is interested in observing the activities of a particular social or 
cultural group within a particular environment (physical/social/cultural).  As 
Gomm (2004) states, such naturalistic observation ―shows the researcher what 
people actually do‖ within a particular environmental context (Gomm 2004: 12). 
The significance of this approach is that the researcher is ostensibly able to get a 
more accurate perspective on people‘s behaviour and ideas through observing 
them ‗in their natural state‘ of everyday activity. In this case, I was interested in 
observing what conspiracy theorists did within the cultural environment of the 
internet. Such observation also provided me with insights into the worldviews and 
mindsets of conspiracy theorists.  
     On a regular or semi-regular basis I observed a variety of conspiracy websites 
in terms of factors such as the specific ideas presented in a conspiracist essay, the 
ideas put forth in the comments pages of the site, and the ways in which the 
website presented its information content.  Given my own socio-cultural 
background, and in relation to the practicalities of undertaking this study,  I  only 
looked at English-language websites.  This approach was treated as a means of 
‗objectively‘ examining the themes and ideas promulgated by conspiracy theorists 
and the modes of presentation used in the operation of conspiracy websites.  The 
interpretations of online conspiracy thought and practice made through such 
observation were then used as the basis for developing frameworks for 
understanding  the relationships between conspiracy theory and the Internet, such 
as my central argument that conspiracy theorists  see themselves as practitioners 
of radical/alternative media.  
     A wide range of conspiracy websites were observed in order to both gain a 
thorough overview of the ways in which conspiracy theorists engaged with the net 
and a good knowledge of conspiracist worldviews and mindsets (see the list of 
conspiracy websites in the bibliography). From my observations of these sites I 
then selected content on particular sites, or particular sites themselves, as 
representative examples of major trends and themes of online conspiracist thought 
and practice. Conspiracist essays and articles presented in this study are the pieces 
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by Swinney and Weidner presented in chapter 4 section 4.22, and the ‗Jolly 
Roger‘ piece presented in chapter 5 section 5.3; while a detailed examination of 
the Rense.com website is the subject of chapter 8. This use of specific examples as 
illustrations of a corpus of beliefs and practices is a standard application of 
hermeneutic approaches outlined above, in which specific texts are considered in 
relation to more general ideas of what they may mean. In this case, the ‗general‘ 
context for interpretation of these specific texts was that of a conspiracist 
worldview, as outlined in appendix 1 and the typology of conspiracy theories 
delineated in chapter 2, section 2.51. I will also state here that I have presented the 
aforementioned articles in their entirety within the main body of my text, rather 
than as an appendix. While lengthy, I considered this approach important in 
effectively conveying to the reader an accurate sense of the sorts of mindsets and 
writing styles that typify conspiracist writing, and in presenting an in-depth ‗set-
up‘ for my subsequent arguments related to the content presented in these articles. 
There was also an ethical dimension to this approach, in that I felt presenting a 
piece of conspiracist writing verbatim not only constituted a corrective to the 
conspiracist practice of selective quotation (presenting snippets of writing from 
the likes of official or institutional sources as proof of conspiratorial machinations 
because such snippets are decontextualized from their larger frameworks of 
meaning) but would also present a buffer from possible criticism of my ideas from 
conspiracy theorists if they came across this study, since I have not engaged in the 
likes of selective quotation in relation to the conspiracist sources involved. 
24
  
    I adopted this non-participant observational approach because I considered this 
the most effective way of ascertaining how conspiracy theorists engaged with the 
internet.  I could observe large quantities of conspiracist material freely available 
online in forms such as web sites, blogs, and personal web sites and therefore 
comparatively ascertain specific patterns and trends of conspiracist belief and 
practice on a wide scale. Since Anglophone conspiracy theory is predominantly 
                                                 
24
 This attitude was also prompted by the fracas surrounding the masters thesis written  by 
University of Waikato philosophy student Roel van Leeuwen tracing the ideological trajectory of 
leading New Zealand far-right extremist Kerry Bolton that occurred when I was beginning my 
research. After reading the thesis online, Bolton undertook legal action against the University and 
van Leeuwen, claiming the thesis quoted him out of context and misrepresented his ideas (van 
Leeuwen was later exonerated from these charges). For a good local summary of the saga, see Josh 
Drummond‘s article ‗Dark Dreams: How Waikato University‘s handling of the van Leeuwen 
thesis created the worst academic scandal in years‘, written 13 July 2009, originally written for the 
University of Waikato student magazine Nexus and available online at 
http://www.scoop.co.nz/stories/ED0907/S00049.htm. 
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the domain of American theorists (and to a lesser extent the UK), the virtual 
nature of the internet also meant that I had direct access to conspiracist content 
that logistically would have been extremely hard to source from New Zealand due 
to geographical constraints.  There were also two major assumptions underpinning 
this approach that I adopted as self-evident.  Firstly, that conspiracy websites were 
accurate reflections of conspiracy thought and practice. Secondly, that the specific 
ideas expressed by the authors of the content to be found on such sites were 
accurate reflections of the conspiracist beliefs of those individuals.   
     As stated in qualitative research surveys such as Gomm (2004) and Glesne 
(2005), naturalistic observation (both participant and non-participant) is often 
complemented by some form of qualitative interviewing of individuals or groups 
related to the socio-cultural group, behaviour, or belief system under observation.  
I did not undertake interview-based research  because I considered the content 
presented on conspiracy websites to be suitably indicative both of  the ways in 
which conspiracy theorists engaged with the internet, and in what their 
conspiracist worldviews were (in regards to what individual conspiracy theorists 
wrote and of how these individual contributions revealed collective conspiracist 
beliefs and mindsets).  While more complexity and depth may have resulted from 
interviews with conspiracy theorists regarding their ideas and attitudes towards 
the internet, there were also a variety of logistical and ethical issues involved in 
this regard, such as getting in contact with prospective interviewees (most of 
whom would be based in the USA) and getting conspiracy theorists to co-operate 
with an academic study that takes a critical stance towards their beliefs (academia 
being one of the institutions of social power that most conspiracy theorists regard 
in an conspiratorial light).  Since the development of a critical framework for 
considering the relationships between conspiracy theory and the internet was 
enough of a focus for this study, I consider such interview-based research as an 
area that could be prospectively be dealt with in terms of follow-up work.  
      In early stages of the study I did engage in a modicum of direct participation 
with conspiracy theorists through the comments sections on the New Zealand 
conspiracy news website Uncensored.com.  Here I adopted a pseudonym and 
proceeded to engage in sceptical debate with other conspiracist commentators 
regarding the conspiracist ideas that they were propagating.  However, such 
participation was personally rather than research-motivated, in that I found myself 
emotionally and ethically affronted by the extremist worldviews presented by the 
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conspiracy theorists on the site (being a local site for the dissemination of ideas 
that I previously envisaged in foreign cultural contexts), and engaged in such 
activity as a form of psychological adjustment to the disturbing realities of the 
subject area.  While these interactions with actual conspiracy theorists where 
useful in reinforcing my understandings of conspiracist thought and practice, I did 
not consider them as formal research for the personal motivations outlined above. 
 
 
3.42 Observation of online conspiracy material – website analysis 
 
      In relation to the methodological principles of hermeneutic interpretation and 
non-participant observation discussed above, my  research observations of online 
conspiracy material were conducted in relation to what web theorists Schneider 
and Foot (2004) delineate as the three main techniques of website analysis.  
     The first of these techniques is labelled discursive or rhetorical analysis. These 
are ―more concerned with the content of a website than its structuring elements‖, 
focussing on ―the texts and images that are contained on webpages, and /or on 
webpages/websites‖ (Schneider and Foot 2004: 116). Schneider and Foot argue 
that a problem with this approach is that it considers web content in relation to 
ideas of text typical of old media (e.g. a text as a discrete object). In this respect it 
can overlook the importance of factors such as hypertextuality and connectivity in 
relation to web content. The second technique is termed structural or feature 
analysis. This focuses on the structural elements of a site, such as the number of 
pages contained within a site and the ways in which these might be ordered, or 
organising features of a site such as  search engines, privacy policies, or multiple 
navigation options.  Schneider and Foot regard such approaches as limited in that 
―they do not afford systematic analysis of an individual site's situatedness in the 
larger web, that is, the external pages to which it links and are linked to it‖ (ibid: 
116). The third technique is socio-cultural analysis. This examines  ―the 
hyperlinked context(s) and situatedness of websites‖ along with ―the aims, 
strategies and identity-construction processes of website producers‖ (ibid: 116). 
This approach is preferred to the other two in that it combines an understanding of 
website content and structure from the discursive and structural approaches with 
an awareness of the unique properties of websites, such as hypertextuality and 
situatedness.  
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     I would describe my research technique as, therefore, socio-cultural analysis of 
online conspiracy material. Socio-cultural analysis can be seen to encapsulate 
both the theoretical contexts and methodological frameworks already discussed as 
being of significance to this study. Ideas from medium theory, and associated 
frameworks of interpretative qualitative research, are reflected in the socio-
cultural analysis of conspiracy websites to examine the ways in which conspiracy 
theorists have conceptualised the Net as part of their conspiracist identity (e.g. 
through ideas of ‗information freedom‘ – see chapter 4). Theoretical ideas of 
public communication and cultural politics, and the critical qualitative research 
frameworks associated with these, are reflected in the socio-cultural analysis of 
conspiracy websites to examine how conspiracy theorists have used the Net 
strategically in relation to the aim of legitimating their conspiracist beliefs within 
the wider culture (e.g. in relation to ideas of alternative media – see chapter 6). 
This socio-cultural analysis of online material also makes use of discursive and 
structural analysis of website content. The syncretic nature of the socio-cultural 
approach, in that it makes use of both discursive and rhetorical analytic 
techniques, is also reflected in this study. Understanding the ways in which 
conspiracy theorists have conceptualised the Net as part of their conspiracist 
identity are based upon discursive analyses of online conspiracy essays that 
discuss the Internet (see chapters 4 & 5). Similarly, my theorising regarding how 
conspiracy theorists have used the Net to position their conspiracist beliefs within 
the wider culture are based upon structural analyses of conspiracy websites, such 
as Rense.com (see chapter 8).  
     Schneider and Foot also propose the notion of a ‗web sphere‘ as a useful way 
of conceptualising particular forms of online content as a specific research object, 
in relation to the hypertextual and interactive capacities that distinguish the Net 
from other media systems. A web sphere is outlined as ―not simply a collection of 
websites, but as a hyperlinked set of dynamically-defined digital resources that 
span multiple websites and are deemed relevant, or related, to a central theme or 
‗object‘. The boundaries of a web sphere are delimited by a shared object-
orientation and a temporal framework‖ (ibid: 118). In this respect online 
conspiracy theory could be configured as the conspiracist web sphere – multiple 
websites, connected to each other via hyperlinkages, that provide resources for 
research and discussion of conspiracy topics.  
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     While I find the notion of a web sphere useful for describing online conspiracy 
theory as a research object due to its recognition of multiple websites linked by 
particular subject matter and by temporal factors (such as old webpages which are 
still accessible), I do not consider this study to be a specific ‗web sphere analysis‘ 
as outlined by  Schneider and Foot. This would be an analytical technique that 
attempts to give  comprehensive research coverage of online material within a 
particular web sphere through  the archiving of individual websites within a 
particular sphere at different time periods; the cross-referencing of various 
components across collected sites using computer-assisted techniques 
(presumably for objectivity); and the integration of interviews with the producers 
and users of websites. I see this study as instead developing a critical framework 
for discussing the relationships between conspiracy theory and the Internet that 
can then be examined more closely through intensive web sphere analysis. For 
example, the discussions in chapter 7 and 8 about how conspiracy theorists make 
use of online modes of alternative news would probably serve as a good basis for 
a future analysis of news sites within the conspiracist web sphere.  
 
 
3.43 Observing online conspiracy material – website types  and 
conspiracy content 
 
     I will here outline the main types of conspiracy websites to indicate the wide 
range of material that I observed as research background for this assignment. 
While my central focus in this study is on conspiracy news sites, the content 
presented on such sites was often derived from non-news conspiracy sites, while a 
detailed understanding of the conspiracist mindset and worldview required 
observation of a wide range of online conspiracy material.  In terms of 
conceptualising websites as objects of study, it is important to note that the 
multimedia capacities of the Net can enable the producers of websites to present 
information in written forms (e.g. news items, essays, comments), visual forms 
(e.g. still images, video footage) and ‗cyber‘-forms (e.g. hypertext).  
     The two types of website that seemed most popular for the online presentation 
of conspiracist material were news sites and homepages/blogs. News sites are 
websites which provide news information in a manner similar to existing news 
media such as newspapers and television news bulletins. Conspiracy news sites 
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typically featured the following sorts of content: stories from mainstream news 
sources on topics of conspiracist significance; news items from conspiracist 
sources; and opinion/commentary pieces on current events. Indicative examples of 
conspiracy news sites include the American sites InfoWars.com and Rense.com 
and the New Zealand site Uncensored.com (a case study of conspiracist news sites 
in the form of Rense.com is presented in chapter 8). Homepages and blogs are 
both variants of  personal websites. A personal homepage refers to a site that deals 
with the lifestyle and interests of a particular person and where content is about 
the personal ―interests and aspirations of its producer‖ (Whittaker 2004: 174). 
Blogs – short for weblogs – consist of ―a regularly updated diary or log of a 
person‘s interests or activities‖ (Whittaker 2004: 176). The content on such sites 
is not necessarily self-centered in relation to the personality of the producer, but 
may reflect an individual‘s interest in particular political issues and cultural 
activities. Good examples of such sites include the homepage of the American 
conspiracy theorist Jordan Maxwell, and the 9/11 blog Truth Gone Wild.  Other 
general types of web format that conspiracy theorists often used are newsgroups 
and bulletin boards. These are ―communal‖ sites in which individuals post 
comments on a particular topic or subject area as part of a process of interactive 
online dialogue with other web users – ―readers do not simply consume messages 
but are expected to post their own responses, whether as answers to questions or 
requests for help, or a public statement in reply to other (equally public) 
statements posted online‖ (Whittaker 2004: 174). An exemplar of this is the 
abovetopsecret.com website.   
     Alongside versions of news sites and blogs adapted to conspiracist topics, there 
are also several types of web site that appear to be more specific to conspiracy 
culture in general. Particularly notable in this regard are website versions of 
conspiracy magazines and radio shows. The content of such sites generally serves 
two functions. Firstly, to provide a complementary source of information in 
relation to conspiracist topics raised in the magazine/radio formats but which are 
limited in terms of the spatial and temporal constraints of such media. In this 
respect such sites may provide features such as comments pages and chat rooms 
in which readers/listeners can provide feedback on and engage in debate about 
conspiracy topics presented in print and on-air formats, or conspiracy topics in 
general. Secondly to promote the more commercially lucrative magazine and 
radio show formats. Representative examples of these types of site include 
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Rense.com, which is the Net version of the Jeff Rense syndicated radio show; 
Paranoia, the website of the conspiracy magazine of the same name;  and Coast 
to Coast AM, the website of one of America‘s most popular talk radio shows 
which specialises in paranormal and conspiracist subjects.  
    Also specifically conspiracist in nature are websites devoted to a specific 
conspiracy topic or worldview such as 9/11 or the Illuminati. Representative 
examples of these types of site include the self explanatory Illuminati Conspiracy 
Archives, and The Enterprise Mission.com   which focuses on conspiracy theories 
regarding NASA and US government cover-ups of the existence of extra-
terrestrial life on Mars and the moon. A variation on this type are websites 
centered upon groups and communities whose worldview is heavily predicated 
upon conspiracy beliefs. For example, the Leading Edge International Research 
Group is a New Age group whose worldview is one that incorporates UFO 
conspiracy theories.   Both of these types of sites often have a promotional tone, 
in that they are attempting to raise the profile of the conspiracy theory or group in 
question, and an organisational tone in that they seek to enlist members and/or 
funding to the particular conspiracy cause or group involved.  
     In terms of subject matter,  while my observations involved websites dealing 
with ‗realpolitik‘ conspiracism as a means of getting a thorough knowledge of the 
subject area (such as the British website Lobster), my core focus was upon what I 
have outlined in section 2.51, chapter 1 as classical conspiracy theories, in which 
the conspiracist ideas presented are predicated upon various strands of identity 
politics linked with extremist/far right ideologies and occult beliefs. To briefly 
define these in terms of conspiracist tropes, conspiracy theories based in 
nationalist identity politics tend to present conspiracy theories dealing with 
themes such as the New World Order, One World Government, secret 
government, communists, and ‗international bankers‘. Conspiracy theories based 
on the identity politics of fundamentalist Christianity focus on conspiracies 
relating to belief systems such as Zionism, Freemasonry, Catholicism, Jesuitism, 
Satanism. Conspiracy theories based upon the identity politics of New Age beliefs 
tend to deal with topics such as UFOs, alien invasions, underground bases, earth 
changes, and the 2012 apocalypse. Many contemporary conspiracy websites 
promote ‗super-conspiracy‘ theories that link ideas from all of these positions 
together, with the secret society of the Illuminati functioning as the all-
encompassing conspiratorial agency involved.   
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     Alongside subject matter, it was clear that conspiracy websites were also 
readily identifiable by some distinctive stylistic tendencies in areas such as 
language use and website aesthetics. Particularly notable in rhetorical terms were  
conspiracist terminology, jargon, and neologisms. Examples include the phrase 
‗the New World Order‘ as a generic signifier of conspiratorial activity: the term 
‘sheeple‘ to pejoratively describe those average citizens who do not ascribe to the 
‗truth‘ of the conspiracy theory in question: and ‗shill‘ to denote someone who 
actively debunks or challenges conspiracy theorists as an agent of the conspiracy. 
A tone of populist outrage was also typical of conspiracy sites – for example, 
exhortations by the conspiracy theorist in question for ‗the people‘ to ‗Wake up!‘ 
to the evil truth of the conspiracy in their midst. Specific modes of reasoning and 
presentation of evidence are also hallmarks of conspiracy rhetoric. Prime 
examples include ‗self-referential‘ or ‗pseudo‘ scholarship, in which conspiracy 
theorists cite each other‘s work as ‗scholarly‘ references (for more on this strategy 
see Hofstadter 1966: 35-38; Pipes 1997: 34), and a reliance on anecdotal  
testimony by alleged conspiratorial ‗whistleblowers‘. A visual corollary to this 
was the presentation of conspiracist iconography.  Probably the most visible 
example of this was  the use of the ‗eye in the pyramid‘  (an established Masonic 
motif) as a symbol for the omnipresent ‗Illuminati‘ superconspiracy.    
     In terms of the aesthetics of website appearance and design, conspiracy 
websites were also notable for their  presentation of advertising for conspiracy-
themed products, such as  ‗survivalist supplies‘ of food, water, and weapons (so 
that conspiracists can equip themselves to be self-sufficient and thus escape the 
clutches of the totalitarian ‗New World Order‘), and the selling of conspiracist 
books and  DVD documentaries.  Other significant aesthetic  features of 
conspiracy websites were related to the ways in which conspiracy evidence was 
presented.  For example, this included analysis of photos using digital 
manipulation software, a use of material such as news footage accessed from 
other websites, and embedded audio-visual material, such as YouTube clips and 
conspiracist documentaries.  
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3.5 Summary 
 
     While public communication is the major theoretical framework I am using for 
considering the relationships between conspiracy theory and the Internet, I have 
also incorporated ideas from media theory and cultural politics perspectives as 
these are particularly pertinent to discussions of the technocultural capacities and 
effects of the Internet.  
      The methodological context  for this study is one of hermeneutic analysis in 
relation to non-participant observation of online conspiracy material.  I considered 
these research approaches to be the most straightforward in relation to the main 
objectives of this study – the development of a critical framework for 
understanding the relationships between the internet and conspiracy theory – in 
that they provided a wide scope for engagement with conspiracy material and the 
proposition of critical hypotheses related to such material.  
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CHAPTER 4 
CONSPIRACY THEORY AND MAINSTREAM MEDIA 
___________________________________________________________________ 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
     This chapter will argue that a suspicion of the relationships between traditional 
media and power is an integral part of the logic of classical conspiracist thought, 
and that in this respect conspiracy theories operate inside major frameworks of 
critical thinking about the relationships between media and power. It will also 
discuss how these conspiracist attitudes towards media power are informed by 
political concepts of freedom and democracy, including the likes of civil liberties 
and public service media, and democratic variants such as populism and 
libertarianism. The explication of such ideas in this chapter will inform my 
subsequent arguments regarding the ways in which classical conspiracy theorists 
configure the Internet as a medium which embodies a democratic ideal of 
‗information freedom‘, and in how they appropriate this ideal as a legitimating 
framework for their conspiracist beliefs.  
     The chapter has two main parts. The first section discusses how classical 
conspiracy theorists perceive established mainstream media, such as television 
and the press, to be systems of conspiratorial control, in a manner akin to 
radical/critical traditions of media power. Against these perceptions the Internet is 
conceptualised in ideal terms as a medium where information can be presented 
free of conspiracist influence. The second part outlines the political ideas that 
inform classical conspiracist  notions of freedom in general and conspiracist 
views of the Net as a site of information freedom in particular. These ideas will in 
turn inform the discussions of the Internet as a site of information freedom in 
chapter 5, and the discussions of the relationship between conspiracy theory and 
the Internet as an alternative public sphere that form the subject matter of chapters 
6-8.  
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4.21 The mainstream media as conspiratorial control system 
 
     From my observations of conspiracist material, I would argue that the ways in 
which classical conspiracy theorists conceptualise established media systems as 
agents of conspiratorial control constitutes the central starting point for 
understanding the relationships between classical conspiracy culture and the 
Internet.  My discussion of these ideas in this and the following chapters will 
revolve around a schema of media systems which distinguishes between 
mainstream media, alternative media, and conspiracist media. I will here present a 
table outlining these differences as a reference aid for subsequent discussion: 
 
Figure 1: Schema of media systems referred to in this study 
 
Media 
systems 
Ownership Content Ideological 
function  
Ideal 
audience 
Major 
media 
forms 
Mainstream  State 
Corporate 
Popular 
Commercial 
Sensational 
 
Reinforce 
status quo 
Consumers TV 
Newspapers 
Magazines 
Film 
 
Alternative Independent 
Amateur 
Informative 
Democratic 
Debate 
Critical/radical 
Public Sphere 
Citizens Internet 
Radio 
Journals 
Magazines 
Conspiracist Independent 
Amateur 
Informative 
Didactic 
Critical/radical 
Extremist 
Citizens 
Believers 
Internet 
Radio 
Magazines 
Books 
 
 
 
My delineation of media systems here is an attempt to portray what I understand 
as the conspiracist view of media – a dichotomy between mainstream and 
alternative sources. As will be discussed in the following chapters, conspiracy 
theorists consider themselves to be operating in the realms of alternative media in 
ideological opposition to media which is configured as the mainstream.  The 
bottom row is my outline of what I consider to be the main characteristics of 
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‗conspiracist‘ media. While such media possesses some significant points of 
overlap with alternative media, it also possesses significant degrees of difference 
as well  - an important point that underpins much of the discussions in chapters 6-
8.  
     In relation to the major tenets of conspiracist thought outlined in chapter 2, 
section 2.51, and Appendix 1, I would argue that the key theme influencing 
conspiracist attitudes towards mainstream media is that of control. The 
conspirators are envisaged as small groups who use various systems of control to 
realise the maximum extent of power over the ‗mass‘ public. This control is 
exercised in an inter-related fashion via control over thought – how people think 
about the world – and control over action and behaviour – how people act in 
relation to their views of social and political reality. Such control systems enable 
the conspirators to more effectively implement their schemes by reducing possible 
opposition and interpellating citizens into positions of acceptance and 
acquiescence with the conspiratorial scheme. Central to this process is the idea of 
the control of information. In conspiracist thought, information  is synonymous 
with the ‗facts‘ regarding the ways in which political and social systems are 
organized and operate. Genuine or ‗true‘ information that is information of the 
sort which reveals the reality of the conspiratorial plots for global domination or 
similar would provide citizens with the knowledge needed to challenge the 
conspirators‘ plans. The control of such information is thus a crucial aspect of the 
conspiracy in question. This control of information takes two major forms in 
conspiracist discourse. One is the suppression of information, in which 
information potentially harmful to the conspirators‘ interests is censored or 
rendered off-limits as a topic of public discussion. The other is the manipulation 
of information, in which ostensibly ‗truthful‘ information is made public but in 
forms shaped in accordance with the interests of the conspiratorial groups 
involved so that its veracity is compromised.  
     Since one of the prime functions of mainstream media is to provide citizens 
with ostensibly accurate and useful information about the wider socio-political 
reality in which they live, it is inevitable that such media will be regarded with 
suspicion by conspiracy theorists as prime sites in which the conspiratorial control 
of information can be exercised. In this perspective the government officials and 
corporate professionals who own and operate mainstream media outlets become 
agents of the conspiracy who use their influence to propagate information 
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conducive to the aims of the conspirators involved. Thus, for many classical 
conspiracy theorists, the information presented in mainstream media systems 
consists of forms of conspiratorial propaganda, disinformation, or ‗mind control‘. 
By publicising information that has been suppressed or unknown, conspiracy 
theorists represent a challenge to these conspiratorial systems of information 
control. In this respect many contemporary conspiracy theorists present 
themselves as activists, subversives, or rebels engaged in ‗information warfare‘ 
against the conspiratorial ‗controllers‘ who are manipulating mainstream media 
representations of the world in their own interests.
25
  
     These conspiracist attitudes towards the mainstream media can be considered 
as extremist or fringe versions of radical/critical critiques of media power. With 
reference to the work of James Curran (2002), I will use this section to outline the 
major ideas of the radical/critical tradition and consider how such perspectives are 
reflected in conspiracist conceptions of mainstream media as conspiratorial 
control systems. This discussion will articulate some key themes underlying the 
relationships between the logic of conspiracy theory and the technocultural myths 
of the Internet as an embodiment of democratic ideas of information freedom that 
will form the basis for subsequent arguments in this study.  The following section 
will present some representative examples of how these radical/critical suspicions 
of the mainstream media are articulated in conspiracist terms, and how these 
articulations position the Internet as a medium free from conspiratorial control, 
prefiguring the discussion of the Internet as a site of information freedom 
presented in chapter 5.  
     Curran posits radical approaches to ideas of media power as operating in 
contrast to the dominant liberal tradition which conceives the media as possessing 
―a high degree of autonomy in advanced liberal democracies‖ (Curran 2002: 129). 
In this tradition the mainstream media are believed to work in the public interest  
―as a consequence of being independent from government, accountable to the 
public through the market and influenced by the professional concerns of media 
staff‖ (ibid: 132). Radical approaches argue that mainstream media are not 
autonomous, but are instead heavily implicated with the structures of political and 
economic power. For example, in their news and entertainment content, 
                                                 
25
 I have borrowed the phrase ‗information warfare‘ in this context from one of the leading 
conspiracy news sites on the Web – Infowars.com run by American conspiracist Alex Jones. This 
term is also used in other contexts to refer to the likes of cyber attacks and politically motivated 
online hacking.  
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mainstream media outlets favour certain types of stories and modes of 
representation that generally reinforce rather than challenge or critique the status 
quo (ibid: 138-139).  Radical critics are therefore concerned with the multitude of 
inter-related factors that ―encourage the media to support dominant power 
interests‖ (ibid: 148). These factors include:  
 
1. State censorship. The ―wide range of coercive, regulatory and patronage 
powers‖ the state possesses that ―potentially enable it to gag and control the 
media‖. These include ―repressive legal limitations on freedom of media 
expression‖,  ―control over entry into the journalism profession‖, and ―the lifting 
of monopoly restraints and provision of financial aid to assist only pro-
government media‖ (ibid). 
 2. High entry costs. The ―large investment needed to establish new media 
enterprises in the mass market‖ which effectively ―prevent non-elite groups from 
owning popular media‖, limiting media diversity and curtailing consumer choice 
(ibid).   
3. Media concentration. The supplanting of the old looser ―partnership 
arrangements between leading media companies‖ (ibid) in favour of concentration 
and consolidation which has resulted in ―a growing alliance between the providers 
of media content and controllers of distribution channels, and between companies 
in the old and new media sectors, both nationally and globally‖. In these respects 
―producer power has been extended at the expense of consumer influence‖ (ibid: 
149).    
4. Corporate ownership. The corporate nature of many mainstream media 
companies which mean that ―their principal shareholders and top executives are 
wealthy people, with a stake in the status quo‖, who have ―material business in 
promoting market-friendly policies‖. These corporate owners can ―influence the 
ethos, direction and goals of these organizations through the setting of policy, the 
hiring and firing of key staff, and the allocation of rewards‖ (although ―their 
exercise of power within media organizations is constrained in a number of ways, 
and their political orientations are also not uniform‖) (ibid). 
5. Mass market pressures. Because ―economies of scale are especially high in 
the media industries‖, there is ―a very strong incentive to maximise audiences‖. 
Mainstream media content, particularly that classed as entertainment, tends 
―therefore to converge towards the consensual and conventional, advance 
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universal themes with a wide appeal, follow tried and tested formulae and seek to 
avoid giving offence to significant segments of their audience‖ (ibid). 
6. Consumer inequalities: Much of the ―media provision for niche markets is 
skewed towards the interests and needs of the affluent because their high 
disposable incomes make them a prime market‖ (ibid).  
7. Advertising influence. The consumer inequalities inherent in mainstream 
media ―distort the distribution of media advertising expenditure‖ and create a 
‗prestige press‘ of ―advertising-rich minority‖ media aimed at elites, giving them 
―an influential voice not available to other small minority groups‖, and orienting 
media systems ―more towards the wealthy than the poor because the former bring 
higher advertising rewards‖ (ibid). Advertisers can also exert direct influence over 
media outlets ―by supporting media which offer a conducive environment for 
their products or politics, and withholding support from those who do not 
conform‖, something to which ―specialist and local media, dependent on a small 
pool of advertisers, are more vulnerable to‖ (ibid: 150). 
8. Rise of public relations. The use of public relations companies by ―both 
government and business corporations‖ which effectively ―subsidise the cost of 
gathering and processing the news in order to influence positively the way they 
are reported‖ (ibid).  
9. News routines and values. The time and budget pressures which lead news 
organizations to regularly ―cover prestige institutions (such as branches of the 
state)‖, which have well-organized media capacities, ―as an economical and 
effective way of gathering the news‖.   Such routines encourage mainstream 
media ―to give disproportionate attention to the activities and concerns of these 
institutions‖ (ibid) at the expense of less organized and/or less powerful groups. 
10. Unequal resources. The involuntarily internalization by media staff of ―the 
values, images, explanatory frameworks and premises that are widely shared in 
society‖, and the ability for groups which possess ―greater cultural capital 
(authority, expertise, communication skills), social capital (prestige and social 
connexions), or economic capital (economic power and material resources) than 
others‖ to ―exploit these assets to gain control of leading institutions, which 
influence public attitudes and behaviour‖ (ibid). 
11. Dominant discourses. This refers to the deployment in mainstream media of 
dominant discourses which underpin capitalist and nationalist structures of power, 
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such as the anti-communism that was ―a key theme of twentieth-century Western 
ideology‖ (ibid).  
 
     These factors can be thematically combined into three broad areas of radical 
concern with media power. These are state/corporate control of media content (1, 
3, 4, 8); market forces and their restrictions on media access/shaping of media 
content (2, 5, 6, 7); and the relationships between media content and journalistic 
practices (9, 10, 11). Classical conspiracy thought can be said to focus on similar 
areas of concern in its suspicion of mainstream media as systems of conspiratorial 
control. In terms of concerns about state/corporate control of media content, 
almost all classical conspiracy theorists identify the workings of the conspiracy 
with the activities of the state and major corporations. Because these are the two 
institutional forces that possess the most political and economic power, they are 
inevitably seen as vehicles through which the conspirators enact their schemes of 
world domination. In relation to the radical concerns with state/corporate 
ownership outlined above, conspiracy theorists view the power of the state to 
censor information, particularly on social/defense grounds such as ‗public morals‘ 
or ‗national security‘ (factor 1) as a direct means by which the conspirators 
involved can silence dissenting voices seeking to expose the ‗truth‘ behind the 
conspiracy. The concentration of media outlets as part of larger corporate 
networks (factors 3 and 4) are seen as indirect means of 
censorship/misinformation in that the conspiratorial/corporate power interests can 
use their position as media owners to directly/indirectly shape news content into 
ideologically amenable forms, along with restricting the amount of independent 
news sources that may offer more ‗truthful‘ media content. These trends are 
exacerbated by public relations practices which, in the conspiracist view, involve 
deliberately misinforming the public as to the ‗real‘ conspiratorial activities of 
governments and corporations (factor 8). Such perspectives are readily apparent 
in the conspiracist article by Clare Swinney which will be discussed in section 
4.22. Swinney argues that both the corporate and state-owned New Zealand 
television channels are controlled by conspiratorial forces which manipulate the 
news through the likes of censorship (through what Swinney sees as the failure of 
the mainstream media to report on a scientific study that allegedly supported 
conspiracist claims that the 9/11 attacks on the WTC buildings were controlled 
demolitions undertaken by forces within the US government) and misinformation 
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(Swinney arguing that news footage of the 7/7 London bombings is a fabrication 
designed to cover up the actual conspiratorial truth of the event).  
     In relation to radical concerns with market forces and how these restrict access 
to media and shape media content, conspiracy theorists argue that the high entry 
costs (factor 2) required to establish media on a mainstream footing are effective 
restrictions on smaller/independent news and information sources, such as those 
made by conspiracy theorists, from reaching mass audiences with their ideas. 
Swinney clearly articulates these ideas by presenting conspiracy websites such as 
Infowars.com as independent – and therefore better quality – information sources 
than corporate controlled mainstream media such as television. Regarding the 
ways in which market forces shape mainstream content,  conspiracy theorists 
appear unanimous in their perceptions of mainstream media systems as providing 
the public with poor quality information on important issues because they are 
more concerned with formulaic content they know will attract audiences and 
generate advertising revenue (factors 5 and 7), and that media representations are 
designed to inculcate the values of the dominant conspiratorial elites in the rest of 
the populace (factor 6). The conspiracist essay by Jay Weidner which is also 
presented in section 4.22 echoes such perspectives by arguing that the non-
commercial and interactive nature of the Internet has enabled users to create and 
access content in ways which have undermined the traditional demographic 
models of mainstream media production and distribution that were used to divide 
audiences ―along the lines of race, creed, class, color, religion, sex, and location‖ 
(Weidner 2008).  
     Finally, the radical concerns regarding mainstream journalistic practices are 
also highly applicable to conspiracist views of mainstream media. Mainstream 
journalism is seen by many conspiracy theorists to be a key site of conspiratorial 
control due to the ability of powerful conspiratorial groups to manipulate the 
information resources journalists rely on through the likes of political and 
economic influence and the implication of journalists within the dominant 
worldview which downplays the ‗truth‘ of the conspiratorial nature of society, 
thus ensuring journalists naturally reinforce the conspiratorial status quo and 
marginalise the dissenting voices of conspiracy theorists (factors 9, 10, and 11). 
This perception is particularly evident in Weidner‘s article, in which the online 
conspiracy news site Rense.com is delineated as a site of journalistic ‗excellence‘ 
 70 
since it deals with information regarding the conspiratorial truths of society that 
mainstream journalism ignores.  
     Alongside this discussion of the power imbalances which constitute the main 
areas of concern for radical/critical approaches to media power, Curran also 
outlines several main ―countervailing influences‖ on media power in the form of 
popular and radical forces which ―can influence the media in liberal democracies‖ 
(ibid: 151).  Many of these influences can be also seen to inform conspiracy 
theorists‘ perceptions of the Internet as a medium free of the conspiratorial control 
that typifies the mainstream media. The first countervailing influence outlined by 
Curran is cultural power, in which  
 
non-elite groups can develop alternative understandings of society, 
engender a strong sense of collective identity, and transmit collective 
allegiances and radical commitments from one generation to the next, 
through personal interaction, social rituals and the institutions under their 
control or influence. Through collective action in the workplace and civil 
society, they can seek to change prevailing attitudes. Above all, their 
numerical strength means that potentially they can secure, through the 
electoral process, political influence over the state and use its power to 
modify the organization and culture of society (ibid).   
 
The Internet can be configured as a site of cultural power for conspiracy theorists 
because it provides a cultural space for conspiracy theorists, as ‗non-elite groups‘, 
to ‗develop alternative understandings of society‘ and ‗engender a strong sense of 
collective identity‘ through the ‗personal interaction‘ and ‗social rituals‘ inherent 
in online communication, outside of the traditional structures of media power 
which ensure the marginalisation of conspiracist perspectives in the mainstream 
media.  This notion of cultural power is clearly articulated in Weidner‘s 
description in section 4.22 of the Rense.com conspiracy news site as forming the 
basis for a ‗rebellion of the intelligent‘ because it attracts ‗smart‘ people who are 
aware of the compromised nature of the information reported in the mainstream 
media. While the ability for conspiracy theorists to translate this cultural power 
into political forms of the type suggested by Curran is a source of theoretical 
contention (e.g. Fenster 1999: 225-226), it should be noted that the cultural power 
of online conspiracy theory have in some cases, such as the 9/11 truth movement,  
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contributed to increased public awareness and identification with specific 
conspiracist discourses (such as the belief that the WTC buildings were 
deliberately destroyed by the US government under the pretext of the 9/11 
attacks),
26
 and the manifestation of direct political activity (for example, 9/11 
truth public meetings, demonstrations, and appeals to government officials).
27
 
     Other countervailing influences outlined by Curran include notions of producer 
power and source power. Producer power refers to the ability for ―subordinate 
groups‖ to ―gain a media voice through owning their own media enterprises‖.  
These ―have met with greatest success in specialist markets where entry costs are 
low, and also in the past when media costs were sometimes less than they are 
now‖ (Curran 2002: 154). Curran singles out the Internet as being particularly 
significant in this respect, providing ―a means of communication which is cheap, 
global, interactive and relatively free from official regulation‖ (ibid).28  The 
Internet can be seen as a site of producer power for conspiracy theorists in that its 
relatively cheap and unregulated nature enables the development of conspiracy-
specific content platforms such as websites, streamed radio broadcasts and 
downloadable documentaries and because its global networking capacities enable 
the dissemination of such material to potentially large audiences around the globe.  
     Source power refers to the processes by which ―non-elite groups can influence 
the media‖ through the establishment of ―organizations which are used as sources 
of news and comment by the media‖ (ibid: 152). Whether such sources are treated 
                                                 
26
 Good examples of these are the online 9/11 conspiracy documentaries in the Loose Change 
series (Avery 2005-2009) , and the New Age conspiracy documentary Zeitgeist (Joseph 2007) 
which prominently features 9/11 conspiracy material. These documentaries have proved hugely 
popular on prominent websites such as Youtube (British journalist Ed Pilkington, for example, 
states that over 4 million people had viewed one of the Loose Change films by 2007) and have 
helped popularise the ‗9/11 as US government conspiracy‘ theory on a worldwide scale. Amidst a 
plethora of online information on these films, reference material consulted for this study included 
the websites for the Loose Change films, http://www.loosechange911.com/, and Zeitgeist, 
http://www.zeitgeistmovie.com/; skeptical websites such as Screw Loose Change, 
http://screwloosechange.blogspot.com/; and articles such as ‗Loose Talk‘ by Ed Pilkington 
published in the UK newspaper the  Guardian Weekly Feb 9-15 2007 (hard copy only: does not 
appear to be available via the Guardian website). Websites  accessed 9/9/2010. 
 
27
 The website 9/11Truth.org is a focal point for activism centered around 9/11 conspiracy beliefs. 
Grassroots communities organised around the Web that regularly undertake public activity relating 
to 9/11 conspiracy theories include Architects & Engineers for 9/11 Truth, 
http://www.ae911truth.org/, and the International Center for 9/11 Studies, 
http://www.ic911studies.org/Home_Page.html. Websites accessed 9/9/2010.  
 
28
 Curran also notes that the real world imbalances of cultural/media resources are reflected on the 
Internet as well. Access to online info is ―restricted by global and class-based inequalities of 
computer ownership‖, while content is ―dominated by business use‖ with ―internal signposting 
systems‖ that ―can sideline alternative communications‖ (Curran 2002: 154).   
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credibly and used by mainstream media ―depends, in part, on how much public 
backing they receive, the topical resonance of their concerns, their perceived 
importance and their proven reliability‖ (ibid: 153). Such status can be developed 
―through improvements in organization‖ (e.g. cheap PR strategies) and ―wider 
changes in society‖ which can ―influence the structure and hierarchy of the news 
sources routinely used by the media‖ (ibid). The Internet can be seen as a site of 
source power for conspiracy theorists because of the ways in which its 
decentralised structures of information organisation remove the hierarchical 
constraints that influence the use of sources in mainstream media contexts. For 
example, the search engines such as Google which constitute the chief means by 
which users selecting online content often present websites based upon the 
popularity of a site (how many ‗hits‘ it has received) rather than the institutional 
or professional status of the website. Websites created by amateur users and 
which may contain qualitatively dubious information – such as those typical of 
conspiracy theorists – may, because of their regular usage, be ranked as a 
reputable online information source on an equivalent level to official news sites. 
Since, for example,  many mainstream news agencies are cutting back on their 
hard information practices such as frontline reporting and increasingly using the 
Internet as an information source (Davies 2008),  the perceived importance of 
conspiracy websites as useful sources of information created by search engine 
rankings may lead to conspiracist ideas filtering into mainstream media discourse, 
as has happened with 9/11 conspiracy theories that the US government secretly 
staged the 9/11 attacks, or theories that anthropogenic global warming is not a 
scientific fact but part of a plot to establish a conspiratorial New World Order.  
     The last major countervailing influence outlined by Curran is staff power - the 
relationships between journalists and the public. Curran outlines three main 
strands in this relationship. The first is the populist view of journalism, in which 
news presenters and reporters represent the ‗unified public‘. This generally results 
in news which reflects, and thereby reinforces, existing social values rather than 
critiquing or challenging them. The second is the democratic perspective, in 
which the journalists‘ job is to facilitate debate amongst the populace on issues 
and topics of collective interest. While this perspective ostensibly involves 
critiquing the mainstream, Curran points out that such debates are usually framed 
in relation to values and ideas that are derived from the establishment rather than 
‗unrepresented‘ sources.  The third position is the ‗radical/romantic‘ one, in which 
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journalists are seen as crusaders for truth and justice, standing up for the rights 
and voices of the socially underprivileged and dispossessed. The Internet endows  
conspiracy theorists with staff power because the decentralised and unregulated 
characteristics that place it outside the traditional structures of mainstream media 
accentuate the radical and romantic impulses that are innate to the conspiracist 
mindset – for example, the belief of many conspiracy theorists that the public 
needs to accept that their conspiracy theories constitute the real nature of society, 
and that their conspiracist beliefs are literally revolutionary in their political and 
epistemological implications. On the Internet conspiracy theorists can absolve 
themselves of the mainstream stereotypes of conspiracy theorists as paranoid 
cranks and present themselves as radical investigative journalists who are 
exposing the reality that exists behind the veneer of political and economic power 
for the benefit of a public who are otherwise manipulated and lied to. Such a 
perspective is evident in the Weidner article presented in section 4.22, which 
depicts conspiracy theorist Jeff Rense as the epitome of the radical ideal of the 
muckraking journalist, uncovering information that is inspiring people to rebel 
against the conspiratorial structures that govern society.  
     This discussion of the ostensibly radical approaches taken by conspiracy 
theorists towards mainstream media power has articulated important themes 
implicit to the logic of conspiracy theory which inform the arguments regarding 
the relationships between conspiracy theory and the Internet that will be 
developed throughout the rest of this study. The first is the conspiracist belief that 
the public service/civil society functions of the mainstream media to effectively 
inform the public about the workings of power, such as journalism, have been 
irrevocably compromised by the conspiratorially-affiliated state and market 
institutions which own and operate mainstream media systems. The second is the 
conspiracist configuration of the Internet as a countervailing influence to the 
conspiratorial control of the mainstream media. The technocultural structures of 
the Net enable information to be presented and distributed free of the 
conspiratorial control structures of the mainstream media, thus empowering 
conspiracy theorists by providing a media environment conducive to their 
information practices.  These essential components of conspiracy logic will be 
developed as major points of connection with the mythic discourses of the 
Internet in the delineation of the Internet as a site of information freedom in 
chapter 5, and in the critical articulation of the Internet as an alternative medium 
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(and legitimating framework for conspiracist beliefs) that is developed across 
chapters 6-8. 
 
 
4.22 Conspiratorial control of the media – examples 
 
     This section presents two online articles written by conspiracy theorists as 
exemplars of the ideas discussed in section 4.21 regarding conspiracist suspicions 
of mainstream media power and the conspiracist articulation of the Internet as a 
countervailing influence on such power. I have chosen these articles as they 
present clear examples of the discursive tropes that are typical of conspiracist 
attitudes towards the power structures of  mainstream media. The first article is 
written by New Zealand conspiracy theorist Clare Swinney and is taken from the 
New Zealand conspiracy news site Web Of Evidence: What They Don’t Want you 
to Know. The article is presented in full on pages 71-78 with discussion following 
on pages 79-82. The second article is written by American conspiracy theorist Jay 
Weidner and is taken from the New Zealand conspiracy news site 
Uncensored.co.nz where it has been sourced from the American conspiracy news 
site Rense.com. This article is presented in full on pages 82-87  with discussion 
following on pages 87-89. 
     Swinney‘s article argues that mainstream media content, particularly news, is 
controlled by conspiratorial forces in the shape of the corporate and state entities 
that own and operate mainstream media outlets, and that the Internet represents a 
significant alternative to mainstream media because it enables information to be 
presented free of the control structures of mainstream media. Swinney‘s sources 
will be referenced throughout. 
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Why Are So Many People in New Zealand Out of 
Touch With Reality? 06/23/2009 
 
Artwork By Brocke Lever truthimage@internode.on.net 
A cursory examination of how the mainstream media has 
addressed, or more to the point,  has not addressed a number of 
issues recently, including some relating to 9/11,  so-called “man-
made global warming” and the “swine flu,”  reveals the extent to 
which the public in New Zealand is being blatantly manipulated. 
If you are new to this area, please take the time to look at the 
evidence at the links provided closely, before dismissing the claims 
that are being made. 
9/11 And The Nanothermite Evidence 
World Trade Centre (WTC) 1, 2 and 7 collapsed on September the 
11th 2001  as if demolished by a team of highly-trained 
professionals, revealing that the official story about Muslim 
hijackers is a lie.   Now there is hard scientific proof to show that the 
buildings were demolished, thanks to the work of a team of scientists 
who examined the WTC dust, and found a military-grade composite 
called nano-thermite.  Read about their work here:  Active 
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Thermitic Material Discovered in Dust from the 9/11 World Trade 
Center Catastrophe. 29 
While the public in Denmark heard the news about the nanothermite 
that had been found from their mainstream media in April,30 and 
mainstream radio listeners heard about it in the US 31 in early-June,  
many New Zealanders are still none the wiser, as the closest the 
story got to their mainstream media, was via the Scoop.co.nz 
website. 
The Real Story About the 7/7 London Bombings  
New Zealand‟s TV viewers are still being kept in ignorance about 
the facts of the 7/7 bombings, as an item on 60 Minutes on TV3 
which aired on the 22nd of June 2009 demonstrated.   In a New 
Zealand-made feature about the pervasive presence of surveillance 
cameras, a picture of four Muslim men, whom the reporter said 
were the 7/7 bombers, was displayed and used to justify the use of 
Big Brother surveillance in New Zealand.  In reality, the picture 
shown, time stamped 07.21.54am and taken outside the Luton train 
station, is a fake, which is why only a single frame was shown and 
not actual video footage. 
                                                 
29 Link to ‗Active Thermitic Material Discovered in Dust from the 9/11 World Trade Center 
Catastrophe‘ at Global Research .ca. This is an alternative news/left activism site that advocates  
conspiracy theories claiming that the US government is responsible for 9/11: 
http://www.globalresearch.ca/index.php?context=va&aid=13049,  posted 03/04/09, accessed 25/09/09. 
 
30 Link to YouTube archival footage of Danish TV channel TV2 interview with Danish scientist Niels 
Harrit regarding the ‗nanothermite‘ findings: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8_tf25lx_3o,  posted 
10/04/09, accessed 25/09/09. 
 
31 Link to ‗Richard Gage Discusses 9/11 Truth On Coast To Coast AM, One Of The Most Popular 
Radio Shows In The US‘ on Swinney‘s conspiracy blog Web of Evidence: What They Don’t Want You 
To Know: http://clareswinney.wordpress.com/2009/06/11/richard-gage-discusses-911-truth-on-coast-
to-coast-am-one-of-the-most-popular-radio-shows-in-us/,  posted 10/6/09, accessed 25/09/09. 
     Coast to Coast FM is a syndicated American talk radio show specialising in paranormal/conspiracy 
subjects, and is not a ‗mainstream‘ station in terms of subject matter and ownership.  
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Picture Shown on 60 Minutes To Justify CCTV Camera 
use in NZ 
The four men, who were patsies and told they were  involved in a 
mock terrorist exercise, were given instructions and told which 
trains to catch. They were supposed to have been on the 7.40am 
train from Luton to the Kingscross Thameslink station  with pretend 
bombs, and then have  split up and caught three tube trains and one 
bus that were evidently scheduled to blow up.   However,  things 
didn‟t go as planned for the organisers of the false-flag terror event, 
as the 7.40am train from Luton to Kingscross was cancelled that 
day, so their patsies could not have been on the trains that 
exploded.  This was why it was reported later that the 7/7  “suicide 
bombers”  had been shot by police at Canary Wharf  that day 32 and 
proved that the bomb attacks were an inside job, as  “suicide 
bombers” who were supposed to have blown themselves up, would 
not have been seen alive after the bombings to be killed.  To see 
more of the evidence go here.33 
Global Warming Propaganda 
When The Great Global Warming Swindle aired on Prime TV in June 
2008,  scenes had been cut from the film. 
                                                 
32Link to 'Police shot bombers' reports New Zealander‘ from the NZ Herald website: 
http://www.nzherald.co.nz/world/news/article.cfm?c_id=2&objectid=10334992, posted 09/07/05. 
33 Link to ‗7/7 Ripple Effect‘ page at the 7/7 conspiracy website http://forjustice.co.uk/77/, site updated 
4-5/11/07, accessed 25/9/09. 
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Al Gore Showing The Temperature & CO2 Graphs 
These included those taken from An Inconvenient Truth in which Al 
Gore is on a stage displaying the temperature and CO2 graphs 
separately saying: “When there is more carbon dioxide, the 
temperature gets warmer,” followed by footage of Professor Ian 
Clark reporting that when Gore‟s two graphs are put together,  it 
can be seen that the level of atmospheric carbon dioxide follows 
temperature in this ice core.   This was thus perhaps the most 
important point made in the documentary – one that the public 
should have been shown, as it reveals that the fundamental 
assumption of global warming theory – that carbon dioxide causes 
the temperature to rise, is not supported by the evidence. 
“Swine Flu” Disinformation 
The information the corporate-controlled media is neglecting to 
advise the New Zealand public of regarding the wrongly named 
“swine flu”34 is alarming, given its huge ramifications also.   For 
example, a local newspaper, the Northern Advocate, included full-
page “APN Newspapers in education” page in the May the 19th 
edition, entitled “SWINE FLU,”  which omitted basic information the 
public had a right to know about. 
While purporting to cover the history of the swine flu, it failed to 
address what occurred the last time there was an outbreak of a new 
form of “swine flu.” 
                                                 
34 Link to ‗Swine Flu Is Deadly Mix Of Never-Before-Seen Viruses‘ by Paul Joseph Watson posted on 
Alex Jones conspiracy news website Infowars.com: http://www.infowars.com/swine-flu-is-deadly-mix-
of-never-before-seen-viruses/, posted 25/4/09, accessed 25/9/09.  
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The last significant outbreak originated at Fort Dix army base in 
1976 and although only one death was reported, 35 President Gerald 
Ford ordered a nationwide vaccination program.    According to a 
60 Minutes program from 1979, of the 46 million who were 
vaccinated before the program was halted, over 500 cases of a 
severe nerve disease were reported, as well as thirty deaths as a 
result of the vaccine.  To watch the 60 Minutes report go here. 
Furthermore, the “SWINE FLU” education page didn‟t report that 
vaccines contaminated with live H5N1 avian flu virus were 
distributed to 18 countries last December by Baxter International 
Inc  and that in spite of this recent “mistake,” this company has been 
chosen to work with the WHO on a vaccine for the “swine flu.”36 
Likewise, the page did not mention that highly-respected medical 
researcher, Dr Len Horowitz has reported that the Mexican swine flu 
virus could only have originated in a lab. 37 In a report dated April 
the 25th, he has stated that there is only one group in the world that 
“takes H5N1 Asian flu infected chickens, brings them to Europe, 
extracts their DNA, combines their proteins with H1N1 viruses from 
the 1918 Spanish flu isolate, additionally mixes in swine flu genes 
from pigs, then „reverse engineers‟ them to infect humans.”  This 
group has been working with a vaccine manufacturer which posted 
a preliminary report online in the Journal of Virology as soon as 
Mexican officials began reporting deaths from the new flu. 
So, do you think you are being fed information that a healthy 
democracy needs in order to survive – or are you being misled and 
                                                 
35 Link to ‗Video: Mike Wallace Of 60 Minutes Addresses Issue Of The Neurological Disorders 
Caused By ―Swine Flu‖ Vaccine Of 1976‘ featured on Swinney‘s blog Web of Evidence: What They 
Don’t Want You To Know:  
http://clareswinney.wordpress.com/2009/06/26/video-mike-wallace-of-60-minutes-addresses-issue-of-
the-neurological-disorders-caused-by-swine-flu-vaccines-of-1976/, posted 26/6/09, accessed 25/9/09. 
 
36 Link to ‗Baxter To Develop Swine Flu Vaccine Despite Bird Flu Scandal‘ by Steve Watson, posted 
on Infowars.com: http://www.infowars.net/articles/april2009/270409Baxter.htm, posted 27/04/09, 
accessed 25/9/09. 
 
37 Link to ‗Dr Len Horowitz: Mexican Flu Outbreak From Lab‘ featured on Swinney‘s blog Web of 
Evidence: What They Don’t Want You To Know: http://clareswinney.wordpress.com/2009/05/06/dr-
len-horowitz-mexican-flu-outbreak-from-lab/, posted 05/06/09, accessed 25/9/09. 
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deceived about what is really going on in your world and you 
wonder why this is occurring? 
Disconcertingly, a few global corporations controlled by people with 
an agenda to bring in a New World Order, carbon taxes and reduce 
the population, are trying to overwhelm all competing voices in an 
attempt to turn lies into truth.  
  
Here are a number of quotes from a variety of sources which 
provide some clues as to what has been going on behind the scenes: 
David Rockefeller, who is regarded as the kingpin of the New World 
Order, said at a Bilderberg meeting in 1991: “We are grateful to the 
Washington Post, the New York Times, Time magazine, and other 
great publications whose directors have attended our meetings and 
respected their promises of discretion for almost forty years. It 
would have been impossible for us to develop our plan for the world 
if we had been subject to the bright lights of publicity during these 
years [original emphasis]. But the world is now more sophisticated 
and prepared to march towards a world government which will 
never again know war, but only peace and prosperity for the whole 
of humanity. The supranational sovereignty of an intellectual elite 
and world bankers is surely preferable to the national 
autodetermination practiced in the past centuries. It is also our duty 
to inform the press of our convictions as to the historic future of the 
century.” 
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William Colby  former Director of the CIA stated: “The Central 
Intelligence Agency owns everyone of any significance in the major 
media.” 
Professor of Communications and Media Studies at the University 
of New York, Aurora Wallace said: “There is an illusion of choice 
that‟s maintained when you can have 100 channels on your cable 
system…and the owners are a few five or six.(…)It‟s a democratic 
issue.  It means one viewpoint will come to dominate in most of the 
outlets we use for what‟s going on in the world.” 
New York University Media Professor Mark Crispin Miller said: 
“These commercial [media] entities now vie with the government 
for control over our lives. They are not a healthy counterweight to 
government. Goebbels said that what you want in a media system – 
he meant the Nazi media system – is to present the ostensible 
diversity that conceals an actual uniformity.” 
“We falsely think of our country as a democracy, when it has 
evolved into a mediacracy, where the media that is supposed to 
check the political abuse, is part of the political abuse.” – Danny 
Schechter, Former Producer for CNN & ABC. 
Aldous Huxley, the author of Brave New World, stated in 1961: 
“There will be, in the next generation or so, a pharmacological 
method of making people love their servitude, and producing 
dictatorship without tears, so to speak, producing a kind of painless 
concentration camp for entire societies, so that people will in fact 
have their liberties taken away from them, but will rather enjoy it, 
because they will be distracted from any desire to rebel by 
propaganda or brainwashing, or brainwashing enhanced by 
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pharmacological methods. And this seems to be the final 
revolution.” 
Thus, it seems the glowing rectangle in the corner of your lounge 
and your newspapers have developed into the most powerful 
weapons of mind control and disinformation ever invented, and 
there is a plethora of evidence to show that this is the case.   
Needless to state, if you want to create a healthier society, you must  
stop reading corporate-controlled newspapers, stop watching 
corporate-controlled TV,  stop listening to corporate-controlled 
radio and cease disseminating their propaganda for them.  You 
don‟t have to take part in the lie.  As Alexander Solzhenitsyn, the 
Russian writer who was imprisoned for 8 years for criticizing 
Stalin in a personal letter, wrote: “The simple step of a courageous 
individual is not to take part in the lie.  One word of truth outweighs 
the world.” 
Try out the alternative media at Infowars.com, Prisonplanet.com 
and GcnLive.com and you will quickly come to understand why a 
recent Zogby poll found that 37% of respondents said they found the 
Internet more reliable as a news source than newspapers, which came 
in at only 16%.38 (Swinney,2009) 
 
                                                 
38 Link to ‗Editor & Publisher‘ newspaper  website:   
http://www.editorandpublisher.com/eandp/news/article_display.jsp?vnu_content_id=1003985649, 
article deleted.  
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     Swinney‘s article is a good example of conspiracy theorists‘ radical views of 
mainstream media power. She argues that the New Zealand mainstream news 
media deliberately manipulate news stories on behalf of the conspiratorial forces 
in power to suppress and manipulate information on topics that threaten to expose 
the conspiratorial ‗truth‘.39 This belief is clearly signposted by the graphic that 
accompanies the introductory paragraph. Here a child is having his 
impressionable young mind brainwashed by the conspiratorial information on his 
TV set (as suggested by the swirly shapes on the TV screen, a  standard pop 
culture symbol of hypnotic suggestion). The purveyors of this misinformation are 
clearly identified in the accompanying text as the mainstream NZ news media, in 
the form of the TV news shows of the state-owned TV 1 and corporate-owned 
TV3 networks; the news and current affairs presented through the state-owned 
public broadcaster Radio NZ (particularly the National programme); and the 
nation‘s leading daily newspaper, the NZ Herald. Global media mogul Rupert 
Murdoch‘s name is also listed, presumably for the symbolic resonance of 
Murdoch‘s reputation as someone who deliberately manipulates stories in his 
                                                 
39
 For the purposes of comprehending this piece, Swinney is an adherent of the ‗Illuminati‘ 
superconspiracy mentioned in chapter 2, section 2.51. To describe this in more detail,  the 
Illuminati are conceptualised by contemporary classical conspiracy theorists  as an evil ‗secret 
society‘ which originated in 18th century Enlightenment Europe and which has subsequently 
manipulated world history towards the furtherance of a totalitarian one world government/‘New 
World Order‘. Influential ideological and philosophical systems of a radical or universalist bent, 
such as Communism, Zionism, secular humanism, and environmentalism, are regarded by 
conspiracy theorists as systems of Illuminati developments through which they shape political and 
social developments to their totalitarian ‗endgame‘. Perceived members of the Illuminati  include 
pretty much anyone who is part of the Western/global elite – politicians, corporate leaders,  
journalists and academics etc. Particular emphasis is placed upon international organisations such 
as the United Nations and elite think-tanks such as the Bilderberg group as key political agencies 
of  Illuminati influence.  
     The various conspiracy theories presented in Swinney‘s article reflect different aspects of the 
multi-faceted Illuminati plot for world domination. The first is the belief that the 9/11  and 7/7 
terror attacks were deliberately staged by the US and UK governments (controlled by Illuminist 
politicians) as a pretext for a ‗crackdown‘ on constitutional and civil liberties in the name of 
national defence. The state of quasi-martial law that conspiracy theorists see as the ongoing result 
of such terrorism is a first major step towards totalitarian control of ‗free‘ countries such as the UK 
and USA. The second is the theory that global warming is a fabricated threat made up by 
Illuminist scientists and politicians to encourage nations to economically and politically ‗unite‘ to 
prevent environmental catastrophe – this unification again being one of the building blocks for a 
one-world government. The third is the theory that swine flu was genetically engineered by 
Illuminati/US government scientists and deliberately released as  a pandemic for the purposes of 
reducing the earth‘s population so that total Illuminati control can be more easily implemented. 
Vaccination programmes are a key part of this depopulation plan, as the vaccines are Illuminati-
produced poisons rather than medicines. 
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many news media holdings for political and financial gain, rather than for his 
direct involvement in the New Zealand news media. 
40
  
     Swinney outlines some of the key techniques of such conspiratorial 
manipulation of mainstream media news content.  Censorship is implied in the 
failure of the NZ mainstream media to report on the ‗discovery‘ by Danish 
scientists of nano-thermite particles in the debris of the World Trade Centre, 
thereby proving conspiracist suspicions that the towers were destroyed by 
controlled demolitions set up by the US government or other conspiratorial 
agencies, rather than the plane impacts themselves. Disinformation – the 
presentation of fabricated information as fact – is argued for in the claims that the 
TV3 60 Minutes news feature on the use of surveillance cameras as a deterrent 
against terrorism used false footage. Misinformation, in the form of the deliberate 
misrepresentation of facts, is reflected in accusations that Prime TV undermined 
the scientific credibility of a documentary skeptical of global warming by editing 
out a crucial scene of evidence, and that NZ newspaper coverage of the 2009 
swine flu epidemic neglects to mention ‗facts‘ such as the origin of the swine flu 
as a genetically engineered NWO ‗bioweapon‘. A pertinent aspect of these wider 
conspiracist debates about the conspiratorial control of mainstream media that is 
also present here is the singling out of television as the most  ideologically 
‗dangerous‘ media technology. Alongside the claims made regarding the 
presentation of disinformation and misinformation in the television coverage of 
the 7/7 terror attacks and the Great Global Warming Swindle documentary, the 
opening graphic and the penultimate paragraph explicitly portray television as a 
‗brainwashing‘ technology: ―Thus, it seems the glowing rectangle in the corner of 
your lounge and your newspapers have developed into the most powerful 
weapons of mind control and disinformation ever invented, and there is a plethora 
of evidence to show that this is the case‖ (Swinney 2009).  While seldom clearly 
articulated, the conspiracist animus against television appears to result from a 
suspicion of the medium‘s socio-political scope – for example, the acculturation 
                                                 
40
 Murdoch‘s NZ news media assets appear relatively small at the time of writing. Apart from 
owning the parent company of NZ Sky TV, Murdoch‘s major involvement in NZ media was that 
News Ltd. – an Australian subsidiary of Murdoch‘s global NewsCorp media corporation – was a 
major stakeholder in the INL chain of NZ regional newspapers. However, News Ltd‘s media 
holdings here were bought out by Australian media company Fairfax holdings in 2003. 
Information from the article ‗Who owns New Zealand‘s news media?‘ by Bill Rosenberg, 
http://www.converge.org.nz/watchdog/03/07.htm, accessed 25/09/09.  
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of the medium into the daily routines of domestic life so that it is relied upon as a 
particularly trusted and reliable information source – with technophobic anxieties 
regarding the deleterious effects of television as a viewing experience, such as 
theories that the flickering of the television screen somehow induces photo-
chemical changes in the brain that in turn induce a kind of psychological and 
physiological stupor in viewers (e.g. Mander 1978). In this framework television 
is conceptualised as a highly effective tool of conspiratorial control,  a significant 
part of citizens daily lives that helps to literally ‗dumb down‘ their critical 
faculties and prevent them considering the conspiratorial truth of the world 
around them.  
    Swinney also presents ostensible proof for these ‗radical‘ conspiracist takes on 
mainstream media power through the presentation of comments from media 
critics such as Aurora Wallace, Professor of Media Studies and Communication at 
the University of New York, and ―Danny Schechter, former producer for CNN 
and ABC‖, regarding the conflict between corporate ownership of multiple media 
platforms and the democratic functions of news media. Proof that mainstream 
media are under conspiratorial control is also provided  in the form of  
(unsourced) insider comments by public figures regarded as linchpins of the 
Illuminati conspiracy elite, such as  US billionaire David Rockefeller and ex-CIA 
head William Colby, as to their influence over the content of American 
mainstream media. 
41
 
     Alongside these conspiracist critiques of mainstream media power, Swinney 
delineates the Internet as a countervailing influence against the conspiratorial 
power structures of mainstream media. In the  concluding paragraphs, Swinney 
argues that conspiracy websites such as Infowars.com and Prisonplanet.com 
constitute ―more reliable‖ news sources than those found in the mainstream media 
mainstream ―corporate-controlled‖ newspapers, TV, and radio because  their 
status as online ‗alternative media‘ enables them to operate free of the ‗corporate 
control‘ which limits the reliability of mainstream newspapers, television, and 
radio as news sources. The Solzhenitsyn reference – ―As Alexander Solzhenitsyn, 
the Russian writer who was imprisoned for eight years for criticizing Stalin in a 
personal letter, wrote: ‗The simple step of a courageous individual is not to take 
                                                 
41
 Swinney‘s use of quotes taken out of context and unsourced revelations by conspiratorial 
insiders are typical examples of the practices of conspiracist pseudo-scholarship (see Hofstadter‘s 
outline of conspiracist practice in chapter 2 section 2.21),  practices enhanced by the ‗digital 
library‘ capacities of the Internet (see chapter 5, section 5.21).  
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part in the lie.  One word of truth outweighs the world‘‖ (ibid) - adds a mythic 
gloss to conspiracy theorists‘ radical critiques and rejections of mainstream 
media. By suggesting that the mainstream Western media is controlled by 
conspiratorial forces in a repressive manner akin to that of Stalinist Russia, 
Swinney implies that conspiracy theorists, in their drive to uncover the 
conspiratorial truth that is otherwise suppressed in mainstream news media, are 
not ‗paranoid cranks‘ but investigative journalists crusading for truth and justice 
on behalf of the public, as per the radical/romantic tradition of staff power 
outlined by Curran  (see section 4.21 above).  
     Since the non-mainstream status of the Internet is one of the main factors 
informing such revisioning of conspiracy theory as ‗investigative journalism‘, so 
Swinney here also imbues the Internet with this conspiracist aura of romantic 
radicalism. The significance of the Internet to conspiracy theory is also practically 
affirmed in the fact that almost all of Swinney‘s points are referenced with links 
to websites and webpages, rather than other media such as newspapers, 
magazines, or TV, and that almost all of the websites and webpages cited are of 
conspiracist provenance or affiliation (as outlined in footnotes 37-46 above).  
     Jay Weidner‘s article is a panegyric for the major American conspiracy news 
site Rense.com, which also forms the basis of the case study presented in chapter 
8. Weidner links the revolutionary implications of the conspiracist information 
presented on Rense.com with the revolutionary implications of the Internet as a 
challenge to the established power structures of mainstream media. 
 
Rebellion of the Intelligent: Jeff Rense and the Internet  
By Jay Weidner 
Why are the MSM and the people who run this place so afraid of 
Jeff Rense?  How can one guy running a single web site be such a 
threat to the most powerful forces on the planet? 
The answer goes beyond the excellent journalistic skills he brings 
to the site.  It goes beyond the incredible daily revelations that he 
somehow manages to present in a coherent and understandable 
fashion. 
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What Jeff Rense and his site have achieved is more easily 
understood by a close study of a political movement that is only 
becoming apparent now.  It is a completely new trend that this 
planet has never witnessed before.  Before it is through this 
emerging movement will have kicked the legs out from under our 
failed society.  As you will see this force cannot be stopped. 
Before the advent of the Internet people were divided along the 
lines of race, creed, class, color, religion, sex and location.  This 
made it easy for politicians to carve us up by playing one side 
against another.  This made it easy for the Controllers to 
manipulate us. 
But in the last few years this model of demographics has not only 
been completely undermined, it has nearly been destroyed.  The 
weapons that decimated this old view of how we think and live 
are the Internet and more specifically sites like rense.com. 
The way that the Internet has changed the game can give one a 
glimpse into the newly emerging „McCluhanesque‟  [sic] reality 
that is going to soon overwhelm our politics, our lives and our 
future. 
On the Internet the old paradigm of demographic reality no 
longer divide us.  Instead of divisions based on old models like 
race, ethnicity, religion or the neighborhood where you lived, the 
Internet is divided by just two streams: Interests and Intellect. 
No one knows who you are on the web.  It doesn‟t give a damn 
about your race, creed, color, whatever, unless those subjects are 
your interests.  The archaic and arbitrary borders, like race, 
creed and color that used to separate us are being replaced by 
new and much more profound alliances. 
These new alliances will be the catalyst for a revolution that will 
sweep the world. And this is where Jeff Rense comes in.  What 
Jeff has done is that he has created a web site that is so smart, so 
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ballsy and so informative that there is a massive re-education 
happening underneath the surface.  
The ones being re-educated are the smartest and the most 
intelligent of us.  That is why the next revolution will be a 
rebellion of the intelligent. 
Smart people are also busy people.  They don‟t have time to riffle 
through hundreds of web sites everyday looking for the news 
that they desire.  Jeff Rense has solved this dilemma and created 
a one stop-shopping zone for the most intelligent of the 
population.  They don‟t agree with everything on the site but they 
do appreciate the spectrum of revealing stories and information 
that he provides. 
If this goes on – and it will – there will be a revolution.  
Hopefully it will not be a violent revolution, but it is coming 
never the less.  
And this rebellion will be by the smartest people on the planet.  
The rebellion of the intelligent will not be found in Gallup polls; 
there will be little mention of this phenomenon in the media.  In 
fact there is almost no one who actually understands the cultural 
change that is occurring right in front of us. 
Smart people in the United States and the world are waking up 
to what is really going on.  And they are not happy about it.  
Beginning with 9-11 the smartest people found that all of their 
suspicions were true.  It is that realization which will be the 
catalyst for this forthcoming change. 
And so this is why the Controllers are afraid of Jeff Rense.  This 
is why they attack his site and call him names. He is the 
consummate journalist in the tradition of the great muckrakers 
through out the history of our country.  
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The difference between those great journalists and Jeff Rense is 
the Internet.  Now we can all read and understand what is 
happening instantaneously. 
There is another time in history where something of this 
magnitude occurred.  The last time that a reformation took place 
that even approaches the one that is happening now began in 
1440 when Johannes Gutenberg invented the printing press.  
Naturally, being a good Christian, the first thing that Gutenberg 
published was the Bible.  
But soon word got out and there were other printing presses.  
The De Medici family began printing other items of interest than 
just the Good Book.  One of these volumes being the Corpus 
Hermeticum, which was ancient sacred and alchemical texts, 
translated from the Greek and Arabic.  
The real results of Gutenberg‟s invention were two-fold. 
The first had to do with the mass printing of the Bible.  This 
single act undercut the Church‟s established authority and for 
the first time in Christian, European history anyone could read 
the Bible.  
The printing press is what gave rise to Martin Luther and the 
entire Protestant rebellion. 
The second result of the printing press was the publishing of the 
Corpus Heremticum. These ancient alchemical and hermetic 
texts fueled the Neo-Platonic revolution that later became the 
European Renaissance.  
Gutenberg had no idea that his invention would shake the very 
foundations of European society. 
But it did. 
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In the 1950‟s John Von Neumann and his friends invented the 
first computer.  This was the ENIAC and it was huge and used 
tremendous amounts of electricity.  By 1965 IBM had created the 
first business computers and by the late 1970s the personal 
computer was born.  
The Pentagon invented the first Internet for military purposes.  
Like Gutenberg‟s printing the Bible, the military‟s initial use of 
the Internet was evidence of who was in power at the time of the 
invention. 
The Internet will undermine everything around us just as surely 
as Gutenberg‟s printing press did.  
The Internet is Gutenberg‟s printing press multiplied by a few 
million. 
The mass realization of what we have done to ourselves will 
shake the old structures that have held us together.  Already they 
have developed fissures and their collapse is imminent.  Each 
day brings us closer to the moment when enough intelligent 
people actually figure out exactly what is going on and do 
something about it. 
At this moment it is difficult to say what will happen and when.  
The kettle had been boiling for a long time and it appears as if 
the lid is going to fly off at any moment. 
But make no mistake.  The Smart revolution is coming.  It is only 
a matter of time now. 
And this will not be a socialist revolution, or a rebellion of the 
workers.  
This will not be a war between classes or races.  
This will be a rebellion of the intelligent.  
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And that is why the Controllers are so afraid of Jeff Rense.  They 
know that they cannot put the genie back in the bottle.  They 
know that they cannot afford to make Jeff Rense a martyr.  
They know that he has shown the way towards a larger truth 
that can no longer be denied.  They know that his bravery is a 
beacon of light to all of us. 
The next stage is up to us. (Weidner 2008)
  
     Like Swinney, Weidner presents a conspiracist configuration of the Internet as 
a countervailing influence to the perceived conspiratorial control of the 
mainstream media, but also provides a particularly clear articulation of  how the 
ostensibly radical status of the Internet as a medium which operates outside the 
structures of mainstream media is one which is ideologically resonant with the 
ostensibly radical attitudes towards mainstream media power inherent to the logic 
of classical conspiracy theory. This articulation is developed by linking the 
Internet and conspiracy together through the radical trope of social and political 
revolution. Weidner argues that conspiracy websites such as Rense.com are 
imbued with revolutionary potential because the conspiracist information they 
present is serving to ‗wake people up‘ to ―what is really going on‖ behind the 
scenes of modern life. This radical revisioning of Rense.com is reinforced by 
Weidner‘s sycophantic description of Jeff Rense as a ―consummate journalist in 
the tradition of the great muckrakers throughout the history of our country‖, 
acting in the public interest to uncover the conspiratorial corruption of power 
within American society.
42
 Rense.com and sites like it are therefore re-educating 
                                                 
42
 Although Weidner praises the journalistic attributes of Rense.com, I would argue that Rense‘s 
style of journalism has little to do with traditional journalistic practices such as the research and 
writing of stories. Rense‘s actual written contributions to the site that bears his name are minimal. 
Rather, he functions as editor, selecting pre-existing material from other Web-based sources (both 
conspiracist and mainstream) on the basis of their implications for various conspiracist ‗grand 
narratives‘ (such as the ‗Illuminati‘ superconspiracy) and compiling them as a resource base for 
other conspiracy theorists.  Just as Hofstadter identified ‗pseudo-scholarship‘ as a hallmark of the 
‗paranoid style‘ of conspiracy discourse (Hofstadter 1966), so the work of Rense could be 
considered a form of conspiracist ‗pseudo-journalism‘  directly related to the nature of the Internet 
as medium: the gathering and re-presentation of news material from online sources becomes a 
substitute for original research and writing of such material. 
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the public into a state of genuine ‗intelligence‘ by making them aware of the 
conspiratorial truth that is hidden by the lies of the mainstream media.  
     Alongside this Weidner outlines the revolutionary power of the Internet as 
residing in its freedom from the ―old paradigm of demographic reality‖ that 
typifies conspiratorially-controlled mainstream media. In this paradigm, people 
are presented as divided from each other in relation to identity positions such as 
―race, creed, class, color, religion, sex, and location‖. Such divisiveness enables 
people to be effectively manipulated against each other according to the purposes 
of the conspiratorial ‗controllers‘, and prevents them from developing the sorts of 
solidarity that would enable them to join together and challenge the power of the 
conspiratorial elites. While the technical capacities of the Net are not explicitly 
delineated in the article, Weidner suggests, through comments like ―no one knows 
who you are on the web‖, that the interactive and decentralised nature of the Net 
constitutes an information environment free of these divisive identity positions. 
Instead, the Net promotes a sense of solidarity because people interact with each 
other according to their shared interests and understandings of reality – 
particularly the conspiracist awareness of reality that Weidner associates with 
genuine ‗intelligence‘. In such respects, the Net undermines the conspiratorial 
socio-political paradigms perpetuated by mainstream media and provides the basis 
for new, more prospectively radical  forms of socio-political organization.  
     Weidner argues that the revolutionary potential of conspiracy theory is 
inextricably linked to the revolutionary potential of the Internet. Weidner 
articulates this relationship through the technologically deterministic framework 
of new media technologies as socio-political paradigm shifts derived from  the 
well-known ideas of Canadian media studies theorist Marshall McLuhan. In this 
respect Weidner discusses  the  mass production of written material that resulted 
from the development of the printing press in the 15
th
 century as a revolutionary 
act against the dominant political and cultural power of the era, the Catholic 
church. Printing enabled people to access ideas that were outside officially 
sanctioned church doctrine (e.g. the ‗Corpus Hermeticum‘) and to communicate 
ideas that challenged the authority of the church (e.g. Lutheran Protestantism). 
This combination of radical ideas with the new communication forms that resulted 
from developments in media technology led to the development of cultural 
movements – the Protestant reformation and the Renaissance – that constituted 
very clear paradigm shifts in the history of Western civilization. Weidner suggests 
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that the combination of the radical ideas of conspiracy theory with the more 
socially integrative modes of communication inherent to the Internet constitutes a 
paradigm shift on a comparable scale – a ‗rebellion of the intelligent‘ that will 
help liberate humanity from the shackles of its conspiratorial ‗controllers‘. 
      Weidner‘s articulation of the Internet as an intrinsically radical medium - 
―Gutenberg's printing press multiplied by a few million‖ –  is therefore used to 
affirm the ostensibly ‗radical‘ credentials of the conspiracist beliefs presented on a 
site such as Rense.com (see chapter 8, section 8.22). In this respect, Weidner can 
be seen to use the McLuhanesque discourses of technological determinism, that 
conceptualise the technocultural capacities of the Internet as constituting a socio-
political paradigm shift, to legitimate the classical conspiracist ideas presented on 
Rense.com  as radical ideas of democratic change. I regard this ‗legitimation‘ 
dynamic as integral to the relationship between the Internet and conspiracy theory, 
as I will discuss further in chapters 6-8 regarding the Internet‘s status as an 
alternative medium.  
 
 
4.31  Conspiracist ideas of information freedom – political 
contexts 
 
    As argued in sections 4.21 and 4.22, radical/critical traditions of mainstream 
media power can be seen as forming an implicit level of affinity between 
conspiracy theory and the Internet, in the sense that the radical suspicion of 
mainstream media power that forms a central part of the logic of conspiracy 
theory envisages the Internet as a site of ‗information freedom‘ - a medium free of 
the conspiratorial control structures that govern mainstream media.  I would also 
argue that there are several political concepts affiliated with these radical/critical 
traditions which also inform conspiracist thinking, and that these constitute 
significant points of connection between classical conspiracy theory and the 
democratic discourses that have been articulated in relation to the technocultural 
capacities of the Internet, such as the Second Media Age framework that will be 
outlined in chapter 5 and the configurations of the Internet as an alternative 
medium that will be discussed in chapters 6-8. I will use the following sections to 
outline some of these political concepts, such as freedom and democracy,  
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democratic structures such as civil liberties and civil society,  and politically 
influential but ideologically distorted variants of democratic thought and practice 
such as populism and libertarianism, and how these concepts are reconstituted in 
terms of the right-wing/extremist worldviews of classical conspiracy theory.  
     The discussions presented here regarding conspiracist articulations of ideas of 
freedom and democracy  are not intended to argue that classical conspiracy 
theories are in some way progressive forms of political commentary and change. 
As outlined in chapter 2 section 2.51 and Appendix A, most classical conspiracy 
theories embody political beliefs that are highly conservative, if not explicitly far-
right.  As such, notions of freedom and democracy tend to be configured in 
distorted, if not outright contradictory, forms according to the different ideological 
permutations of classical conspiracy theory and the idiosyncracies of individual 
conspiracy theorists. For example, fundamentalist and nationalist conspiracy 
theories appear to conceptualise ‗freedom‘ as consisting of the liberation of  
people of favoured religious and ethnic identity positions, such as ‗white Anglo-
Saxon Protestants‘, from the alleged control of groups identified with ‗outsider‘ 
identity positions, such as Freemasons and Jews, from  control by people of other 
religious and ethnic affiliations. My intention is merely to show that democratic 
concepts (albeit in distorted forms) constitute significant aspects of the logic of 
conspiracy theory,  and that these concepts constitute major points of connection 
between conspiracy theory and the Internet in relation to critical configurations of 
the Internet as an alternative public sphere, as will be discussed in chapters 6-8.   
 
 
4.32 Freedom – political traditions 
 
     Notions of freedom are integral both to ideas of democracy and the worldview 
of classical conspiracy culture. As already stated in section 4.21, a central aspect 
of conspiracy logic is that citizens are controlled by conspiratorial structures such 
as mainstream media systems. Classical conspiracy theorists perceive such 
conspiratorial control as a means to the desired end of the conspirators – their 
totalitarian power over most – if not all - aspects of society and the self (see 
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appendix A).
43
 The conspiracy is therefore identified with those institutions that 
possess large degrees of political, economic, and  social power,  such as state 
governments, corporations, and religious organisations.  Personal and collective 
freedom from such institutions is therefore a central tenet of conspiracist thought. 
     Like many terms in political usage, freedom and/or liberty have a variety of 
meanings in relation to different political philosophies. I will here refer to political 
theorist David Miller‘s outline of the three major conceptions of freedom that 
underpin Western political and social thought.  
 
1 – Republican. Miller states that ―this is the most directly political conception of 
freedom, since it defines freedom by reference to a certain set of political 
arrangements. To be a free person is to be a citizen of a free political community. 
A free political community, in turn, is one that is self-governing. This means, first 
of all, one that is not subject to rule by foreigners; second, one in which the 
citizens play an active role in government, so that the laws that are enacted in 
some sense reflect the wishes of the people‖ (Miller 1991: 2-3). A caveat here is 
that this perspective ―does not imply strict democracy‖ (ibid: 3). Citizenship of a 
free political community may only be granted to certain members of a society on 
ideological grounds, as for example, 19
th
 and 20
th
 century struggles to extend 
suffrage rights to women and those of non-European ethnicity. Here freedom is 
identified with the nature of the political community or state, taken as 
representative of the collective consensus of its citizens.  
2 – Liberal. In the liberal view, freedom is taken to be  
 
a property of individuals and consists in the absence of constraint or 
interference by others. A person is free to the extent that he is able to do 
things if he wishes – speak, worship, travel, marry – without these 
actions being blocked or hindered by the activities of other people. This 
conception of freedom is also directly related to politics, but in a quite 
different way from the first. In the liberal view, government secures 
freedom by protecting each person from the interference of others, but it 
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 ‗Power‘ here being defined differently according to the ideological beliefs of the conspiracy 
theorists involved. For example, fundamentalist Christian conspiracists may see the conspirators as 
representatives of anti-Christian faiths seeking ‗spiritual power‘ over whatever sect or 
denomination is involved; nationalist conspiracy theorists may regard the conspirators‘ goal as 
‗political power‘ over the country involved, such as deep-rooted American fears of Communist 
conspiracies. 
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also threatens freedom by itself imposing laws and directives backed up 
by the threat of force. So whereas the republican sees freedom as being 
realized through a certain kind of politics, the liberal tends to see 
freedom as beginning where politics ends, especially in various forms of 
private life (ibid).  
 
In this perspective freedom is identified with the individual, with the state 
perceived in ambivalent terms as facilitator – but also potential oppressor - of 
individual freedoms. 
3 – Idealist. Miller describes the idealist perspective on freedom as one in which 
the  
 
focus shifts from the social arrangements within which a person lives to 
the internal forces which determine how he shall act. A person is free 
when he is autonomous – when he follows his own authentic desires, or 
his rational beliefs about how he should live. The struggle for freedom is 
no longer directly with the external environment, but with elements 
within the person himself which thwart his desire to realize his own true 
nature – weaknesses, compulsions, irrational beliefs, and so forth. Now 
it might at first seem as though this conception of freedom has nothing 
to do with politics. But a connection is made as soon as the idealist 
identifies certain political conditions as necessary for freedom in his 
sense – and in the history of political thought such connections have 
often been made (ibid: 4).  
 
Idealist notions of freedom can thus be applied to a variety of political 
perspectives. For example, some ―see political arrangements as providing the 
conditions under which individuals may achieve their own freedom, for instance 
by encouraging the cultural diversity which alone makes an authentic choice of 
lifestyle possible‖ (ibid: 4). Of particular note here is the idealist position in which 
politics is  
 
the means whereby people can be disciplined to follow a rational mode 
of life. It is this last possibility which has preoccupied liberal critics of 
the idealist conception of freedom. As they see it, ordinary liberal 
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freedoms – of speech, movement, and so on – may be sacrificed in the 
pursuit of a ‗higher‘ form of freedom, as the state eliminates all those 
options which it would not be rational for people to choose. Thus, in the 
liberal view, there is a close connection between (this definition of ) 
idealism…and totalitarianism in politics, whether of the Right (Nazism) 
or of the Left (Stalinist Communism)(ibid: 4-5).  
 
     Most political systems are seen to incorporate elements from all three of these 
traditions, albeit with certain perspectives more dominant than others. For 
example, the liberal democracy model that has marked modern Western societies 
(see section 4.34 below) could be perceived to adhere mostly to the republican 
perspective in which the state is the dominant arbiter of freedom. Much emphasis 
is placed upon elections in which citizens vote for parties as representatives of the 
interests of broad social groups, thus actively participating in government, with 
the state being seen as a sovereign political entity which is independent of 
external control, unlike imperial colonies. However, modern Western societies are 
also marked by a strong liberal emphasis on the freedoms of the individual outside 
of ‗collective‘ identity positions, while idealist influences can be seen in the co-
option of liberal democracies to particular ideological notions of liberty, as with 
the late 20
th
 century reconstruction of democratic states in accordance with the 
rational ideals of free-market economics.  
      A similar mixture of all three perspectives can also be seen to inform ideas of 
freedom as expressed in classical conspiracy culture. As Mark Fenster states, 
―conspiracy theory perceives the power of the ruling individual, group, or 
coalition to be thoroughly instrumental, controlling virtually all aspects of social 
life, politics, and economics‖ (Fenster 1999: xiv). The ultimate goal of the 
conspirators is perceived to be the total imposition of their power over 
successively greater levels of political organisation – societies, nations, the entire 
world. Since collective and individual freedoms represent a challenge to these 
totalitarian conceptions of power, a key aspect of conspiratorial control is the 
demolition or co-option of the structures of freedom within a given society. A 
profound fear of ‗enslavement‘ is thus a trademark of conspiracist discourse. 
Many conspiracy theorists postulate an Orwellian future in which formerly free 
citizens will be enslaved through both physical and psychological means. For 
example, many contemporary American conspiracy theorists see the 9/11 terror 
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attacks as a ‗false flag‘ operation staged by the conspiratorial US government for 
the purpose of removing collective and individual freedoms under the legitimate 
guise of the ‗war on terror‘. The ultimate goal of such staged attacks is the 
implementation of a state of martial law in which armed troops from 
conspiratorial organisations such as the federal government and the United 
Nations physically ‗enslave‘ American citizens under the pretext of protecting 
them from terrorist threats. This physical slavery is to be reinforced by 
psychological enslavement through mind control techniques, such as 
brainwashing through media content or the use of electromagnetic technologies 
(e.g. cellphone towers) to interfere with the natural processes of the human brain. 
44
 
     In relation to such conspiracist worldviews, I would argue that conspiracist 
conceptions of freedom are rooted in the liberal position, in which the state is 
posited in opposition to the liberties of the individual and  the specific identity 
groups to which they belong. For many classical conspiracy theorists, government 
activity of almost any kind is interpreted as a ‗forceful imposition of laws and 
directives‘ that is concerned with advancing the totalitarian goals of the 
conspiratorial elites in power at the expense of  the liberties of the individual and 
the general public. The conspiracist  fear of totalitarian forms of power reflects 
what Miller describes as the liberal critique of the idealistic philosophies of 
freedom, in which ―ordinary liberal freedoms – of speech, movement, and so on – 
may be sacrificed in the pursuit of a ‗higher‘ form of freedom, as the state 
eliminates all those options which it would not be rational for people to choose‖.  
The conspirators wish to gain ‗total power‘ so that they can remake society 
according to the ‗idealised freedoms‘ inherent to the ideological and religious 
positions they are seen to be affiliated with. The conspiracist conception of these 
ideals differs according to the ideological and religious affiliations of the 
conspiracy theorist in question. For example, many conspiracy theorists steeped in 
American nationalism regard the conspiratorial ideal as the replacement of the 
‗freedoms‘ of capitalist America with those of Communism. 
      While this liberal dichotomy between the freedoms of the individual and the 
repression of the state is central to classical conspiracy thought, much conspiracist 
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 Such ideas are ubiquitous throughout the American online conspiracy ‗community‘; good 
examples of such tropes can be found in the news stories and commentaries regularly posted on 
two sites which served as prime research material for this study, Alex Jones‘s Infowars.com and 
Jeff Rense‘s Rense.com.  
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discourse also incorporates elements of republican perspectives on freedom. As 
Miller states of the liberal views of freedom, governments are ambivalent in that 
their notional threats to individual freedom often operate alongside their abilities 
to secure freedom ―by protecting each person from the interference of others‖ 
through laws, social policy, etc. (Miller 1991: 3). This ambivalence towards the 
state as both oppressor and protector of freedoms is reflected in the republican 
subtext of many conspiracy theories, particularly those based in nationalistic 
worldviews. In these theories it is not the existence of the state per se that is the 
problem, but the fact that the mechanisms by which the state operates as a ‗free 
political community‘, and which help guarantee individual liberties, have been 
corrupted or taken over by conspiratorial influences. The conspiracist 
identification of the conspiratorial elites as agents of power interests foreign  to 
the ‗true‘ identity of the nation-state in question reflects republican ideas of  a free 
political community being one that is not subject to rule by foreigners. Similarly,  
the activist tone which many conspiracist theorists adopt, in which they admonish 
the ‗masses‘ for their passivity in the face of the conspiratorially-controlled state, 
is in keeping with the republican belief that a free political community is one in 
which citizens play an active role in government.  
     A combination of all three traditions of political freedom can be clearly seen in 
the thematic and narrative structures of the American nationalist conspiracy 
theories that dominate contemporary conspiracy culture. Major examples of these 
are the New World Order conspiracy theories that flourished in the 1990s militia 
movements (Fenster 1999: Goldberg 2001) and which are still being propagated 
by prominent conspiracy theorists such as Alex Jones
45
 and Glenn Beck.
46
 These 
theories hypothesise that internationalist political and economic groups such as 
the United Nations, which are secretly controlled by the Zionist Illuminati, are 
going to forcibly invade America and institute a totalitarian one world 
government. Other prominent examples include the 9/11 conspiracy theories that 
argue that corrupt elites within the US military-intelligence complex deliberately 
staged the 9/11 terror attacks, as typified by the theories of David Ray Griffin 
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 See Jones‘s website Infowars.com: http://www.infowars.com/ , accessed 31/8/10. 
 
46
 Beck is a far-right demagogue who presents his own current affairs show on the conservative 
US news network Fox News. A typical overview of his NWO conspiracist rhetoric can be found  
in American media commentator Eric Boehlert‘s article ‗Glenn Beck and the rise of Fox News‘ 
militia media‘ at MediaMatters.org, http://mediamatters.org/columns/200904070009, posted 
7/4/09, accessed 31/8/10.  
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(Griffin 2004) and Richard Gage;
47
 and the conspiratorial claims that current 
Democratic president Barack Obama is an Islamic militant or Communist agent.
48
 
The basic premise is usually one rooted in the liberal context of freedom, in which 
the liberties of the citizens of the United States (as defined by the constitution, 
regarded as the ‗sacred‘ cornerstone of American identity and freedom, and thus 
above criticism) – and the status of the USA itself as global hyper-power that 
embodies the very essence of ‗freedom‘ for the world as a whole – are threatened 
by the power structures of the US federal government. The theory then moves to a 
republican position. It is not the structure of the US government per se that is at 
fault (since this is constitutionally designed to work for rather than against the 
freedoms of ordinary citizens); instead the problem is  the control of the US 
government by ‗foreign‘, ‗un-American‘ elites whose motivations are 
conceptualised in idealistic terms. The conspirators seek to transform America 
into a totalitarian state in keeping with their ideological ideals of a free society.   
      The identification of these conspiratorial foreign elements, and the nature of 
their threats to American freedoms, is shaped by the particular ideological 
worldview of the conspiracy theorists involved. Conspiracy theorists from a 
fundamentalist Christian background tend to portray the conspirators as rivals to 
essentialist notions of American Protestantism (e.g. Catholics, Jesuits, Jews, 
Masons) or as embodiments of anti-Christian beliefs (Satanists, Illuminati, secular 
humanists). The objectives of the conspirators are to undermine the Christian 
beliefs that are regarded as integral aspects of American identity and freedom – a 
common example being the threat posed to these beliefs by the forces of 
rationalism and secular humanism, as manifested in social movements such as 
feminism and gay rights. Conspiracists from a fundamentalist nationalist 
perspective (e.g. ‗patriots‘) posit similar essentialisms. American freedom is 
identified with autonomy from foreign political influence (as per the formative 
nation-building struggle against the British in the War of Independence); 
capitalism as the economic system best suited to ensuring the liberties of the 
individual;  a suspicion of state power in relation to individual freedoms; and 
nativist conceptions of cultural identity (e.g. ‗true‘ Americans as white anglo-
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 Gage is affiliated with the group Architects and Engineers for 911 Truth: 
http://www.ae911truth.org/, accessed 31/8/10.  
 
48
 These anti-Obama conspiracy theories can be found across the classical conspiracy web sphere, 
particularly on leading American conspiracy news sites such as Jones‘s Infowars.com and 
Rense.com.  
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saxon Protestants). Nationalist conspirators thereby see the US government as 
under the control of foreign  agencies that represent the opposite of these 
freedoms. Standard identifications include:  Communists (socialism as economic 
and ideological system ‗antithetical‘ to capitalist/Christian conceptions of 
individual liberty); ‗Zionist‘ Jews (America transformed into geo-political 
‗puppet‘ through which the ‗non-Christian‘ state of  Israel can achieve their goal 
of domination of the Middle East); and ‗globalist‘ political and economic bodies 
such as the Trilateral Commission and Bilderberg Group (the political autonomy 
of the American nation-state, and the liberties entailed therein, destroyed by 
appropriation into a ‗New World Order‘ of inter-dependence between states). 
New Age inspired conspiracy theorists offer extreme and fantastical versions of 
these foreign threats to America with claims that the US government is secretly 
controlled by extra-terrestrials, inter-dimensional beings or other 
occult/paranormal forces, using US hyper-power to enact their plans for the 
conquest of Earth and enslavement of the human race.  
 
 
4.33 Democracy – key concepts 
 
     Democracy means political systems in which power is exercised in a collective 
manner incorporating all groups in a society - ―the right of all to decide what are 
matters of general concern‖ (Bullock, Stallybrass & Trombley 1988: 211). 
Underlying this system are philosophical beliefs (deriving largely from Classical 
and Enlightenment thought) about ―the value of the individual human being‖ 
(ibid). As is to be expected with such a historically and politically significant 
concept, there is no absolute definition of democracy as a singular theoretical 
object (Weale 2007). I will refer to John Keane‘s view that ―democracy is best 
understood as a system of procedural rules with normative implications‖ – such 
procedures designed ―for arriving at collective decisions in a way which secures 
the fullest possible and qualitatively best participation of interested parties‖ 
(Keane 1991: 168). These procedural rules, or what are commonly termed 
democratic rights, include  ―equal and universal adult suffrage‖ – free elections 
open to citizens regardless of identity positions; ―majority rule and guarantees of 
minority rights, which ensure that collective decisions are approved by a 
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substantial number of those entitled to make them‖;  ―the rule of law‖, which has 
to be agreed upon by citizens and applied equally to all citizens; and 
―constitutional guarantees‖ of civil liberties or the rights and freedoms of citizens 
(ibid: 168-169).   
     It is necessary to delineate notions of  civil liberties in some detail here since 
these are particularly pertinent to conspiracist ideas of personal and individual 
freedom.  
Civil liberties represent the  rights granted to citizens for the purposes of 
maintaining citizen autonomy in relation to larger structures of power. Citizens 
are free to engage in certain activities and adhere to particular beliefs without 
these being controlled by the likes of state and corporate institutions. Most 
Western democratic states recognise the following civil liberties:   
 
A – freedom of speech (or freedom of expression). Citizens are allowed to state 
and present ideas and viewpoints of any kind without fear of censure or 
punishment if the ideas are seditious or controversial. This is extended into the 
realm of the media to include ‗freedom of the press‘ and other media systems. 
B – freedom of assembly. Citizens have the rights to hold public meetings and 
engage in dialogue about topics of popular concern. 
C – freedom of petition and of association – ―the right to form parties, trade 
unions, and other societies‖ (Bullock, Stallybrass & Trombley 1988: 211).   
D – freedom of movement – citizens are free to travel without unnecessary 
restriction (within their own national borders). 
E – freedom of religion and teaching – citizens are free to practice a variety of 
religious beliefs according to their own desires without threat of persecution. 
 
The implementation of civil liberties is associated with major institutional forces 
and pieces of legislation. A cornerstone of these is the legitimation of civil 
liberties via law, through ―the establishment of an independent judiciary and 
courts to which everyone can have access‖ (ibid).  In modern liberal democracies, 
the efficacy of civil liberties are associated with pluralistic conceptions of society 
and culture. As a general tenet of political thought, pluralism can be summarised 
as ―a concern for the tolerance of difference (in beliefs and social practices)‖  
within the operation of political and social structures of power (Edgar and 
Sedgwick 1999: 281). Expressed in more directly sociological terms, pluralism  
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refers to societies that contain ―communities which are distinct in many 
(predominantly cultural) respects (such as racial background and religious 
beliefs)‖ which are unified as part of a general social collective by ―an overall 
political authority‖ (Bullock, Stallybrass & Trombley 1988: 655).  
     Raymond Williams (in his standard reference work on key terms in modern 
critical thought) qualifies the practice of democracy in the West into two main 
traditions: the socialist tradition and the liberal tradition. The socialist tradition of 
democracy conceives of ―a state in which the interests of the majority of the 
people were paramount and in which those interests were practically exercised 
and controlled by the majority‖ – the emphasis here on the direct participation of 
citizens in the democratic process. The liberal tradition differs in its emphasis on 
representation over direct participation: ―democracy meant open election of 
representatives and certain conditions (democratic rights, such as free speech) 
which maintained the openness of election and political argument‖ (Williams 
1988: 96). The socialist ‗direct democracy‘ model, in which every individual 
member of a society is invited to directly participate in debate about issues of 
collective concern,  is regarded as being virtually impossible to realise in modern 
societies marked by large population concentrations (e.g.  urbanisation) and 
complex social relationships (e.g. cosmopolitanism). Thus most Western countries 
adhere to the liberal model of democratic representation. Liberal democracy is 
typified by two broad systems of organisation. Firstly, mechanisms of 
representation. The most obvious example of this is elections based on the party 
system, in which the parties are developed as governing constructs representative 
of the values and interests of specific groups. Secondly, a feedback system in 
which the state – as representative of the people - is able to be held accountable to 
the public interest instead of pursuing agendas that reflect an unrepresentative 
wielding of power. This system takes the form of a separation between the 
institutions of the state and the public with the latter configured in terms of a 
―pluralistic and self-organizing civil society‖ (Keane 1991: 169). 
     Civil society here refers to ―the array of voluntary organizations and civic 
associations – parties, trade unions, religious organizations, cultural and 
educational bodies – that are to be found in modern liberal societies. A key aspect 
of these bodies is that, though public, they are not official or governmental. They 
enable individuals to discuss matters of public concern and to participate in the 
life of society without direction by the state. Civil society has therefore often been 
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seen…as the bulwark of liberties in modern societies‖ (Bullock & Trombley 
1999: 126).  The sphere of civil society is guaranteed by the institutions of the 
state (e.g. through legislation). Accountability takes place via mechanisms such as 
―political parties, legislatures, communications media‖ which serve to ―keep open 
the channels‖ – that is, facilitate dialogue - between the public/civil society and 
the state (Keane 1991: 169).  The political spheres of activity that constitute  
democratic societies can therefore be summarised as operating on three main 
levels: individual citizens; a civil society consisting of citizens organised into 
politically active groups; and the state as governing authority representative of the 
citizenry as a whole.  
     Concomitant with an emphasis on the accountability of political 
representatives to the public is an emphasis on the public‘s ability to critique and 
debate the performance of their representatives. In a democratic system, citizens 
have the right to evaluate and judge decisions that are made on their collective 
behalf and act towards changing these decisions through such means as elections 
and referenda.  As Keane states, ―the chief and unsurpassed advantage of 
democracy is not that it guarantees peace and quiet and good decisions, but that it 
offers citizens the right to judge…the quality of those decisions. Democracy is 
rule by publics who make judgments in public‖ (ibid: 190). Democratic political 
systems thus serve as a means for such judgments to be put into political action by 
providing  
 
citizens who are affected by certain decisions with the possibility of 
reconsidering their judgments about the quality and unintended 
consequences of these decisions. Democratic procedures sometimes 
allow the majority to decide things about which they are blissfully 
ignorant; but they also enable minorities to challenge blissfully ignorant 
majorities, to bring them to their senses (ibid: 178).  
 
Debate and conflict of opinion are therefore regarded as integral to democratic 
life. Democracy is not a static form of government but a dynamic one, responsive 
to the considered judgments or criticisms of the public.  
      This reminder of the basic tenets of democracy is helpful to understanding the 
classical conspiracist mindset. The archetypal political theme of conspiracy 
theories  - that the mass public is being secretly controlled in accordance with the 
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hidden agendas of  sinister elites in charge of institutions of power such as 
governments and corporations – can be seen as a symbolic inversion of the 
democratic ethos. Instead of citizens having control over the state, the state 
(including associated power structures such as corporations) controls the citizens. 
Here the mechanisms of democracy, such as elections and the watchdog 
institutions of civil society, are little more than fronts disguising the conspiratorial 
reality of the nature of power. In this perspective ideas of democratic autonomy 
are reduced in scale from the levels of the state and community to that of the 
individual citizen and his/her immediate family/social group. As a political entity 
the conspiracy theorist can therefore be seen as an individual citizen who has 
become aware of the corruption of the democratic apparatus of civil society and 
the state by an unrepresentative group of self-serving elites – the conspirators. The 
individual – rather than the state or the society - is reinforced here as the critical 
centre of democracy. In this context the activities of the conspiracy theorist – the 
presentation of conspiracy theories as explanations for the true nature of power  – 
can be seen to serve as substitutes for the watchdog functions of civil society that 
are perceived as inadequate due to conspiratorial influence and infiltration. Such 
activities can also serve as the basis for a conspiracist revitalisation of democracy 
in which power is reworked upwards from the level of individual autonomy. By 
propagating their conspiracy beliefs with enough efficacy, some conspiracy 
theorists can gain a large number of followers to their particular view of political 
reality; these followers in turn coalescing into bigger schools of conspiracy 
believers that can (under certain circumstances) form the basis of citizen-led 
collective movements on the civil society level. The ultimate permutation here is 
the realisation of these conspiracy-based civil movements into more directly 
political forms such as protest marches and even political parties.  
     Such processes can clearly be seen in the development of contemporary 
conspiracy theorists such as Alex Jones and David Icke into demagogic political 
figures. Both figures have successfully proselytised their individual conspiracy 
beliefs to wider audiences through techniques such as websites and lecture tours; 
both have in turn been adopted as demagogic figureheads for micro-scale ‗citizen 
movements‘ based upon their conspiracy beliefs. For example, Jones is regarded 
as a leader of the 9/11 truth movement, a coalition of citizen groups across the 
USA who believe that the 9/11 attacks were  the work of  the US government 
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rather than Al Qaeda network of fundamentalist Islamic terrorists.
49
 The 9/11 truth 
movement has undertaken a number of civil society activities, such as protest 
marches, publishing journals, and making web documentaries, as a means of 
sparking an independent re-investigation into the 9/11 attacks based on their 
conspiratorial beliefs. In 2008 Icke stood as an independent candidate in a 
parliamentary by-election for the English constituency of Haltemprice and 
Howden, as a symbolic gesture regarding the ‗crackdown‘ on civil liberties that he 
believes the conspiratorial forces controlling the UK government had 
implemented under the guise of anti-terrorism security measure. 
50
  
     Civil liberties are factors of specific importance in terms of configuring the 
relationships between conspiracy theories and democracy. Civil liberties are 
generally taken as sacrosanct principles of the rights and freedoms of citizens in 
relation to the activities of the state. Political activity that adversely affects civil 
liberties can therefore be readily construed by conspiracy theorists as indications 
of conspiratorial activity – the conspiratorial powers that control the state seeking 
to maximise their power and push through their sinister agendas by controlling the 
liberties of the citizenry. In a democratic sense, conspiracy theorists can be seen 
as civil libertarians operating primarily with regards to the freedom of expression. 
By speaking out with conspiracy theories that seem unbelievable or offensive,  
conspiracy theorists are none the less exercising their freedoms of speech, 
presenting their fellow citizens with ‗truths‘ that they think the conspiratorial 
powers do not want revealed. Such information can then form the basis for 
political action and resistance against the conspiratorially-controlled state and 
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 Like any conspiracy ‗movement‘, the 9/11 ‗truth‘ movement is particularly captious, with 
various factions and splinter groups. Jones‘s extensive advocacy of 9/11 conspiracy theories on his 
websites (e.g. Prison Planet and Infowars.com , syndicated radio show The Alex Jones Show  and 
online/DVD conspiracy documentaries (Martial Law-9/11: The Rise of the Police State, 2005) has 
led to him gaining a reputation  as a figurehead of the‘9/11 truthers‘. For instance, an article on 
Jones in the American political magazine The New Republic refers to Jones as ―a leader of the 9/11 
truth movement‖: see ‗Truther Consequences‘ by Michelle Goldberg at 
http://www.tnr.com/article/politics/truther-consequences, posted 7/10/09, accessed 23/10/09. 
     However, Jones has also been heavily criticised by other ‗truthers‘. For example, the US 9/11 
blog  justgetthere.us accused Jones of working to discredit the ‗true‘ truth movement by the 
promotion of sensational news stories (in this instance a fabricated interview on the subject of 9/11 
between President Obama and the actor Charlie Sheen that was presented as fact): 
http://justgetthere.us/blog/archives/The-Alex-Jones-Deception-False-Flag-Journalism-
Discrediting-The-Truth-Movement.html , posted 9/9/09, accessed 23/10/09.  
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 See Icke‘s statement on http://www.davidicke.com/content/view/14120,  (n.d.), accessed 
23/10/09. Needless to say Mr Icke did not win the seat, gaining a measly 110 votes in the by-
election: http://liberalengland.blogspot.com/2008/06/david-icke-to-stand-in-haltemprice_23.html,  
posted 23/6/08, accessed 23/10/09.  
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institutions. Thus any idea presented by conspiracy theorists, no matter how 
offensive or false, such as anti-Semitic beliefs in Zionist conspiracies of world 
domination, can be argued to be legitimate according to their rights as citizens to 
freedom of expression. Attempts to censor and restrict offensive views, such as 
‗hate speech‘ or libel laws, are readily invoked by conspiracy theorists as proof 
that the conspirators in control of state power are deliberately trying to thwart 
individual citizens‘ civil liberties are part of their plans for totalitarian control. 
Values and practices rooted in ideas of civil society can therefore be seen as 
important components of conspiracist content and beliefs, and, as I will argue in 
chapters 5 and 6, operate as an important link between conspiracy theory and the 
democratic principles that have been critically articulated as inherent to the 
technocultural capacities of the Internet.  
 
 
4.34 Democracy and media 
 
     The ability of citizens in liberal democracies to participate effectively in 
democratic activities requires them to be well-informed about the activities of the 
state and the opinions of other social groups. Democracy thus ―requires informed 
citizens. Their capacity to produce intelligent agreements by democratic means 
can be nurtured only when they enjoy equal and open access to diverse sources of 
opinion‖ (Keane 1991:176). Particular kinds of communication systems are 
therefore integral to the operation of liberal democracies. Such systems should be 
capable of transmitting information from the state to the citizenry in keeping with 
the large-scale, pluralistic social networks that typify the latter in modern 
societies; of transmitting information from citizen/group to citizen/group; and to 
enable dialogue to occur between citizens, groups and representatives.  
     The mainstream media systems that developed alongside Western democracies 
in the 19
th
/20
th
 centuries are generally regarded as examples of communication 
systems that fulfil the above criteria. These systems, irrespective of their function 
as purveyors of entertainment, ‗mediate‘ information across and between the 
realms of the individual citizen, civil society and the state in order to maintain 
existing democratic procedures and create an informed basis for decision-
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making.
51
 The relationship between the media and democracy has traditionally 
taken the form of the following perspectives:  
- the utilitarian perspective – ―democratic mechanisms and a free press 
guarantee that the best interpreters of interests – the interested parties themselves 
– can sift through various options and decide for themselves‖ (ibid: 175).  In other 
words, the media present a wide variety of political opinion, from which citizens 
and groups can make decisions as to how to engage in democratic activities.  
- the libertarian perspective – ―democracy and an independent media are 
justified by their ability to maximise freedom in the sense of individual or group 
autonomy‖ (ibid).  The information presented through the media can be used by 
citizens to help in the development of their own autonomy, away from larger 
structures of political control.  
- the critical perspective – ―democracy and a free press …are the strongest 
antidote to the abuse of power‖ (ibid). The media are a major part of the 
mechanisms of accountability, serving as a means of informing citizens about 
potential abuses of power in the representative state. 
     In each of these perspectives the media is seen to be serving the interests of the 
public by facilitating citizen‘s abilities to make individual and collective 
decisions, and  by ensuring the accountability of representatives within the 
different institutions of power. Public service media is the label given to media 
systems and content based upon these functions. As defined by Tim O‘Sullivan,  
 
public service broadcasting entails the provision and organisation of 
radio and television channels primarily as public utilities and resources 
rather than profitable commodities. This emphasis has entailed their 
organisation as national, cultural institutions, owned, regulated and run 
in the public interest and dedicated to the public provision of 
information and entertainment, part and parcel of the requirements of 
modern democratic societies. In contrast to the view of broadcast 
audiences as consumers to be attracted for profit – which is associated 
with the commercial model – public service broadcasting has been 
motivated much more by a commitment to the socially responsible 
provision of information and culture – to which, it is argued, all citizens 
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 The press being the original model for this democratic function. See chapter 7, section 7.2.  
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have rights of access, above and beyond their abilities to pay (O‘ 
Sullivan in Fleming 2000: 193).  
 
In this respect, public service media can be regarded as ―reflexive means of 
controlling the exercise of power. They are unsurpassed methods of checking the 
unending arrogance and foolishness of those who wield it…They help to define 
and publicize risks that are not worth taking‖ (Keane 1991: 181-182).  The close 
relationship between democracy and the media encapsulated by the public service 
model is also encapsulated in the ideas of the public sphere that are central to 
many contemporary debates about the political aspects of media systems (as will 
be discussed in detail in chapters 6 and 7).  
 
 
4.35 Populism – key concepts 
 
      A manifestation of democratic politics that is particularly relevant to 
conspiracy culture is populism. I will here refer to the essays contained in Ionescu 
and Gellner‘s (1969) comprehensive overview of the subject to delineate several 
key aspects of populist thought and practice. Populism is here theorised as 
predicated upon nationalist beliefs of a past ‗golden age‘ in which ordinary people 
were the main arbiters of their own prosperity and freedom (the pioneer 
mythologies of Western colonial nations, such as the ‗American frontier‘, are key 
examples of such beliefs) (Macrae 1969: 155). In this respect essentialist notions 
of national identity - of ‗belonging‘ to a particular nation and culture - are integral 
to the populist ethos (ibid: 156). This essentialist or idealised national identity is 
configured in relation to identity positions such as race, class, and cultural 
background (e.g. a rural/premodern past rather than an urban/modern one). 
Translated into socio-political terms, this populist ethos manifests a dichotomous 
‗us and them‘ worldview in which the ‗people‘ of the nation are adversely 
affected by the activities of elite groups of ‗outsiders‘ who have commandeered 
positions of power within the nation and are using such power to benefit 
themselves and the ‗outsider‘ ideologies or interests they represent. Because it is 
suspicious of power, populism ―distrusts the state and its bureaucracy‖ (along 
with corporations, the major institutions of power in the modern West) and 
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―would minimize them before the rights and virtues of local communities and the 
populist individual‖ (ibid: 162). Underpinning this nationalist worldview is a 
mode of address that interpellates the individual citizens who constitute ‗the 
people‘ as a ‗mass‘ unified by shared characteristics of national identity.  
     Political and economic changes that may have radical or deleterious effects 
upon large numbers of the populace are identified as the major forces leading to 
the development of populist discourses and movements as socio-political forces 
(Hofstadter 1969: 17). Such populist perspectives present the ordinary people who 
embody the true values of a nation as  the victims of the machinations of elite 
groups of outsiders who control the institutions of political and economic power. 
In such respects populism can be considered a radical political force in that it 
typically seeks major social and political change to counteract such concentrations 
of power.  However, it is also a reactionary one in that the changes advocated are 
not predicated upon progressive ideas of a new future but on regressive ones of an 
idealised national past (Macrae 1969: 159).  
     The populist idea that elite groups of outsiders have taken over institutions of 
power against the true interests of the people is one integral to almost all forms of 
classical conspiracy theory, which are ―based on the perceived secret elite 
domination over and manipulation of the entirety of economic, political, and 
social relations‖ (Fenster 1999: 66). Such conspiracy theories explicitly reflect 
populist distinctions between the ‗bad‘ elites and ‗good‘ citizenry. Here almost 
anyone in a position of institutional authority, such as politicians, bankers, 
academics, and scientists, can be condemned as members of  elites pursuing their 
own interests at the expense of the ordinary person.
52
 The populist disdain for 
such elites is augmented and amplified through the extremist or paranoid 
ideological positions of the conspiracy theorists. Those in power are no longer 
engaged in corrupt activity due to understandable human impulses such as greed 
and egotism; rather, such figures are regarded as members of supra-elite groups, 
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 A specifically American populist ethos is a central theme to most contemporary conspiracy 
culture. The main premise here is that the ‗ordinary‘ people of America, who are regarded as the 
embodiment of the ideals of liberty laid down in the Constitutional ideals at the heart of American 
identity, are finding that their ‗freedoms‘ are under threat by conspiracies of ‗un-American forces‘. 
This conflict is expressed in numerous ideological dichotomies readily apparent in an overview of 
American conspiracy theory; For example, the ‗true‘ American ‗white Anglo-saxon protestant‘ 
identity is threatened by conspiracies by ‗un-American‘ racial and religious groups such as Jews 
and Catholics; all-American ‗free-market capitalism‘ is threatened by communist and socialist 
conspirators;  American manifest destiny is threatened by ‗internationalism‘ in the form of groups 
such as the UN etc. (see Hofstadter 1966; Goldberg 2001).  
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such as the Illuminati and Masons, whose abuses of power are not opportunistic 
but intentional elements of such group‘s trans-historical schemes for world 
domination et al.
53
 While populist movements may reflect genuine issues relating 
to imbalances in the democratic structures of power,  their simplified ‗us and 
them‘ logic is readily convertible to extremist interpretations, such as the populist 
conspiracist  worldview of Nazi Germany in which ‗the German people‘ were 
portrayed as victims of conspiracies by outsider groups such as Jews and 
Communists. 
      This is not, however, to say that conspiracy theories are synonymous with  
populist political perspectives per se.  Many populist movements, such as workers 
solidarity or anti-globalisation movements, adhere to structural critiques of power 
imbalances without recourse to the extremist identity politics of conspiracist 
thought. Building on neo-Marxist formulations of power as hegemonic - fluid and 
dispersed throughout society – rather than concrete, Mark Fenster argues that 
populism is less a concrete political philosophy than ―an assemblage of often 
contradictory elements and interpellations of ‗the people‘‖. These assemblages 
can take various political forms: ―neutralized, articulated in specific directions, or 
infused with varying degrees of significance at particular (political and social) 
conjunctures‖ (ibid: 65).  Conspiracy theories can therefore represent a particular 
articulation of populist elements into a coherent form or may serve as a force 
which ‗infuses‘ populist movements with specific meanings related to the political 
and social concerns of a particular era. Thus, while recognising that conspiracy 
theory is ―necessarily populist in its evocation of an unwitting and unwilling 
populace in thrall to the secretive machinations of power‖ (ibid: 63), the 
relationship between populist political perspectives and classical conspiracy 
theories should not be regarded as a direct or causal one  - conspiracy theory ―has 
played a role of varied importance in many, but not all, populist movements‖ 
(ibid: 66).  
     The populist components of classical conspiracy thought form an important 
point of affinity between conspiracy theory and the Internet. In particular, the 
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 Such ‗paranoid populism‘ is further reflected in  conspiracist beliefs of ‗elites behind elites‘. In 
general, ‗elite‘ political organisations, such as the US government or the United Nations, are 
regarded as fronts for even more secret elites such as the Illuminati, Communists, or Zionists.  The 
Illuminati ‗superconspiracy‘ that is the default belief system for most 21st century Western 
conspiracists  takes this even further by arguing for the Illuminati as the uber-elite conspiracy 
group that operates a variety of subsidiary conspiratorial elites – the likes of the Masons, Zionists, 
Communists, etc.  
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populist dichotomy in which the freedoms of the ordinary people are adversely 
affected by the machinations of outsider elites can be seen as one resonant with 
the democratic ethos of the Internet discussed in chapter 5, in which the Internet is 
configured as empowering ordinary people through access to information and the 
ability for citizens to create their own media content.  An extension of this 
dichotomy, in which online content derived from amateur/grassroots sources is 
perceived to possess more democratic integrity than content that derives from 
professional/mainstream sources, forms an important thread in notions of the 
Internet as an alternative medium that are discussed in chapters 6, 7 and 8 as a 
major legitimating framework for classical conspiracy theory.  
 
 
4.36 Libertarianism  
 
     Alongside populism, libertarianism is another variant of democratic thought 
that forms a significant influence on conspiracist thought. With reference to 
section 4.32, libertarianism can be seen as an extension of the liberal tradition of 
freedom that associates freedom with the individual rather than the state, with the 
powers of the latter regarded as a potential threat to the liberties of the former. 
Libertarian theorist David Boaz defines libertarianism as ―a species of (classical) 
liberalism, an advocacy of individual liberty, free markets, and limited 
government rooted in a commitment to self-ownership, imprescriptible rights, and 
the moral autonomy of the individual‖ (Boaz 1998: xiv). The notion of ‗limited 
government‘ is an expression of the libertarian skepticism ―about the effects of 
concentrated power‖ to guarantee individual liberties (ibid: xv).  In this respect, 
libertarianism posits an extreme form of this liberal suspicion of the state as an 
affront to personal freedom. Libertarian Jan Narveson outlines this position as 
follows: 
 
…the state is a public with a government; and a government is a 
smallish subset of the public that has somehow acquired the power to 
rule, that is to say, to make people do the things it wants them to. 
Membership in the public is not voluntary, and being under the control 
of its government is not voluntary. All must ―join‖, whether they like it 
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or not, and the ―must‖ really means business, for the State may enforce 
its commands by outright force…It claims, indeed, a monopoly on the 
use of force, in the specific sense that private uses of force must be 
authorized by it, whereas its own employments of force, though they too 
need, in the favourable cases, to be authorized, are authorized by itself. 
In the case of nondemocratic states, this leaves the unwitting victim (= 
―citizen‖) completely at the mercy of the government‖ (Narveson 1988: 
208).  
 
Libertarians thus ―support institutions that limit and divide (centralised or 
totalising systems of) power, such as federalism, separation of powers, private 
property, and free markets. Capitalism, democracy, and the Western intellectual 
system are all competitive systems that give no one final authority‖ (Boaz 1998: 
xv).  
     Libertarian fears of excessive state power are significant ideological influences 
on contemporary conspiracy culture, particularly those based on American 
nationalist worldviews. In libertarian politics the state – as typically identified 
with the likes of the US federal government – is condemned for being large rather 
than limited, for possessing the ability to determine the freedoms of citizens 
without their active consent. The conspiracist demonisation of institutionalised 
bodies of governance as a totalitarian threat to social and individual liberty can 
readily be seen as a paranoid extrapolation of these libertarian anxieties. A good 
example of this tendency is the conspiracist worldview of the far-right 
militia/patriot movements that have been a cornerstone of American conspiracy 
culture since the 1990s (Fenster 1999: Goldberg 2001: Bratich 2008).  The 
founding documents of the USA, such as the Constitution and Declaration of 
Independence, are perceived as codifying the USA as a libertarian nation in which 
the rights and freedoms of individual citizens, rather than conceptions of ‗big‘, 
centralised government, are central to ideas of national identity.
54
 However, 
conspiratorial forces constituted of ‗non-American‘ elites have secretly gained 
control of the US government and are deliberately seeking to dismantle the 
                                                 
54The American right‘s fixation on the constitutional‘ right to bear arms‘ is directly related to this 
libertarian ethos. An armed citizenry is regarded as a necessary corrective to potential abuses of 
state power . In other words, the democratic control citizens possess over the government should 
be  literally manifested through implements of physical force, such as armaments. See section 3.2 
this chapter for further discussion of such ideas in relation to contemporary conspiracism.  
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libertarian ethos of the constitution as a means of transforming America into a 
totalitarian state which in turn will form the basis of a New World Order (NWO) 
of global totalitarian government. This paranoid libertarianism formed the basis of 
the federal government/patriot community conflicts that were a crucial aspect of 
the American political landscape in the 1990s. The early 1990s saw a number of 
occurrences in which attempts by federal authorities to enforce gun control laws 
led to the deaths of American citizens. A significant example is the Ruby Ridge 
case of 1992. In this event an American family, living in seclusion in the state of 
Idaho in accordance with their nationalist/fundamentalist conspiracy beliefs in a 
New World Order takeover of America by a Communist-Zionist-Illuminist cabal,  
were raided by Federal officials investigating the father‘s alleged involvement in 
illegal gun sales. The raid turned into a siege in which several members of the 
family were killed by federal agents. This incident seemed the very embodiment 
of paranoid libertarian conspiracy beliefs that the US government is a 
conspiratorial agency bent on using force to make citizens give up their freedoms 
in order to submit to totalising government authority. These beliefs were 
reinforced in 1993 by the similar but more infamous situation that occurred in 
Waco, Texas. Here the compound of a Christian fundamentalist cult was raided by 
federal officials on arms charges; again, the situation ended in the deaths of most 
of the cultists at the hands of federal authorities. The conspiracist implications of 
this government activity against the ‗liberties‘ of American citizens to freely bear 
arms directly motivated members of the patriot/militia communities to strike back 
at the US government via the fatal bombing of the Murrah federal building in 
Oklahoma City in 1995. 
55
 
      Despite the shared emphasis on ideas of individual freedom in relation to ‗big 
government‘, classical conspiracist thought diverges from libertarianism in its 
ideological basis in identity politics. The libertarian emphasis on individual 
freedom through the removal of systems of state control – such as regulated 
financial markets and social welfare systems – marks libertarianism as  an 
explicitly right-wing political philosophy against the ethos of state intervention 
and managerialism that marks leftist and centrist ideas of democratic government. 
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 Information on these events can be found in numerous academic and popular studies of 
conspiracy culture.  Specific sources here include: British journalist Jon Ronson‘s Them (2002) 
regarding the Ruby Ridge incident; McConnachie and Tudge (2005) (pp207-216) per the Waco 
and Oklahoma City bombings.  Chapter 5 of Bratich (2008) presents detailed cultural and political 
background of the militia/patriot movements of this period (albeit in the context of a postmodern 
legitimation of such conspiracism – see chapter 2, section 2.42).  
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However, the liberal traditions of freedom that form the basis of libertarianism – 
the freedoms of individuals to live their private lives without interference or 
coercion from larger power structures – are also those which inform left-wing 
perspectives on individual and social rights. The individual is seen in universalist 
terms as possessing the freedoms of self-ownership and self-determination outside 
of identity positions such as race and religion. For example, ―unlike orthodox 
conservatives, libertarians believe it is no part of the state‘s duties to enforce 
private morality; prostitution, drug taking and sexual perversion not involving 
harm to others are all within the individual‘s right to do what he chooses with his 
own resources‖ (Bullock, Stallybrass & Trombley 1988: 476).  
     By contrast, classical conspiracy theories explicate worldviews based on ultra-
conservative forms of identity politics. The major types of classical conspiracy 
thinking (see chapter 2, section 2.51) associate political ideas of freedom with 
essentialist cultural identity positions, such as fundamentalist Protestantism or 
Anglo-Saxon ethnicity. Conspiratorial threats to freedom are lumped with identity 
positions – such as secular humanism or Judaism – that represent the ‗other‘ in 
relation to these core fundamentalist identity positions. Activity by governments 
that accords with the liberal ideal of individual freedoms are interpreted by 
classical conspiracy theorists as evidence of conspiratorially-controlled 
government‘s plans to undermine the freedoms of these specific ultra-
conservative identity positions. For example, government legislation that seeks to 
improve the rights of women and gays in relation to liberal ideas of individual 
freedoms without constraint and interference from others is seized upon by 
fundamentalist conspiracy theorists as evidence of government efforts to 
destabilise Christianity as part of some grander anti-Christian conspiracy; social 
policies that support multiculturalism in keeping with both liberal conceptions of 
freedom and democratic ideals of pluralism are interpreted by nationalist 
conspiracy theorists as evidence of the conspiratorial takeover of the nation in 
question by ‗foreign‘ powers. The anti-liberal  nature of these essentialist 
ideologies is further augmented by conspiracist appeals to populist modes of 
political thought. The institutions of capitalism, democracy and the Western 
intellectual system that both libertarians and liberals regard as conducive to 
checks on state power (with widely differing degrees of emphasis) are generally 
condemned by conspiracy theorists as being under conspiratorial control because 
their operation is in the hands of professional knowledge ‗elites‘ (e.g. bankers, 
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politicians, academics) who are out of touch or wilfully opposed to the wishes and 
needs of the common people.  
     In these respects it can be argued that libertarian views of the state as a threat 
to individual and social liberty are crucial to  classical conspiracy culture in that 
they provide an ideological point of synthesis between liberal ideas of freedom as 
democratic ‗people power‘ and far-right ideologies that posit the workings of 
liberal democracy as a threat to the ‗freedoms‘ of essentialist identity groups. The 
ambivalence of the libertarian position, in which leftist ideas of social and 
personal liberty are combined with rightist disdain for the power structures of the 
liberal democratic state as the means by which such liberties are implemented and 
upheld, provides an ideological basis for the reconciliation of seemingly opposed 
ideological positions typical of the far-right belief structures that underlie classical 
conspiracist thought. Such ambivalence enables conspiracy theorists to present 
their critiques of power within the political framework of democratic traditions 
such as civil society and populism in ways that disguise and legitimate the 
extremist identity politics (of fundamentalist religion and nationalism) that form 
the basis of their conspiracist worldview. I will explore this theme in relation to 
the discussions of the Internet as an alternative medium in chapters 6 -8).  
56
 
     As with populism, the libertarian components of classical conspiracy theory 
also constitute an important point of affinity between conspiracy theory and the 
Internet. As I will discuss in chapter 5, the mythic discourses that surround the 
democratic potential of the Internet have been shaped by libertarian arguments 
that the Net should be kept free from state and corporate control. The Internet is a 
space unregulated by state authority where people can create and access content in 
accordance with their own prospective individual and social liberty.  A libertarian 
sensibility in which online content being presented in opposition to or produced 
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 A good contemporary example of this ambivalence can be seen in American conspiracy 
theorists‘ almost unanimous support for US senator Ron Paul as the Republican nominee for 
president in the 2008 American elections.  Paul‘s political beliefs are a mixture of libertarian 
economics and anti-statism combined with a right-wing moral conservatism. Newsletters 
expressing this beliefs in far-right terms have garnered Paul a controversial status in American 
politics. For example, the New Republic magazine in 2007 printed an article that accused Paul of 
having ―an obsession with conspiracies, sympathy with the right-wing militia movement, and 
deeply held bigotry‖.   
      Whatever his actual beliefs, Paul has effectively been adopted as a ‗poster boy‘ by American 
conspiracy theorists affiliated with nationalist conspiracy beliefs, with press releases and 
interviews regularly posted on conspiracy websites and his name gushed over in conspiracist 
essays. See:  Wikipedia page on Ron Paul: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ron_Paul, accessed 
5/02/09; and the New Republic article ‗Angry White Man‘: 
http://www.tnr.com/politics/story.html?id=e2f15397-a3c7-4720-ac15-4532a7da84ca accessed 
5/02/09. 
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outside of the structures of the state or other mainstream institutions of power, 
such as corporations,  can also be seen to form a major part of the alternative 
media ethos that I argue in chapters 6-8 is integral to the relationships between 
classical conspiracy theory and the internet.  
 
 
4.4 Summary 
 
     In this chapter I have presented a macro-focus outline of what I consider to be 
some the key ideas that constitute the underlying logic of classical conspiracy 
theory and which, as I will illustrate in the following chapters, also constitute the 
major points of connection between conspiracy theory and the technocultural 
capacities of the Internet. As the discussion in section 4.21 argued, a key aspect of 
conspiracist logic is an ostensibly radical suspicion of mainstream media power, 
which is perceived to be a major system of conspiratorial control over society. As 
illustrated by the conspiracist articles presented in section 4.22, the Internet is 
configured by conspiracy theorists as a countervailing influence to mainstream 
media power because it operates free of the organising structures of mainstream 
media and because its technocultural capacities, such as interactivity, facilitate 
more genuinely democratic means of communication that represent challenges to 
conspiratorial control.  
     In relation to the main arguments of this study, I have also (in the various sub-
sections of 4.31 – 4.36) delineated some of the key aspects of democratic thought 
and practice that I consider, in ideologically permutated forms, to form 
cornerstones of classical conspiracy belief (such as populism and libertarianism). 
These also form the basis for cybercultural discourses which articulate the Net as 
a site of radical democratic practice in ways resonant with conspiracist thought, an 
important theme that will be delineated in detail in chapter 5.  
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CHAPTER 5 
THE INTERNET AND INFORMATION FREEDOM 
__________________________________________________________________ 
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
     Chapter 4 provided a macro-level overview of the radical suspicions of media power 
that form the basis of conspiracist attitudes towards mainstream media, and conspiracist 
conceptions of the Internet as an embodiment of ideals of information freedom in terms 
of its perceived technocultural status as a medium which operates outside mainstream 
media structures. It also discussed the ways in which ideas of freedom and democracy 
are articulated in relation to classical conspiracy thought, and considered how these 
articulations  inform conspiracist attitudes towards the Internet.  
     This chapter will complement the ideas introduced in chapter 4 by presenting a 
macro-level overview of the technocultural discourses that constitute dominant 
configurations of the Internet as a ‗new‘ medium which is structured around democratic 
principles of ‗information freedom‘. I will suggest that these technocultural and socio-
political conceptualisations of ‗information freedom‘ constitute major points of 
connection between the Internet and classical conspiracy culture in relation to the ideas 
discussed in chapter 4. This chapter has two main parts. The first discusses the technical 
features that define the Internet as a ‗new medium‘, and how the communicative 
potentialities of these features have led to the Net being conceptualised in relation to 
technocultural discourses of information freedom and democratic ‗empowerment‘. The 
second part considers how these technocultural discourses have been articulated in 
relation to American cyberculture, and argues that the democratic ideals inherent in these 
discourses forms a key point of ideological resonance with the Amerocentric ideologies 
that form a key part of the logic of contemporary classical conspiracy theory.  
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5.21 The Net and discourses of the second media age      
 
     Technocultural discourses which articulate the Internet as the driving force of a 
‗second media age‘ can be seen as central to critical and cybercultural 
configurations of the Net as an embodiment of democratic ideas of information 
freedom – configurations which underlie conspiracist affinities with the Internet. 
In explicating this argument I will refer to David Holmes‘ (2005) critical account 
of new media history.  
     Holmes argues that media history has largely been conceptualised in terms of a 
McLuhanesque, technologically deterministic narrative in which new media 
technologies are portrayed as revolutionary forces of social and political change. 
He outlines this narrative in the form of dominant theoretical frameworks of the 
first media age and the second media age. The first media age is considered to 
incorporate most of the 20
th
 century, and is defined by broadcast models of media 
communication as implemented  via analogue communication technologies such 
as television, radio, and cinema. Broadcast media are typified by one-way 
transmission of content from a centralised source ―to an indeterminate mass or 
audience‖ (Holmes 2005: 84). The second media age – associated with the 21st 
century - is predicated upon a shift to digital communication technologies, such as 
the Internet, that are organised around a network system in which information 
content is generated from multiple sources and disseminated in a non-linear 
fashion across a wide number of digitally interconnected pieces of media 
hardware.  
     Holmes identifies the interactive nature of the Internet and its decentralised 
operating structure as the key technocultural components underlying the utopian 
second media age discourses of the Net‘s radical democratic potential which have 
been developed by cyberculture theorists and academics such as Howard 
Rheingold (1995), Mark Poster (1995), and the writers presented in the American 
cyberculture magazine Wired (1993-), and which have remained highly influential 
in terms of shaping popular and critical perceptions of the Internet and society.  
Such discourses configure the Internet as a compensation for and corrective to the 
power imbalances that are perceived to be inherent to mainstream broadcast 
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media such as television,
57
 offering ―free-ranging possibilities of political 
expression and rights of electronic assembly‖ within a media environment 
ostensibly free of the ―technical, political, and social‖ constraints of broadcast 
systems (Holmes 2005: 9). In this discursive framework the Net is conceptualised 
as facilitating democracy by providing new channels for democratic organization 
and new cultural spaces in which matters of cultural politics can be exercised and 
addressed. In terms of democratic organization, for example, the interactive 
capacities of the Internet are regarded as possessing the potential to facilitate 
direct democracy in the form of ―two-way interaction‖ between the public and 
institutions of power, and to aid in the mobilisation of democratic activity against 
abuses of power in the form of online dialogue and organization between 
concerned citizens (ibid: 84). In terms of cultural politics, the Net‘s capacity for 
personalised interactive communication, in combination with a decentered and 
non-hierarchical information environment is regarded as providing the basis for 
the development  of ―new kinds of [virtual] community that transcend modern 
forms of state control‖ (ibid: 10-11). Such communities could embody political 
and cultural beliefs that represent alternatives or challenges to the status quo, such 
as ―oppositional subjectivities‖ based upon marginalised identity positions related 
to the likes of ethnicity, gender, or religious affiliation (ibid: 11). The 
decentralised nature of the Internet can be seen to reinforce the democratic 
potential offered by such interactivity since it enables citizens to engage in 
communicative activity without having recourse to the centralised operating 
structures of the mainstream media and the power interests that influence such 
structures.
58
 
     As the summary in figure 1 indicates, these second media age discourses offer 
articulations of the relationships between media power, democracy, and the 
Internet resonant with the suspicions of mainstream media which were discussed 
in chapter 4 as being central to radical/critical approaches to media power and 
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 Although newspapers are not technically broadcast media, they are still based upon the ‗one to 
many‘ mode of content that is regarded as a defining principle of broadcast media, and so could be 
considered to operate in a broadcast mode on a social –cultural level.  
58
 Of course, discourses articulating the Net as a socio-political paradigm shift tend to overlook the 
‗digital divide‘ that operates in many nations regarding access to communication and information 
technologies. As Stuart Allan states, ―celebratory claims about the [likes of] ‗the global village‘ 
engendered‖ by the Internet ―ring hollow, especially when it is acknowledged that the majority of 
the world‘s population have bever even made a telephone call, let alone logged on to a computer‖ 
(Allan 2004: 190).  
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which, in ideologically distorted forms, constitute a significant component of the 
logic of classical conspiracy theory.  
 
 
Figure 2.  Differences between  first and second media age media 
 
First media age (broadcast) Second media age (interactivity) 
 
- Centred (few speak to many) 
- One-way communication 
- Predisposed to state control 
- An instrument of regimes of 
stratification and inequality 
- Participants are fragmented and 
constituted as a mass 
- Influences consciousness  
 
- Decentred (many speak to many) 
- Two way communication 
- Evades state control 
- Democratizing: facilitates universal 
citizenship 
- Participants are seen to retain their 
individuality 
- Influences individual experiences of 
space and time 
 
(ibid: 10) 
 
     The mainstream broadcast systems of the first media age are delineated here in 
terms highly evocative of the conspiracist suspicions of mainstream media as 
systems of conspiratorial control. For example, their predisposition to state control 
is in keeping with conspiracist beliefs in the state as the main agent of 
conspiratorial agency; their instrumental function in promoting socio-political 
stratification and inequality is in keeping with the conspiratorial strategy of social 
division and manipulation (as discussed in the Weidner article in chapter 4, 
section 4.22); and their constitution of the public as a mass made up of 
‗fragments‘ implies an ethos opposed to the individual and collective activity 
required to challenge conspiratorial power structures. The delineation of the 
characteristics typical of second media age media such as the Internet reflects 
conspiracist conceptions of the Internet as a medium which operates outside 
mainstream conspiratorial control and which embodies the democratic principles 
that inform conspiracist conceptions of freedom. The Net‘s position outside of the 
structures of state control is obviously highly resonant with conspiracist 
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imaginings of the state as the main agent of conspiratorial power; its 
technocultural capacities for facilitating universal citizenship reflect an innate 
adherence to the democratic ethos in opposition to the perceived conspiratorial 
agenda of totalitarian control; and the organisation of its information structures 
around notions of individual users rather than mass audiences affirms a 
commitment to ideas of personal liberty, a commitment well-suited to the 
dichotomy of personal liberty vs totalitarian power that forms one of the 
foundations of conspiracist belief.  
     The discourses of the second media age which configure the Net as a radical 
force for democratic change within a technologically deterministic narrative of 
socio-political progress through new media technologies, and which have proved 
highly influential frameworks in terms of popular and critical perceptions of the 
Net‘s role in society, can therefore be seen to inform conspiracist notions of the 
Internet as a site of information freedom from conspiratorial control.  
 
 
5.22 The Net and myths of the digital sublime 
 
     The ostensibly revolutionary relationships between the Internet and democracy 
which inform discursive conceptions of a second media age can also be articulated 
on a more intrinsic level of socio-political imagining that has particular resonance 
with conspiracist notions of information freedom. In his overview of the 
conceptual and imaginary frameworks that have shaped popular and critical 
attitudes towards the Internet and influenced the applications of Internet capacities 
to contemporary social existence, Vincent Mosco (2004) argues that discourses 
such as those of the second media age have become dominant frameworks for 
articulating the relationships between the Internet and society because they 
embody mythic conceptions of the Net as a vehicle for socio-political 
transcendence and transformation – conceptions that he collectively designates as 
the ‗digital sublime‘. By ‗sublime‘ Mosco means to evoke the theories of  
transcendent experience that were developed by Enlightenment thinkers such as 
Edmund Burke and which have become staples of Western cultural thought. The 
core ideas underlying such theories are that certain objects, environments, and 
situations are so complex and overwhelming in terms of their 
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aesthetic/experiential impact upon an individual or group that that appear to 
transcend the normally mundane nature of reality, inducing imaginative and 
metaphysical sensations such as ―astonishment, awe, terror, and psychic distance‖ 
(Mosco 2004: 23).  
     Building on the work of other cultural theorists such as Carey (1992),  Mosco 
argues that notions of the sublime have shifted in relation to the large-scale 
changes of modernity. While natural landscapes formed the Enlightenment basis 
for ideas of sublimity, modern and post-modern senses of the sublime have 
developed in relation to the scale and complexity of the technological systems 
upon which modern Western societies are based.  Although modern technologies 
have been criticised for their negative characteristics and effects (e.g. the work of 
the Frankfurt School),  the sense of the ‗technological sublime‘ that predominates 
in Western societies is generally a positive one due to the deep associations made 
between technological systems and the utopian grand narratives, such as the 
concept of ‗progress‘, that are integral to Western thought.  The scale and 
complexity of the Internet and other ICTs have led to the development of a 
‗digital sublime‘ within contemporary Western culture in which the Internet,  in 
particular, is perceived as a technology that can help individuals, communities and 
even whole cultures ‗transcend‘ the limitations of the material, social and political 
realities in which they are situated.  
     These imaginative configurations of the Internet as a medium of transcendence 
and transformation have powerful mythic overtones in relation to ideas of 
democracy, power, and media. Mosco uses ‗myth‘ in the socio-cultural and 
ideological senses within which it is has been articulated within the contemporary 
humanities and social sciences fields via the influence of structuralist theorists 
such as Levi-Strauss and neo-Marxist/post-structuralist theorists such  Gramsci, 
Foucault and Barthes. In relation to these structuralist perspectives, Mosco 
delineates myths as ―stories that help people deal with contradictions in social life 
that can never be fully resolved‖ (Mosco 2004: 28).  Such contradictions may 
include the desire for people to express their individuality ―and yet participate 
fully in a collective community‖, and people‘s wish to control their circumstances 
even as they ―desire to give up some control to bring about a more democratic 
society‖ (ibid). The neo-Marxist/post-structuralist approaches to myth develop 
this structuralist theme by arguing that myth is ―a political term that inflects 
human values with ideology‖ (ibid: 30). Myths serve to transform the innate 
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contradictions of social life and the ―messy complexities of history‖ (ibid) into 
simplified and idealised versions of social reality. While these mythic ideals are 
often developed and/or appropriated by dominant power structures as discourses 
of normality and common-sense which serve to naturalise the ideology that 
underpins such power (an approach favoured by neo-Marxist theorists), they may 
also function as expressions of alternative modes of social existence (an approach 
more readily associated with the likes of postmodern theory and cultural politics 
perspectives). In this respect, myths may be seen to be catalysts for change in that 
they motivate people to instigate social and political change according to the 
mythic ideals in question.  
      For Mosco,  technologically determinist discourses such as those of the second 
media age which configure the Internet as the basis of paradigm shifts in Western 
society are particularly powerful and appealing because they correlate the ‗digital 
sublime‘ with mythic ideals of democratic revolution. In this articulation, ―the 
Internet provides the basis for a powerful myth‖ (ibid) of transcendence over or 
transformation from the stagnant or corrupt cultural and political structures of 
modernity and late capitalism. Mosco labels this mythic configuration the 
‗Internet revolution‘, and delineates it as  
 
a story about how ever smaller, faster, cheaper, and better 
computer and communication technologies help to realize, with 
little effort, those seemingly impossible dreams of democracy and 
community with practically no pressure on the natural 
environment. According to this view, computer communication 
empowers people largely by realizing the perennial dream of 
philosophers and librarians: to make possible instant access to the 
world‘s store of information without requiring the time, energy and 
money to physically go where the information is stored. Moreover, 
the story continues, computer networks offer relatively 
inexpensive access, making possible a primary feature of 
democracy, that the tools necessary for empowerment are equally 
available to all. Furthermore, this vision of the Internet fosters 
community because it enables people to communicate with one 
another in any part of the world. As a result, existing communities 
are strengthened and whole new ‗virtual‘ communities arise from 
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the creation of networks of people who share interests, 
commitments, and values. (ibid: 30-31) 
 
The key mythic idea encapsulated in the ‗Internet Revolution‘ myth that informs 
dominant cyber-discourses such as those of the second media age is that of 
transcendence and transformation in the form of democratic empowerment. The 
Internet is configured as a medium which empowers individuals and societies by 
facilitating communicative practices conducive to utopian ideals of ―democracy 
and community‖ (ibid: 30).  
     Mosco identifies accessibility and interactivity as the two main technocultural 
principles of the Net which embody these mythic ideals of ‗cyber-empowerment‘. 
In terms of accessibility, the virtuality of the Internet - its ability to transcend the 
material barriers of time and space through the development of electronically 
created ‗virtual realms‘ in cyberspace (such as the Web) – is regarded as the main 
factor enabling the Net to transcend the material limitations of ―time, energy, 
money‖ and geography that have traditionally restricted most peoples access to 
information as presented through mainstream broadcast media (ibid: 31) The 
Internet enables information in a variety of forms (text, images, sounds) to be 
stored online as digital codes that are capable of being accessed by anyone around 
the world who possesses the appropriate and, (by Western standards), ―relatively 
inexpensive‖ computer and telecommunications equipment (ibid: 31). In this 
respect the Internet can be mythologised as a ‗digital library‘, a potentially 
limitless ―storage house of information that is instantly accessible through any 
computer at any time‖ (ibid: 51), which empowers citizens by providing them 
with prospective access to the entire world‘s  ―store of information‖ (ibid: 30) and 
thus keeping them particularly well-informed and capable of making considered 
political decisions in relation to the tenets of public service media (as outlined in 
chapter 4 section 4.34). In terms of interactivity, the technocultural capacities of 
the Net enable it to facilitate interactive communication between people who 
would previously have been unable or unwilling to engage in direct interpersonal 
forms of contact due to the technical constraints and socio-political limitations of 
mainstream broadcast media. In these respects the Net can be regarded as 
empowering citizens by facilitating the development of virtual communities and 
thereby enhancing the sense of collective action which is a necessary requirement 
for democratic activity (see chapter 4 section 4.33). People can use the Net to 
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strengthen the existing communities to which they belong,  while ―whole new 
‗virtual‘ communities‖ may ―arise from the creation of networks of people who 
share interests, commitments, and values‖ (ibid: 31). 
    I argue that the Net is conceptualised by conspiracy theorists in relation to these 
democratic myths of the digital sublime. The technocultural capacities of the 
Internet enable conspiracy theorists to transcend what they perceive as the 
conspiratorial control structures of mainstream media and develop information 
practices which empower them in their self-perceived radical struggle against the 
forces of conspiratorial control. For instance, the mythic configuration of the Net 
as a digital library can be seen to be integral to the conspiracist development of 
online information practices. The mythic notion that the Internet is an omniscient 
medium in that it is has the potential to store vast quantities of information is 
reflected in the fact that conspiracy theorists rely upon the Net as their resource 
base in terms of researching evidence for their theories, and presenting such 
evidence through forms such as websites or online documentaries. For example, 
the conspiracy documentary series Loose Change (2005- 2009), something of an 
online cause celebre in its promotion of the conspiracy theory that the 9/11 terror 
attacks were an ‗inside job‘ undertaken by conspiratorial forces in the US 
government, is constructed almost entirely from news and library footage sourced 
from websites. The development of conspiracy documentaries (either as 
downloads or DVDs) constructed from online footage by conspiracy theorists 
using the convergent and interactive technocultural capacities of the Internet (e.g. 
digital filmmaking software) has, over the last several years, become a staple of 
online conspiracist practice (Sargeant 2006). The ‗digital library‘ myth configures 
the Net as a medium of free information which transcends the archival, economic,  
and institutional limitations that restrict conspiracy theorists‘ ability to undertake 
similar practices in relation to mainstream media.
59
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 Conspiracist documentaries such as Loose Change also make clear some of the limitations of the 
digital library that render it a more mythic than realistic framework for Net practice in their belief 
that access to large amounts of information online equate with the qualitative veracity and worth 
of such information. In other words, it appears to be automatically assumed by conspiracy 
theorists– as an act of faith in the democratic potential of the Net, perhaps? – that information 
presented online by amateur users is somehow as truthful as that undertaken by mainstream 
information experts such as journalists, academics, and public intellectuals because of what they 
perceive to be the Net‘s inherently democratic nature. 
     This conflation of the quantitative information capacities of the Net with the qualitative 
properties of information itself is also eminently suited to conspiracist practices of ‗pseudo-
scholarship‘ (Hofstadter 1966; Knight 2001). Of particular relevance to the digital library 
framework is the practice of ‗data-bombing‘, in which conspiracy theorists present large amounts 
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     Mythic conceptions of online communities as sites of democratic 
transcendence over the socio-political strictures of real world communities are 
also reflected in the development of conspiracist demagogues such as Alex Jones 
and David Icke. These figures make use of the interactive capacities of the Net in  
forms such as personal website forums and amateur streamed radio and television 
broadcasting
60
 to present themselves as figureheads for an ostensible online 
community of conspiracy theorists who believe in superconspiracy theories 
regarding the Illuminati (as also discussed in chapter 7, section 7.32). These 
examples of the ways in which conspiracy theorists use the technocultural 
capacities of the Net to empower themselves outside of the mainstream media 
illustrate the ways in which discursive articulations of the Net as a radical 
democratic medium, such the myths of the ‗Internet revolution‘ that are inherent 
to cyber-utopian discourses of the digital sublime, constitute a profound point of 
connection between the Internet and the logic of conspiracy theory. 
 
     
5.3 American discourses of the Internet and information freedom 
      
     Mythic discourses of the Internet as an embodiment of democratic ideals, such 
as those of the second media age and the digital sublime, form a particularly 
prominent aspect of American cyberculture because such discourses resonate 
profoundly with the democratic ideals that constitute the mythic underpinnings of 
American political and cultural identity. In this section I will extend the 
arguments presented in sections 5.21 and 5.22 above to a consideration of how the 
democratic discourses of American cyberculture constitute a major point of 
connection with the Amerocentric worldview and values that predominate 
classical conspiracy thought.  
     As cyber-critics such as Richard Barbrook (2006, 2007) have argued, mythic 
associations between the technocultural capacities of the Internet and democratic 
empowerment, as articulated in cyber-discourses such as those of the second 
                                                                                                                                     
of evidence in the form of decontextualised ‗factoids‘ or pieces of information ‗cherry-picked‘ 
from mainstream sources as collectively constituting qualitative evidence for the reality of the 
conspiracy in question.  
 
60
 See Alex Jones‘s websites Prison Planet.com,  http://www.prisonplanet.com/ and Infowars.com, 
http://www.infowars.com/, and David Icke‘s website, http://www.davidicke.com/index.php/, 
accessed 15/9/10. 
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media age, have predominantly been articulated in relation to American 
democratic traditions. Barbrook identifies the American cultural mythology of the 
‗frontier‘ as a defining context for the development of such articulations. This 
frontier mythos equates perceptions of geographical and socio-cultural space with 
the democratic ideals that are enshrined in the founding texts of American 
nationhood such as the Declaration of Independence and the Constitution. In this 
mythos the ‗wide open spaces‘ of the American continent that formed the physical 
frontier to American nation-building during the periods of colonialism and 
independence are configured as symbols of the democratic ideals that defined 
America as a nation against the old world of Europe. Because such frontier spaces 
exist outside of or on the edges of society, they represent a social and cultural 
space where individual citizens can express their democratic rights and freedoms 
to their fullest potential outside of the repressive structures of social and political 
control that are associated with the centralized state and established civilization.  
The frontier therefore symbolises the utopian possibilities of American democracy 
by contrast with the absolutist or statist power structures typical of early modern 
Europe or, to state their most influential modern permutation, communist Russia.  
    In this respect Barbrook, and other cultural historians such as Francois Cusset 
(2008),  have delineated the historical development of the Internet in relation to 
American society as one shaped by the radical and libertarian perspectives of the 
computer engineers and cyber-theorists who constituted the ―alternative 
cybercultures and political subgroups‖ which were formed around the ―early days 
of the Internet‖ in late 80s/early 90s America (Cusset 2008: 253), and which 
drove the technological and socio-cultural processes that led to the Internet 
becoming established in its present form as a popular, everyday medium. As 
Cusset argues, the cybercultural perspective that ―emerged victorious‖ as  the 
dominant discursive framework for conceptualising the relationship between the 
Net and American society ―was that of the civil libertarians‖ (ibid). This group 
configured the Internet in mythic terms as a ‗virtual frontier‘ in which the 
democratic ideals underlying American life could  be reclaimed and revitalized in 
response to the repressive structures of centralized state government. Referring 
back to the technocultural principles of cyber-empowerment outlined in the 
discussion of the digital sublime in section 5.22, and the outline of civil liberties 
presented in chapter 4 section 4.33, these discourses articulated the Internet as a 
medium which offered American citizens  the potential to more fully realize their 
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civil liberties through more open access to information, which empowered 
citizens freedom of speech and expression, and interactive communication, which 
empowered citizens freedoms of assembly and association.   
     As Cusset notes, the civil libertarians successfully ―argued for freedom of 
expression without regard to content, intransitive to the point of tautology‖, and 
―for the abolition of copyright laws in favor of self-regulating use by 
communities‖ (ibid). They also 
 
brandished the [libertarian] notion of a ―Washington conspiracy‖ 
and called for general privatization and dismantling of state 
power, which allegedly policed communication and encrypted its 
own internal messages. Promoted by John Perry Barlow...and his 
Electric Frontier Foundation, along with several other white and 
regionalist lobby groups, the [civil libertarian] movement made 
the sacrosanct freedom of expression into the sole ―content‖ of 
the Internet, instead of working toward an exogenous political 
program, some form of collective action off of the Internet – 
because [its‘ libertarian ethos] denied the very notion of public 
space (ibid). 
 
The name of the leading civil libertarian ‗cyber-lobby‘ group – the Electric 
Frontier Foundation – makes explicit the symbolic affinities they perceived 
between the historical frontier of the American landscape and the virtual frontier 
of cyberspace typified by the Internet. This articulation of the Internet as an 
extension of American democracy is also evident in one of the seminal documents 
of American cyberculture developed by Barlow and the ELF, ‗A Declaration of 
the Independence of Cyberspace‘ (1996). As its title suggests, this document, 
written in response to then - proposed government legislation seeking to restrict 
and regulate Net content on political and economic grounds, uses the 
revolutionary mythology of American ‗independence‘ from colonial rule to 
articulate cyberspace (and the Internet) as a similarly revolutionary cultural space 
independent of the perceived oppressive structures of American governmental 
power.
61
 In this radical cyber-cultural ethos, the Net is discursively configured as 
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 The  writing style of the document is explicitly referential to the tone and content of the original 
constitution; e.g. ―These increasingly hostile and colonial measures place us in the same position 
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a democratically revolutionary space that operates outside of the repressive 
structures of mainstream media power and which possesses technocultural 
capacities that facilitate American citizens‘ abilities  to challenge and critique 
government power. This is in accordance with the libertarian suspicions of big 
government – what Cusset delineates as the notion of a ‗Washington conspiracy‘ - 
that are a prominent strand in American political thought. 
     These radical and libertarian impulses intrinsic to the dominant discourses of 
American cyber-culture constitute important affinities with the libertarian 
perspectives that inform classical conspiracist conceptions of the American 
government as the leading agent of conspiratorial power.
62
 To illustrate this I will 
present an article by American conspiracy theorist ‗Jolly Roger‘, taken from the 
leading American conspiracy news website Rense.com, as an exemplar of 
conspiracist attitudes towards the American government.  The author is affiliated 
with the ‗American Resistance Movement‘, a grassroots network of ‗patriot‘ 
groups across the USA whose worldview is predicated upon nationalistic 
conspiracy beliefs that the size and power of the federal government in the lives of 
American citizens is unconstitutional and therefore indicative of the fact that the 
government is under the control of conspiratorial forces opposed to the ideals of 
American democracy.
63
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                     
as those previous lovers of freedom and self-determination who had to reject the authorities of 
distant, uninformed powers.‖ From  http://homes.eff.org/~barlow/Declaration-Final.html, accessed 
11/12/08.  
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 The American socio-political contexts that inform most contemporary conspiracy theories are 
explicated in many of the conspiracy theory studies discussed in chapter 2 (e.g. Hofstadter 1966; 
Johnson 1983; Melley 2000; Goldberg 2001; Knight 2002). These contexts form the basis for the 
undeniably Amerocentric worldview of most classical conspiracy theories, which are predicated 
upon variants of the theme ‗the plot against America‘. For example, the Illuminati 
superconspiracy that is predominant in classical conspiracy circles is generally described as 
centering around the Illuminist takeover of the American government in order to implement their 
totalitarian New World Order/One World Government (see chapter 2 section 2.51). That this 
conspiracist worldview is heavily influenced by extremist notions of American national identity is 
evidenced by the identification of the conspirators with groups such as Communists, Zionists, 
Masons, Catholics, and internationalist bodies such as the UN, EU, and Trilateral Commission. 
Such groups and organisations represent outside alternatives or perceived threats to what the 
conspiracy theorists consider to be the essential American ideals of democracy, free market 
capitalism and ‗white Anglo-Saxon Protestant‘ cultural identity.  
 
63
 These ‗patriot‘ groups  ―share in the belief that the Constitution is the supreme law of the land 
and that Government must abide by it, be limited by just powers derived therein and should never 
act outside its constitutional limitations. We have a common belief that Liberty and Justice is for 
all and extends to all the citizens of our great republic.‖   From the American Resistance Movement 
website, http://www.theamericanresistancemovement.com/about.php,   accessed 11/12/09.  
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Conspiracy Theorists 
By Jolly Roger 
2-20-9 
  
Everyone has heard, and has probably used the term "conspiracy 
theorist," and the fact of the term being in common use, also 
indicates that we generally agree on what it means. I saw a movie 
by that name, and the title character was a raving lunatic who kept 
his food in thermoses with combination locks to reduce his chances 
of being poisoned by imaginary enemies.  
   
Regardless of how the stupid movie turned out, what's important 
here is the common perception people have of someone to whom 
that label is applied, and just as important, is who it is that applies 
the label. The common perception is that someone who is labeled a 
"conspiracy theorist" is suffering from some type of psychological 
disorder, and that label is usually applied to people by our 
government, and our news media. The next thing to consider, is 
that the label is applied to anyone who questions our government's 
version of events in any matter. Doesn't it logically follow that the 
media are teaching us to assume that anyone who questions the 
government is insane? When that label is applied to a person, 
doesn't it become easy to dismiss everything they say without even 
hearing it? How convenient for them.  
   
I think the label first became widely used to slander people who 
questioned the details surrounding the JFK assassination, and forty 
years later, there aren't too many thinking people who still believe 
the Warren Commission's "lone gunman" explanation. That 
explanation is doubted by everyone who has taken the time to look 
into the details, and believed only by people who refuse to.  
   
Which is "theory" and which is fact? In the absence of a full 
confession, this can only be decided by a preponderance of 
evidence, and it would be silly to come to a conclusion on any 
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matter without looking at all the evidence available. This is only 
common sense, just as it is safe to assume some degree of guilt or 
complicity on the part of anyone who lies about an event, or tries to 
hide, plant, or destroy any type of evidence.  
   
Conspiracy theories arise from evidence. After the government 
releases an explanation of a particular event, a conspiracy theory 
is only born because evidence exists to disprove their explanation, 
or at least call it into question. There's nothing insane about it, 
unless you define sanity as believing whatever the government tells 
you. In light of the fact that our government lies to us regularly, I 
would define believing everything they tell you as utter stupidity.  
   
In July of 1996, flight 800 exploded over Long Island. Shortly after 
their terrorist explanation failed scrutiny, our government then 
explained the event by claiming that a faulty electrical system 
caused a spark that ignited a fuel tank, and the people who doubted 
this explanation were quickly labeled "conspiracy theorists." More 
than a hundred witnesses saw a missile travel from the ground up 
to the plane just prior to its explosion, but rather than being treated 
as eyewitnesses to an event, they were labeled "conspiracy 
theorists," which label allowed all subsequent investigation to 
ignore the strongest evidence in the matter.  
   
Our "investigative" news agencies decided to accept and 
disseminate the official story, and they helped us forget the U.S. 
naval station nearby, the fact that missiles were regularly test fired 
there, and naturally, they paid no heed to more than a hundred 
"conspiracy theorists" who saw the plane get blown out of the sky 
by a missile. I believe that the U.S. Navy accidentally shot down 
flight 800, and that's my belief because it's the most sensible 
explanation that can be drawn from the available evidence. I'm not 
theorizing about conspiracies, but there are conflicting 
explanations of the event, and if the Navy did accidentally blow a 
passenger plane out of the sky, who would have a motive to lie 
133 
 
about it? The U.S. government, or a hundred witnesses?  
   
Then of course, there were the "crazy conspiracy theories" arising 
from the bombing of the Alfred Murrah federal building in 
Oklahoma City. In that matter, audio tapes and witnesses agree 
that there were two explosions, the first of which occurred inside 
the building between eight and ten seconds before the truck bomb 
exploded. Explosive experts agree that Timothy McVeigh's fertilizer 
bomb could not have destroyed the building, and the FBI's counter 
terrorism chief, and members of BATF lied about their whereabouts 
during and prior to the catastrophe. The evening news decided not 
to tell you any of this, and they will label anyone who tries to a 
"paranoid conspiracy theorist." In light of the evidence, we would 
be complete fools if a conspiracy theory didn't exist.  
   
There were no conspiracy theories arising from the explosion of 
flight 103 over Lockerbie, Scotland, and there were no conspiracy 
theories arising from the work of the uni-bomber, so the newly 
invented psycho-babble that tries to explain the malady of 
conspiracy theorists, also needs to explain why millions of 
conspiracy theorists all decided not to theorize about those events. 
There is no psychological malady. There was simply no evidence to 
indicate a conspiracy.  
   
The real question is not why people theorize about conspiracies, but 
why people choose to believe the government's version of events 
when it's obvious that they're lying. One reason is that most people 
never see the evidence because our "news" industry hides it, and 
another reason is that the same news industry will quickly 
associate anyone who questions the government with the people 
who see Elvis, Bigfoot, and UFO's.  
   
But sadly, I think the main reason people choose to believe the 
government's version of events despite overwhelming evidence to 
the contrary, is because it's easier, and safer. If you ignore most of 
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the evidence, and accept as plausible whatever ridiculous 
explanation the T.V. provides, your life remains simple, and you get 
to sit on your ass and watch more T.V. If on the other hand, you 
pluck your head from that same ass and realize you've been lied to, 
as a citizen in a democratic society, you're instantly burdened with 
being responsible for doing something about it. Every citizen of the 
United States has a civic duty to participate in their government, 
and keep themselves informed of its actions, or government "of the 
people, by the people, and for the people" isn't possible. You were 
warned that "eternal vigilance is the price of freedom, " but you 
chose to ignore your government, and believe whatever they told 
you, and because of this, Americans have lost their freedom. 
Although presidents and senators are public servants, unlike the 
dog catcher and mailman, they wield a lot of power over people's 
lives, and that's why they have to be watched, and scrutinized.  
   
Statistical analysts from UCLA and Rutgers University believe that 
John Kerry won the 2004 presidential election by an estimated 1.3 
million votes, and despite the fact that these learned scholars are 
probably the most qualified people alive to forward such an 
opinion, our news media dismisses this as "conspiracy theory." 
George W. Bush lost the 2000 election, and he lost the 2004 
election, but he's occupying the White House, shredding our 
constitution, and stealing our wealth and freedom in a "war on 
terror" that's as fraudulent as his presidency because many 
Americans are too stupid to see it, too lazy to do anything about it, 
or both.  
   
I'm sorry if I sound angry, but the fact of the matter is that I am 
angry. While you were staring into the television like an idiot, our 
freedom, wealth, and constitutional protections have been stolen 
from us, and because you're stupid enough to believe the manure 
being shoveled by our government, you've allowed them to commit 
bigger and more heinous crimes. Because you were too lazy to 
research their nonsensical economic policies, and see them for the 
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scams that they are, we'll all soon be living in poverty. And because 
you're so lazy, apathetic, and easily lied to, millions have died for 
the profits of a few. I have every right to be angry, and only a fool 
wouldn't be.  
   
Only a small portion of my anger is reserved for the government of 
the United States, because they only did what can be expected of 
any government. They grabbed money, power and control where it 
was easy to do so. Most of my anger is directed toward my fellow 
American citizens, because they allowed it to happen by believing 
whatever they're told, and not doing what's expected of them. 
Patriotism in America does not mean waving the flag in blind 
loyalty to the government. As an American citizen, you have a civic 
duty to question your government, and hold them accountable for 
their actions, not use the flag as a blindfold. The American people 
have been duped once again, and it doesn't seem like it's a difficult 
thing to accomplish.  
   
America's latest "conspiracy nuts" are better known as the 9-11 
truth movement. The news media are doing their usual job of 
slandering them with their usual childish name calling, but for 
more than three years, they have refused to show you the 
documented fact, scientific data, expert testimony, photographic 
evidence, or the credible eyewitness accounts that prove U.S. 
government complicity in the events of September, 11, 2001. If this 
were just a "crazy conspiracy theory," I don't think people in our 
government would have worked so hard to destroy, hide, and lie 
about the evidence. The White House tried to derail every 
investigation into the matter. If we had an honest government, we 
wouldn't have conspiracy theories. We would have honest 
investigations, and fair trials, but these things are disappearing 
from America.  
   
There are disturbing facts regarding the events of September 11 
that every American needs to be aware of , but naturally, none of it 
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will be on T.V. I've met a lot of people in the 9-11 truth movement, 
and I can assure you that none of them are crazy, paranoid, or 
even "conspiracy theorists." One generalization I can make about 
them is that they all seem to be very intelligent. Maybe the smartest 
thing you could do would be to start listening to them. The Arabs 
don't "hate your freedom." The White House hates your freedom, 
because it's the only thing that stands between them, and unlimited 
power. - Jolly Roger  
   
"Eternal Vigilance is the Price of Freedom" - Thomas Jefferson  
   
911truth.org 911review.org 911review.com physics911.org wtc7.net  
   
Anything written by "Jolly Roger" is the property of the American 
Resistance Movement, and the author hereby grants permission to 
anyone who so desires to post, print, copy, or distribute this letter 
as they see fit, and in fact, the author encourages you to do so.  
(Roger, 2009).  
 
 
    The libertarian suspicion of government evident in the ‗cyber-libertarian‘ critique 
of the US government as a ‗Washington conspiracy‘ because of its intentions to 
regulate the Internet, is on explicit display in Jolly Roger‘s article. He takes for 
granted that the US government would engage in conspiratorial acts such as 9/11 
and the 1995 Oklahoma City bombing because such activity is what ―can be 
expected of any government‖ – to grab ―money, power and control where it [is] easy 
to do so‖ (Roger 2009). Since conspiracy and corruption are conceptualised in these 
libertarian terms as the natural state of government, the upholding of the ideals of 
democracy lies with the people rather than the state. In this respect Jolly Roger 
argues that American citizens have ―a civic duty to question [the American] 
government, and hold them accountable for their actions‖ (ibid), in accordance with 
the libertarian ideal that forms a cornerstone of American democratic mythology: 
‗eternal vigilance is the price of freedom‘. 64  
                                                 
64
 Although this adage is commonly attributed to Thomas Jefferson, its historical provenance is 
that of a speech given by 19
th
 century American abolitionist Wendell Phillips. Internet references: 
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    However, Roger excoriates his fellow citizens for failing to exercise such 
vigilance and allowing themselves to be ‗duped‘ into accepting the official version 
of events such as 9/11, rather than the conspiracist explanations of government 
conspiracy which he assumes to be the truth. He therefore considers that the most 
important epistemological question raised by the likes of 9/11 conspiracy theories 
―is not why people theorize about conspiracies, but why people choose to believe the 
government‘s version of events when it‘s obvious that they‘re lying‖ (ibid). In 
keeping with the conspiracist suspicions of mainstream media articulated in the 
conspiracist articles by Swinney and Weidner outlined in chapter 4 section 4.22, 
Roger identifies the answer as the implication of mainstream journalism within the 
conspiratorial apparatus of state power.  
     The mainstream news media are perceived as a propaganda arm of the 
government rather than a public service (see chapter 4, section 4.34), using tactics 
such as the  suppression of information - ―most people never see the evidence 
because our ―news‖ industry hides it‖ - and socio-cultural marginalisation - ―the 
same news industry will quickly associate anyone who questions the government 
with the people who see Elvis, Bigfoot, and UFOs‖ (ibid). As evidence that the 
mainstream news media plays such a propaganda role, Roger provides a 
representative example in the form of mainstream journalists‘ dismissal as 
‗conspiracy theory‘ of the purported analysis undertaken by statisticians at UCLA 
and Rutgers University – ―probably the most qualified people alive to forward such 
an opinion‖ – which indicated that John Kerry, rather than George W. Bush, won the 
2004 presidential election in terms of votes. Roger also reflects the conspiracist 
animus against television as the mainstream medium most-suited to the practices of 
conspiratorial information control (clearly expressed in the Swinney article in 
chapter 4 section 4.22) by associating television news with the wilful ignorance of 
the public to face up to the conspiracist truth about government : ―if you ignore most 
of the evidence, and accept as plausible whatever ridiculous explanation the T.V. 
provides, your life remains simple, and you get to sit on your ass and watch more 
T.V.‖ (ibid). 
     As a countervailing influence to this mainstream media control, and in keeping 
with the American libertarian ethos which underpins the civil libertarian cyber-
culture discourses of Internet independence and information freedom, Roger 
                                                                                                                                     
http://www.bartleby.com/73/1073.html, http://www.quotationspage.com/quote/14714.html, 
accessed 15/12/09.  
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configures the Net as a radical medium that empowers American citizens to fulfill 
their civic duty of ‗eternal vigilance‘ against the conspiratorial power of government 
through engagement with democratic information practices akin to those outlined in 
section 5.22 above. In its mythic configuration as a digital library, the Net has the 
capacity to make conspiracist information accessible to the public that would 
otherwise be unavailable through mainstream media channels. Thus, the 
―documented fact[s], scientific data, expert testimony, photographic evidence‖ and 
―credible eyewitness accounts that prove U.S. government complicity‖ (ibid) in the 
9/11 terror attacks – and which have been suppressed by the mainstream American 
news media – can be made available online for the edification of the American 
public as to the conspiratorial truth of American government power. The idea that 
the interactive capacities of the Net can facilitate virtual communities and collective 
action online as forms of radical opposition to mainstream media control is also 
evident in the disclaimer at the end of Jolly Roger‘s article, in which he ―grants 
permission to anyone who so desires to post, print, copy, or distribute this letter as 
they see fit, and, in fact, the author encourages you to do so‖ (ibid). Roger sees the 
free online circulation of his article online as contributing to American citizens‘ 
abilities to fulfill their civic duties of ‗eternal vigilance‘ because his conspiracist 
arguments make people aware of the conspiratorial ‗truth‘ of American government 
power and the ways in which the mainstream media are working to render them 
passive in the face of such power. As the title ‗American Resistance Movement‘ 
signifies, such conspiracist knowledge can be translated into radical collective action 
which challenges and resists the conspiratorial power of ‗big government‘. Through 
its capacities to provide American citizens with access to conspiratorial information 
about the conspiratorial nature of the US government, and to facilitate collective 
action between citizens as a means of critiquing and resisting such power, Jolly 
Roger‘s article configures the Internet in libertarian terms as a major tool of the 
‗eternal vigilance‘ that American citizens must exercise as part of their civic duties 
regarding the preservation and maintenance of the democratic ideals of American 
nationhood. 
65
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 A prime example here are the so-called ‗tea-bagger‘ citizens movements that manifested in the 
American political landscape in 2009. The tea-baggers were groups of rightwing Americans 
opposed to what they regarded as the ‗un-American‘ policies of the  Obama administration, such 
as ‗socialistic‘ proposals to overhaul the largely privatised healthcare system in favour of a state-
governed scheme. The political perspective of the tea-baggers was one rooted in nationalistic 
conspiracy theories, such as those  in which President Obama (in particular) is accused of being 
the head of a communist or Islamic plot to ‗take over‘ America, and was inspired and supported by 
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     As this section illustrates (as an extension of the ideas presented in sections 5.21 
and 5.22 regarding the discursive framing of the Net as an embodiment of radical 
democratic ideals), the American cybercultural discourses which configure the Net 
as a ‗virtual frontier‘ where the libertarian impulses that underpin the mythic ideals 
of American democracy can be realised can be seen to constitute a major point of 
affinity between the Net and the libertarian suspicions of the US government that are 
an integral part of the logic of contemporary classical conspiracy theory. 
      
 
5.4 Summary  
 
     This chapter has examined cybercultural discourses which have been 
particularly influential in terms of shaping Western perceptions of the Internet as a 
revoutionary medium of democratic empowerment, and has argued that these 
configurations constitute major points of connection with radical ideas of 
information freedom from mainstream media control that were discussed in 
chapter 4 as central aspects of the logic of classical conspiracy theory. 
Technologically deterministic discourses of the second media age, which 
configure the technocultural capacities of the Internet as the basis for a paradigm 
shift from mainstream broadcast media systems and their affiliated structures of 
media power to digital network systems predicated upon utopian notions of 
radical democracy, can be seen to present important points of connection with the 
ideas presented in chapter 4 regarding conspiracist configurations of the Internet 
as a radical medium of ‗information freedom‘ which operates in opposition to the 
power structures of mainstream media. The associated discourses of the digital 
sublime, which articulate the democratic potentials of the Net in mythic terms of 
transcendence and empowerment,  further this sense of connection by providing a 
discursive basis for conspiracist configurations of the Net as a medium through 
                                                                                                                                     
leading American far-right conspiracy theorists such as Alex Jones and Fox News pundit Glenn 
Beck.  
     Right-wing websites served as organisational  points for the tea-baggers to engage in direct 
political activity such as protest marches on Washington DC in October 2009. For background on 
this movement, see, for example,  ‗Fake Teabaggers Are Anti-Spend, Anti-Government: Real 
Populists Want to Stop Banks from Plundering America‘ by Mark Ames, Yasha Levine, and 
Alexander Zaitchik, at Alternet.org, 
http://www.alternet.org/story/136688/fake_teabaggers_are_anti-spend%2C_anti-
government%3A_real_populists_want_to_stop_banks_from_plundering_america/,  
posted 15/4/2009, accessed 18/12/09. 
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which conspiracy theorists can empower themselves in relation to mainstream 
media power. American cybercultural discourses of civil libertarianism, which 
conceptualise the Net as a virtual embodiment of the ‗frontier‘ mythos central to 
American democratic traditions, can also be considered significant points of 
connection in that they articulate ideas of online information freedom in relation 
to the libertarian perspectives that underpin the Amerocentric worldview of 
classical conspiracy theory. 
     These cyber-cultural configurations of the Net as a site of radical information 
freedom which serves to empower citizens against mainstream media power 
structures function as the discursive underpinnings for radical configurations of 
the Internet as an alternative public sphere, which I will argue in chapters 6-8 
constitute the most integral point of connection between the Internet and the logic 
of classical conspiracy theory.  
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CHAPTER 6 
THE INTERNET AS AN ALTERNATIVE MEDIUM 
_________________________________________________ 
 
6.1 Introduction 
 
     Chapters 4 and 5 presented macro-level overviews of two major discursive 
frameworks - the radical critiques of mainstream media power implicit in 
conspiracy theory and cybercultural configurations of the Internet as an 
embodiment of radical democratic ideals - that I argue constitute the major points 
of affinity and connection between the Internet and the logic of conspiracy theory. 
Chapters 6, 7 and 8 will develop these arguments in a more in-depth fashion by 
presenting a micro-level examination of discursive configurations of the Internet 
as an ‗alternative medium‘ in which radical democratic practices are enacted in 
response to the perceived failings of mainstream media to enact its public service 
duties and principles. In these chapters I will argue that not only do these 
discursive configurations of the Net as an alternative medium serve as an 
important point of connection with the ostensibly radical ethos of classical 
conspiracy theory (thus extending arguments introduced in chapters 4 and 5), but 
that these configurations of the Net as an alternative medium are appropriated by 
classical conspiracy theorists as a means of legitimating their conspiracist ideas in 
relation to the democratic apparatus by presenting them as genuinely radical 
democratic perspectives rather than expressions of far-right/extremist ideologies.  
     Below is a graphic representation of the structure delineated above as a means 
of aiding the reader‘s comprehension of my arguments at this mid-way point: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
142 
 
 
 
Figure 3.  Outline of thesis argument. 
Conspiracist suspicions of 
mainstream media and 
conceptualisations of the Net as a 
countervailing influence to 
mainstream media power (chpt 4)
Internet as alternative public 
sphere & alternative news as 
major content of alternative public 
sphere (chpts 6 & 7)
Second media age discourses that 
configure Net as site of democratic 
empowerment (chpt 5)
Appropriation of alternative 
news practices as legitimating 
framework for conspiracy 
theory (chpts 7 & 8)
 
 
     
    Chapter 6 has three main parts. The first part outlines alternative media 
concepts as articulated in relation to critical discourses of the democratic 
functions of the media as a public sphere. The second part discusses 
configurations of the Internet as an alternative public sphere. The third part 
considers how these configurations not only present a point of connection with the 
‗radical‘ democratic ideas that have been discussed in chapters 4 and 5 as forming 
part of the underlying logic of classical conspiracy theory, but also constitute a 
framework through which conspiracy theorists can legitimate their ideas as radical 
democratic practices. Chapter 7 will further this micro-level focus on the Internet 
as an alternative public sphere by delineating the integral role played by news in 
relation to the public sphere ideal,  and the articulation of this relationship with 
regards to alternative media configurations of the Net as an alternative public 
sphere. I will then consider how online alternative news practices are appropriated 
143 
 
by classical conspiracy theorists as the key legitimating framework for their 
conspiracist beliefs in relation to the alternative public sphere. Chapter 8 will 
present empirical evidence of the conspiracy theory/alternative media 
appropriation-legitimation dynamic in the form of a case study of the ‗alternative‘ 
news practices of the American conspiracy news site Rense.com.  
 
 
6.21 The public sphere - background 
 
     Cyber-cultural configurations of the Internet as an alternative medium are 
predicated upon critical configurations of the public service functions and 
responsibilities of media in democratic political systems. Arguably the most 
influential and prominent theoretical articulation of these ideas are the notions of 
the ‗public sphere‘ developed by the German political philosopher Jürgen 
Habermas.  The following sections from this one to section 6.24 will outline the 
key concepts of the public sphere in order to establish the theoretical context for 
subsequent discussions of the relationships between conspiracy theorising and 
alternative media.  
     In Habermas's conception, the public sphere refers to the central role played by  
media systems in the communicative practices which are integral to the operation 
of democratic forms of governance:    
 
By ―the public sphere‖ we mean first of all a realm of our social life in 
which something approaching public opinion can be formed. Access is 
guaranteed to all citizens. A portion of the public sphere comes into 
being in every conversation in which private individuals assemble to 
form a public body. They then behave neither like business or 
professional people transacting private affairs, nor like members of a 
constitutional order subject to the legal constraints of a state 
bureaucracy. Citizens behave as a public body when they confer in an 
unrestricted fashion – that is, with the guarantee of freedom of assembly 
and association and the freedom to express and publish their opinions – 
about matters of general interest. In a large public body this kind of 
communication requires specific means for transmitting information and 
influencing those who receive it. Today newspapers and magazines, 
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radio and TV are the media of the public sphere. We speak of the 
political public sphere in contrast, for instance, to the literary one, when 
public discussion deals with objects connected to the activity of the 
state. Although state activity is so to speak the executor, it is not a part 
of it….Only when the exercise of political control is effectively 
subordinated to the democratic demand that information be accessible to 
the public, does the political public sphere win an institutionalized 
influence over the government through the instrument of law-making 
bodies. (Habermas 1974: 49).  
 
      With reference to the principles and practices of democracy outlined in 
chapter 4 , sections 4.31 – 4.36, Habermas here outlines the public sphere as a 
specific kind of social or cultural space (―realm‖) within modern societies 
predicated on pluralistic democratic principles (―access is guaranteed to all 
citizens‖), in which citizens engage in communicative activity (―conversation‖) 
about issues of democratic importance (―matters of general interest‖).  The public 
sphere is defined by civil liberties, in that citizens should be free to gather 
together in the appropriate spaces (―freedom of assembly and association‖) and to 
discuss and disseminate any topic (―freedom to express and publish their 
opinions‖); furthermore, these freedoms should be codified as rule of law 
(―guaranteed‖).  In these respects media systems are articulated as a public service 
that enable citizens to engage in communicative activity as a means of exercising 
and reinforcing their democratic rights and responsibilities. Writing in the pre-
digital era, Habermas clearly denotes ―newspapers and magazines, radio and TV‖  
as ―the media of the public sphere‖ (ibid). Described in more general terms, the 
public sphere can be ―broadly understood as a general context of [media] 
interaction where citizens get informed and public discussion takes place‖ 
(Karppinen 2008: 31).   In this interactive space the ―voicing of diverse views and 
access to a wide range of information and experiences‖ are regarded as ―a 
precondition for citizen‘s effective participation in public life‖ (ibid). Habermas 
also conceptualises the public sphere as a median space between what he 
considers the two other major ‗spheres‘ of modern social power: the government 
sphere of the state and the private sphere of the individual (or, by extension, the 
family group) (Crossley & Roberts 2004: 3). In this respect the public sphere can 
be articulated as a communicative realm ―that mediates between society and state, 
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in which the public organizes itself as the bearer of public opinion‖ (Eley 1992: 
290). 
     Habermas's conceptions of the public sphere are positioned in relation to the 
socio-historical contexts that have shaped modern Western society since the 
Enlightenment.  The public sphere initially developed around early modern 
concepts of the state as a representative system of power on behalf of the public.  
The ‗private public sphere‘ of the Enlightenment consisted of  ―private individuals 
(coming) together to engage in reasoned argument over key issues of mutual 
interest and concern, creating a space in which both new ideas and the practices 
and discipline of rational public debate were cultivated‖ (Crossley & Roberts 
2004: 2).  In the 18
th
 century the rise of printing technologies and the mass 
production of literary media, such as novels and newspapers, led to this private 
public sphere evolving into the ‗literary public sphere‘ in which ―art and literature 
became a focus of public discussion and debate‖ (ibid: 3).  Such communicative 
activity occurred  in specific public spaces (e.g. the much evoked coffee houses 
and salons). This literary public sphere subsequently gave way to the ‗political 
public sphere‘ of 19th/20th century modernity. The political public sphere was 
typified by two major developments. Firstly, the establishment of a physical and 
social infrastructure for public debate ―as topics of debate shifted from art and 
literature to politics and economics‖ (ibid). Secondly, the establishment of a 
public culture of debate as a means of ―generating the cultural resources necessary 
for critical and rational political debate‖ (ibid). Central to both of these 
developments were the rise of broadcast media systems such as radio and 
television. The ability of these media systems to present the same information to 
audiences over wide geographical areas and through audio-visual – rather than 
purely literary or oral - forms of communication meant that they formed an 
effective virtual and social space for public debate in relation to the social changes 
of 20
th
 century modernity, such as the establishment of urbanised mass society 
and the rise of liberal democracy as the dominant political form.  
     As an extension and synthesis of these earlier configurations of the public 
sphere, distinguishing characteristics of the political public sphere include public 
discussion regarding the activities of the state and its operation ‗free‘ from state 
interference (―although state activity is so to speak the executor, it is not a part of 
it‖: Habermas 1974: 49).  Habermas argues that the role of the political public 
sphere is in maintaining the democratic balance of power between state and 
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public, and that this role is dependent upon notions of transparency. The ability of 
citizens to exercise their democratic rights and responsibilities requires the public 
communication of information regarding the workings of state power through the 
public sphere. Transparency - public access to information regarding the workings 
of the state - is therefore the basis of democratic principles of accountability – that 
the  activities of the state are a reflection of the public interest (―only when the 
exercise of political control is effectively subordinated to the democratic demand 
that information be accessible to the public, does the political public sphere win 
an institutionalized influence over the government through the instrument of law-
making bodies‖) (ibid). In such respects the Habermasian public sphere can be 
said to represent ―a set of political norms crucial for democratic practice‖ (Dean 
2003: 96). In Jodi Dean's summation, these norms are ―equality, transparency, 
inclusivity, rationality‖ (ibid).   
 
 
6.22 The public sphere - principles and practices 
 
     The Habermasian foundations of public sphere theory outlined above have 
been further articulated by democratic theorists in terms of communicative 
principles and practices held to be typical of public sphere communication. The 
principle of deliberative democracy can be considered a cornerstone of public 
sphere debate in practice.  As defined by Phil Neisser, ―the theory of deliberative 
democracy holds that a democracy fully worthy of the name needs face-to-face, 
public dialogues regularly held in a multitude of different kinds of spaces, both 
within and without the state, allowing for the formation of multiple ―publics‖, 
some more narrow than others, so that the public sphere writ large is constituted 
by contesting discourses‖ (Neisser 2007). The rational deliberations of political 
opinion central to the democratic process are presented in Neisser‘s definition as 
contingent with democratic ideas of plurality. The public is constituted as a 
plurality of voices (―contesting discourses‖) and interest groups (―multiple 
publics‖); such plurality is in turn reflected through a diversity of communication 
channels (―different kinds of spaces‖). Explicit in Neisser‘s definition is the 
positioning of one particular type of communicative activity – ―face to face public 
dialogue‖ - as that best-suited to this style of democracy. Related to this principle 
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of deliberative democracy is an idealised view of public communication labelled 
ideal speech. As defined by Seyla Benhabib,  
 
the procedural constraints of the ideal speech situation are that each 
participant must have an equal change to initiate and to continue 
communication; each must have an equal chance to make assertions, 
recommendations, and explanations; all must have equal chances to 
express their wishes, desires, and feelings; and finally, within dialogue, 
speakers must be free to thematize those power relations that in ordinary 
contexts would constrain the wholly free articulation of opinions and 
positions. Together these conditions specify a norm of communication 
that can be named that of egalitarian reciprocity (Benhabib 1992: 89).  
 
     A third guiding principle here is that of rational-critical debate. The public 
sphere is conceived as both a communicative space where citizens are informed 
about the workings of the state and society and a deliberative space where the 
public is able to debate possible courses of action relating to these political and 
social situations, and communicate these decisions to the state for implementation 
via the democratic political apparatus.  The public (both as individuals and as a 
collective) is therefore envisaged as  making ‗rational‘ decisions on political and 
social matters based on access to information and spaces for deliberation: ―the 
public as a whole can generally form policy preferences that reflect the best 
available information‖ (Page 1995, quoted in Bohman 2004: 142). The 
implication here is that the public sphere – and, by association, democratic 
systems of government – requires publics capable of making critical evaluations 
and rational judgments according to the information presented to them. 
Concomitant with rational-critical debate are ideas of publicity. These are the 
cultural processes whereby the socio-political interests of particular groups within 
society are articulated in the public sphere as democratic issues.  Media systems 
are therefore integral both to publicity processes and the realization of the public 
sphere ideal itself (Dean 2002).  
     These guiding principles of public sphere communication require certain 
conditions in order to be implemented as media practices. A fundamental 
condition for such practices is the configuration of media as a ―forum, that is, a 
social space in which speakers may express their views to others and who in turn 
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respond to them and raise their own opinions and concerns‖ (Bohman 2004: 133).  
In other words, the socio-cultural space in which public sphere communication is 
to take place must provide the potential for interpersonal communication between 
members of the public. A second prerequisite for public sphere media is that they 
should facilitate some degree of interactive communication.  As defined by James 
Bohman,  
 
a democratic public sphere must manifest commitments to freedom and 
equality in the communicative interaction in the forum. Such interaction 
takes the specific form of a conversation or dialogue, in which speakers 
and hearers treat each other with equal respect and freely exchange their 
roles in their responses to each other. What makes dialogue so crucial is 
that it not only proceeds as a communicative exchange, in the form of 
turn-taking, but also that it is guided by the mutual expectation of 
uptake; that is, speakers offer reasons to each other and expect that 
others will consider their reasons or concerns at least to the extent that 
their speech acts contribute to shaping the ongoing course of the 
interaction, without anyone exerting control over it or having special 
status (ibid). 
   
Communication in the public sphere is not merely people talking to each other: 
rather, such communication is deemed to take a specific politicised form – in this 
case, that of a dialogue in which two or more people engage in measured, 
balanced debate about ideas or issues of political or social significance. 
Furthermore, efforts are made to ensure that the dialogue adheres to rules of 
freedom and equality, in that it is open to speakers from a variety of backgrounds 
and respectful of each speaker‘s participation.  
     A third condition for public sphere media is that they should be inclusive with 
regards to the public. In this respect, ―communication must address an indefinite 
audience. In this sense, any social exclusion undermines the existence of a public 
sphere. This indefiniteness is required even of face-to-face interaction, since a 
conversation is public not simply because it could be heard by others but to the 
extent that it could be taken to address anyone‖ (ibid: 134). The types of dialogue 
presented by media operating in the public service mode should therefore be 
perceived as having universal relevance and appeal to other citizens. A variety of 
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―technologies and institutions‖ are also required to ―secure the continued 
existence‖ of public sphere communication, and to ―regularize opportunities and 
access to it‖ (ibid). Such technologies include the production and distribution 
networks of specific media systems, such as the transmission apparatus necessary 
for broadcast media such as television to reach most households within a nation. 
Such institutions include the likes of government departments and media 
organisations which serve to secure  public sphere communication through the 
implementation of  laws that ensure citizens have adequate opportunities and 
access to public sphere media, and codes of conduct that regulate the activities of 
media professionals in relation to public sphere principles. In Bohman‘s overview, 
―a public sphere depends upon the opening up [through media principles and 
practices] of a social space for a particular kind of repeated and open-ended 
interaction‖ (ibid).  
 
 
6.23 The public sphere - criticisms and revisions  
 
    The establishment of Habermasian conceptions of the public sphere as 
something of a template for theoretical discussions of the relationships between 
democracy and media power in post WWII Western thought has led to a variety of 
critical challenges and revisions being developed in relation to public sphere 
ideals, particularly by critics affiliated with postmodern and poststructuralist 
perspectives on media. Given that I am positioning my delineation of the Internet 
as an alternative medium in relation to this traditional public sphere template, I 
will here discuss some of these criticisms and revisions in order to signal my 
awareness of the broader critical contexts of public sphere theory, and to indicate 
the critical significance some of these revisions have for conspiracy culture.  
     Postmodern and cultural studies theorists have criticised the Habermasian 
public sphere for its essentialist identity politics and adherence to Enlightenment 
ideals of  a grand narrative of social progress (refer to the discussion of 
postmodern ideas in chapter 2, section 2.31).  For example, Habermas's claims 
that the public sphere as communicative ideal reached its fullest realisation in 
early modern Europe (Habermas 1989), a period when politics was the almost 
exclusive domain of males and the wealthy,  has been critiqued for implying that 
the public sphere is the provenance of  the ―white male bourgeoisie‖(Crossley & 
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Roberts 2004: 13). Similarly, the key principle of 'rational-critical debate',  in 
which all members of a society have the potential to ―deliberate as if they were 
social equals‖ (Fraser 1992: 117),  has been attacked for  advocating a  totalising 
and essentialist view of society.  Other theorists have argued against the very 
concept of the public sphere itself on postmodern and poststructuralist grounds 
(Calhoun 1992: Dean 2002).  
     Various theorists, notably Habermas himself (1992), have offered revisions of 
the public sphere template that address these criticisms. The most significant area 
of revision in relation to discussions of the relationships between the Net as an 
alternative medium and classical conspiracy theory is that regarding the notion of 
the public itself.  In his formative delineations of the public sphere concept, 
Habermas configures the public as a unified collective of individuals whose 
identity is articulated in relation to  modernist notions of a socially unified and 
cohesive nation-state.  The post-structuralist and post-modern emphasis on the 
multiplicity and fluidity of personal and cultural identity, along with the changes 
to traditional models of the unified nation-state wrought by such historical 
processes as neo-liberal globalisation,  has led to democracy being redirected 
away from universal models to fragmented ones in which society is configured as 
a collection of different interest groups, defined by specific identity positions such 
as class, ethnicity, and gender. In this new democratic configuration,  such groups 
tend to equate the furthering of their specific socio-political interests as something 
beneficial to the democratic development of society as a whole. Rather than one 
singular public defined according to their shared status as citizens of a nation,  
there are now multiple 'publics' defined according to differing socio-cultural 
identity positions. As Klaus Eder states, ―with the growing pluralization and 
heterogenization of modern societies, the requirement of a defined set of people as 
the carriers of a public sphere is no longer met by constructing a ‗nation‘. 
Transnational and subnational publics are expected to emerge that no longer 
coincide with the nation as the community constituting a nation-state‖ (Eder 2006: 
337).  
     These factors have led to the public sphere being revised in relation to what 
Neisser (2007) refers to as a ―public of publics‖. Instead of one universal public 
sphere enacted in relation to one universal public, there are now multiple public 
spheres which are enacted in relation to the multiple publics that collectively 
constitute a ‗society‘ or ‗nation‘. In Atton‘s words, the ―different groups and 
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movements‖ that constitute these multiple publics create ―their own particular fora 
for discussion, opinion-formation and political action‖ (Atton 2004:10) within the 
larger political grouping of ‗society‘. However, the interests of these multiple 
publics may coincide, leading to these publics forming alliances with each other 
which manifest in socio-political form as something akin to the ―bounded national 
public spheres‖ associated with traditional conceptions of the unified nation-state 
(Bohman 2004: 135). As Bohman argues, such co-operation is likely to be based 
upon shared concerns with wide-ranging issues of power and citizenship, such as 
―citizens demands for mutual accountability‖ in relation to wider issues with  ―the 
state and the economy‖ (ibid: 137). Citizens can therefore participate within the 
multiple public spheres of their respective identity–based groups, and also in the 
traditional or mainstream public sphere of the wider society.  
     In these respects conspiracy theorists can be seen to constitute a specific 
transnational or subnational public with their own conspiracist public sphere 
which attempts to influence national democratic activity in relation to their own 
interests (for example, the attempts by 9/11 conspiracy theorists to instigate new 
public investigations into the 9/11 attacks in relation to their beliefs that it was an 
‗inside job‘ by the US government). In relation to the democratic concepts 
discussed in chapter 4, sections 4.31 – 4.36, conspiracy theorists occupy a highly 
ambivalent position in relation to mainstream democratic practice in that they are 
concerned with democratic principles such as transparency and civil liberties, but 
articulate these concerns in relation to extremist ideologies that are inherently 
anti-democratic, such as anti-Semitism, thus consigning themselves to the 
margins of mainstream democratic discourse. The appropriation by conspiracy 
theorists of alternative media configurations of the Internet as an ‗alternative 
public sphere‘ which operates as a corrective to the traditional public sphere of 
mainstream media (as will be discussed in the next section) can therefore be seen 
as a means of legitimating the public sphere of classical conspiracy theory in 
relation to the mainstream public sphere of established democratic practice.  
 
 
6.24 The public sphere and the Internet 
 
     As discussed in chapters 4 and 5, cyber-discourses such as those of  the second 
media age articulate the Internet as a countervailing influence to mainstream 
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media power, an articulation predicated upon radical conceptions of mainstream 
media power as implicated within the structures of state and corporate power (as 
discussed in chapter 4, section 4.21). Articulating these themes in relation to the 
public sphere concepts outlined in sections 6.21 – 6.23 above, the mainstream 
media can be conceptualised as failing to adhere to its public sphere duties, such 
as the provision of public service content (see chapter 4, section 4.34)  or the 
development of its public sphere potential (e.g. in facilitating public 
communication between, as well as within, nations) because of its ‗situatedness‘ 
within the structures of state and corporate power. For example, many media 
theorists argue that the privatisation of mainstream media systems in Western 
nations has resulted in the decline of the mainstream public sphere due to the 
commercial imperatives of media corporations. As expressed by  Crossley & 
Roberts,  
 
as the mass media began to establish itself as a viable economic 
market...it was both hijacked for the purpose of selling goods, via 
advertising, and became a considerable saleable commodity in its own 
right. This has meant that public communication, by this means at least, 
has been moderated by the demands of big business and it has led to a 
regressive 'dumbing down' of the level of public debate as editors, 
pursuing new and larger markets, have been inclined to play to the 
lowest common denominator. Where the early public sphere, as a 
domain of self-education and cultivation, tended to 'level up', the 
modern media, in its pursuit of the widest audience, is inclined to 'level 
down' (Crossley & Roberts 2004: 6).  
 
     With the democratic capacities of mainstream public sphere media such as 
television and newspapers seen as irrevocably compromised by commercial 
forces, the Internet – as a medium which operates outside structures of 
mainstream media control, and which is equipped with technocultural capacities 
for interactive communication – has been configured in relation to the 
cyberdiscourses of the second media age and digital sublime discussed in chapter 
5 as a site for the reconstitution and revitalisation of the public sphere ethos. 
Referring to Hubertus Buchstein‘s delineation of this position,  
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if one accepts the claims of the optimists, the new technology seems to 
match all the basic requirements of Habermas‘s normative theory of the 
democratic public sphere: it is a universal, anti-hierarchical, complex, 
and demanding mode of interaction. Because it offers universal access, 
uncoerced communication, freedom of expression, an unrestricted 
agenda, participation outside of traditional political institutions and 
generates public opinion through processes of discussion, the Internet 
looks like the most ideal speech situation (Buchstein 1997, quoted in 
Dean 2002: 2).  
 
James Bohman develops this configuration of the Net as a public sphere further 
by suggesting that the Internet‘s combination of ―many-to-many communication 
with newly increased interactivity‖ (Bohman 2004: 134) creates a ―network-based 
extension of dialogue‖ (ibid: 135) between citizens. Such networked dialogue can 
potentially overcome ―the specific linguistic, cultural and spatial limitations of the 
bounded national public spheres that have up to now supported representative 
democratic institutions‖ (ibid) – limitations which have contributed to a 
contemporary democratic environment in which ―there is a lack of congruity 
between existing political institutions and the wider potential for public 
communicative interaction‖ (ibid) – by offering ―the possibility of re-embedding 
the public sphere in a new and potentially larger set of institutions‖ (ibid).  
     An example of the Net‘s potential to reconstitute and revitalise the public 
sphere ideal in relation to these conceptualisations is the application of the Net‘s 
technocultural capacities for interactive communication to facilitate processes of 
publicity and networking on behalf of the ‗multiple publics‘ that are outlined in 
section 6.23 as the basis for revised theoretical conceptions of democracy and the 
public sphere. Where certain publics may have previously found their interests 
marginalized within the mainstream public sphere because of factors such as their 
identity positions and ideological beliefs, the ability of the Net to operate as a 
public sphere outside of the limitations of mainstream media means that such 
publics can utilise the Net‘s low-cost interactive capacities and non-hierarchical 
information structures to ‗publicise‘ their ideas in more readily visible and 
potentially democratically influential forms. The interactive capacities of the Net 
which Bohman describes as forming the basis for  ―network-based extension[s] of 
dialogue‖ (ibid),  as expressed in forms such as web forums and the comments 
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pages of blogs, which enable individuals belonging to different publics to engage 
in virtual dialogues with each other on a multitude of topics, can be seen to 
facilitate prospective networking between multiple publics and the translation of 
such alliances into mainstream democratic activity (see section 6.23 above).  
     As Bohman notes, such critical articulations of the potential of the Internet to 
revitalise national notions of the public sphere and contribute to the development 
of ―global democracy‖ (ibid) are highly idealistic and must be considered in 
relation to some of the problematic aspects of Net communication. Two factors he 
regards as pertinent in this regard are, firstly, the fact that ―many-to-many 
communication may increase interactivity without preserving the essential 
features of dialogue, such as responsive uptake‖ (ibid), and, secondly, that the 
Internet ―may be embedded in institutions that do not help in transforming the 
communicative space into a public sphere. Even if it is a free and open space, the 
Internet could simply be a marketplace or commons‖ (ibid). However, as 
discussed in chapter 5, section 5.22 in relation to ideas of the ‗digital sublime‘, 
critical discourses of the Net‘s democratic potential tend to be configured in 
mythic terms, so that these pragmatic viewpoints are subsumed within utopian 
conceptions of the Net‘s perceived capacities to transcend the limitations of the 
mainstream public sphere and radically improve the public communication 
necessary for the functioning of democracy. While not utopian in tone, critical 
conceptions of the Internet as an alternative medium are predicated upon such 
mythic configurations of the Net as a medium capable of transcending the 
mainstream public sphere and revitalising democracy – configurations which, as 
also outlined in chapter 5, serve as an integral point of connection between the 
Net and the radical impulses that constitute part of the logic of classical 
conspiracy theory.  Such configurations of the Internet as an alternative medium, 
and their relationship to conspiracist thought and practice, will be discussed in the 
following sections.  
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6.31 Alternative media - definitions 
 
     Theoretical configurations of the Internet as an alternative medium, such as 
those developed by Chris Atton (2004) and which form the basis for my 
discussion of alternative media ideas, are attempts to reconstitute the public 
sphere as a cultural space that can operate free from the power imbalances of 
mainstream media, and to reinvigorate the public sphere through the application 
of the Internet‘s radical potential for democratic activity. In these respects, 
conceptualisations of the Internet as an alternative medium can be seen as 
extensions of the radical articulations of the Internet as a countervailing influence 
to mainstream media power discussed in chapter 4, and of the cyber-cultural 
discourses of the Internet as a radical site of information freedom outlined in 
chapter 5.  
     Atton defines 'alternative media' as ―a range of media projects, interventions 
and networks that work against, or seek to develop different forms of, the 
dominant, expected (and broadly accepted) ways of 'doing' media‖ (Atton 2004: 
ix), and which are ―produced outside the forces of market economics and the 
state‖ (ibid: 3). Alternative media are here conceptualised in relation to radical 
traditions of media power, as media systems which operate outside of and in 
opposition to the structures of mainstream media power which shape the activity 
of the mainstream public sphere. As Atton states, ―rather than media production 
being the province of elite, centralised organisations and institutions, alternative 
media offer possibilities for individuals and groups to create their own media 
'from the periphery'. Such media formations, through their very practice, will tend 
to critique notions of truth, reality and objectivity that we find at the heart of 
mainstream media practices‖ (ibid: 9). Therefore, ―it is perhaps in addressing 
radical questions of citizenship in the public sphere that alternative media are 
most powerful‖ (ibid: 3).  
     With reference to the notion of multiple publics discussed in section 6.23, the 
individuals and groups that are the focus of alternative media discourses are those 
subnational publics that operate as challenges to the dominant discourses 
presented in the mainstream public sphere, such as ―protest groups‖ and 
―dissidents‖, and publics such as ―'fringe' political organisations‖ whose political 
perspectives and beliefs consign them to the margins of mainstream public sphere 
debate (ibid: 3). While these publics may have developed their own public 
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spheres, alternative media networks may also help form alliances between these 
different publics so that a collective ‗alternative public sphere‘ is developed 
which expresses the interests and concerns of these groups in relation to the 
dominant discourses of mainstream society.  For example, environmentalists, 
feminists, and indigenous peoples can be seen as distinct subnational publics that 
may each have developed their own public spheres, but which all also operate 
collectively as part of a wider ‗alternative public sphere‘ that advocates 
democratic change based on shared issues with existing structures of citizenship 
and power (see section 6.23 above). In this respect, the term ‗alternative‘ is thus 
―employed to denote media practices [by such subnational publics] that 
'strengthen democratic culture'‖ (Downing 2001:95, cited in Atton 2004: 62) by 
publicising the voices and perspectives of groups that may have been traditionally 
marginalised or distorted in the mainstream media. However, Atton also notes a 
problematic aspect of the term alternative, which is that it has the potential to 
incorporate publics such as the far-right and fundamentalist groups which 
constitute the main constituency for classical conspiracy beliefs (see chapter 2, 
section 2.51). These groups may be considered alternative in their ostensibly 
radical opposition to the publics who dominate mainstream democratic activity, 
but they are also opposed to the liberal and progressive values  of democracy 
which underpin the alternative media ethos (Atton 2004: chapter 3). 
66
 
     Drawing on Gramscian notions of hegemony where relations between actors 
are seen as ―unstable and non-unitary ...where ideology is mobile and dynamic, 
and where strategic compromises are continually negotiated‖ (Gramsci 1971: 
cited in Atton 2004: 10), Atton articulates the oppositional relationships between 
alternative media and mainstream media as  'negotiated' rather than 'fixed' due to 
the ‗movable‘ nature of media practices. By this he considers that the same media 
practices may be articulated in relation to mainstream media values at one point 
of media production and with alternative media values at another (Atton 2004: 
10). For example, alternative media may use the same technological and 
                                                 
66
 Atton's discussion of the Net as alternative medium is positioned within a cultural studies 
framework with a particular emphasis upon subcultural practices. Atton refers to the seminal work 
of Hebdige (1979) in which a subculture is ―taken as a movement that is at once in opposition to 
aspects of a dominant culture, is oppressed or marginalised by it and yet is related to it structurally 
and historically‖ (Atton 2004: xi-xii). I have elided this aspect of Atton‘s work as I feel the 
delineation of conspiracy theory in terms of the cultural politics of subcultures is critically 
problematic (see discussion of Bratich (2008) in chapter 2 section 2.42), and that an engagement 
with notions of conspiracy theory as subculture is, given the complex historical, ideological, and 
cultural contexts of conspiracist thought, beyond the scope of this study.  
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distribution infrastructure as mainstream media; while mainstream media may 
appropriate ideas originating in the alternative realm according to commercial 
imperatives for new or sensational content. However, a side effect of the 
negotiated nature of alternative media practices is that such practices, and the 
ideas associated with them, are capable of being appropriated by other publics or 
groups who may reconfigure such ideas and practices according to their own 
interests. Thus, far-right and fundamentalist groups may appropriate alternative 
media practices as a means of legitimating their extremist and anti-democratic 
ideas as radical democratic activity within the alternative public sphere.
67
  As I 
will argue over the course of the next two chapters, this dynamic of appropriation 
and legitmation can be considered an integral aspect of the relationship between 
classical conspiracy culture and the Internet.  
       In relation to the alternative media concepts delineated above, Atton builds 
upon critical conceptions of the public sphere potential of the technocultural 
capacities of the Internet (as outlined in section 6.24) to configure the Internet as 
the basis for the development and realisation of an alternative public sphere. In 
this configuration the Net embodies an opportunity for those publics whose 
voices have traditionally been marginalised in relation to the mainstream public 
sphere to empower themselves by using the Net‘s technocultural capacities to 
create and access information free of the institutional and ideological constraints 
of mainstream public sphere media. Such empowerment may be considered in 
relation to a variety of media practices, such as the ability for groups to create and 
disseminate their own media content as a means of publicising their interests and 
concerns in relation to broader democratic processes; the ability for groups to 
present ideas and perspectives which constitute forms of progressive critique and 
challenge to the groups whose interests and values tend to dominate mainstream 
democratic thought and practice; and the ability of groups to develop networked 
alliances with other publics as a means of contributing to collective debates 
within the mainstream public sphere. Atton identifies ―radical political web sites 
and discussion lists‖, ―net radio sites‖, ―personal web sites‖, and alternative news 
sites such as Indymedia (ibid: 12) as prime examples of such alternative media 
practices. As will be discussed in the next section, this configuration of the 
                                                 
67
 Atton examines the online practices of the racist British National Party as an example of such 
dynamics (Atton 2004: chapter 3).  
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Internet as an alternative public sphere is one that is particularly resonant with the 
logic of classical conspiracy theory.  
 
 
6.32 The Internet as alternative public sphere and conspiracy 
theory 
 
     Atton‘s radical configurations of the Internet as an alternative public sphere 
can be seen to form important points of connection with classical conspiracy 
theory on two levels. On the first level, the configuration of the Internet as an 
alternative public sphere which operates in opposition to the democratically 
compromised mainstream public sphere presents an affinity with the ‗radical‘ 
conspiracist suspicions of mainstream media power discussed in chapter 4. On the 
second level, the configuration of the Internet as an alternative public sphere 
where marginalised or excluded publics are able to publicise themselves and 
contribute to democratic debate is one which puts into practice the theoretical 
articulations of the Internet as a mythic space of democratic empowerment which 
were discussed in chapter 5 in relation to influential cyber-cultural discourses 
such as the second media age. In these respects, the alternative public sphere can 
be seen to constitute a specific framework of radical media practices that can 
serve to legitimate classical conspiracy theories as forms of public sphere 
discourse by either overlapping with existing online media practices of conspiracy 
theorists, or by being actively appropriated by conspiracy theorists in order to 
present their ideas  as legitimate discourses of radical challenge and critique, 
rather than expressions of extremist ideologies and outré belief systems (as 
described in chapter 2 section 2.51).  
     As evidence for the argument that the media practices of the alternative public 
sphere can legitimate conspiracy theories by overlapping with the online practices 
of conspiracy theorists, it is apparent that the types of websites singled out by 
Atton as mainstays of alternative media practice, such as ―radical political web 
sites and discussion lists‖, ―net radio sites‖, ―personal web sites‖, and alternative 
news sites such as Indymedia (Atton 2004:12), are also the types of sites most 
typical of online conspiracy practices. Examples of each of these include: 
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 - radical political web sites – Freedom Force International. Political group 
formed in relation to American nationalist conspiracy beliefs that the federal 
government is a conspiratorial organisation run by elites who seek to transform 
the USA into a totalitarian state. FFI is concerned with changing the government 
through direct political action. To quote from the FFI ‗welcome‘ page: ―The 
mission of the members of Freedom Force is to shape public policy within their 
respective countries in favour of personal and global freedom. The method is 
threefold: (1) dissemination of ideological and issue-related information, (2) 
instruction in how to become influential within community and national 
organizations, and (3) instruction in how to lawfully and constitutionally convert 
that influence into public policy. Members seek to become change agents so they 
truly can make a difference in the world.‖ 68 
- discussion lists – Above Top Secret.com. This website describes itself as ―the 
Internet's largest and most popular discussion board community dedicated to the 
intelligent exchange of ideas and debate on a wide range of "alternative topics" 
such as conspiracies, UFO's, paranormal, secret societies, political scandals, new 
world order, terrorism, and dozens of related topics with an impressive 
demographic mix of members.‖69  
- Net radio sites – Radio Liberty. American nationalist/fundamentalist Christian 
conspiracism. Users can listen to the radio shows online via the website.
70
 
- personal web sites –  Jordan Maxwell. Web site operated by the titular 
conspiracy researcher outlining his research into religious/occult conspiracism.
71
   
- alternative news sites – Propaganda Matrix. Web site specialising in news 
stories from around the Net that are regarded of conspiracist significance.
72
  
 
Such sites are used by conspiracy theorists for a variety of information practices 
that serve to empower them in relation to the structures of information control 
evident in the mainstream public sphere. Such empowering practices include the 
                                                 
68
 http://www.freedom-force.org/, accessed 21/4/10.    
 
69
 http://www/abovetopsecret.com/about_abovetopsecret.html, accessed 21/4/10.  
 
70
 http://www/radioliberty.com/, accessed 21/4/10.  
 
71
 http://www.jordanmaxwell.com/, accessed 21/04/10. 
 
72
 http://www.propagandamatrix.com/index.html, accessed 21/04/10.  
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presentation of conspiracist information which conspiracy theorists regard as 
being normally suppressed by mainstream media because of the threat such 
information presents to conspiratorial power interests; the facilitation of dialogues 
between conspiracy theorists; and the organization of conspiracy theorists 
towards real world civic action (e.g. 9/11 truth petitions and protest marches).    
     It is also evident from observations of online conspiracy culture that many 
conspiracy theorists undertake to position their ideas and information practices 
within the alternative public sphere by actively appropriating the term 
‗alternative‘ and the language of alternative media practice. Examples of this 
strategy include:  
 
- the byline of the Above Top Secret conspiracy discussion site: ―the most popular 
website for alternative topics‖.  73 
- the byline of the Conspiracy Planet site : ―The Alternative News & Media 
Network: your antidote to media cartel propaganda‖. 74 
- the byline of the End Game Now site – ―what mainstream media won‘t tell 
you‖.75 
- the byline of the Web of Evidence site: - ―what they don‘t want you to know: 
exposing media manipulation and how the system works‖.76 
- the byline of the Rense.com conspiracy news site – ―the world‘s #1 alternative 
news service‖, 77 and the description of its alternative credentials:  ―Thanks to the 
program and site, listeners, researchers and information seekers from across the 
US and around the world are being exposed to information and learning about the 
most important issues of our times they rarely, if ever, encounter in the controlled 
corporate world of mainstream broadcast and monopoly print media‖.78 
                                                 
73
 http://www.abovetopsecret.com/, accessed 21/04/10. 
 
74
 http://www.conspiracyplanet.com/, accessed 23/09/08. 
 
75
 http://endgamenow/, accessed 20/08/2010. 
 
76
 http://clareswinney.wordpress.com/ , accessed 21/04/2010.  
 
77
 http://www.rense.com/,  accessed 21/4/10. 
 
78
 http://www.rense.com/aboutnew1.html,  accessed 08/10/08. 
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- the description of the openUReyes site as an ―alternative news blog‖ with the 
motto ―alternative news headlines free minds for freedom‖. 79 
- the homepage of the conspiracy site Outside the Box which presents two 
columns of online information sources. The left hand column is a list of 
conspiracy sites under the heading ―Alternative media and the quest for truth‖; the 
right hand column is a list of mainstream news sites under the heading 
―mainstream media and the official view of reality‖.80 
- the list of news sources presented on the Propaganda Matrix site.
81
  This list is 
divided into ‗mainstream media‘ and ‗alternative media‘. The former contains 
sub-sections such as ‗Major US Newspapers‘ that features links to news sources 
such as The New York Times and Washington Post. The ‗Alternative News Sites‘ 
section combines alternative media of the progressive type identified by Atton as 
typical of alternative public sphere content (e.g. Press Esc.;
82
 The Raw Story 
83
), 
with conspiracy news sites (e.g. Rense.com, 
84
 Cremation Of Care, 
85
 Prison 
Planet
86
). 
- the description of  the Prison Planet news site (part of Alex Jones‘s Infowars 
online conspiracy news network) in radical alternative public sphere terms: 
―Seven years after the attacks of September the Eleventh, a global awakening has 
taken place, the likes of which the world has never seen. As the corporate-
controlled media dwindles into extinction, a new breed of journalists and activists 
has emerged.‖87 
 
     In these examples conspiracy theorists can be seen to have appropriated the 
radical connotations of alternative media practice as a ‗re-branding‘ exercise, a 
discursive ‗makeover‘ that attempts to legitimate the conspiracist content 
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 http://www.openureyes.org.nz/blog/, accessed 21/04/10. 
 
80
 http://alexansary.com/links.html ,accessed 21/4/10. 
 
81
 http://www.propagandamatrix.com/ , accessed 21/4/10. 
 
82
 http://pressesc.com/, accessed 4/11/08. 
 
83
 http://rawstory.com/, accessed 4/11/08. 
 
84
 http://www.rense.com/, accessed 4/11/08. 
 
85
 http://wwwcremationofcare.com/, accessed 4/11/08. 
 
86
 http://www.prisonplanet.com/, accessed 4/11/08. 
 
87
 http://www.prisonplanet.tv/subscribe.html,  accessed 08/10/08. 
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presented on such sites as part of the radical democratic discourses associated 
with the alternative public sphere.  
 
 
6.4 Summary 
 
     This chapter has discussed critical configurations of the Internet as an 
alternative public sphere with reference to Habermasian notions of the public 
sphere as the principles and practices by which media systems work to facilitate 
democracy, and Atton‘s (2004) critical articulations of the Internet as an 
alternative medium. I regard this configuration of the Net as an as alternative 
public sphere as constituting one of the most integral points of connection 
between the Internet and the logic of conspiracy theory, in that it presents a 
radical framework of democratic empowerment through online ‗information 
freedom‘ that is able to be appropriated by conspiracy theorists in order to 
legitimate their conspiracist beliefs as radical democratic discourses. The 
significance of online news as the key type of alternative media content which 
underpins this appropriation-legitimation dynamic will be discussed in chapter 7, 
and empirically examined in the case study presented in chapter 8.  
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CHAPTER 7 
CONSPIRACY THEORY AND ALTERNATIVE NEWS 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
7.1 Introduction   
 
     This chapter is an extension of the arguments introduced in chapter 6 
regarding conspiracy theorists‘ appropriation of critical configurations of the 
Internet as an ‗alternative public sphere‘ as a legitimating framework for their 
conspiracist ideas. In this chapter I will develop these arguments in more detail 
via a discussion of news as the type of media content most integral to the 
operation of the alternative public sphere, a status which makes it the main focus 
of the strategies of appropriation by which classical conspiracy theorists attempt 
to legitimate their conspiracist beliefs as part of the alternative public sphere.  
     This chapter has two main parts.  The first part is an outline of the integral role 
played by news media in relation to the Habermasian public sphere concepts 
delineated in chapter 6. The second part discusses the problems with mainstream 
news media that have led to the development of alternative news practices as a 
central facet of the alternative public sphere, and considers the ways in which 
these practices serve to facilitate the conspiracist appropriation of the alternative 
public sphere ethos as a legitimating framework for their beliefs. The arguments 
presented here will then be empirically examined via the case study of the 
conspiracist news site Rense.com presented in chapter 8.  
 
     
7.2 News media and the public sphere 
 
     News media can be configured as central to the operation and maintenance of 
the public sphere.  In relation to the public sphere theory outlined in chapter 6, 
section 6.21, Habermas states that the efficacy of the public sphere as part of the 
democratic apparatus is contingent upon ―the democratic demand that information 
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be accessible to the public‖ (Habermas 1974: 289). The practices of news 
journalism are critically articulated as the embodiment of this public sphere 
imperative. As delineated by Stuart Allan in his overview of contemporary news 
culture, news can be defined in this public sphere context as ―an object of public 
opinion‖ related to a democratic culture of ―rational-critical debate within the 
realm of the public sphere‖ (Allan 2004: 3). Its democratic significance resides in 
―the decisive role the news media play in establishing a discursive space, one 
framed by the state and economic domains on either side, for public deliberation 
over social issues. The formative influence of the news on popular attitudes is 
accentuated by conceiving of the news audience as citizens engaged in public 
dialogue‖ (ibid).  
     The traditional critical configuration of the relationship between news and the 
public sphere is the ‗fourth estate‘ model. As outlined by Jim Willis (2007), 
Enlightenment era political philosophers such as Thomas Carlyle envisaged 
British society as made up of three main institutions of ‗estates‘ of power – ―the 
aristocracy, the House of Commons, and the priesthood‖. Such philosophers 
theorised that the job of the press ―was to explain the workings of these three 
powerful institutions and, by that public explanation, to involve the citizenry 
more in the process of government and to let them know what their leaders were 
doing and how well (or badly) they were doing it. Only by so doing could the 
people hope to attain their measure of power themselves by retaining the good 
leaders and ousting the bad.‖ (Willis 2007: 139). Within pluralist liberal 
democracies such as the UK and USA, the news media was therefore  configured 
as the ‗fourth estate‘, keeping tabs on the activities of the other three dominant 
institutions of political power ―for the public good and the good of democracy‖ 
(Willis 2007: 138).  
     Willis also notes that the public sphere role of the news media as a fourth 
estate is informed by two major critical models of the relationships between 
media systems and democracy – the libertarian model and the social 
responsibility model. I will here refer to the standard template of these models as 
developed by American communication scholars in the 1950s (Siebert, Peterson 
& Schramm 1956). These scholars identified two main tendencies by which news 
media operates in relation to the dominant political ideology or systems of a 
nation. The oldest was identified as the authoritarian model. Here the news media 
operates in a ‗top-down‘ fashion, being produced by ruling power structures, such 
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as the monarchy or the state, as a means of social and political control. Decisions 
as to the content and intention of news – what types of subject matter are reported 
as news, the manner in which news is presented, and the political and social 
purpose of the news itself – were perceived in this model as being carried out by 
dominant power structures to suit their own interests. In short, the news is a form 
of propaganda, designed to condition the public into upholding the dominant 
structures of power by suppressing and manipulating the information provided to 
the public.
88
      
     Contrasting with this authoritarian perspective, and underpinning democracy, 
is the libertarian model of the news. In this model 
 
the press is not an instrument of government, but rather a device for 
presenting evidence and arguments on the basis of which the people can 
check on government and make up their minds as to policy. Therefore, it 
is imperative that the press be free from government control and 
influence. In order for truth to emerge, all ideas must get a fair hearing; 
there must be a ―free market place‖ of ideas and information. Minorities 
as well as majorities, the weak as well as the strong, must have access to 
the press (Siebert, Peterson & Schramm 1956: 3-4).  
 
The political imperatives guiding news produced under this model were to service 
democracy ―by providing information, discussion, and debate on public affairs‖; 
to enlighten the public ―so as to make it capable of self-government‖; and to 
safeguard ―the rights of the individual by serving as a watchdog against 
government‖ (Peterson in Siebert et al 1956: 74). The ‗watchdog principle‘ can be 
seen as particularly significant to conceptions of the public sphere  in that the 
news media scrutinize and investigate the workings of those in positions of 
political power in accordance with the principles of transparency and 
accountability which are part of the democratic ethos (see chapter 4, section 4.33). 
The ability of the news media to function as a watchdog is determined by the 
degree of independence or ‗freedom‘ such media has from government influence. 
The news media is thus one of the prime embodiments of the democratic ‗will‘ 
                                                 
88
The presentation of the Soviet news system as the example of this authoritarian model reflects 
the Cold War environment in which the Siebert et al study was produced.  
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and rights of the public. This libertarian model reflects a particularly American 
conception of democracy in its association of the individual and social freedoms 
of democracy with the economic freedoms of ‗free market‘ capitalism. ―Financial 
self-sufficiency‖ is outlined as a prerequisite for the efficient functioning of news 
media as part of the democratic apparatus in that it ensures the news remains ―free 
from the pressures of special interests‖ within the institutions of the state (ibid). 
Private ownership of media companies is therefore seen as conducive to the news 
media‘s public sphere functions because of the ways in which it ensures such 
‗financial self-sufficiency‘. In this perspective, ‗free market‘ capitalism is equated 
with the ‗free market place‘ of ideas and information necessary for the functioning 
of the public sphere. In terms of radical/critical attitudes towards media as 
discussed in chapter 4, section 4.21, such a position can be seen to merely 
exchange one power structure – the state – for another – the capitalist free market. 
     The social responsibility model is presented as a response to the freemarket 
ethos which underpins the libertarian model. Since mainstream media systems 
serve as the major source of information for the public in modern western 
societies, such systems therefore have a large degree of power in terms of the 
functioning of democracy. In the social responsibility framework, such power 
places an ethical and political obligation upon the owners of media systems to be 
‗socially responsible‘ in terms of ensuring that news content is produced in 
accordance with public sphere principles. For instance, news media should 
present a plurality of voices on issues in keeping with the egalitarian ethos of the 
‗ideal-speech‘ principle, and also provide a diverse range of information on topics 
so that citizens are best able to engage in rational-critical debate regarding the 
implications of political and social issues. Since media systems run as privately-
owned businesses can easily place the financial interests of their owners above the 
public interests of the citizenry, they can be criticized for being deficient in terms 
of enacting their public service duties. Forces outside of the free-market 
framework are therefore required to ensure that private media owners meet their 
public sphere obligations, in forms such as self-regulation through professional 
codes of journalistic practice, or government regulations regarding the types and 
amounts of news media content to be presented. Public service media – news 
media that are operated by the state on a non-commercial basis (see chapter 4, 
section 4.34) - represent a more direct articulation of this social responsibility 
approach.  
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     The profession of journalist, as in those who research and present current 
events and happenings in the form of mediated news items and stories, is thus one 
integral to the effective operation of the public sphere. As elaborated by Allan, 
journalism  
 
is charged with the crucial mission of ensuring that members of the 
public are able to draw upon a diverse ‗market place of ideas‘ to both 
sustain and challenge their sense of the world around them. This 
responsibility for giving expression to a richly pluralistic spectrum of 
information sources places the journalist at the centre of public life. 
Thus it is the news media, to the extent that they facilitate the 
formation of public opinion, which are said to make democratic 
control over governing relations possible. 
     The performance of this democratic function is contingent upon the 
realization of ‗press freedom‘ as a principle safeguarded from any 
possible impediment associated with power and privilege. The news 
media, according to the liberal pluralists, must carry out the crucial 
work of contributing to the ‗system of checks and balances‘ popularly 
held to be representative of democratic structures and processes. More 
specifically, by fostering a public engagement with the issues of the 
day, they are regarded as helping to underwrite a consensual (albeit 
informal) process of surveillance whereby the activities of the state 
and corporate sectors are made more responsive to the dictates of 
public opinion. As arenas of arbitration, the news media are said to 
allow for clashes over decision making to be expressed, adjudicated 
and ultimately reconciled in such a way as to ensure that neither 
cumulative nor continuous influence is accorded to a single set of 
interests‖ (Allan 2004: 47-48).  
 
     The significance of journalism to the operation of the public sphere can be 
further configured in relation to institutional notions of news values (ideas about 
what constitutes news) and news practices (how the news is researched and 
presented). McQuail (1992) defines the news values of public sphere journalism 
in terms of responsibility (keeping citizens actively informed as to the activities of 
government), diversity (reflecting a wide range of social and cultural identity 
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positions and ways of life) and objectivity (trying to present information in a 
balanced or neutral manner so as not to shape citizen‘s attitudes towards an issue 
in a particular way). McQuail suggests that the ‗canons of journalism‘ developed 
by the American Society of Newspaper Editors ―provide a good indication of 
what is currently regarded as good practice‖ in relation to ideas of public sphere 
journalism (McQuail 1992: 38). These canons are presented as follows:  
 
1- Responsibility: the aim of serving the ‗general welfare‘ by informing people 
and enabling them to make judgments about issues of the time. 
2 – Freedom of the press. 
3 – Independence from vested interest. 
4 – Truth and accuracy. 
5 – Impartiality, in particular a clear distinction between news reports and 
opinion. 
6 – Fair play, meaning respect for the rights of people involved in the news. 
(ibid).  
 
The first three principles relate to the institutional and professional structures 
within which news is produced, and state that journalism should promote an ethos 
of responsibility to the public interest, and be able to operate free of the influence 
of specific power interests. The last three principles relate to the practices by 
which news items are actually produced, and state that journalism should be as 
truthful and accurate as possible in terms of relating the details and circumstances 
of events; should strive for ‗impartiality‘ or ‗objectivity‘ in terms of addressing 
the news in relation to the general public; and should aim for fairness in how 
people are treated and presented in their status as the subjects of news stories.  
      
 
7.31 Mainstream news media and alternative news media 
 
     Configurations of the Internet as an alternative public sphere are to a large 
degree predicated on critical understandings that the public sphere duties of 
mainstream news media have been irrevocably compromised by the structures of 
state and corporate power. This critical perspective on the decline of journalism 
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and the public sphere is a well-established tenet of contemporary media studies 
scholarship (e.g. Chomsky & Herman 1988; Dennis & Merrill 1996; Curran 
2002; Winter 2007; Davies 2008). Such studies generally posit the decline of the 
mainstream public sphere as a late 20
th
 century/early 21
st
 century trend that 
corresponded with the corporatization of mainstream media systems that occurred 
in relation to the rationalization of neo-liberal economic ideologies as the 
dominant paradigm for the development of Western democracies. In this 
corporatized media environment, it is argued that the private interests of 
shareholders take priority over public service interests (Allan 2004: 201), 
resulting in a consequent shift in news values from those associated with public 
sphere functions, such as an emphasis on ‗hard news‘ and investigative 
journalism dealing with political and social issues, to news values associated with 
the propagation of a consumerist mindset, such as sensationalism, celebrity, and 
an emphasis on human interest stories. Such corporate formulations of 
mainstream news are labelled ‗tabloid news‘ or ‗infotainment‘ by comparison 
with public sphere news. To cite Allan‘s (2004) overview of this perspective,  
 
critics contend that processes of ‗tabloidization‘, to the extent that 
they erode ‗serious‘ principled‘ journalistic criteria of 
newsworthiness, threaten to undermine the integrity of the ‗quality‘ 
end of the news reporting spectrum. In addition to the conflation of 
‗hard‘ and ‗soft‘ news agendas, and with it the privileging of scandal, 
gossip, celebrity and sports over and above politics and economics, 
‗information‘ is said to be merging with ‗entertainment‘ into an 
‗infotainment‘ muddle. Much is made, therefore, of how editorial 
commentary (features and opinion columns) appears to be flourishing 
at the expense of ‗proper‘ reporting. These critics observe that it is 
evidently much more ‗cost effective‘ to hire someone to sit at their 
desk and wax philosophical about the pressing issues of the day, as 
opposed to employing journalists to actually investigate what is 
happening. Quality reporting requires sufficient human investment, 
but also time, effort and specialized knowledge, amongst other human 
resources (ibid: 206).  
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     This critical perspective on public sphere news argues that the journalistic 
ethos and associated news practices necessary for the maintenance of ‗public 
sphere‘ news are now seriously lacking in mainstream news media. In relation to 
the ‗canons‘ of public journalism outlined in section 7.2 above, mainstream news 
media is critiqued for inaccurate or ideologically unbalanced reportage of events, 
for forsaking impartiality in favour of subjectivity, and for disrespecting citizens 
in terms of how they are presented in news items. Examples of such critiques 
include the relationship between ‗truth and accuracy‘ and the changing nature of 
the practices of news reportage. The pressures placed upon journalists in 
commercial news environments are considered to promote reportage practices that 
revolve around speed and quantity – producing news stories as commodities to fill 
up the required print space or airtime – rather than a more measured approach in 
which reporters are given time to understand events so that they can report them 
more accurately. For instance, Allan (2004) cites Bell‘s (1991) study of 
journalistic practices in New Zealand that revealed many journalists ―regularly 
rely on reprocessing or repackaging source material as news‖ (Allan 2004: 69). 
The time and financial pressures placed upon journalists leads them to use sources 
such as press releases and press conferences, which are written and staged by 
specific groups as a means of managing their media profile, as information 
sources despite their obvious biases in terms of the ‗truth and accuracy‘ of the 
information they present (Bell 1991: cited in Allan 2004 68-69). Similarly, critics 
with professional experience as journalists, such as Nick Davies (2008), have 
argued that the commercial imperatives of contemporary mainstream news 
organizations have led to newsroom environments in which public sphere values 
of neutrality, balance and impartiality are downplayed in favour of ‗infotainment‘ 
news constructed and presented so as to provoke emotional responses from the 
audience.  
     In relation to radical critiques of media power discussed in chapter 4, section 
4.21, these changes in mainstream news ownership and practice can be seen to 
reconstitute the news as one of the major factors reinforcing the media power of 
state and corporate interests. Of particular concern to this radical perspective and 
notions of the alternative public sphere is the perceived re-articulation of news 
values and practices from public sphere principles of the fourth estate, where the 
news operates on behalf of the public as a ‗watchdog‘ on the activities of those in 
power, to news values and practices that appear to enact a propagandistic agenda 
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in relation to dominant power interests. Key issues of radical concern in this 
regard include the construction of news stories in accordance with the ideological 
beliefs of the state/corporate owners of news media,  and the suppression of 
investigative journalism that seeks to expose corporate malfeasance by news 
executives who fear losing revenue as a result of consequences such as the 
imposition of lawsuits from the aggrieved parties or the withdrawal of advertising.  
An exemplar of both these issues is Australian media magnate Rupert Murdoch, 
whose multinational corporation NewsCorp owns or has interests in a multitude of 
news media outlets in a variety of countries. A mini-industry exists within the 
fields of popular and academic media criticism that not only accuses Murdoch of 
promoting a news culture of celebrity-centric ‗infotainment‘ that propagates an 
ultra-consumerist worldview, but also argues that Murdoch brazenly uses his 
news outlets to propagate political points of view that reflect his own right-wing 
ideological perspectives (e.g. Chenoweth 2001: Page & Potter 2004: Kitty 2005: 
Davies 2008). Murdoch‘s status as an object of radical opprobrium regarding his 
corporate news practices is reflected in the reference made to his name in the 
conspiracist article of mainstream media control by Swinney discussed in chapter 
4, section 4.22.  
89
 
     This radical concern with issues of political economy and the shift in 
mainstream news media from public sphere values to ‗propagandistic‘ ones is also 
articulated in relation to the critical perspectives on the techniques and modes of 
news reporting and presentation discussed above. For example, mainstream news 
emphasis on emotional identification can be seen as antithetical to public sphere 
principles in that it serves to constitute public attitudes towards political, 
economic and social issues in terms of affective or subjective factors which are 
much more amenable to manipulation by  dominant power interests, rather than 
attitudes based upon the ‗objective‘ Habermasian ideal of rational-critical thought. 
In terms of the radical attitudes towards cultural politics that inform alternative 
media discourses, the ways in which subjects are represented in mainstream news 
stories can be considered a key part of the process by which particular publics are 
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 Many online alternative news sites offer good criticism of mainstream journalism in relation to 
these themes of corporate influence and public sphere news functions. For example, the recent 
article ‗Corrupt Practices Accelerating the Decline of American Journalism‘ by David Sirota 
featured on the leading American alternative site Alternet.org:  
http://www.alternet.org/media/146506/corrupt_practices_accelerating_the_decline_of_american_j
ournalismposted 17/04/2010.  
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rendered marginal in relation to mainstream public sphere debates. A prominent 
example of such news practices in Western countries is the heavy representation 
of non-white ethnic groups in relation to news stories focussing on negative 
subjects such as crime and violence (Allan 2004: chapter 7). In this radical 
perspective, the mainstream news media is no longer a bastion of public sphere 
ideals such as dialogue and free speech, but a control system where the public 
sphere capacities of news media are manipulated by dominant power structures in 
their own interests. 
      In relation to these critical/radical perspectives on mainstream news media, 
the revitalization of news practice as a foundation for the realisation of public 
sphere ideals is one of the key projects of Attonian conceptions of the Net as an 
alternative public sphere. Atton argues that contemporary debates in countries 
such as the USA regarding the reformation of mainstream news  as ‗public 
journalism‘ which operates in accordance to traditional public sphere principles 
are likely to be ineffectual because such public journalism will still be configured 
―within the market and within long-standing organizational, institutional, and 
professional structures‖ of mainstream news (Atton 2004: 26). Atton singles out 
the public journalism emphasis on the journalist as the institutional ‗voice of the 
people‘ as an example of the power imbalances institutionally entrenched in 
mainstream news systems, in that  the ―power of telling society‘s stories‖ is 
placed ― in the hands of journalists‖ rather than the people themselves 
(Woodstock 2002: quoted in Atton 2004: 26).  
     Instead of reforming the mainstream media in relation to traditional public 
sphere principles, Atton argues that a more genuinely radical and democratically 
empowering approach is to develop alternative news media and alternative news 
practices within the alternative public sphere of the Internet, in relation to his 
articulation of alternative media as ―an ideology that holds that only through more 
egalitarian, inclusive media organizations is it possible to even think about a 
socially responsible journalism‖ (Atton 2004: 26). In relation to the social 
responsibility model of news outlined in section 7.2 above, Atton configures 
online alternative news as   
 
journalism that is closely wedded to notions of social responsibility, 
replacing an ideology of ‗objectivity‘ with overt advocacy and 
oppositional practices. Its practices emphasise first-person, eyewitness 
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accounts by participants; a reworking of the populist approaches of 
tabloid newspapers to recover a ‗radical popular‘ style of reporting; and 
collective and anti-hierarchical forms of organization which eschew 
demarcation and specialization – and which importantly suggest an 
inclusive, radical form of civic journalism (ibid). 
 
Alternative news media is further conceived as being ―opposed to [the] 
hierarchical, elite-centred notions of journalism as a business‖ that typify 
mainstream journalism. (ibid).  Thus, ―where public journalism seeks to effect 
change from within current practices and organizational regimes, alternative 
journalism seeks to do so freed from the constraints that limit the development of 
social responsibility in mainstream journalism‖ (ibid: 41). Some of the key 
characteristics of alternative news as articulated by Atton, and which I will 
discuss below, include an emphasis on ―radical critiques of government policies, 
government actions and the mass media; the occasional use of mainstream and 
‗radical mainstream‘ sources; and the creation of spaces for discussion and 
debate‖ (ibid: 59).  
     Of central importance to Atton‘s outline of alternative news principles and 
practices is a critical concern with the cultural politics of journalistic notions of 
objectivity. Atton argues that mainstream journalism‘s emphasis on ‗objectivity‘ – 
the reporting of news events in a neutral tone that encompasses a supposedly 
balanced take on the events in question through the presentation of different 
viewpoints (such as those representing for and against arguments in relation to 
political issues) – downplays the critical and radical argument that objectivity is 
an ideological construction – that news facts can never be fully separated from the 
values of mainstream news media which are shaped in relation to the interests of 
their state/corporate owners. For instance, the ‗objective‘ content of mainstream 
news stories may be shaped to fit commercial media formats, such as the 
‗soundbite‘ model, or shaped in relation to the perceived values of dominant 
publics, such as arguments that Western news reflects a dominant ‗white‘ 
sensibility in that non-white ethnicities are regularly portrayed in a negative light. 
In this sense, news reports can only ever capture a semblance of the reality of a 
news event or the event from a particular perspective – generally one based upon 
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the worldview and values propagated by dominant power structures within 
society. 
90
 
     In terms of the radical oppositional politics that underpin the alternative media 
ethos, Atton delineates alternative journalism in terms of ‗non-objective‘ news 
practices which are biased towards radical/progressive topics and specific 
subnational publics which are both usually marginalised and misrepresented in 
mainstream news. As he argues,  
 
alternative media projects tend to be set up in order to provide a counter 
to what alternative journalists consider an already biased set of reports. 
Sceptical of what counts as balance in the mainstream media, they seek 
to set up their own counter-balance. Hence, the argument runs, the 
viewpoints already dominant in the mainstream media do not need 
repeating, what appears as bias and the absence of balance in the 
alternative media is to considered not as a set of absolute truths; instead 
it comprises a set of accounts told from different perspectives (ibid: 39).  
 
Atton presents the anti-globalisation critiques of the Mexican Zapatista 
movement, and the anti-imperialist coverage of the 9/11 attacks presented through 
the Indymedia online alternative news network as examples of the radical subject 
matter towards which alternative journalism is ‗biased‘ (Atton 2004: chapter 2). In 
such respects alternative news can be seen to articulate the ‗watchdog‘ function, 
associated with libertarian models of news, that is reconstituted within the social 
responsibility framework that informs the alternative news ethos (see the 
discussion of news models in section 7.2 above).  
     The notion of ‗non-objective‘ news practices which are biased towards the 
representation of marginalized publics is configured in the form of ‗citizen-
centric‘ processes of news reportage and news production, in which the subject-
position of the citizen is prioritised over the subject-position of the journalist. In 
terms of processes of news reportage, Atton configures alternative media as 
inverting ―the hierarchy of access‖ (Glasgow University Media Group 1976: 
quoted in Atton 2004: 40) typical of mainstream news media, in which the 
                                                 
90
 The use of poststructuralist theory as one of the pivots of cultural politics perspectives is also 
significant here. In poststructuralist terms objectivity can be critiqued as a  ‗totalising narrative‘ 
that reinforces a sense of a dominant shared social reality, rather than a reality in which events are 
experienced and interpreted in relation to multiple reference points of the participants.  
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―visibility‖ of citizens ―in the mainstream media tends to be obscured by the 
presence of elite groups and individuals‖ (Atton 2004: 40). Alternative news 
reportage can achieve such inversion by ―explicitly foregrounding the viewpoints 
of ‗ordinary‘ people (activists, protesters, local residents), citizens whose visibility 
in the mainstream media tends to be obscured by the presence of elite groups and 
individuals‖ (ibid), through practices such as ‗native reporting‘, ―where social 
actors, instead of being subjects of the news, become their own correspondents, 
reporting on their own experiences, struggles, and ideas‖ (ibid: 42). Such self-
representation ―of ordinary people in alternative journalism seeks not to set them 
apart as either heroes or victims but as a set of voices which have as equal a right 
to be heard as do the voices of elite groups‖ (ibid: 40). Such citizen-based 
reportage, as mediated via the interactive and multi-media  capacities of the 
Internet in forms such as amateur video footage posted on blogs, can be seen as 
more fully realising public sphere principles such as ideal speech and rational-
critical debate (see chapter 6, section 6.22) in that it facilitates dialogue based on 
first-person knowledge and experience. This is in opposition to the mainstream 
news positioning of professional journalists as ‗objective‘ representatives of the 
public at large, who speak for and of behalf of citizens. In relation to radical 
critiques of mainstream news, this practice is ideologically suspect given the 
embeddedness of mainstream journalists within the greater institutional structures 
of mainstream news power.  
     Atton also argues for citizen-based, rather than institutional-based, news 
production. The specialization and demarcation typical of professional journalistic 
practices can be criticized for not only enforcing the authority of mainstream 
journalists, but for contributing to a news culture in which news is reported as 
fragmented events removed from the broader historical, political, and social 
contexts of which they are part. As a response to these problems, Atton advocates 
‗citizen journalism‘ as a framework for alternative news production. The site of 
news production is here conceived in terms of citizen-based collectives which are 
non-hierarchical in their organization and which undertake their news-making 
activities in relation to a radical identification ―with specific causes or ideologies‖ 
and ―the particular, activist communities in which they are actors‖ (ibid: 41), 
rather than an identification with professional or institutional bodies typical of 
mainstream news. In keeping with public sphere ideals, news produced along 
these lines would be more pluralistic, in terms of enabling citizens to 
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contextualize news stories in relation to their own knowledge and experience, and 
inclusive, with citizens operating as active participants of the news process rather 
than passive audiences of institutionalised news interests. Such news practices 
would help affirm the public sphere ethos by reconstituting a sense of ―the 
journalist as citizen, with a sense of loyalty to other citizens‖ (Harcup 2002: 
quoted in Atton 2004: 41). 
    Despite this emphasis on citizen-centric news practices, Atton also configures 
alternative journalism as making ―occasional use of mainstream and ‗radical 
mainstream‘ sources‖ (Atton 2004: 59).  The ideological essentialism inherent in 
positing alternative news as a system that only makes use of information from 
alternative sources is a position that is both reductive and counter- productive. 
Mainstream news sources can be considered useful to alternative journalism in 
that they may possess a resource base that enables them to get extensive coverage 
of a news event (such as the 9/11 terror attacks of 2001) in ways which may be 
unavailable to small-scale or localised alternative journalists. Similarly, there are 
also mainstream news sources which operate within the capitalist structures of the 
newspaper industry yet still adopt leftist or progressive perspectives towards news 
and current affairs in forms that are often compatible with the more radical 
alternative media ethos. For example, the British newspaper The Guardian 
features a variety of columnists, such as civic and environmental activist George 
Monbiot, who critique modern capitalist power in fairly radical terms. 
91
  
     Atton‘s outline of alternative journalism as a cornerstone of the alternative 
public sphere can therefore be seen as a much more thorough realization of public 
sphere ideals than mainstream journalism since it configures news practices in 
forms such as ‗citizen journalism‘ which more directly articulate public sphere 
principles such as interactive and inclusive communication between citizens (see 
chapter 6, section 6.22). With reference to the work of Deuze (2003), Atton 
discusses ―interactivity, hypertextuality and multimediality‖ (ibid: 53) as the 
technocultural capacities of the Net most important to the facilitation of 
alternative news practices.  Such capacities facilitate citizen-centric news 
practices in that they enable ―Internet publics to respond to, interact with or even 
customize the content presented to them‖ (ibid). In terms of interactivity, citizens 
are able to use news sites and blogs to present the alternative news content that 
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 http://www.guardian.co.uk/, accessed 14/9/10. 
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they have produced outside of the institutional and professional barriers that 
restrict such contribution in mainstream news environments. Similarly, citizens 
are also able to use the interactive features of websites, such as comments boxes 
and forum pages, to facilitate dialogue on radical subjects that would probably be 
avoided in mainstream news. Hypertextuality enables alternative websites to form 
a network of related sites in different geographical and cultural territories (as with 
the Indymedia network),
92
 ―and to provide access to other, original sources of 
…news and commentary‖, such as the ‗radical mainstream‘ news sources 
discussed above (ibid: 54). The multimedia capacities of the Net enable citizens to 
access news information from a wide variety of news sources, such as online 
newspapers and archived television footage and radio interviews. 
93
 Multimedia 
software and the convergent nature of digital technologies, such as digital video 
cameras and computers, also facilitate alternative news practitioners‘ abilities to 
make their own news content in forms that are comparable to those of online 
mainstream news sites. This can counteract the association between production 
values and the quality of news that separates mainstream from alternative news 
content in terms of broadcast and print media. For example, sites like Indymedia 
or Alternet have modes of presentation comparable to mainstream news sites such 
as those for the New York Times 
94
 or BBC News 
95
, while amateur documentaries 
on alternative subjects can be posted on popular file-sharing sites such as YouTube 
96
 alongside mainstream documentaries or news footage. In such ways the 
democratically empowering applications of the Net‘s technocultural capacities, in 
combination with the Net‘s ostensibly radical status as a medium which operates 
outside of mainstream media control structures, underpin radical configurations of 
the Net as the alternative public sphere within which alternative news practices 
can be implemented.  
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 The capacity of the Net to function as an information archive being articulated in relation to 
mythic concepts of the Net as ‗digital library‘, as discussed in chapter 5, section 5.22. 
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 http://www.youtube.com/, accessed 14/9/10.  
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7.32 Alternative news media and conspiracy theory 
 
     The radical configuration of the Internet as an alternative public sphere that 
facilitates alternative news practices is one well-suited to appropriation by 
classical conspiracy theorists as a means of legitimating their ideas within the 
alternative public sphere as manifestations of radical democratic politics rather 
than right-wing extremist ideologies. As discussed in chapter 6, section 6.32, 
conspiracy theorists have explicitly appropriated the ‗alternative‘ label, with its 
connotations of radical and oppositional information practices, as a signifier for 
their online activities. In this respect the radical connotations of the Net as an 
alternative public sphere can be applied to classical conspiracy theories and thus 
serve to legitimate the extremist/anti-democratic beliefs of such conspiracy 
theories as forms of radical democratic discourse. Building on theoretical 
discussions of the significance of news to the Habermasian public sphere ideal, 
Atton‘s articulation of alternative news as the main form of online content through 
which the alternative public sphere ethos is enacted can be seen as a framework 
integral to the conspiracist appropriation-legitimation dynamic.  
     As is clearly evident in the Swinney and Weidner articles discussed in chapter 
4, section 4.22, and the ‗Jolly Roger‘ article discussed in chapter 5, section 5.3, 
conspiracy theorists view mainstream news as being irrevocably compromised in 
carrying out its public sphere duties because such news is perceived to 
deliberately ignore, suppress, or manipulate information regarding the 
conspiratorial ‗truths‘ of socio-political power. Such information is 
conceptualised in conspiracist terms as forming the basis for popular 
revolutionary activity against the conspiratorial elites towards a more ‗pure‘ 
realisation of democratic ideals.
97
 In these respects radical configurations of 
online alternative news practices, as attempts to counteract and correct the 
compromised nature of mainstream news, constitute existing frameworks of 
democratically legitimate media practice that are not only resonant with 
conspiracist conceptions of news practice but which can empower conspiracy 
theorists in terms of facilitating their ‗civic duty‘ to inform the public - through 
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 These democratic ideals being configured in relation to the extremist/fantastical beliefs of the 
conspiracy theorist in question.  Refer chapter 4, sections 4.31 - 4.36.  
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the ‗free‘ medium of the Internet - of the conspiratorial truths which are 
suppressed by the conspiratorially-controlled mainstream news media. Alternative 
news practices of the types delineated by Atton can therefore be considered a 
prime subject for appropriation by conspiracy theorists. 
     There are several key characteristics of the alternative news framework, as 
outlined in section 7.31 above, that can be regarded as potentially empowering in 
relation to classical conspiracy theory.  A central factor is the raison d’etre of 
alternative news as part of the broader framework of the alternative public sphere 
- the presentation of ―radical critiques of government policies, government actions 
and the mass media‖ (Atton 2004: 59). As already discussed, alternative news can 
be seen to function as a ‗watchdog‘ on state power in keeping with the libertarian 
impulses that are incorporated into the ‗social responsibility‘ model of news upon 
which notions of the alternative public sphere are based.  This function is 
obviously highly attractive to conspiracy theorists in terms of the libertarian 
suspicions of government power that constitute a core part of the logic of classical 
conspiracy thought (see chapter 4, section 4.36, and chapter 5, section 5.3).  
     The main areas of alternative news practice delineated by Atton, news 
reportage and news production, can also be readily appropriated for conspiracist 
purposes. In terms of alternative practices of news reportage, Atton advocated a 
non-objective style of reportage that was explicitly biased towards the voices of 
ordinary citizens or marginalized groups as  a countermeasure against the 
perceived socio-political biases of mainstream news reportage. Such reportage 
could be achieved through practices such as ‗native reporting‘, which emphasised 
the use of ―first-person, eyewitness accounts by participants‖ (ibid: 26). This 
emphasis on the perspectives of citizens over those of professional journalists is 
resonant with the libertarian and populist impulses that shape the worldview of 
classical conspiracy theory (see chapter 4, sections 4.35 and 4.36). News derived 
from popular sources, such as eyewitness and first-person accounts, is treated by 
conspiracy theorists as possessing a higher degree of truthfulness than the 
‗official‘ news presented in  mainstream journalism because ordinary citizens are 
outside the conspiratorial biases of mainstream news reportage. This is reflected 
in the evidential emphasis placed by conspiracy theorists upon  first-person 
testimony from eyewitnesses to conspiracist events or conspiratorial insiders who 
have come out as ‗whistleblowers‘. For example, 9/11 conspiracy theories rely 
heavily on eye-witness accounts of the attacks. The figurative language used by 
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ordinary citizens to describe their observations of the chaotic events of the day, 
such as descriptions that  the collapse of the World Trade Centre buildings  
sounded like ‗bombs going off‘ or looked like a ‗controlled demolition‘, are 
interpreted by conspiracy theorists as literal descriptions of the true nature of the 
events in question.
98
 Similarly, ufological conspiracy theories which argue that the 
US government is covering up the truth about an alien presence on earth, such as 
those surrounding the alleged Roswell UFO crash of 1947, are predicated on 
multiple variations of eye-witness testimony, such as  deathbed confessions or 
whistleblowing by ex-US military personnel.
99
 In these respects, alternative news 
practices of citizen-based news reportage can be appropriated by conspiracy 
theorists as a means of legitimating conspiracist ideas presented in popular forms 
such as anecdotes or ‗first impressions‘, that present highly subjective (and thus 
distorted) versions of the ‗truth‘ of a news event,  as radical correctives to the 
ideological biases of mainstream news reportage.  
     This alternative emphasis on citizen-based news reporting can be further seen 
as significant to classical conspiracy theory in that it enables conspiracy theorists 
to present themselves as ‗citizens‘ and their conspiracist ideas as popular truths or 
beliefs.  In relation to the radical approaches to media power discussed in chapter 
4, section 4.21, radical journalism, in which the journalist  presents themselves as 
a citizen representing the voices of fellow citizens who may be dispossessed and 
marginalized in relation to the mainstream public sphere, can be seen as a 
significant points of connection with conspiracy theory. The populist and 
libertarian impulses inherent in the logic of classical conspiracy theory shape 
conspiracy theorists into presenting themselves not as extremist ideologues but as 
concerned citizens trying to educate their fellow citizens to the reality of the 
conspiracy that is threatening to undermine their democratic freedoms (a good 
example of this self-image is  the ‗Jolly Roger‘ article featured in chapter 5, 
section 5.3). In this respect the ethos behind alternative citizen-centric news – to 
present citizens‘ perspectives on news events that are normally invisible due to 
mainstream news bias towards the perspectives of powerful groups – can be 
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 For example, the page entitled ‗Explosion Witnesses‘ contained on the Fire Fighters For 9-11 
Truth website: http://firefightersfor911truth.org/?cat=4, accessed 15/9/10.  
 
99
 A detailed overview of Roswell informants which highlights the problems with their eyewitness 
accounts is presented at The Roswell Files, http://www.roswellfiles.com/witness.htm, accessed 
15/9/10.  
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applied to online conspiracy theory presented under the appropriated banner of 
alternative news. In this alternative context conspiracy theorists can present 
themselves as authentic or representative ‗voices of the people‘ of the kind 
normally biased against in mainstream news. Conspiracy theorists can therefore 
use the citizen-based reportage practices of alternative media to legitimate 
themselves and their ideas within the alternative public sphere.  The implicit 
tendency for conspiracy theorists to present themselves as demagogues rather than 
ideologues can be seen in the online practices of conspiracy theorists such as Alex 
Jones. For example, Jones‘s website Infowars.com provides a self-profile that 
presents Jones as a consummate American citizen, whose ‗radical‘ investigative 
journalism is undertaken as part of his civic duty to uphold the constitutional 
values that define American democracy:  
 
As a dedicated and aggressive Constutionalist, Jones consistently 
defends the Bill of Rights, property rights, and our nation's borders. In 
the spirit of Thomas Jefferson and George Washington, Jones 
passionately argues against foreign entanglements and wars for the sake 
of corporate and banking interests. Jones avoids the bogus political 
labels of ―left and right‖ and instead focuses on what really matters — 
what‘s right and wrong. As a tenacious journalist, Jones has broken 
hundreds of national stories over the span of his career. 
100
 
 
     The alternative practices of citizen-based news production which Atton 
describes as ‗citizen journalism‘ can also be configured as significant legitimating 
frameworks for online conspiracy theory. Such citizen journalism is delineated in 
opposition to mainstream journalism as news produced by citizen-based 
collectives, which is biased in subject matter towards  ―specific causes or 
ideologies‖ and ―the particular, activist communities‖ that the citizen journalists 
identify with (Atton 2004: 41), both of which may be marginalized in mainstream 
news production. These practices of citizen journalism can also be articulated in 
relation to online conspiracist news practices. Much conspiracist news is 
presented on blogs or news sites which are operated by and feature news by 
volunteers committed to the specific conspiracist beliefs of the site in question. 
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 http://www.infowars.com/alexbio.html, accessed 15/9/10.  
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For example, the New Zealand conspiracy news site Uncensored.co.nz makes 
much use of material from local conspiracy theorists such as Clare Swinney (see 
article featured in chapter 4, section 4.22) who present themselves as independent 
‗investigative journalists‘ in the mode of citizen-centric reportage discussed 
above;
101
 while the American Rense.com conspiracy news site has a submissions 
page that contains information for readers wishing to contribute material to the 
site such as articles, images, and artwork (in in-depth examination of this site will 
be presented in chapter 8). 
102
 As discussed above in  relation to the populist and 
libertarian aspects of conspiracist logic, conspiracy theorists also articulate 
themselves as belonging to activist communities of other conspiracy theorists 
concerned with maintaining citizens freedoms in the face of conspiratorial power 
structures. This tendency is made explicit with the likes of the online 9/11 truth 
movement, which is based upon ‗ordinary citizens‘ engaging in political activism 
to heighten awareness of the ‗truth‘ that the 9/11 attacks were an inside job 
enacted by the US government.
103
 The multi-media capacities of the Net also 
enable conspiracy theorists to forsake the eccentric or low-budget production 
values generally associated with conspiracy media by using generic multi-media 
and web software to produce conspiracy news sites with production values 
comparable to alternative (and mainstream) news sites. For example, the look of 
Alex Jones‘s Info Wars site,104 with its slick graphics, prominent display of 
rotating headlines, and organisation of stories under sub-categories with generic 
subject headings such as ‗Science and Technology‘ and ‗Economic Crisis‘, 
renders it comparable to a leading alternative site such as Alternet.org.
105
  
     Atton‘s advocacy of blogging as an online form well-suited to citizen 
production can also be discussed as a legitimating framework for conspiracy 
theory. As Atton notes, the personalized nature of blogs is well-suited to this ethos 
of citizen production in that such sites make the biases of the news producer 
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 This ‗investigative journalism‘ stance is much in evidence on  Swinney‘s personal website Web 
of Evidence: What They Don’t Want You to Know:  http://clareswinney.wordpress.com/, accessed 
15/9/10.  
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 http://www.rense.com/sub.htm , accessed 15/9/10.  
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 For example, the ‗Activist Resources‘ page at 9-11 Research.com, 
http://911research.wtc7.net/resources/web/activism.html , accessed 15/9/10.  
 
104
 http://www.infowars.com/ , accessed 15/9/10.  
 
105
 http://www.alternet.org/ , accessed 15/9/10.  
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readily visible to audiences, and also interpellate the reader in the journalistic 
process by creating the sense of a virtual dialogue between the blogger as citizen 
and the reader as citizen (a sensibility enhanced by the use of interactive features 
such as comments boxes to enable readers to directly engage in dialogue with the 
blogger). The visibility of bias and the presence of interactive dialogue help 
configure the blogger (and those with other forms of personal website) as an 
‗informed citizen‘ who constitutes a potentially trustworthy and reliable news 
source by comparison with mainstream journalists (Atton 2004: 56; Barlow 
2007).
106
 This alternative configuration of blogs and other personalized web sites 
as ones that facilitate citizen-centric dialogue, in keeping with alternative news 
practices, is one that can be readily seen as a useful legitimating framework for 
conspiracy theorists. 
107
 
     As the above discussion illustrates, the conspiracist appropriation of the 
alternative media framework can mean that their conspiracist information 
practices can be articulated as forms of alternative news practices, thereby 
legitimating their conspiracist beliefs within the alternative public sphere. Chapter 
8 will explicate these critical and theoretical arguments in practical terms through 
an in-depth examination of conspiracist news practices of the American 
conspiracy news site Rense.com.  
 
 
7.4 Summary     
 
     This chapter has developed the arguments presented in chapter 6 regarding the 
configuration of the Internet as an alternative public sphere as major point of 
connection with the logic of classical conspiracy theory through a discussion of 
alternative news. In relation to theoretical configurations of news as the type of 
media content central to the effective operation of the public sphere model, and 
critical beliefs that the public sphere functions of mainstream news media have 
been irrevocably compromised by powerful political and economic interests, 
theorists such as Atton (2004) have conceptualised online alternative news 
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 Mainstream journalists obviously make use of blogs as much as alternative ones, but a debate 
around this point is outside the scope of this study.  
 
107
 Typical examples of conspiracy blogs include Femacamper, http://femacampr.wordpress.com ; 
openUReyes, http://www.openureyes.org.nz/blog/; Truth Gone Wild, 
http://truthgonewild.blogspot.com, all sites accessed 15/9/10.  
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practices as a means of counteracting and correcting the biases of mainstream 
news media and underpinning radical configurations of the Internet as an 
alternative public sphere. Conspiracy theorists‘ appropriation of the alternative 
media ethos means that their online information practices can also be configured 
as forms of alternative news practice, thus helping to legitimate their conspiracist 
beliefs within the alternative public sphere of the Internet. The following chapter 
will examine this appropriation-legitimation dynamic on an empirical level 
through a case study of the news practices of the conspiracy news site Rense.com.  
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CHAPTER 8 
ALTERNATIVE NEWS CASE STUDY – Rense.com 
__________________________________________________________________ 
 
8.1 Introduction 
 
     This chapter is a case study of the American conspiracy news site Rense.com 
that is intended to illustrate the arguments developed in chapters 6 and 7 regarding 
how conspiracy theorists engage with ideas of alternative media in accordance 
with a dynamic of appropriation and legitimation. As stated above, these 
arguments are related to the dominant theme of the study – that configurations of 
the Internet as an alternative public sphere operate as the most significant point of 
connection between the Internet and the logic of conspiracy theory.  
     This case study is structured in three parts. The first part presents background 
material pertaining to the Rense.com site in order to explain why I selected this 
site as an example of online news analysis. The second part outlines the 
methodology for the survey of Rense.com news practices. The third part presents 
the data from the Rense.com survey, and analyses the data in relation to the 
conspiracist appropriation and legitimation dynamic developed over the preceding 
two chapters.  
 
 
8.2 Rense.com – background 
 
My selection of the Rense.com site for this example was based on two main 
factors. The first was the classical conspiracist worldview evident in the site 
content. The second was the way in which the Rense.com site – and its explicitly 
conspiracist content – was presented to readers as an alternative news site.  
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8.21 The conspiracist worldview presented on Rense.com 
 
     Rense.com is a website that is directly concerned with the propagation and 
dissemination of classical conspiracy theories. My identification of Rense.com as 
a conspiracy site is based upon my long-term perusal of the site as part of my 
researches into online conspiracy culture. While the conspiracist worldview 
behind Rense.com is obscured by its operation as a news site, incorporating a wide 
variety of material from numerous sources and contributors, it is apparent from 
regular observation that the site advocates a ‗superconspiracy‘ worldview typical 
of much post-war American conspiracist thought. As per the conspiracist typology 
outlined in chapter 2, section 2.51, this worldview combines several main strands 
of conspiracism: traditional far-right anti-semitic beliefs about ‗Jewish/Zionist 
plots for global domination‘; the paranoid ‗libertarian populism‘ of American 
nationalism that sees the US government as an institution under the control of ‗un-
American‘ forces such as communists and the Illuminati; and paranormal/occult 
ideas, such as the existence of UFOs or the ‗satanic‘ nature of the Illuminati, 
derived from New Age and fundamentalist thought. The underlying conspiracist 
framework of Rense.com can be summarised along the following lines. Elite 
institutions of global power, such as the US government and large corporations, 
are secretly run by a small group of Zionist Illuminists who wish to establish a 
totalitarian new world order as part of some transhistorical, occult-based plot of 
global domination (both Zionists and Illuminati being perceived as innately 
‗evil‘).  This plot involves killing off most of the human race in order to preserve 
natural resources for the use of the conspiratorial elite, and subjugating the rest as 
mind-controlled slaves. This totalitarian scheme is being enacted on both micro 
and macro levels of society. On a macro-level large-scale historical events such as 
wars, economic depressions and pandemics are being deliberately engineered by 
the conspirators as means of population control and pretexts for implementing 
new systems of social control. On a micro-level the basic institutions of everyday 
civic existence, such as public health and education, and the media, are being 
transformed into vehicles for the physical and mental control of the populace. The 
conspirators are also suppressing potentially revolutionary ideas, such as 
alternative health and technology and the reality of paranormal phenomena such 
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as UFOs, as a means of preventing the development of alternatives to the current 
political, economic, and social systems that they control. 
     Rense.com is also significant as a major information ‗node‘ for online 
conspiracy culture. Rense.com functions as a ‗one-stop information shop‘, 
presenting conspiracy-related news stories from other conspiracy sites across the 
Net, as well as presenting site-specific material. Some of the sites regularly used 
as content sources in this way include far right American news sites News With 
Views, World Net Daily, and American Free Press, and the personal websites and 
blogs of Illuminati conspiracy theorists such as Henry Makow, Paul Drockton, 
and Joan Veon.
108
 Regular readers of the site thereby get a good spread of 
conspiracist news from across the conspiracist web sphere.  Because of the wide 
range of news stories featured on the site, Rense.com is also regularly used as a 
source of news by other conspiracy sites. Notable examples of these include the 
website of leading British conspiracy theorist David Icke, the New Zealand  
conspiracy news site Uncensored, and the New Age conspiracy site Sign of the 
Times. 
109
 Since each of these sites is in turn linked to many other conspiracy 
sites, news information gathered from Rense.com may be considered to have a 
wide degree of circulation throughout the conspiracy web sphere.  
     In these respects, I thought that Rense.com is a good exemplar of the 
superconspiracist worldview that dominates 21
st
 century American conspiracy 
culture (and, by extension, the conspiracy web sphere). My study of the 
information practices of this site could therefore be taken as indicative of the 
information practices of other conspiracy websites that present themselves as 
‗alternative news‘ sites.  
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 News site references: 
 NewsWithViews, http://www.newswithviews.com/, 
World Net Daily,  http://www.wnd.com/ , 
American Free Press, http://www.americanfreepress.net/; 
Personal site references: 
Henry Makow, http://www.henrymakow.com/ , 
Paul Drockton, http://www.moneyteachers.org/Deadmanmusings1.htm , 
Joan Veon , http://www.womensgroup.org/, all accessed 14/5/10.  
The Illuminati conspiracy advocated by Drockton, Veon, and Makow  is based in American 
nationalism and fundamentalist Protestantism. New Age beliefs are usually condemned by these 
theorists as parts of the Illuminati plot. While Makow gets a lot of coverage on American 
conspiracy websites such as Rense.com, it is worth noting that he is Canadian (Drockton and Veon 
being American).  
 
109
 References for these sites;  
David Icke‘s site, http://www.davidicke.com/index.php/,  
Uncensored, http://uncensored.co.nz ,  
Sign of the Times news, http://www.sott.net/,  all accessed 14/5/10.  
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8.22 The presentation of Rense.com as an alternative news site 
 
     Rense.com explicitly positions itself as an alternative news site. A banner on 
the main news page, just above the news headlines, reads ‗Rense.com – World‘s 
#1 Alternative News Service. Your First Source For Reality & Honest 
Journalism‘. The description of the show presented on the site‘s ‗About the Show‘ 
page outlines the nature of the show as an oppositional one in the alternative 
tradition, providing citizens with information that they are unlikely to encounter in 
the controlled world of mainstream journalism: ―Thanks to the program and site, 
listeners, researchers and information seekers from across the US and around the 
world are being exposed to information and learning about the most important 
issues of our times they rarely, if ever, encounter in the controlled corporate world 
of mainstream broadcast and monopoly print media (sic)‖(Rense.com, n.d.).110 In 
other words, Rense.com is predicated on an awareness of the failure of the 
mainstream news media to fulfil its public sphere duties in keeping the public 
effectively informed in issues of political and social importance. In relation to the 
radical ethos of alternative media outlined by Atton, this failure is attributed to the 
co-option of mainstream broadcast and print journalism by corporations who 
control the information provided to the public in accordance with their 
commercial interests. In this respect Rense.com can be seen to operate as part of 
the alternative public sphere that has developed as a means of redressing the 
inadequacies of the mainstream public sphere. It seeks to provide audiences with 
access to information that they ―rarely, if ever, encounter in the controlled 
corporate world of mainstream broadcast and monopoly print media.‖: such 
access to information in turn leading to audiences developing their understanding 
of the world in a manner redolent of the ‗rational-critical worldview‘ of the public 
sphere ideal, i.e. ―learning about the most important issues of our times‖ (ibid).  
      Jeff Rense, the show‘s originator, is described in terms befitting the citizen 
journalist model:  
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 http://www.rense.com/aboutnew1.htm, accessed 14/5/10. 
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As an award-winning television News Director and News Anchor for 
over ten years, Jeff continually pushed for higher standards of 
journalism and responsible, intelligent reporting and inquiry. 
Regrettably, those goals were often at odds with the irrevocable tv news 
obsession for tabloid exploitation of the trivial, the tragic and the 
sensational. The situation became so dubious and distasteful that one 
day he walked away from his highly-successful news anchor/news 
director career (as high as a 53 Share of the audience - Nielsen) and 
moved to radio, recognizing it as the last viable approach to bringing 
reality to the American public...and now with the internet, to the world 
(Rense.com, n.d.).
111
 
 
 In alternative media terms, Rense is presented here as a journalist committed to 
the ideals of the public sphere – ―Jeff continually pushed for higher standards of 
journalism and responsible, intelligent reporting and inquiry‖ (Rense.com, n.d.). 
However, the commercial nature of mainstream journalism, in which public 
sphere values are downplayed in favour of easily packaged ‗tabloid‘ journalism – 
―exploitation of the trivial, the tragic, and the sensational‖ – led to Rense leaving 
mainstream TV journalism and setting up his own talkback radio show and online 
news site outside of mainstream control as a means of conveying serious 
information about the nature of political and social power – what is referred to 
here as ―reality‖ – to ―the American public…and the world‖ (Rense.com, n.d.).   
     The efficacy of the site as an alternative public sphere news source is implied 
in the statistics presented which attest to the site‘s popularity. The site is 
described as ―one of the world's elite and most referenced 24-hour news services. 
It is the world's number ONE talk radio site and records close to 10 million total 
hits per month. Rense.com archives over 150,000 pages of stories, articles, reports 
and features. Rense.com is a powerhouse and sits firmly in the top .001% of the 
20 million websites on the internet. (World rankings as of March 1, 2007)‖ 
(Rense.com, n.d.).  Its radical credentials, in terms of presenting information 
about the dominant power structures of society that is poorly reported in the 
mainstream public sphere, are also reflected in the claims that ―the site and 
program are constantly visited by globalist elite, government agencies, military 
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 http://www.rense.com/aboutnew1.htm, accessed 14/05/2010.  
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and intelligence agencies and worldwide defense industry sources ... all 
confirmed by electronic monitoring of site visitors‖ (Rense.com, n.d.). 112 The 
implication here is that these ‗power elites‘ are keeping tabs on the nature of the 
information presented by Rense.com because of the potential threat such 
information poses to their power.  
     The presentation of Rense.com as an alternative news site is also evident in the 
format of the site. News information is presented in formatting modes that are 
established signifiers of news media in both mainstream and alternative forms. 
Such ‗news formatting‘ includes: 
- news headlines. That these are the major feature of the Rense.com site is 
signalled by the way in which they dominate the layout of the homepage. The 
headlines are positioned in the centre of the homepage and extend the entire 
length of the page. The news headlines are updated several times a day in keeping 
with generic expectations of ‗breaking news‘ as a key index of a news site.  
- news features. The side bar to the left of the news headlines box is made up of 
‗topic boxes‘ that provide in-depth information on particular conspiracist topics 
related to current affairs. Under a heading outlining the particular topic in 
question are presented specific pieces of relevant information in the shape of news 
stories, conspiracist commentary and other material.  This is similar to newspaper 
formats in which certain news topics are deemed to be particularly important in 
relation to the social and institutional contexts within which the news media 
operate (for example, government policy may be covered in depth in a feature 
article as this would have wide-ranging impacts upon all sectors of society). Such 
subjects are therefore singled out for more in-depth journalistic coverage in the 
form of feature articles rather than news stories.  
- columnists. A sub-section within the ‗features‘ section presents a list of 
conspiracy theorists who regularly contribute to the Rense.com news headlines in 
the form of news stories and commentary. This mirrors mainstream news formats 
in which various journalists write regular columns expressing their opinions on 
various topics or their specialised knowledge of a particular field.  
- editorial cartoon. The Rense.com banner usually appears at the top of an 
illustration by conspiracist artist David Dees which provides graphic commentary 
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 http://www.rense.com/aboutnew1.htm,  accessed 8/06/07. 
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on particular conspiracist themes or issues. This is in keeping with the newspaper 
tradition of editorial cartoons which offer commentary on current events.  
 
     The large amount of advertising on the Rense.com homepage is important to 
discuss here in relation to ideas of news formatting and alternative media 
credentials. As outlined by Atton, the radical ethos of alternative media sites 
means that many of them try and avoid advertising as a means of preserving their 
ideological integrity and journalistic autonomy, since the manipulation of news in 
relation to the interests of advertisers is regarded as being one of the major 
problems affecting the public sphere functions of mainstream journalism. Even 
most mainstream news sites do not feature as much advertising as Rense.com. On 
a prima facie basis, the amount of advertising on Rense.com could be taken to 
suggest that the site is as much a commercial news site as the mainstream 
journalism it purports to be an alternative to. However, I would argue that the 
advertising does not undermine the alternative status of the Rense.com in terms of 
the content and tone of the products being promoted. The products and services 
advertised on the site are directly related to the conspiracist worldview of the site 
in that they are produced by ‗alternative lifestyle‘ companies. Such companies are 
concerned with providing products and services to help citizens free themselves 
from corporate-controlled structures of consumption. For example, conspiracist 
fears of the control and manipulation of the food supply as a means by which the 
conspiratorial elites can physically control the population are reflected in 
advertisements for products such as heirloom seeds.
113
 Citizens can use such seeds 
to grow their own crops and preserve genetic diversity in the food supply in 
opposition to the agricultural monoculture of large food companies and the 
attempts to directly control food through genetic engineering and patents practiced 
by multinational corporations such as Monsanto. Similarly, conspiracist concerns 
about the conspiratorial control of the banking and finance industries as a means 
of ‗enslaving‘ the citizenry via such forms as taxes, credit ratings, and debt 
repayments are evident in advertisements for ‗alternative‘ financial services that 
promote legal loopholes for citizens to use to challenge and avoid such systems. 
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 ‗Heirloom Organics 100% Non-Hybrid/GMO Survival Seed Banks‘,  http://www.non-hybrid-
seeds.com/, advertised on http://rense.com , accessed 14/5/10.  
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114
 The establishment of economic autonomy is here presented as being a 
prerequisite for personal freedom from the conspiratorial system. The advertising 
can thus be seen to function as an integral part of Rense.com, reinforcing the 
conspiracist ethos of the site rather than contradicting or undermining it through 
the promotion of unrelated products and the practicalities of owning and operating 
a website in general. Such subject-related advertising can also be seen as a method 
for Rense.com to continue functioning as an ‗alternative‘ news source in regards 
to the various costs involved in operating a website (e.g. server space rent, 
employment of news editors etc).     
 
 
8.3 Methodology 
 
     This examination of the news practices of Rense.com took the form of a 
content analysis of the news material presented on the site. My interest was in 
ascertaining patterns and trends in the ways in which news content was presented 
on the site as evidence for the idea that classical conspiracy theorists could be 
seen to appropriate the ethos of alternative news practices as a means of 
legitimating their conspiracist beliefs in relation to ideas of the public sphere.  
    I collated the news updates presented on Rense.com each day over a 9-day 
period.  I thought this period (just over a week) suitable as the basis for a piece of 
exploratory research into this relationship since the time period was long enough 
to indicate the development of particular trends in relation to news cycles and 
stories. This was concomitant with the fact that large amounts of news stories 
were posted on Rense.com on a daily basis, so that the 9-day period provided a 
large amount of material to examine from which could be extrapolated critical 
observations regarding wider trends related to the ways in which Rense.com made 
use of news sources. 
     The patterns ascertained from noting the content of each news item in relation 
to the criteria outlined in the following sections was plotted against the total 
number of news items presented on Rense.com in turns of each day and 
collectively across all nine days. The ratios involved were as follows:  
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 ‗Redemption Process – Legally Eliminate Debt via America‘s #1 UCC Secured Party‘, 
http://www.redemptionservice.com/ , advertised on http://rense.com , accessed 14/5/10.  
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Day 1 – 30 news items 
Day 2 – 44 news items 
Day 3 – 45 news items (47 stories listed, but two deleted/unavailable at original 
links) 
Day 4 – 37 news items 
Day 5 – 28 news items 
Day 6 – 61 news items 
Day 7 – 58 news items (60 items listed, two deleted/unavailable at original links) 
Day 8 – 45 news items (46 listed, one deleted/unavailable at original link) 
Day 9 – 60 news items (61 listed, one deleted/unavailable) 
 
Collectively: 408 news items over the 9 day period.  
 
I listed different aspects of the content of the individual news stories presented on 
Rense.com in relation to several criteria pertaining to the content of each news 
story. These criteria were deemed to be significant in ascertaining possible 
patterns involved in Rense.com‘s news coverage and its presentation as an 
alternative news site. I developed these criteria in accordance with factors noted 
across previous observations of Rense.com 
and other conspiracy sites. 
 
In the following sections I will outline the criteria by which I analysed each news 
item.  
 
 
8.31 The address of each individual news webpage 
 
     This was for reference purposes (i.e. the need to go back and recheck the link if 
checking/further research was required).  
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8.32 The headline under which the news story was presented at its 
original source 
 
     The headlines under which news stories were presented on the Rense.com site 
often differed from the original headline of the article. From my overviews of 
Rense.com and other conspiracy sites, it was noted that news stories – particularly 
those originating from mainstream sources – were often listed under headlines 
that were  notably different from the original titles of the articles themselves. 
These site-specific headlines made clear to fellow conspiracists the conspiratorial 
significance of the events featured in the news stories. I was therefore interested to 
see how this practice was exercised at Rense.com. Questions here included: how 
widespread was this practice? Were new headlines provided for news stories 
dealing with certain subjects more than others? What did these substitute 
headlines signify in relation to the ostensible nature of the site as an ‗alternative 
news‘ source? 
 
 
8.33 The types of news story featured on Rense.com 
 
This typology was divided into two sections: 
A – the format of the news item. This refers to the style of writing and mode of 
presentation by which the news information was presented to readers. My format 
categories constituted the following: 
- news report – standard ‗objective‘ descriptions of events 
- commentary – pieces by columnists/specialist journalists/experts etc. offering 
personal and/or indepth opinion and facts on particular news items and trends 
- letters – letters from readers to the news journal 
- essay – long research pieces on specific topics presented by contributors 
- press release – information presented by institutions or groups that is presented 
in a direct form ‗clear‘ of journalistic rewriting 
- online video – news items presented in the form of online audio-visual clips.  
 
B – the subject matter of the news item. My interest here was in seeing the 
patterns involved in the relationships between the subject matter of news stories 
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and the selection of news stories for the Rense.com site.  Questions here included:  
were stories dealing with specific subjects selected more than others? What did 
these emphases (if any) reveal about the conspiracist beliefs informing the 
Rense.com site? How might these emphases relate to conspiracist attempts to 
legitimate their activities under the guise of ‗alternative‘ media?  
 
I classified each story according to the following subject categories: 
National politics – stories dealing with political events within the nation-state 
that the news source is based in, e.g. news stories originating from American 
websites discussing US national and local politics.  
International politics – stories dealing with political events in countries outside 
of the nation-state where the news source is based e.g. American news-sites 
discussing political events in China. I also filed stories dealing with events such as 
the Feb 2010 Haiti earthquake in this category (given that reportage of such 
events is generally extricated with the geopolitics of relief efforts et al).  
Middle East politics. While this subject area would normally be filed under the 
International Politics section outlined above, the anti-semitic conspiracy beliefs 
that informed the Rense.com site meant that a large proportion of stories dealt 
with Israel and the whole sphere of Middle East politics. I therefore placed stories 
dealing with ‗the Middle East‘ in a separate category. 
War on Terror – again, this was a specific area of international political news 
that appeared of major interest to the Rense.com webmasters. 
Economics – stories dealing with economic policy and the social effects of such 
policies. Included in this category were stories dealing with the global economic 
depression of 2008 - 2010 brought on by the collapse of the US finance sector. 
Business – stories that dealt specifically with the workings of companies, the 
business community e.g. corporate machinations, companies recalling faulty 
products.   
Society – stories dealing with issues and trends pertinent to specific social groups 
or general conceptions of society as a whole, e.g. stories about ‗declining moral 
standards‘ amongst youth. 
Culture – stories that deal with creative/cultural aspects of human life e.g. 
festivals and the arts.  
Media – stories related to media fields such as television, film, newspapers. 
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Internet –stories specifically dealing with Internet/Web topics, such as social 
changes wrought by the Web, the introduction of new Web forms etc. Given the 
focus of this thesis on the relationships between the Internet and conspiracy 
culture, I thought it important to consider Rense.com stories dealing with Net/Web 
topics as a category separate from other media.  
Health – stories dealing with health topics e.g. pandemics, obesity. 
Environment – stories dealing with environmental issues e.g. global warming 
Science & Technology – stories dealing with scientific surveys and discoveries 
and new technological developments e.g. sociological studies of human 
interaction. 
History – stories presenting recent updates or reappraisals of historical events e.g. 
new information about events of World War II. 
Religion – stories dealing with issues pertaining to religious groups and 
institutions e.g. Catholicism, Islam. 
Crime – stories dealing with policing, criminal activity etc. 
Human interest – stories presented more for their entertainment/filler angle than 
their information/facts e.g. the infamous ‗cute animal‘ type stories. 
 
 
8.34 The source of the news items listed  
 
     More specifically, the cultural/ideological positions of the news sources from 
which the Rense.com  editors gathered their news. Such identifications are 
obviously central in discussing possible relationships between conspiracist 
thought and cultural conceptions of the Net as an alternative public sphere. I 
categorised each news item in relation to three general types of source which I 
will outline here. 
     The first type were what I labeled mainstream news sources. These were 
corporate/state operated news outlets that operate within the realm of readily 
accessible/popularly recognized ‗mass media‘ culture.  Most online sources of this 
type are the Web versions of established newspaper and television news sources, 
for example the BBC or the New York Times. I also included news originating 
from sources that specialise in particular types of subject matter but which do so 
in forms readily accessible to the general public (in terms of factors such as 
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writing style and distribution). Examples here may include financial news such as 
The Wall Street Journal, or popular science periodicals such as Nature.  
     The second type were alternative news sources. In keeping with Atton‘s 
definition of ‗alternative ‗media, I classified as ‗alternative‘ those news sources 
whose production base, informational practices, and choices of subject matter 
signified a commitment to the radical/progressive ethos that Atton identified as 
typical of ‗alternative media‘. Sites that may have presented radical or unusual 
political and cultural views without any intrinsic conspiracist worldview were 
categorised as alternative sites. For example, news originating from left and right-
wing groups, such as neo-Marxist activists or libertarian organisations, were 
treated as ‗alternative‘ because the political ideas presented are generally deemed 
too radical by mainstream media standards that strive to reflect the political views 
of the ‗mass‘ public. However, I also classified as ‗alternative‘ news that 
originates from sites dealing with subjects that are generally relegated to the 
fringes of mainstream culture because of their paranormal or trans-rational subject 
matter, such as ufology and pseudo-science. 
     Given their shared modus operandi in terms of presenting an alternative to 
mainstream culture and beliefs, my categorisation of a site as alternative or 
conspiracist was difficult at times since there was often some degree of thematic 
overlap between the two. For example, the website GlobalResearch.ca was a 
regular source of Rense.com news items.
115
 The website presents news and 
commentary dealing with critical views of globalisation issues such as American 
imperialism and international economic organisations. As edited by Canadian 
academic Michel Chossudovsky, this combination would suggest the site to be a 
bastion of serious left-wing critique of the type associated with the American 
academic and activist Noam Chomsky and websites such as Indymedia.  
However, the site also features stories that deal with distinctly conspiracist topics. 
Major examples here include stories arguing that the  9/11 terror attacks were 
false flag operations by the US government,  and that global warming is a 
scientific hoax implemented by global elites as part of a international power grab. 
I was thus forced to decide if I should classify GlobalResearch.ca as an 
alternative or conspiracist website. I chose to classify it as an alternative site for 
two main reasons: firstly, that the bulk of the material featured on the site did not 
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deal with  conspiracist themes;  secondly, that the site appeared to express no 
distinctive classical conspiracist agenda (e.g. Illuminati/Zionist/Communist 
conspiracy narratives). My distinction between ‗alternative‘ and conspiracist‘ 
categories was therefore often subjective - a matter of discernment and judgment 
based upon my observations of alternative and conspiracist websites. While I 
freely acknowledge the problematic aspects of this approach – for instance, 
someone else repeating this news survey may well see fit to classify 
GlobalResearch.ca as a conspiracy site – I feel that my separation of conspiracist 
from alternative news sources was fairly accurate. 
     The third type were conspiracist news sources. As outlined above, my 
identification of conspiracy sites as news sources for Rense.com was based 
primarily upon the explicitly conspiratorial beliefs evident in the news items listed 
(e.g. discussions of the Illuminati or 9/11) and/or the conspiracist background of 
the news source (e.g. blogs of known conspiracy theorists). I also included in this 
category material that was presented directly under the Rense.com banner. Such 
material consisted of a text presented in a standard ‗rense.com‘ page format as a 
piece of news that originated internally from the site, without linking to any 
external news source. The problematic aspect with such material was that some of 
it was not overtly ‗conspiracist‘ in content but rather consisted of such things as 
political commentary from bloggers or journalists in alternative modes. However, 
I decided to classify such material as ‗conspiracist‘ due to its presentation as a 
product of the Rense.com site rather than an external source, and because there 
may have been editorial factors behind such presentation. For example, the writers 
of the material presented may have given permission to Rense.com to present the 
material on their behalf (this was suggested by the listing of copyright information 
and similar details of authorship as part of these articles). In such cases, the 
writers have allowed their work to be presented under the banner of an explicitly 
conspiracist website.  
     There were also a number of subsidiary factors related to these news sources 
that I  thought worthy of noting in regards to the ideas about sources outlined 
above. In relation to mainstream news sources, I noted separately if the news 
source originated from a news site specialising in regional news (e.g. city, 
province, state-wide) and/or international news (sourced outside the US or UK 
press). This was based upon an awareness (from my own experience and reading 
about news institutions) of the relationships between the geographical/social 
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scope of news sources and the types of news stories they carry. For example, the 
big newspaper and television news outlets are designed to address large-scale 
national audiences. Their choice of news items, and the ways in which they report 
news stories, are likely to be more general and less specific than regional news 
sources that consider stories within a much smaller geographical and social range. 
Similarly, mainstream news sources from countries outside of the US/UK may 
have developed their own news content and  particular ‗takes‘ on news stories in 
keeping with their own national political, social and cultural perspectives. My 
interest here was in seeing if the Rense.com news compilers made much use of 
such sources as means of providing more specific information or examples on 
topics of conspiracist interest. For example, a local newspaper may have an in-
depth article about local economic or cultural trends that could be taken as a 
specific example of conspiratorial machinations. This reasoning was also behind 
my noting whether news items were sourced from what I term above as 
‗mainstream specialist‘ publications, e.g. mass-market magazines specialising in 
certain subject areas (e.g. science and technology), or journals/websites related to 
particular professions or institutions (e.g. medical and business journals).  
     From previous overviews of the Rense.com site, it was also apparent that the 
websites of leading UK national newspapers were a major source of news items. 
Given that Rense.com is a website based in the USA, I found it interesting that 
mainstream British newspapers should be a major news source for a conspiracy 
website based in the USA. Such a relationship suggested that the news team at 
Rense.com regarded the mainstream British news media as possessing a cachet of 
quality, in terms of such factors as the veracity of the facts being reported, that its 
US equivalents lacked. Noting the frequency  with which mainstream British 
newspaper sites were used as source material for Rense.com was a way of 
examining this point in detail.  
     In relation to the alternative categories, I also noted if the news sources 
referenced  had distinctive liberal or conservative political stances, i.e. did the 
news come from the websites of conservative groups (such as far-right ‗patriot‘ 
organisations) or liberal groups (such as civil rights/anti-globalisation groups)? 
My intention here was to see if there were any notable ideological patterns 
involved in the selection of source material in relation to ideas of conspiracism as 
a form of ‗alternative media‘. For instance, the regular use of liberal alternative 
sites may have suggested a tactic by the Rense.com web crew to position itself in 
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relation to left-wing political perspectives, thereby obscuring the extremist/far-
right nature of the conspiracist worldview that permeates the site. While I am 
aware that the mainstream news media can also be divided into liberal and 
conservative sources (e.g. the liberal British newspaper The Guardian and the 
conservative Daily Telegraph), alternative media are usually much more direct 
and partisan in the expression of their political views since they are not bound by 
institutional and industrial notions of appealing to ‗mainstream mass audiences‘.  
 
 
8.35 The country of origin of the news items featured on 
Rense.com 
 
     This information was intended to complement the hypothesis regarding the 
geographical/cultural origins of the online news material used by Rense.com 
outlined in the section above. For example, does the Rense.com site use more non-
American news sources than American ones (despite its own American identity)? 
If so – what might such patterns indicate in regards to the Rense.com site and 
conceptions of the Net as an alternative medium? 
 
 
8.36 The relationship between the news stories presented and the 
conspiracist themes that inform the Rense.com site 
 
     Given the theoretical ideas underlying this study – that conspiracy sites use 
ideas of alternative media as a means of legitimating their conspiracist content - it 
was obviously important to consider how the news items presented related to the 
conspiracist worldview of the Rense.com site. In other words – why did the 
Rense.com news compilers select these stories and not others for the site? What 
was the conspiratorial significance of the news stories presented (in relation to the 
conspiracist worldview of the Rense.com site)? 
     I classified the news items presented on Rense.com in relation to specific sub-
themes (e.g. government corruption) that related to a more general thematic 
framework of conspiracist belief (e.g. the conspiratorial control of the US 
government). I will outline these thematic categories below. 
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1 – Conspiracy theories about the US government and corporations.  
Rense.com presented numerous stories dealing with the activities of the American 
‗power elites‘ of government and business as a means of showing how these 
groups are working to implement a Zionist/Illuminati ‗New World Order‘. I 
categorised news items related to this theme according to the following 
subjects/sub-themes: 
A – ‘Hard’ politics. The workings and policies of the US government are 
evidence of conspiratorial control of the US political system. 
B – Government/corporate corruption. Abuses of power within governments 
and corporations are evidence  of conspiratorial control of these organisations. 
C – President Obama. The President of the USA is a conspiratorial agent who is 
secretly promoting a conspiratorial,  ‗un-American‘ political agenda. 
D – 9/11. The 9/11 terror attacks were secretly carried out by the US government 
as a means of instigating international conflict, thereby furthering the 
development of a conspiratorial ‗new world order‘ and state control of American 
citizens. 
E  – the ‘war on terror’. Related to above – the US military conflicts against 
terrorists in the Middle East are part of the conspiratorial ‗great game‘ for 
establishing a ‗New World Order‘. 
F – the US as ‘police state’. The US governmental/corporate elites are using 
various methods and pretexts to dismantle the civil liberties of American citizens 
to further their totalitarian agenda.  
 
2 - Conspiracy beliefs about ‘the Zionist plot for world domination’. 
Rense.com perpetuates these anti-semitic conspiracy trope by featuring news 
items dealing with Israeli politics and Jewish culture. These stories are invariably 
selected because of the ways they portray Jewish people in a negative light, thus 
reinforcing anti-semitic stereotypes.  
A – Middle Eastern politics. Israel‘s role in the geopolitical issues of the Middle 
East – especially the Palestinian situation – reflects the ‗evil‘ nature of the Jewish 
people and their Zionist ‗new world Order‘ agenda.  
B – Zionist control of the USA. Israeli – US relations and American politicians 
of Jewish background are evidence of Zionist control of the US government. 
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C – Zionist control of world events. Israeli/Jewish connections to international 
political/economic systems are part of the Zionist plots for world domination. 
D – Jewish culture. News stories dealing with aspects of Jewish culture are 
presented as a means of demonising Jews in accordance with anti-Semitic 
conspiracist beliefs.  
 
3 –  Conspiracy theories about the decline of America and the West. These 
news items deal with various types of internal crises or political trends that signify 
major problems or shifts in American (and more broadly Western)  political, 
economic and social systems. The conspiracist implication is that such crises and 
trends are ‗engineered‘ by the conspiratorial elites as a means of furthering their 
control over the USA and the West and their manipulation of international 
relations towards the creation  of a conspiratorial ‗New World Order‘.  
A – USA and international relations. American relationships with other nation 
states are evidence of conspiratorial attempts to use American hyperpower as a 
means of establishing a New World Order and/or destabilise American 
hyperpower as a means of allowing the rise of other countries as a means of 
developing a new world order e.g. China. 
B – US economic crisis. The current economic depression in the USA (2008 – 
present) is part of conspiratorial attempts to control global economic systems as 
part of the development of a New World Order. 
C – Global economic crisis. The global economic depression that resulted from 
the American crises is part of conspiratorial attempts to control global economic 
systems as part of the development of a New World Order. 
D – Globalisation. Political organisations and economic agreements based on 
ideas of globalisation are conspiratorial plots to develop a New World Order. 
E – International conflict. Conflicts in non-Western geopolitical sphere are 
instigated by conspiratorial agents as a means of achieving New World Order 
ends.  
F – Decline of American society. Conspirators are sowing moral corruption and 
social discord as a means of undermining the ‗true American values‘ that are an 
affront to their conspiratorial agenda. 
 
4 – Conspiracy theories about conspiratorial ‘control systems’. These news 
items relate to conspiracist concerns that almost all facets of modern cultural and 
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social life have been designed as and/or transformed into systems of conspiratorial 
control of the populace. This control is both physical (controlling such things as 
freedom of movement and organisation) and mental (controlling the ways in 
which citizens think about power, society, and the self).  
A – Food. Conspiratorial elites are drugging/poisoning the populace through food 
production e.g. chemical additives 
B – Science and technology. Scientific research and technological developments 
signify new forms of conspiratorial control. 
C – US media. The American media is a system of conspiratorial mind control 
D – Internet. The information freedom of the Net is under threat by conspiratorial 
elites through strategies such as legislation, censorship etc. 
E – Health. Institutionalised medicine is a conspiratorial method for 
drugging/killing the populace.  Alternative health practices and theories are 
therefore demonised by the conspiratorial establishment because of the 
ideological challenge they present to the health establishment. 
F – Pandemics. Global disease outbreaks are engineered by conspiratorial elites 
as a means of reducing/controlling the world‘s population (through death or  
treatments such as vaccinations). 
G – Global warming. Global warming is a scientific fraud used by conspiratorial 
elites to help establish a conspiratorial new world order through the 
implementation of international environmental laws and practices. 
H – Disasters. Natural disasters such as the Feb 2010 Haiti earthquake are 
engineered by conspiratorial elites using top-secret technologies as a means of 
furthering New World Order goals. 
I – Religion. Institutionalised religions are secretly controlled by the 
conspiratorial elites as forms of social control.  
J – Feminism. Feminism is a conspiratorial plot to destabilise ‗natural‘ social 
relations and enforce conspiratorial patterns of social control 
K – Immigration. Immigration is a conspiratorial plot to destabilise ‗natural‘ 
soicial relations of nation-states like the USA and make them more susceptible to 
conspiratorial control. 
L – History. New research/evidence regarding historical events help validate 
conspiracist beliefs in the transhistorical reality of conspiratorial plots for world 
domination. 
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5 – Conspiracy beliefs about the reality of paranormal phenomena. These 
news items suggest that there exist as yet unknown facets of physical and mental 
reality. These areas are being suppressed by the conspiratorial elites because they 
are using these forces as part of their plans for world domination or because such 
forces signify alternative possibilities to the conspiratorial power structures.  
A – UFOs – the conspiratorial elites are covering up the reality of UFOs and 
aliens due to its revolutionary implications for human society and thought; and/or 
the conspiratorial elites are in cahoots with aliens as part of their plans for wortld 
domination. 
B – Other – stories on psychic phenomena, cryptozoology etc. are presented as 
evidence that there are still aspects of existence outside the control of 
conspiratorially-controlled mainstream science. 
 
6 – The conspiracy community. These are news items that deal with individuals 
who are part of the American/ online conspiracy ‗community‘, or which related to 
the personal interests of Jeff Rense and his website crew. 
A – members of the conspiracy community – stories that discuss aspects of the 
personal lives of conspiracy theorists approved of/affiliated with rense.com (e.g. 
eulogies for deceased conspiracy theorists), or which attack rival conspiracy 
theorists (e.g. Alex Jones). 
B – personal/human interest – stories that have no discernible conspiracist 
connotations. These appear to reflect the personal interests of Rense and 
assistants, or intended as ‗human interest‘ stories which provide a break from the 
conspiracist content otherwise presented.  
 
 
8.4 Data and Analysis 
 
     The quantitative information gleaned from the ‗news mapping‘ exercise 
outlined above indicated clear patterns in terms of the selection and presentation 
of news material on Rense.com that related to the ideas of appropriation of 
alternative news forms as a means of legitimating conspiracist content as part of 
the alternative public sphere. I will use day 6 of the survey (dated 16/2/2010) for 
specific examples with which to illustrate the ideas discussed below.  
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8.41 News sources 
 
Table A outlines the types of news sources used on Rense.com.  
 
Table A – News items presented on Rense.com according to news source 
 
 Mainstream Alternative Conspiracist Official 
 No.  
of 
items 
% of 
total 
No.  
of 
items  
% of 
total 
No. 
of 
items 
% of 
total 
No. 
of 
items 
% of 
total 
Day 1 12/30 40 7/30 23.3 10/30 33.3 1/30 3.3 
Day 2 25/44 56.8 10/44 22.7 9/44 20.4 0 0 
Day 3 19/45 42.2 11/45 24.4 14/45 31.1 1/45 2.2 
Day 4 22/37 59.4 10/37 27.0 5/37 13.5 0 0 
Day 5 14/28 50 7/28 25 7/28 25 0 0 
Day 6 37/61 60.6 11/61 18.0 12/61 19.6 1/61 1.6 
Day 7 31/58 53.4 14/58 24.1 12/58 20.6 1/58 1.7 
Day 8 29/45 64.4 10/45 22.2 7/45 15.5 0 0 
Day 9 37/60 61.6 14/60 23.3 9/60 15 0 0 
In relation to 
total 
226/ 
408 
55.3 94/ 
408 
23.0 85/ 
408 
20.8 4/ 
408 
0.98 
 
     In terms of these news sources, the status of Rense.com as an ‗alternative‘ 
news site could be seen to be predicated upon those news sources classified as  
‗alternative‘ and ‗conspiracist‘. The news items selected from these sources are 
generally produced in relation to the principles of alternative news practices 
outlined in chapter 7,  section 7.31. They originate from organizations and groups 
which are concerned with expressing ideas oppositional or marginal to the 
dominant values of mainstream society, and the news content is created largely by 
people outside of the professional parameters of mainstream journalism who are 
motivated by citizen-centric interests. I will present examples of both from Day 6 
of the survey. A representative example of a news item from an alternative source 
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is a story entitled ‗How Do the PA Ambassadors Represent Palestine?‘ which 
comes from the blog of Kawther Salam, a Palestinian journalist and human rights 
activist. 
116
 This story adheres to alternative news practices in the following ways: 
the subject matter presented is marginal by mainstream standards (the poor quality 
of Palestinian-European diplomacy, hardly a subject of pressing importance to the 
mainstream Western news media); the writing is subjective and colloquial (being 
the blog – online diary – of an individual); and the intentions of the writer are 
political in the sense of being motivated by issues of citizenship and human rights 
(in this case a concern for the sovereignty of the Palestinian people in relation to 
the state of Israel). A representative example of a news item from a conspiracist 
source is that entitled ‗The Fictitious Legal Entity Called ―a Person‖ which comes 
from the website of Illuminati conspiracy theorist Henry Makow.
117
  Apropos of 
its subject matter, this news item can be said to be within the parameters of 
alternative media practice in that it obviously deals with non-mainstream subject 
matter (in this case, critiquing some of the fundamental precepts of mainstream 
law as being manifestations of Zionist-Illuminati conspiracism); is written in a 
style untypical of mainstream journalism (e.g. a rambling essay with lots of 
references to other sources, the overuse of modes of emphasis such as words 
presented in caps or highlighted phrases); and is presented to readers not as an 
objective news story but as information to be shared between citizens regarding 
the oppressive nature of power in Western society (e.g. the author proposes acts of 
civil disobedience as means of challenging the ‗conspiratorially-designed‘ 
precepts of Western legal structures).  
     However, the examination of news sources for Rense.com showed that the 
largest amounts of news items presented on the site were gathered from 
mainstream sources. As indicated in table A, 55.3% - over half - of the news items 
presented on Rense.com during the study period derived from mainstream news 
sources. This is over double the amount of material collectively sourced from 
alternative sites (23 %), conspiracy sites (20.8%) and official sites (0.98%). On 
the surface this trend may appear incongruous with the status of Rense.com as an 
alternative news site. If the mainstream media presents information that is 
irrevocably compromised by dominant power structures, why make such heavy 
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http://www.kawther.info/wpr/2010/02/14/how-do-the-pa-ambassadors-represent-palestine,  
accessed 16/02/2010.  
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 http://www.henrymakow.com/the_fictitious_legal_entity_ca.html, accessed 16/02/2010.  
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use of such information if operating from an ‗alternative media‘ perspective? To 
discuss this I will refer back to Atton‘s outline of alternative news practices as 
discussed in chapter 7, section 7.31. Although the alternative media model is 
predicated on a radical oppositional approach to mainstream journalism, this does 
not mean that alternative news is mutually exclusive of mainstream news. To 
proscribe the use of mainstream news in alternative news practices due to a literal 
enforcement of this oppositional ethos would make alternative news practice 
extremely difficult in both practical and theoretical terms. Practically because 
mainstream journalism still possesses a large amount of resources devoted to 
establishing the ‗facticity‘ at the heart of news stories (such as ‗on-site reportage), 
and theoretically because the essentialism inherent in configuring alternative news 
as something totally separate from mainstream news suggests a degree of 
essentialism that is at odds with the cultural politics context within which Atton‘s 
alternative media model is positioned. In terms of alternative media taking up the 
public sphere duties that have been lost in mainstream media practice due to 
factors such as the increasing corporatisation and commercialization of 
mainstream news, the oppositional stance of alternative news can be considered 
one that operates in relation to mainstream news rather than against it. Alternative 
news practitioners may therefore use mainstream news material as a means of 
gathering factual information about a news event but within a critical framework 
that is aware of the potential biases and distortions of the mainstream journalistic 
practices that may have served to shape the piece. For example, the mainstream 
stories over this period carried stories relating to the economic recession that was 
caused by the byzantine and unregulated financial practices of Wall St banks.  
     Since the use of mainstream news material can be understood as part of 
alternative journalistic practices in such ways, so the reliance on such material 
exhibited by Rense.com does not undermine the self-proclaimed status of 
Rense.com as an alternative news site. Rense.com can be seen to be adhering to 
alternative credentials in that it is re-presenting mainstream news material so as to 
make clear such material only tells part of the story – that it does not represent the 
‗real‘, ‗objective‘ take on the news events in question. Where it deviates from 
alternative news practice is in its use of conspiracist beliefs, rather than the radical 
political ethos of alternative media,  to discuss what might be the hidden 
implications of the news stories presented. The interpretive framework for 
understanding the radical significance of this mainstream news content is not one 
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based in the progressive, democratic structures of alternative media, but rather in 
classical conspiracy beliefs in the reality of a Zionist-Illuminati plot for world 
domination. This conspiracist framework of interpretation is clearly seen in the 
tendency for the new editors on the Rense.com site to list news items, particularly 
those from mainstream sources, under headlines that differ from the actual titles 
of the items at their original source, as illustrated in Table B.  
 
Table B –News items that are presented on Rense.com under a headline 
different from original source 
 
Day 1 Day 2 Day 3 Day 4 Day 5 Day 6  Day 7 Day 8  Day 9  Totals 
16/30 19/44 19/45 14/37 9/28 21/61 13/58 15/45 16/60 142/40
8 
53.3% 43.1% 42.2% 37.8% 32.1% 34.4% 22.4% 33.3% 26.6% 34.8%  
of 408 
items 
 
That this is a common practice of the news editors at Rense.com is evident from 
the high proportions of such re-naming – 34.8% - across the stories sampled. 
These new headlines make clear the conspiracist significance of the news material 
presented.  
     I will present some representative examples of these trends from day 6 of the 
survey. A story from the Reuters press agency on the economic upheaval wrought 
upon Greece as a result of the Wall St financial crisis bore the unprepossessing 
title ‗Greek finance minister unveils tax reform, wage policy‘.118 The Rense.com 
news editors presented this item under the headline ‗Cash outlawed in Greece‘. 
This new title suggests that the dry, ‗objective‘ reportage of the mainstream report 
disguises the ‗true‘ conspiratorial significance of the Greek finance reforms – to 
prepare the country for the abolition of cash in favour of electronic currency and 
financial transactions. The abolition of cash is a central theme of the conspiracist 
worldview that informs the Rense.com site. Conspiracists see the shift to ‗cashless 
societies‘ as a key aspect of the conspirators plans for total social control because 
the conversion of economic transactions into the virtual forms of electronic 
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 http://www.reuters.com/article/id USLDE61824V20100209, accessed 06/02/2010.  
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transfer (such as EFTPOS and credit card systems) provides the opportunity for 
the economic activity of individual citizens to be monitored and manipulated by 
the conspiratorial elites through centrally controlled computer systems. Not only 
can the conspirators have access to private information about individuals‘ 
spending habits and bank balances, they can also use such information as a means 
of exercising totalitarian control, such as labeling someone a subversive because 
their transaction record indicated they purchased goods or services from an 
organization that poses a threat to conspiratorial power structures.  
     Another story dealing with the global repercussions of the Western finance 
sector collapse, from the website of the British mainstream news paper The Daily 
Telegraph,  was entitled ‗Time running out for Dubai to pull itself out of danger, 
says Lord Mandelson‘.119 As the title clearly indicates, the story refers to then 
British finance minister Peter Mandelson‘s comments regarding the global 
financial crisis‘s effects on Middle Eastern economies such as that of Dubai. The 
Rense.com headline for this news item was ‗Time Running Out For Dubai Says 
Rothschild Agent Mandy‘. The conspiracist ‗truth‘ lurking within this mainstream 
news story is contingent on the identification of Mandelson (whose name has been 
sarcastically abbreviated here to the faux-chummy ‗Mandy‘) as a conspiratorial 
‗agent‘ of the Rothschild family. In the Zionist-Illuminati superconspiracy 
narrative to which Rense.com subscribes, the Rothschild‘s – a family of Jewish 
descent whose members have been prominent in Western banking over the last 
couple of centuries – are linchpins of the Zionist-Illuminati plot for world 
domination. Their long-standing power and influence in the Western finance 
sector is regarded by conspiracists such as Rense as a crucial part of the Zionist 
plan for global control in that they use this power and influence to build up and 
then crash the economies of nations around the world. The remedies imposed for 
these economic collapses, such as IMF austerity measures, enable the 
Rothschild‘s and other members of the elites to manipulate and ultimately control 
the economies – and thereby the geo-political fates – of nations around the world. 
In other words, the Rothschild‘s are accused by conspiracy theorists of 
deliberately orchestrating economic depressions and recessions as a means of 
furthering their power on an international scale in keeping with Zionist/Illuminati 
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 http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/newsbysector/banksandfinance/7238174/ Time-running-
out-for-Dubai-to-pull-itself-out-of-danger-says-Lord-Mandelson.html, accessed 06/02/2010.  
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schemes for world domination. Because Mandelson has a background in the UK 
finance sector, including involvement with Rothschild-affiliated banks, he is 
unquestionally regarded by conspiracists as a ‗Rothschild agent‘.  Mandelson‘s 
economic advice to Dubai  is thus presented here as part of the Rothschild 
schemes to manipulate and control the economies of nations around the world – 
the ‗true‘ intention behind the Rothschild-caused financial collapse.  
    However, this practice of ‗re-titling‘ news stories to bring out their ‗hidden 
meaning‘, while it can be validated in terms of alternative news practice, 
effectively compromises Rense.com‘s attempts to present itself as an ‗alternative 
news‘ site. Through their use of conspiracist signifiers such as ‗cash outlawed‘ 
and ‗Rothschilds‘, these substitute headlines clearly signal a conspiracist rather 
than alternative framework for interpretation of the site. This suggests that the 
site‘s appropriation of alternative news forms can only proceed so far before its 
conspiracist beliefs have to be directly asserted to make clear that the ethos of 
Rense.com is one that does not agree with the content – the political sensibility – 
of the alternative media model. The ideological contradictions between the 
alternative and conspiracist worldviews mean that the presentation of Rense.com 
as an ‗alternative‘ news site can only be sustained on a relatively superficial level 
of form, rather than more detailed levels of content. 
120
 As the practice of retitling 
signifies, these contradictions between the conspiracist worldview and the 
alternative ethos  manifest themselves in internal tensions in which the 
conspiracist sensibility is asserted within the legitimating parameters of the 
‗alternative media‘ framework. 
     Alongside the contextualization of mainstream material in conspiracist terms 
evident in the Rense.com practice of retitling, another aspect of news practice on 
Rense.com that is revealing in terms of the relationships between conspiracist, 
alternative and mainstream news content is the site‘s reliance on news items from 
the British mainstream press. This is outlined in Table C.  
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 An observation can also be readily applied apply to other conspiracy news sites, such as Alex 
Jones‘s InfoWars.com.  
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Table C – Amount of news stories on Rense.com originating from UK 
mainstream press 
 
Newspaper Amount of news stories % of total news  
sources 
www.guardian.co.uk 52/408 12.7 
www.telegraph.co.uk 43/408 10.5 
www.timesonline.co.uk 14/408 3.4 
www.dailymail.co.uk 10/408 2.4 
www.independent.co.uk 6/408 1.4 
Total 125/408 30.6% 
 
As Table C indicates, over 30% of the total news stories sampled for the survey 
were sourced from the same pool of British newspaper sites. Most referenced was 
The Guardian website (52 news items), followed by those of The Daily Telegraph 
(43 items), The Times (14 items), The Daily Mail (10 items) and The Independent 
(6 items). The heavy use made of material from the mainstream British press 
seems unusual given the American background of the Rense.com site. A reader 
might assume that, in terms of cultural background, an American alternative news 
site would gather most of its news from American alternative sources. I would 
argue instead that the use of such material is related to the understanding – shared 
by alternative media practitioners and conspiracy theorists alike – that the 
American mainstream news media is a highly compromised and poor quality 
source of news information. The American background of most classical 
conspiracy theory (as discussed in chapter 5, section 5.23), means there is a 
concomitant focus on the limitations of the mainstream US media as an 
information source. In particular, the excessive deregulation of the US media 
environment that has resulted in most news outlets being owned and operated as 
parts of huge media corporations is seen to be a trend that is directly antithetical to 
the effective operation of mainstream journalism in the public sphere tradition. 
(e.g. Curran 2002; Winter 2007; Columbia Journalism Review 2010).
121
 For 
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The Columbia Journalism Review is an academic website, operated out of the Journalism school 
of Columbia University in New York City,  concerned with the relationship between the US news 
media and the public sphere. One of its resources is a regularly updated listing of the corporate 
ownership of US and global news media: http://www.cjr.org/resources/index.php,  accessed 
18/5/10.  
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American conspiracy sites such as Rense.com, the mainstream British press may 
be considered to possess higher degrees of facticity and integrity by comparison 
with their  American counterparts due to the different regulatory, historical, and 
cultural dynamics that have governed the relationships between the British press 
and institutions of power. For American alternative media and conspiracist 
audiences, the British news media may carry a cachet of ‗quality‘ due to cultural 
distance. This cachet is useful for American conspiracists as it can be assumed 
that British mainstream news is fairly accurate and useful, at least on the level of 
the news ‗facts‘ presented.  
     The political stance of these British mainstream papers is also worth 
considering in this regard. While the conservative bias of papers such as The 
Daily Mail and The Daily Telegraph may seem vaguely amenable to the far-right 
worldviews of classical conspiracy theorists, the prominence of The Guardian as a 
news source is surprising given the newspaper‘s obvious liberal–radical 
tendencies. This may be accounted for in terms of the broad political themes that 
underlie the conspiracist worldview. The Rense.com news editors may use the 
Guardian as a favoured news source because its leftist stance makes it critical of 
governments and corporations in ways in which more right-leaning media may 
not be (e.g. in terms of issues such as workers rights and environmental issues).  
In this respect The Guardian may be seen as an effective mainstream news outlet 
in terms of the ‗watchdog‘ function of the press in the public sphere – a function 
that is central to conspiracist conceptions of news media (see chapter 7, section 
7.32). The liberal perspective of The Guardian is based upon an oppositional 
critical stance on news issues which can thematically be appropriated in relation 
to the ‗anti-establishment‘conspiracy worldview of Rense.com, even though the 
ideological content of both sites is antithetical to each other. In other words, the 
basic form of The Guardian‘s politics (oppositional and critical) can be applied to 
conspiracy thinking without a deep engagement with the content (the liberal 
political perspectives) that are intrinsic to The Guardian‘s understanding and 
application of the oppositional-critical perspective. In this respect, the regular use 
of The Guardian as a news source by Rense.com could be seen to play an 
important role in the presentation of Rense.com as an alternative news site. The 
positioning of  extremist and far-right news and ideas alongside those from liberal 
sources such as The Guardian means that the liberal connotations of The 
Guardian can be 'extended out' to the far-right and extremist ideas that mark the 
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bulk of the conspiracist material presented. The conspiracist information is 
therefore given a patina of legitimation as part of a liberal-radical continuum of 
ideas (the mainstream liberal ethos of The Guardian serving as the basis for a 
more radical discussion of such liberal ideas in the alternative media ethos). The 
use of The Guardian – and, by extension, other mainstream news sites, 
particularly those of a liberal slant – thereby serves to ameliorate and disguise the 
far-right conspiracist beliefs that are the raison d’etre of Rense.com.  
      
 
8.42 News types 
 
     The surveys in Tables D and D (i) of the types of news stories presented on 
Rense.com, signify trends in keeping with some of the ideas considered in the 
discussion of news sources presented above.  
 
Table D – News items presented on Rense.com according to type 
 
 News 
report 
Commentary Video 
clip 
Letters Essay Press 
Release 
Day 1 16/30 7/30 3/30 1/30 2/30 1/30 
Day 2 21/44 18/44 2/44 2/44 1/44 0 
Day 3 20/45 11/45 5/45 1/45 6/45 2/45 
Day 4 21/37 9/37 1/37 2/37 4/37 0 
Day 5 15/28 7/28 1/28 0 2/28 2/28 
Day 6 38/61 12/61 1/61 1/61 9/61 0 
Day 7 32/58 18/57 3/57 0 3/57 1/57 
Day 8 29/45 12/45 1/45 0 2/45 1/45 
Day 9 39/60 11/60 5/60 2/60 1/60 2/60 
% of total 
news 
items 
56.6 25.7 5.3 2.2 7.3 2.2 
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Table D (i) – Correlation between mainstream news sources (first number) 
and number of news reports used by Rense.com (second number) 
 
Day 1 Day 2 Day 3 Day 4 Day 5 Day 6  Day 7 Day 8  Day 9  Totals 
11/16 18/21 14/20 19/21 14/15 34/38 29/32 25/29 32/39 196/2
31 
68.7% 85.7% 42.2% 70.0% 93.3% 89.4% 90.6% 86.2% 82.0% 84.8% 
 
As outlined in Table D, most of the news stories featured on Rense.com during the 
survey period were straight news reports (56.6% of total news items over the 
survey period). As listed in Table D (i), almost all of these news reports – 84.8% - 
derived from mainstream news sources. Again, this appears somewhat at odds 
with a conspiracist news site that presents itself as a radical ‗alternative‘ to 
mainstream journalism. As indicated in the practice of retitling discussed above, 
Rense.com uses mainstream news material as part of a strategy of legitimation 
based on form, suggesting that the site adheres to ‗legitimate‘ mainstream 
standards of news credibility and facticity whilst guiding the reader to interpret 
the content of such news in relation to conspiracist perspectives that are highly 
‗illegitimate‘ by such mainstream news standards. I would argue that the reliance 
on news reports is another aspect of this appropriation–legitimation dynamic. The 
‗objective‘ status of news reports helps reinforce the sense of Rense.com as a 
serious news site that presents credible and factual information, even though the 
‗objective‘ content of those reports is designed to be interpreted through the ‗non-
objective‘ frameworks of the sites‘ conspiracist beliefs.  In other words, the heavy 
use of mainstream news reports serves as a means by which Rense.com can 
appropriate the qualities of objectivity and facticity associated with mainstream 
news reportage as a means of legitimating itself as a credible news source within 
the alternative public sphere.  
     A more direct adherence to alternative media practices is evident in the other 
types of news items utilized by Rense.com during the survey period. As listed in 
Table D, these include columnists and commentaries (25.7%); essays (7.3%); 
video clips (5.3%); and letters and press releases (2.2 % respectively). A central 
factor of Atton's formulation of alternative journalism was the problematic nature 
of  'objectivity' as a cornerstone of mainstream journalistic practice. Since true 
objectivity is impossible for human subjects, the objectivity practiced by 
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mainstream journalism was considered by Atton in cultural politics terms as an 
ideological construct that conditions mainstream journalists to shape news stories 
in ways suited to dominant ideological frameworks. As a remedy to this bias, 
Atton proposed that alternative journalism foregrounds the subjective nature of its 
news material. This subjectivity was discussed in two main forms. Firstly, an 
acknowledgment by the journalist that the information presented is constructed in 
accordance with political and social perspectives that are generally marginalised 
within the news values of mainstream journalism so as to function as a counter to 
the ideological biases of objective mainstream journalism. Secondly, an emphasis 
on the role of the journalist as citizen rather than media professional (see chapter 
7, section 7.31).  
     These other types of news stories can be seen to operate largely within this 
'subjective, citizen-journalist' alternative framework. Commentaries and columns, 
essays, and letters are all types of news information that are clearly presented as 
being based in subjective rather than objective positions. Columnists and 
commentators provide their opinion or perspective on events as representatives of 
sectors of the public (e.g. left and right-wing political commentators) or as 
observers whose background may endow them with specific knowledge about a 
particular subject (e.g. foreign correspondents); essayists present theories and 
research that argue for particular  points of view; letter writers are readers of news 
media presenting their opinions on news items of interest. The ideas expressed in 
these types of news items are clearly understood by readers to be the views of the 
person writing the piece, rather than 'objective' reportage of facts. 'Subjective' 
factors such as ideological bias or an emphasis on 'marginal' topics and positions 
are thereby presented in ways amenable to the effective operation of the public 
sphere. By giving voice to the views and ideas of a diverse range of citizens, such 
news types help facilitate the principles of 'interpersonal, interactive and inclusive' 
communication that are regarded as integral to the operation of the public sphere. 
Not only do such 'subjective' news types help make clear the  diversity of public 
opinion, thus serving to exercise democratic principles such as pluralism and 
egalitarianism, but they also provide communicative spaces in which rational-
critical debate can be exercised. Citizens can use such news types to exercise their 
'freedom of speech', presenting their views on particular topics as contributions to 
wider socio-political debates. In relation to alternative media perspectives, these 
'subjective' news types can be regarded as significant in enabling citizens to 
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present ideas that challenge the institutional and informational biases of 
mainstream journalism. 
      The Internet can be seen to play a vital role in this process because of its 
decentered and non-hierarchical information structures. Because there are no 
hierarchical structures delineating mainstream news sources as superior to 
alternative news sources, such as the institutional emphasis on mainstream 
journalism as more objective and thereby factual than alternative media, the 
public can position  'subjective' alternative journalism alongside 'objective' 
mainstream journalism in terms of news factors such as facticity and credibility. 
The interactive and multi-media capacities of the Net are particularly important 
here in that they provide accessible technical means  by which citizens can 
directly produce and present their own news content to other citizens. A type of 
news item significant in this regard is the online video clip. Where mainstream 
television news requires a large resource base and institutional apparatus to 
operate, the combination of domestic media technologies constructed around 
principles of digital convergence, such as digital still and video cameras, enable 
citizens to cheaply and effectively create their own audio-visual news content and 
upload this to the Internet as a means of informing other citizens (the audio-visual 
file-sharing site YouTube being a key online space for such activity).  
     I would posit these notions of 'subjective' alternative news practices as being 
particularly useful in relation to the information  practices of conspiracy theorists. 
The radical emphasis on news that deliberately foregrounds 'non-mainstream' 
subject matter or foregrounds the observations and experiences of ordinary 
citizens as possessing innate credibility and facticity corresponds well to 
conspiracy theorising. A major reason why conspiracy theories in general, and 
classical conspiracy theories in particular, are marginalised by mainstream 
knowledge institutions such as journalism and academia is that the evidence 
presented for such theories is invariably subjective rather than objective. Highly 
personalised forms of information such as anecdotes, suppositions, and 
speculations – often unattributed or poorly referenced – form the basis for most 
classical conspiracy theories. For example, one of the pivots of the 'occult alien 
Illuminati' superconspiracy narrative that is a major strand of contemporary 
Western conspiracy culture as popularised by theorists such as David Icke is the 
anecdotal claims made by Americans Brice Taylor and Cathy O'Brien, to name 
some of the most visible proponents, that they were conditioned from childhood 
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by CIA agents to become mind-controlled 'sex slaves' for the Illuminati elite 
(McConnachie & Tudge 2005: 192-195). Since no verifiable objective evidence 
that validates such claims has been found, and since the claims themselves are so 
fantastic and bizarre they invariably suggest the claimants are suffering from 
psychological conditions such as paranoid delusion or schizophrenia, the 
mainstream reaction has been to dismiss the veracity of such claims due to their 
extreme subjectivity. Similarly, conspiracy theories that NASA and the US 
government faked the moon landings that took place between 1969 – 1974 are 
almost all predicated on idiosyncratic interpretations of photographic imagery by 
individual conspiracy theorists (McConnachie & Tudge 2005: 316-321). The 
alternative legitimation of subjective factors as key parts of radical news practices 
can therefore be seen to be particularly receptive to appropriation and application 
within the realms of conspiracy theorising.  
     In the context of alternative news, the oppositional status of the conspiracy 
theorist – as configured in relation to ideas of citizen journalism (see chapter 7, 
section 7.22) – serves to endow the information presented by the conspiracy 
theorist with an innate degree of veracity because such information can be 
considered within the radical cultural politics framework of a 'counter-narrative' 
developed by marginalized groups as a riposte to the ideological distortions of 
mainstream news. Positioning themselves within the alternative media ethos,  
conspiracy theorists can legitimate their highly subjective claims as being credible 
and factitious accounts or interpretations of news events. Such positioning also 
resonates with the libertarian and populist impulses that underlie the conspiracist 
worldview (see chapter 4, sections 4.35 and 4.36). The radical, 'oppositional' 
politics that informs these alternative notions of subjectivity can be readily 
appropriated and extrapolated into a conspiracist configuration that inverts the 
mainstream associations between objectivity and truth. Because the subjectivity of 
citizen-based journalism is free of the conspiratorial control of mainstream 
journalism – with associations between journalistic objectivity and truth as a 
major part of this control process – so news information from subjective sources, 
such as those that inform conspiracy theorising, can paradoxically be configured 
as representing a more 'accurate', 'truthful', or ostensibly 'objective' view of social 
reality. 
     Such relationships between alternative media  modes of subjective news 
information and conspiracist information practices can be seen in  Table E.   
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Table E – Correlation between alternative news sources and conspiracist 
sources presented on Rense.com 
 
 
 
 
Alternative 
sources: 
commentary 
Conspiracist 
sources – 
commentary 
Totals  
combined 
alt/con  
sources of 
comment-
ary 
Alternative 
sources – 
essays and 
letters 
Conspiracist 
sources – 
essays and 
letters 
Totals 
combined  
alt/con  
sources  
for essays 
and letters 
Day 1 2/7 3/7 5/7 0/3 3/3 3/3 
Day 2 4/18 5/18 9/18 0/3 2/3 2/3 
Day 3 3/11 5/11 8/11 0/7 6/7 6/7 
Day 4 6/9 2/9 8/9 0/3 2/3 2/3 
Day 5 4/7 3/7 7/7 1/3 2/3 3/3 
Day 6 3/12 7/12 10/12 4/10 6/10 10/10 
Day 7 9/18 9/18 18/18 1/3 2/3 3/3 
Day 8 4/12 4/12 8/12 0/2 2/2 2/2 
Day 9 5/11 3/11 8/11 0/3 2/3 2/3 
Totals 40/105 
38.0% 
41/105 
39.0% 
81/105  
 77.1% 
6/37 
16.2% 
27/37 
72.9% 
33/37 
89.1 % 
 
 
 
Almost all (77.1%) of the total commentaries presented as news items on 
Rense.com over the survey period came from alternative and conspiracist sources 
(38.0% from alternative sources and 39.0% from alternative sources respectively). 
The same trend could be seen in relation to essays and letters, with 89.1% of the 
total of these news types deriving from alternative and conspiracist sources 
(16.2% from alternative sources, and 72.9% from conspiracist sources). While the 
news 'facts' presented on the site  may have come from mainstream news reports, 
these statistics show that the types of news story that dealt with subjective 
interpretations of those facts -  commentaries/essays/video clips/letters - were 
almost all derived from alternative and conspiracist sources.  The implication here 
219 
 
is that only those news types positioned within the alternative frameworks of 
citizen journalism are useful as a means of understanding the wider meaning of 
news 'facts' because the subjective qualities of citizen journalism function as a 
corrective to the ideological distortions that shape mainstream news and 
commentary. Since conspiracy theorists regard their work as a form of citizen 
journalism, so the subjective information presented by conspiracy theorists 
through news types such as commentaries and essays can be presented as being 
critically astute and politically engaged in the radical traditions of alternative 
journalism. For example, on day 6 of the survey Rense.com features an essay from 
the alternative anti-US imperialist/globalisation news site GlobalResearch.ca, 
entitled 'Will Obama's Record War Budget Lead to a US Victory in Afghanistan? 
Don't Bet On It!' This can be seen to be a news item very much in the subjective 
citizen journalism ethos described. It presents radical subject matter (a critique of 
US military intervention in Iraq) and is written by a politically engaged citizen 
(Jack A. Smith, ―editor of the Activist Newsletter‖, an anti-war movement 
resource based in New York state).
122
 Alongside this Rense.com also features an 
essay entitled ‗Lethal Obsession: Anti-Semitism from Antiquity to the Global‘ 
from the rabidly anti-Semitic website Revisionist Review, in which leading 
American anti-Semite Michael Hoffman argues that anti-Semitism is a justified 
response to the ‗character‘ of the Jewish people.123 Because the information is 
presented in the ‗subjective‘ news type of the essay, within the context of 
Rense.com as an ostensibly ‗alternative‘ news site,  this essay can be presented as 
a ‗radical‘ piece of citizen journalism in a manner akin to the essay from 
GlobalResearch.ca,  despite the fact that the actual content of the piece is about as 
far removed from radical alternative politics as it is possible to get. The 
associations made between the types of news stories presented and the principles 
of alternative journalism serve as another way in which the forms of alternative 
news practices are appropriated by conspiracy sites such as Rense.com as a means 
of legitimating their conspiracist content within the alternative public sphere.  
 
 
                                                 
 
122
http://www.globalresearch.ca/index.php?context=viewArticle&code=SMI20100214&articleId=
1760accessed 16/2/10.  
 
123
 http://revisionistreview.blogspot.com/2010/02/lethal-obsession-anti-Semitism-from.html, 
accessed 16/2/10.  
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8.43 Subject matter 
 
     The third major area from the Rense.com survey that I will examine here is that 
of the subject matter of the news items presented. As outlined by Atton  in chapter 
7, section 7.31, the basic premise of alternative journalism is to act as a 
counterpoint and riposte to the ideological biases and oversights of the news 
content provided through mainstream news channels. Since mainstream 
journalistic outlets operate within a mainstream commercial/state-owned media 
systems, so many media theorists see mainstream news media as reflecting the 
interests of the market or the state rather than the public. Such commentators 
consider mainstream journalism to be irrevocably compromised in its abilities to 
present news content that is useful and relevant in terms of the effective 
functioning of the public sphere (e.g. Keane 1991; Curran 2002; Winter 2005). As 
an ‗alternative‘ to mainstream media news values, alternative news is therefore 
focused on presenting news that deals with those subject areas that are 
marginalized or ignored within the mainstream news ethos. Particular emphasis is 
placed upon subjects that relate to radical political or social movements and 
issues, such as anti-globalisation, human rights, and environmentalism.  
     The role of alternative news as a counterpoint or corrective to the distortions of 
mainstream reportage is reflected in the formatting of news content on alternative 
news sites. Alternative news sites tend to use news formats familiar from 
mainstream news to present news content that challenges and corrects mainstream 
news perspectives. Headings are provided for broad subject areas such as politics 
or environment; these headings indicate sub-sections within the news site where 
news stories that relate to these particular themes or topics are presented. 
However, some of the news items included within these subject areas, and some 
of the subject areas themselves, are likely to be highly different in terms of subject 
matter and ideas to the types of items featured in mainstream news. For example, 
the American alternative news site truthout.org features news categories on areas 
such as ‗health‘, ‗education‘ and ‗environment‘, all of which are common in 
relation to mainstream news sources, alongside sections presenting news features 
related to subject areas such as ‗labor‘, ‗voter‘s rights‘, and ‗women‘s issues‘ – 
subjects which are generally marginalized or ignored in terms of mainstream 
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media news coverage.
124
 The wide range of news subjects presented on alternative 
news sites thus provides a potentially more comprehensive overview of social and 
political topics as part of a ‗radical‘ redressing of the imbalances of mainstream 
news reportage.  
     Rense.com can also be seen as operating within this alternative framework in 
terms of the scope of news topics presented on the site.   
 
Table F – News stories presented on Rense.com according to subject matter  
 
Topic Day 
1 
Day 
2 
Day 
3 
Day 
4 
Day 
5  
Day 
6 
Day 
7  
Day 
8 
Day 
9 
% of 
total 
news 
items 
National 
Politics 
6/30 2/44 8/45 3/37 1/28 4/61 10/58 6/45 7/60  11.5 
International 
Politics 
4/30 4/44 6/45 3/37 6/28 5/61 6/58 7/45 8/60 12.0 
Mid-East 
issues 
2/30 8/44 4/45 7/37 4/28 10/61 6/58 14/45 10/60 15.9 
War On 
Terror 
 4/44 4/45 2/37 3/28 8/61 5/58 2/45 4/60 7.8 
Economics 
(incl.global 
recession) 
3/30 5/44 4/45 3/37 1/28 8/61 9/58 2/45 2/60 9.0 
Business 1/30 2/44 1/45 1/37  1/61  1/45  1.7 
Society 2/30 2/44 4/45 2/37 1/28 4/61 7/58 4/45 2/60 6.8 
Culture 1/30 2/44 1/45   4/61 1/58  4/60 3.1 
Media  2/44   1/28 2/61 2/58   1.7 
Internet 1/30  1/45 3/37 1/28  2/58 3/45  2.6 
Health 6/30 6/44 4/45 1/37 2/28 1/61 2/58 1/45 6/60 7.1 
Environment 1/30 4/44 2/45 4/37 2/28 2/61 2/58 1/45  4.4 
Science & 
Technology 
1/30 2/44 2/45 3/37 1/28 1/61 2/58 1/45 4/60 4.1 
                                                 
124
 http://www.truthout.org/issues,  accessed 26/5/10.  
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History    1/37  6/61 1/58 1/45 1/60 2.4 
Religion       1/58   0.2 
Crime      3/61 1/58  2/60 1.4 
Conspiracism 1/30  1/45 2/37 5/28   1/45  2.4 
Education      1/61    0.2 
Paranormal   2/45 1/37    1/45 8/60 2.9 
Human 
Interest 
1/30 1/44 1/45 1/37  1/61 1/58  2/60 1.9 
 
 
Table F (i) – News stories featured on Rense.com ranked according to subject 
matter:  
1 Mid-East Issues 
2 International Politics 
3  National Politics 
4  Economics 
5 War on Terror 
6 Health 
7 Society 
8 Environment 
9 Science & Technology 
10 Culture 
11 Paranormal 
12 Internet 
13 History  
Conspiracism 
14 Human Interest 
15 Business  
Media 
16  Crime 
17 Education  
Religion 
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As described in section 8.33 and outlined in table F above, Rense.com featured a 
wide range of news topics that could be classified in terms of content into 20 or so 
general categories. With the exception of a small amount of news items that dealt 
explicitly with conspiracist or paranormal content, (2.4% and 2.9% of the total 
news stories respectively), most of the news items can be categorized in terms of 
subject areas redolent of mainstream media concerns, such as national and 
international politics, the war on terror, and economics. On this formal level 
Rense.com can readily present  itself as an alternative news site in that it combines 
a wide coverage of news subjects with independence from the institutional 
strictures of mainstream journalism. In such respects Rense.com can be configured 
as a ‗one-stop news shop‘, presenting all the reader needs to know about national 
and international events within an alternative news framework that suggests that 
the news information presented will be more ‗truthful‘ and ‗accurate‘ than that 
presented in the mainstream media.
125
 This configuration can be reinforced by the 
sources of the news content presented. As discussed earlier in this section, the 
majority of news items featured on Rense.com over the survey period emanated 
from mainstream and alternative news sources (Table A: alternative - 23.0%; 
mainstream – 55.3% of survey total). The wide spread of news facts available in 
mainstream journalism is contextualized in alternative media terms by being 
presented in conjunction with a critical framework of subjective commentary from 
alternative news sources.  
       This formal reading of Rense.com as a quality alternative news site that offers 
a wide range of news content can be further reinforced by the proportions devoted 
to particular types of news stories over others. As Table F makes clear, news 
items dealing with certain types of subject matter were selected by the Rense.com 
news editors a lot more than other subject areas. News dealing with geopolitics 
and domestic politics constituted the highest proportion of news items. Reports on 
Middle East geopolitical and social issues accounted for 15.9% of the total news 
stories surveyed; those focusing on other types of international politics 12.0%; 
those on domestic (American) politics 11.5%. Other major subject areas covered 
by Rense.com include economics (9.0%), the war on terror (7.8%), health topics 
(7.1%) and social topics (6.8%). The remaining subject areas all ranked below 5% 
of the total news items featured on Rense.com over the survey period. The 
                                                 
125
 Refer to the description of Rense.com as a ‗one-stop shopping zone‘ in the Weidner article 
discussed in chapter 4, section 4.22. 
224 
 
emphasis placed on these particular subject areas can be seen as fairly typical in 
terms of mainstream and alternative debates on news. Because of their direct 
influence on the actions of governments and the lives of citizens, news on 
geopolitics, domestic politics, and economics has traditionally been favoured as 
the most important subject matter for news coverage. In terms of the time frame 
of this survey, the high proportion of news items dealing with economic subjects 
is explainable in relation to the recent global recession that has affected countries 
around the world over the last few years; similarly, it would seem amiss for an 
American based news site of any description to not feature news items relating to 
‗the war on terror‘ that has come to be a central feature in 21st century American 
political and social life. Stories dealing with a wide variety of social issues or with 
events in key social sectors such as health may also be expected to predominate in 
terms of general news coverage.  
     Again, however, it can be seen that the types of news subjects and news 
content featured on Rense.com serve as a legitimating framework that enables the 
editors of Rense.com to position their conspiracist beliefs as a form of alternative 
journalism. I will here present a list of the relationships between the subject matter 
of the news items presented and the conspiracist worldview of Rense.com in the 
form of Table G.  
 
Table G – Correspondence between subject matter of news item and the 
conspiracist worldview of Rense.com 
 
Conspiracy theme Total amount 
amount over  all  
news items 
% of total amount 
US politics 25 6.1 
Pres. Obama 8 1.9 
9/11 11 2.6 
Govt/corporate corruption 24 5.9 
War on terror 33 8.1 
Police state 5 1.2 
Zionism & Mid-East 62 15.1 
Zionism & US 11 2.6 
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Zionism & world 8 1.9 
Jewish culture 6 1.4 
Int. relations 16 3.9 
Moral decline of US 18 4.4 
US economic crisis 17 4.1 
Global economic crisis 20 4.9 
Globalisation 2 0.4 
Int. conflict 6 1.4 
Food 5 1.2 
Sci & Tech 20 4.9 
US media 6 1.4 
Internet 10 2.4 
Pandemics 10 2.4 
Health 14 3.4 
Environment 3 0.7 
Global warming 10 2.4 
Disasters 8 1.9 
History 5 1.2 
Education 1 0.2 
Feminism 2 0.4 
Religion 1 0.2 
Immigration 3 0.7 
UFOs 11 2.6 
Paranormal 2 0.4 
Conspiracism 9 2.2 
Conspiracy community 6 1.4 
Personal Int.  6 1.4 
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Table G (i) – Conspiracy themes featured on Rense.com ranked according to 
percentage of total amount of news items featured: 
126
 
1 Zionism & Mid-east 
2 War on terror 
3 US politics  
4 Govt/Corporate corruption 
5 Global economic crisis 
6 Moral decline of US society 
7 US economic crisis  
8 International relations 
9 Health 
10 9/11  
Zionism and the USA 
UFOs  
11 Internet 
Pandemics  
Global warming 
12 Conspiracism 
13 President Obama 
Zionism and the world  
Disasters 
14 Jewish culture  
International conflict  
US media  
Conspiracy community  
Personal interest            
15 Police state  
                                                 
126
 It is important to note that the news stories sampled for this survey inevitably reflect some of 
the major trends in international news and current affairs journalism at the time the survey was 
carried out (February 2010). Important trends in this regard include the following:  
- news coverage of the ongoing systemic social and economic problems related to the global 
recession caused by the collapse of the US finance sector in 2008 – 2009 are reflected in the 
figures for categories ‗economics ‗ (Table B), ‗US economic crisis‘ and ‗global economic crisis‘ 
(Table E).  
- news coverage of  the social and political aftermath of the Feb 2010 earthquake in Haiti are 
reflected in figures for categories ‗International Politics‘ in Table B and ‗Disasters‘ in Table E.  
- news coverage of the Feb 2010 release of UFO files by the UK Ministry of Defence is reflected 
in the figures for categories ‗Paranormal‘ (Table B) and ‗UFOs‘ (Table E).  
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Food  
History 
16 Environment  
Immigration 
17 Globalisation  
Paranormal 
Feminism 
18 Education  
Religion 
 
 
As illustrated in Table G, each news story posted on Rense.com can be seen to 
have been selected by the news editors of the site because of its resonance to 
particular aspects of the Zionist-Illuminati superconspiracy narrative that forms 
the ideological and epistemological background for Rense.com. The wide range of 
news topics featured on Rense.com is a reflection of the all-encompassing nature 
of this conspiracist mindset, in which every aspect of modern political and social 
life is regarded as being ‗controlled‘ and ‗manipulated‘ by the conspirators. The 
general subject categories of news items outlined in Table F can be converted in 
conspiracist terms into sub-categories of particular conspiracist themes that 
collectively constitute the Zionist-Illuminati conspiracy belief system. For 
example, news items dealing with swine flu and other pandemic diseases, which 
in terms of general news categories would have been classified under health, can 
be considered within conspiracist news values to constitute a subject category in 
their own right, since such diseases are considered by conspiracists to be a major 
part of the Zionist-Illuminati plans for world domination.
127
 Similarly, the general 
category of news items dealing with ‗social events or issues‘ can be converted 
into a variety of conspiracist topic areas, such as religion (e.g. Catholicism as a 
conspiratorial control structure) feminism (women‘s rights as part of 
conspiratorial plot to undermine ‗true‘ American values), and immigration (again, 
immigration as a conspiratorial scheme to destabilize the WASP sensibility that 
such conspiracists take to be the ‗true core‘ of American culture). News items that 
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 Specifically, that such diseases are being genetically engineered in secret government labs and 
deliberately disseminated around the world as a means of reducing the global population in 
accordance with conspiratorial goals for global totalitarianism. See fn 47, chapter 4.  
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may appear to  readers to fit generalized categories of subject matter that they are 
used to from the mainstream news (and, concomitantly, proper alternative news 
sites) are much more likely to have been selected because of their significance to 
subject areas of explicitly conspiracist interest.  
     A much more specific and sinister aspect of the use of news topics to 
legitimate conspiracist ideas is the excessive emphasis Rense.com places on news 
stories dealing with Middle East issues. As indicated in Table F, ‗Mid-East Issues‘ 
was by far the most common type of subject matter presented on Rense.com over 
the survey period (15.9% of the total stories surveyed). What this category 
heading doesn‘t indicate is that the content of almost all of these ‗Mid-East‘ news 
items focused on Israel, particularly the Palestine/Israel situation. In terms of 
Rense.com‘s self-styled status as an ‗alternative‘ news site, one might ask why the 
site should place such a disproportionate emphasis on news items related to Israel. 
Given the American provenance of Rense.com, it might be expected that news 
items dealing with the ‗war on terror‘ – a subject area predominated by the 
American occupations of Iraq and Afghanistan – would feature far more heavily 
in terms of subject matter given that the content of such items is more directly 
relevant to American political and social concerns than Israeli affairs. The answer 
lies in the extreme anti-Semitism that informs the Zionist-Illuminati conspiracist 
worldview that Rense.com is predicated upon. The core ideological tenets of this 
worldview are that the conspiratorial actions of the Illuminati are undertaken as 
manifestations of a ‗Zionist plot‘ for world domination. Since Israel was founded 
as a Jewish state, any news dealing with Israeli politics and society – no matter 
how seemingly innocuous -  is interpreted by conspiracy theorists as part of the 
machinations of this grand Zionist conspiracy (Cohn 1967; Lipstadt 1994; Perry 
& Schweitzer 2002). For example, the news stories that in general terms may be 
categorized as dealing with Middle East issues (Table F) can also be categorized 
(Table G) in accordance with several major themes central to conspiracist anti-
Semitism of the sort Rense.com adheres to: Zionist ‗control‘ over the Middle-East; 
Zionist control over the USA; Zionist control over the world; and the negative 
portrayal of Jewish people and culture in general.   
     The appropriation of alternative news forms as a means of legitimating 
conspiracist ideas is a major part of Rense.com‘s approach in using the subject 
matter of news to assert anti-Semitic conspiracist beliefs. In terms of the 
radical/progressive values of alternative media, alternative newssites regularly 
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present news items that critique Israel on ethical grounds (e.g. human rights 
abuses committed against the Palestinian peoples) and political ones (e.g. right-
wing Israeli governments enacting policies that engender further conflict with 
Palestine rather than ameliorating it).
128
 In terms of subject matter, such news 
items are presented as part of international news coverage, with the Israel-
Palestine conflict being presented as one of many news events of radical interest 
around the world. This critiquing of Israel within the contexts of alternative news 
content is thus highly appealing to conspiracy theorists in that it provides a 
legitimating framework within which their anti-Semitic conspiracist beliefs can be 
expressed. For example, on Day 6 of the survey Rense.com posted 9 news items 
dealing with Israeli or Jewish topics. The content of several of these items suggest 
a concern with the political and humanitarian aspects of Israeli power in the 
Middle East that may be seen as typical of the ‗citizen politics‘ ethos of 
alternative media. For instance, a news item entitled ‗US Army Chief: Iran attack 
option on the table‘ comes from the website of the Israeli Defense Force. The 
article describes a meeting between an American military official and IDF leaders 
in which the former said the USA would support Israel in undertaking military 
strikes on Iran if the country became nuclear-capable because such technology 
would geopolitically ‗destabilise‘ the Middle East.129 The content of this article 
can be seen to be in keeping with Rense.com‘s ostensible status as an ‗alternative 
news‘ site. In this context, the article was included on Rense.com to heighten 
readers awareness as to how some in the American military are advocating further 
American military intervention in the Middle East in support of Israeli political 
power in the region. The criticism of Israeli power in this story therefore appears 
legitimate in relation to ‗alternative‘ concerns with international peace issues. 
Similarly, Rense.com also featured a news item from the website of Kawther 
Salam, a Palestinian journalist who now lives in Vienna and operates as a 
Palestinian activist for rights and peace. The item is a news report from Dubai 
                                                 
128For example: ‗Israeli settlers step up attacks on Palestinian mosques‘ by Mel Frykberg, posted 
10/5/10 on Truthout.org http://www.truthout.org/israeli-settlers-step-up-attacks-palestinian-
mosques59356; and the Israel/Palestine news page on the Indymedia.org.il site: 
http://israel.indymedia.org/. There are also alternative newssites such as The Electronic Intifada 
that specifically offer Palestinian-based information and perspectives on the Israel/Palestine 
conflict: http://electronicintifada.net/new.shtml . All sites accessed 12/5/10.  
 
129
http://dover.idf.il/IDF/English/News/today/10/02/1403.htm,  
accessed via http://www.rense.com/, 16/2/10.  
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media describing Dubai police‘s attempts to track down and prosecute the Mossad 
agents who assassinated a Palestinian (Hamas) official in Dubai in January 
2010.
130
 Not only did the agents commit a criminal act in the form of the 
assassination itself, but they also violated the diplomatic integrity of several 
countries by using faked passports as their means of entry and exit to Dubai 
agents used false passports. Again, the criticism of Israel outlined in this report is 
one in keeping with the humanitarian concerns and peace activism which is part 
of the ‗radical‘ political culture informing alternative media practice (Atton 2004).  
     However, if we consider the subject matter of all 9 Israel-related news items 
posted on Rense.com, it becomes clear that the news editors of Rense.com have 
selected such stories because of their resonance with anti-Semitic conspiracism  
rather than any alternative or radical ethos. Alongside the two news items already 
discussed, these other items are (in order of the days‘ news samples):  
- an essay entitled ‗Lethal Obsession: Anti-Semitism from Antiquity to the 
Global‘ (Rense.com headline: ‗Hoffman - Rant Poses As Study Of Anti 
Semitism‘). What might – from the title – appear to be a historical critique of anti-
Semitic conspiracism turns out to be an attempt to justify anti-Semitism on 
historical grounds. The essay is written by Michael Hoffman, one of America‘s 
leading anti-Semitic conspiracy theorists, and sourced from the anti-
Semitic/holocaust denial website Revisionist Review. 
131
 
- a news report from the website of the mainstream British newspaper The 
Independent entitled ‗Congressman - US Should Break Israeli Gaza Blockade‘. 
The content of the report relates the content of a speech by US congressman Brian 
Baird to Palestinian students in the Gaza strip in which he stated that the US 
should violate the Israeli blockade of the Gaza Strip on humanitarian grounds and 
deliver much-needed supplies to the area. 
132
 
- a news item from the website of the mainstream British newspaper The Times 
entitled ‗Israeli ‗harem‘ leader Goel Ratzon charged with rape and incest‘. The 
item outlined Ratzon‘s status as head of a religious cult of his own devising which 
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http://www.kawther.info/wpr/2010/02/15/names-of-mossad-death-squad-published,  
accessed via http://www.rense.com/, 16/2/10.  
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 http://revisionistreview.blogsopt.com/2010/02/lethal-obsession-anti-semitism-from.html,  
accessed via http://www.rense.com, 16/2/10.  
 
132
 http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/congressman-says-us-should-break-
gaza-blockade-1899787.html, accessed via http://www.rense.com, 16/2/10.  
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consisted of himself and over thirty women whom Ratzon is alleged to have 
psychologically and physically abused over several years. 
133
 
- another news item from The Times website entitled ‗Israeli politicians may 
provoke arrest to force law change in Britain‘. This item describes the existing 
British law which means that Israeli politicians accused of war crimes against the 
Palestinians could be arrested upon entry to Britain. Both Israeli and British 
politicians want the law altered to improve relations between the two countries, 
but it is far down the list in terms of current  British government activities.  Ex- 
Israeli foreign minister Tzipi Livni states that she is considering traveling to 
Britain and getting arrested as a means of impelling the British government to 
urgently act upon changing the law. 
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- an essay posted on Rense.com entitled ‗Absolute Proof Most Jews Are Not ‗True 
Jews‘. This essay is an overview by anti-Semitic conspiracy theorist Dick 
Eastman of  Arthur Koestler‘s 1976 book The Thirteenth Tribe, which argued that 
today‘s Jewish peoples are descended from the ‗Khazar‘ empire of the Caucasus 
region rather than the Middle East. While Koestler intended the book as a piece of 
‗proper‘ historical research (albeit one that has been discredited by historians),  
Eastman uses the ideas presented in the book to argue that Jews are descended 
from the ‗Huns‘ and are therefore an innately brutish, power-hungry race who are 
the antithesis of ‗American christendom‘.135 
- a commentary entitled ‗For Your Viewing Pleasure‘ from the blog of  Mantiq 
Al-Tayr. Ostensibly a Palestinian activist concerned with presenting an alternative 
to the ‗pro-Israeli bias of the mainstream US media, the content of this blog is 
little more than a collection of tirades equating the geopolitics of Israeli power 
with the moral evil of the Jewish people as a whole.  The content of this particular 
page is a collection of video clips on assorted subjects, such as news footage of 
the collapse of the WTC7 building in the 9/11 attacks; positive images of 
Palestinian culture; and footage that portrays Israeli citizens as arrogant 
warmongers. The implication is that 9/11 attacks were caused by Israel as part of 
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http://wwwtimesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/middle_east/article7026987.ece,  
accessed via http://www.rense.com/, 16/2/10.  
 
134
 http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/politics/article7026939.ece, accessed via 
http://www.rense.com/, 16/2/10.  
 
135
http://www.rense.com/general89/notjws.htm,  
accessed via http://www.rense.com/, accessed 16/2/10.  
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their plan for consolidating power in the Middle East through the military 
intervention of the USA in the region. 
136
  
- a commentary entitled ‗Does the Word of God Seem Really Confusing 
Sometimes‘ from a blogspot called The Ugly Truth. From the little information 
provided about the blogger, this site appears to be the work of another ‗Palestinian 
activist‘ like Mantiq Al-Tayr, although the entries appear interchangeable with the 
anti-Semitic discourses advocated by American conspiracists. This particular blog 
entry deals with the ‗moral hypocirsy‘ of the Jewish people. The author takes the 
punitive codes outlined in the Old Testament book of Leviticus to show the 
‗inhumane‘ and ‗immoral‘ nature of the Jewish people in general. 137 
     The intention of the Rense.com news editors in selecting these news items is to 
depict Israelis - and, by association, Jewish people in general – as inherently ‗evil‘ 
in a manner befitting the extremist racist ideologies that underpins the ‗Zionist-
Illuminati world domination‘ superconspiracy narrative. The subject area of the 
Israel-Palestine conflict serves as a legitimating framework within which anti-
Semitic beliefs typical of classical conspiracy thought can be propagated and 
reinforced under the guise of  alternative news and commentary. For instance, the 
news reports from The Times and The Independent - ‗Congressman – US Should 
Break Israeli-Gaza Blockade‘ and ‗Israeli politicians may provoke arrest to force 
law change in Britain‘ – present a critical take of Israeli actions in relation to 
Israel within the legitimate context of the ‗objective‘ mainstream press. The 
humanitarian and legal factors that serve as the bases for the criticism of Israel in 
these items (along with the content of the IDF and Salam articles discussed 
earlier) can be seen to create a framework of ‗legitimate criticism‘ of Israel that 
can then be appropriated to incorporate the explicitly anti-Semitic content of the 
conspiracist news items that are placed alongside these mainstream and alternative 
news pieces. This is clearly seen in the items from the Mantiq Al-Tayr and The 
Ugly Truth blogspots. Both bloggers purport to be Palestinian activists, an 
‗alternative‘ or ‗radical‘ identity position that serves to legitimate the anti-Semitic 
conspiracism that constitutes the regular content of both blogs as the ‗justified 
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 http://mantiqaltayr.wordpress.com/2010/02/14/random-videos/,  
accessed via http://www.rense.com/, 16/2/10.  
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 http://theuglytruth.wordpress.com/2010/02/14/does-the-word-of-god-seem-really-confusing-
sometimes/, accessed via http://www.rense.com/, 16/2/10.  
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anger‘ of Palestinians at the Israeli oppression. The ‗legitimated‘ news focus on 
the Israel-Palestinian situation also provides the basis for a reductive moral 
dichotomy, in which the Palestinians can be presented as heroic freedom fighters 
against the oppressive colonialism of the Israelis. This position in turn provides a 
cover for the expression of the core theme of anti-Semitic conspiracism – the 
‗innate evil/corruption‘ of the Jewish people – that is evident in the other Jewish-
themed news items featured on the site. This explains the selection by the 
Rense.com news editors of The Times piece on the Israeli cult leader, which seems 
incongruous in relation to the ‗alternative‘ focus on more directly political news.  
The implication of this news item is not that the abusive activities of Ratzon were 
the result of his status as a cult leader (the abusive nature of such cult groups 
being a universal social phenomenon), but rather the ‗natural‘ product of his 
Jewish ethnicity. This mainstream news item thus presents ‗objective‘ mainstream 
evidence for the conspiracist theorizing of ‗Jewish evil‘ presented in the pseudo-
historical ‗research‘ essays by Hoffman and Eastman.  
     The high proportion of news stories featured on Rense.com dealing with the 
Israel-Palestine conflict, Israeli society, or Jewish history (as classified in 
mainstream terms under the subject area of ‗Middle-East Issues‘) can thus be seen 
as a prime example of conspiracy theorists legitimating their ideas by 
appropriating the forms of alternative news practices. The focus on the Israel-
Palestine conflict as a news topic suggests a commitment to radical subject matter 
typical of alternative journalism. This ostensibly ‗alternative‘ stance can then be 
used as a legitimating framework for the expression and dissemination of classical 
conspiracist anti-Semitic ideas. 
      The flipside of this legitimating process - the ‗conspiracisation‘ of many 
ostensibly alternative radical issues - should also be considered here. Where 
readers of alternative news sites may have previously interpreted news issues such 
as the Israel-Palestine conflict in relation to the radical/progressive ethos of the 
alternative public sphere, their engagement with such issues through faux-
alternative conspiracy news sites such as Rense.com could be seen to result in 
conspiracist perspectives on such news subjects being accepted as legitimate 
alternative perspectives on such matters. To use a biological metaphor of the sort 
employed by pathological scholars of conspiracy theory (see chapter 2, section 
2.2),  this trend could lead to alternative discourses becoming ‗contaminated‘ by 
conspiracist discourses, with the ideological extremism of conspiracism 
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undermining the radical and progressive ethos of the alternative public sphere. A 
notable example of this process in action is the presentation of anti-vaccination 
discourses on alternative websites. Anti-vaccination discourses are heavily 
implicated with alternative health discourses, which often have roots in classical 
conspiracy beliefs. For example, as illustrated by the Swinney article in chapter 
4,section 4.22, the idea that vaccinations are used to impair public health as a 
means of conspiratorial control is a staple of Illuminati superconspiracy 
narratives. The demonisation of vaccinations through  discourses, such as the 
government cover-up of the alleged MMR vaccine-autism link, that derive from 
conspiratorial beliefs, has been well-noted in regards to prominent alternative 
media sites such as the American site The Huffington Post.
138
 
 
 
8.5 Summary 
 
     In relation to the ideas discussed in chapter 6, the Rense.com conspiracy news 
site describes itself as an alternative news site, appropriating the radical 
connotations of the term ‗alternative‘ as a means of making its classical 
conspiracy content (which revolves around extremist anti-Semitic interpretations 
of the Illuminati superconspiracy discussed in chapter 2, section 2.51) appear 
legitimate in relation to critical configurations of the Internet as an alternative 
public sphere. As this case study illustrates, the news practices of Rense.com help 
reinforce its appropriated status as an alternative news site by operating in a 
manner similar to the alternative news practices which were outlined in chapter 7 
as central to the alternative public sphere model. 
     This case study indicates three main areas in which the news practices of 
Rense.com can be used to legitimate it as an alternative rather than conspiracist 
news site. The first area is the use of news sources. In keeping with the use of 
mainstream news in alternative news practice, the prominent use on Rense.com of 
news from mainstream sources helps position the conspiracist interpretations 
which Rense.com places upon such news as legitimate forms of alternative 
discourse. The second area relates to the different types of news items presented 
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 For example, see the online article ‗The Huffington Post‘s War on Medical Science: A Brief 
History‘ by David Gorski at Science-Based Medicine, 
http://www.sciencebasedmedicine.org/?p=473, posted 04/05/2009, accessed 15/09/2010.  
235 
 
on Rense.com. Not only can the likes of conspiracist essays be articulated as 
alternative forms of ‗biased‘ citizen-centric reportage and citizen journalism, but 
the use of  mainstream/alternative news reports with an ostensibly ‗objective‘ 
ethos can also be appropriated to present conspiracist content as  forms of 
‗reportage‘ rather than subjective speculation. The third area relates to the subject 
matter of the news items presented. In relation to the alternative media emphasis 
of radical subject matter dealing with topics that are usually marginalized in 
mainstream news media, Rense.com can present classical conspiracist beliefs, 
such as anti-Semitism, under the guise of radical commentary on social and 
political events.  
     The case study complements the theoretical focus of chapter 6 and 7 by 
offering an empirical illustration of how the technocultural capacities of the 
Internet can be used to facilitate the legitimation of conspiracist content in the 
alternative public sphere. As ‗alternative news‘, conspiracy theories can be 
presented as information that is of better quality than that presented in mainstream 
news, and as information that is important in terms of realizing the democratic 
ideal of the alternative public sphere. In such respects conspiracy theories can 
achieve a degree of legitimation as political and social discourses within the 
alternative public sphere that it is highly likely they would not normally achieve if 
presented on their own terms. Taken as representative of conspiracist news 
practices on the Net,  this case study illustrates how the Net provides technical 
capacities and information resources that can enable conspiracy theorists to 
develop their ideas and position them within the broader realms of democratic 
discourse typified by notions of the public sphere.  
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CONCLUSION 
________________________________________________ 
 
9.1 Overview of ideas presented 
 
    This study has argued that the Internet does constitute a ‗conspiratoria‘ –   a  
cultural space conducive to the beliefs and practices of classical conspiracy theory 
– because the technocultural capacities of the Internet have been articulated and 
configured in ways that align with, and are receptive to, the epistemological 
principles and ideological beliefs that constitute the conspiracist logic which 
underpins classical conspiracy theory. In these respects the Net can be 
conceptualised as a significant tool for classical conspiracy theory – a medium 
that empowers classical conspiracy theory by enabling and facilitating information 
practices through which conspiracy theorists can present their ideas as being more 
legitimate or acceptable in relation to the dominant political and epistemological 
frameworks of mainstream society. Such ‗empowerment‘ can be discussed as 
operating on two inter-related levels. On a technical level, the principles of 
information organisation and manipulation that distinguish the Internet as a ‗new 
medium‘  empower conspiracy theorists by enabling them to create and 
disseminate conspiracist content in ways unavailable or difficult to achieve 
through mainstream media. On a cultural level, the technologically deterministic 
cyber-cultural discourses that have provided the dominant conceptual framework 
for understanding the Net have influenced articulations of the technical aspects of 
the Net as online cultural forms, notably the articulation of the Internet as an 
alternative public sphere. These cyber-cultural discourses and online forms 
empower conspiracy theorists by enabling them to present their conspiracist 
beliefs as manifestations of radical cyber-culture practices.  
     My focus in this study has been to develop a conceptual framework for 
understanding how the Internet can be configured as a conspiratoria.  Research 
into the ideological and socio-cultural aspects of conspiracy theory, along with 
observations of online conspiracism, suggested a particular blend of   political and 
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technocultural dynamics were integral to the ways in which classical conspiracy 
theorists conceptualised and utilised the Internet.  Chapters 4 and 5 posited two 
influential conceptions of the socio-political significance of the Internet as 
constituting the discursive roots of the connection between the Internet and the 
logic of conspiracy theory.  Chapter 4 argued that a key tenet of conspiracist 
thought is the belief that the mainstream media is an agent of conspiratorial 
control, suppressing and manipulating information pertaining to the truth about 
the conspiratorial nature of society to keep citizens acting out against the 
conspiratorial structures of state and economic power. This suspicion of 
mainstream media has led to conspiracy theorists configuring the Internet as a 
medium eminently suited to conspiracist practice because of its perceived 
operation outside mainstream media structures. In this respect conspiracy theory 
can be seen as resonant with the radical/critical traditions of media studies, in 
which the technocultural capacities of the Internet are also discussed as an 
opportunity for reworking the existing (unequal) structures of media power. 
Chapter 5 argued that the role of the Internet in Western society has been heavily 
influenced by cyber-cultural discourses which configure the Internet in 
technologically deterministic terms as a medium that constitutes a major cultural 
paradigm shift because of the ways in which its technocultural capacities can be 
used to democratically empower users beyond the limitations of established 
mainstream media. This articulation of the Net as a  revolutionary medium 
constitutes a major point of connection with the distorted democratic ideals that  
underpin classical conspiracist thought. This connection is enhanced by the 
American cultural contexts in which these cyber-cultural discourses were 
developed. The articulation of the Net as a medium of democratic freedom in 
relation to American political traditions of small government and individual 
liberty is particularly resonant with the Amerocentric libertarian and populist 
ideals integral to most contemporary classical conspiracy thought. 
      These broad discourses of the Internet as a radical and revolutionary medium 
form the conceptual basis for what I argue in chapters 6, 7, and 8 constitutes the 
most significant dynamic underpinning the Internet as conspiratoria – critical 
configurations of the Internet as an alternative medium.  Chapter 6 delineated the 
alternative media concept in relation to critical notions of the media as a public 
sphere. Public sphere theory argues that mass media systems are integral to the 
operation of Western democracy because they can serve as instruments by which 
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the public can keep power transparent. Radical/critical concerns that the public 
sphere functions of the mainstream media are in serious decline due to recent 
political and economic trends have led to the articulation of the Internet as an 
alternative public sphere in which these public sphere functions can be enacted in 
more intensive ways and in opposition to the limitations of the mainstream public 
sphere. This configuration of the Internet as an alternative medium which 
embodies radical democratic ideals in opposition to mainstream media systems is 
one of particular appeal to conspiracy theorists because it resonates with their 
ideological self-perception as ‗radical‘ activists fighting for democratic ‗freedom‘ 
from conspiratorial power, and their opposition towards mainstream media as 
conspiratorial control systems. I therefore argue that conspiracy theorists have 
appropriated the concept of 'alternative media' to describe their conspiracist 
beliefs and online practices as legitimate forms of radical democratic activity. 
Chapter 7 developed these arguments in more detail by considering alternative 
news practices as the specific type of alternative online content most conducive to 
the conspiracist appropriation-legitimation dynamic. News content and news 
principles are central to the operation of both the traditional public sphere and the 
alternative public sphere. The appropriation of alternative news practices by 
conspiracy theorists can therefore be argued to be the major way in which 
conspiracy theorists could legitimate their ideas in the alternative public sphere. 
Chapter 8 presented a case study of the conspiracist news site Rense.com as an 
illustration of this appropriation-legitimation dynamic in action. 
     The dominant aspects of this conspiratoria framework can be encapsulated as 
follows. Firstly, that the internet is a medium with technocultural capacities that 
have been discursively framed as possessing revolutionary potential in relation to 
existing structures of media and politics. Secondly, such potential is manifested in 
articulations (theoretical and practical)  of the Internet as an alternative public 
sphere. Thirdly, that these perspectives make the internet intrinsically appealling 
to conspiracy theorists because of the opportunities they provide for the re-
presentation of the extremist worldviews of classical conspiracy theory as 
ideologically valid and significant socio-political discourses.  
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9.2 Academic contributions of this study  
      I consider the conspiratoria framework presented in this study as one which 
presents several critical perspectives of importance to scholarship in the fields of 
conspiracy theory and new media. The discussions of the Internet as an alternative 
medium and the cyber-utopian discourses portraying the Internet as a 
'revolutionary' medium are particularly pertinent in this regard.  
   Alternative media perspectives are a significant aspect of online conspiracy 
culture that have hitherto been largely overlooked as a critical framework for 
considering the relationships between conspiracy theory, society, and politics. 
Because the academic backgrounds of the scholars who have published on 
conspiracy theory and conspiracy culture have largely been in disciplines outside 
of media studies, they tend to treat the relationships between conspiracy theory 
and media as something tangential, rather than integral, to their central focus on 
such topics as the cultural politics of conspiracy beliefs. In so doing they overlook 
the significance of how the channels of media communication can influence 
conspiracist thought and practice. However, as this study has illustrated, the 
alternative media emphasis on political and social ideas such as the public sphere, 
democracy, and ‗radical‘ cultural activity in relation to new media systems is 
highly relevant to the political science and cultural studies approaches that have so 
far dominated academic discussions of conspiracy culture. The ideas presented in 
this study regarding the relationships between conspiracy theory and alternative 
media can therefore be seen to be useful contributions in terms of suggesting new 
areas of investigation into the socio-political aspects of conspiracy theory, and by 
extending or revitalising existing theoretical approaches. 
     The argument that conspiracy theorists appropriate the alternative media ethos 
associated with the Internet as a means of legitimating their ideas in relation to the 
broader mainstream of socio-political debate (as represented by the alternative and 
mainstream public spheres) is a significant contribution towards some of the key 
areas of critical debate surrounding contemporary conspiracy culture. These areas 
of debate include: why are conspiracy theories ostensibly more prevalent or 
visible within Western culture today? What is it about conspiracy theories that 
makes them appealing or credible to certain members of the public? Has the 
Internet helped to establish conspiracy ideas as acceptable aspects of political 
discussion in relation to particular topics or issues (such as 9/11)?  
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     The populist and libertarian impulses that this study argues are latent to both 
the radical democratic ideas that underlie the alternative media ethos and 
conspiracy theory suggest answers to the first two questions. For instance, it could 
be argued that conspiracy theories have become more visible in the wider culture 
in the millennial period because audiences find the personalized, amateur nature 
of much Internet content, such as that created by conspiracy theorists, more 
appealing on a populist level then the institutionally and professionally created 
content of mainstream media. The oft-made observation by historians of 
conspiracy culture (e.g. Hofstadter 1966: Goldberg 2001) that conspiracy theories 
become more popular and visible in a society during times of political and 
economic upheaval could also be applied here with regards to theories that such 
periods bring out libertarian and populist attitudes in the public towards dominant 
power structures. In such periods (of which I would argue the West is in at the 
time of writing, with major upheaval in the form of the international war on terror, 
global recession caused by the excesses of the US financial sector, and wide-
reaching environmental problems such as global warming), the libertarian and 
populist overtones of the Net as a democratically ‗radical‘ alternative medium – 
and the conspiracy theories that are presented as manifestations of such radicalism 
– could make audiences more receptive to the ideas presented in online conspiracy 
theory, leading to such material become more visible in the wider society. A 
prospective answer to the third question could be seen to lie in the radical 
articulation of the Internet as a site of free speech by comparison with mainstream 
media, so that conspiracist ideas expressed online are taken by audiences as 
possessing a degree of integrity because their symbolic overtones as examples of 
free speech are conflated with the actual conspiracist ideas presented. Another 
answer may be that members of the public who are particularly interested or 
concerned with events such as 9/11, and who consider the mainstream media to 
poorly represent their objects of interest, will turn to the Net as the perfect site for 
such subject-specific discussions, and therefore be more exposed to the 
conspiracist ideas that are presented online in relation to such topics.  
     The related argument that the Internet functions as an empowering technology 
for conspiracy theorists in relation to the influence of cyber-utopian discourses 
about the ‗revolutionary‘ potential of the Net is another facet of the conspiratoria 
framework presented here that I consider makes an important contribution to 
academic understandings of conspiracy theory and new media, notably in the 
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realms of cultural politics. Where the popular appeal of classical conspiracy 
theories has been traditionally considered largely in terms of ideology, this 
argument posits the technocratic mentality associated with new media 
technologies as being increasingly significant. As has been argued (and will be 
discussed further in section 9.4),  the impact and appeal of many contemporary 
conspiracy theories can be seen to derive from the amalgamation of the intrinsic 
‗logic‘ of classical conspiracy belief with the technologically deterministic 
assumptions that are similarly intrinsic to understandings of new media. In 
relation to new media studies, online conspiracy theories can be considered in this 
regard as exemplars of a new media ‗ethos‘,  rather than marginal or aberrant 
content. In a more direct sense, while some studies on conspiracy culture have 
examined online conspiracy material as illustrations of the philosophical and 
political aspects of contemporary conspiracy culture (e.g. Birchall 2006: Bratich 
2008), such studies have not systematically analysed the communicative and 
informational strategies and techniques by which the conspiracy theorists 
construct such material as distinctive pieces of online content, such as alternative 
news. In this respect, I consider this study to make some important contributions 
for understanding how conspiracy theories work as forms of media 
communication, a critical dimension of central importance to wider discussion of 
the ideological and discursive significance of conspiracy theories in relation to 
broader areas of society and culture.  
     The other major area of this study which I regard as making a useful 
contribution to future scholarship in the subject area of conspiracy theory is the 
typology of conspiracy theory outlined in chapter 2, section 2.51. This typology 
was developed in relation to issues raised in the literature review, in which it 
became apparent that the term ‗conspiracy theory‘ was regularly used in a 
generalised ‗catch-all‘ fashion that failed to convey the diversity and complexity 
of conspiracy theories and their historical, cultural, and ideological contexts. 
While this typology is only briefly delineated in this study (being edited down 
from a much larger section which was too digressive in relation to the main 
arguments of this study), and therefore itself highly generalised, I consider it a 
useful starting point for a more comprehensive understanding of conspiracy 
theory based upon more in-depth research and improved awareness of the 
historical, cultural, and ideological contexts that have shaped different conspiracy 
‗types‘.  
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9.3 Ideas for further research 
     As already stated, I regard the key focus of this thesis as the development of a 
critical framework which outlines the dominant principles shaping the ways in 
which conspiracy theorists conceptualise and utilise the Internet. As an 
exploratory and developmental work, my emphasis has been upon ascertaining 
these principles on a broad or large-scale level.  In terms of a future research 
agenda based upon the arguments presented in this study, there are several 
specific areas of inquiry that I would like to investigate further in terms of 
developing a more in-depth and rounded understanding of the Internet as 
‗conspiratoria‘.  My researches into conspiracy culture, both online and real-
world, constitute the basis for my considerations of these areas as important in this 
regard. They can be presented in relation to the following subject headings: 
Technical – how conspiracy theorists use the technical capacities of the Net to 
develop and present evidence for their claims; the influence of search engines on 
online conspiracism 
Cultural – the development of online conspiracy communities; possible 
connections between the psychological profile of conspiracy theorists and the 
subjective mentalities of the Net 
Political – the ways in which conspiracy theorists utilise the net as an 
entrepreneurial medium, and how this usage relates to the Amerocentric 
libertarian ethos that informs much online conspiracist thought. 
The following sections will present in-depth outlines of each of these ideas.  
 
 9.31 The Internet and conspiracy evidence 
   Discussions of how conspiracy theorists make use of the Internet as a means of 
collecting, interpreting, and presenting evidence were presented in this study, 
particularly in the arguments pertaining to the conspiracist appropriation of 
alternative news practices in chapters 7 and 8.  However, these are such an 
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integral and interesting facet of online conspiracism that they deserve much more 
investigation than could be provided here. 
     Since most conspiracy theorists appear to believe in the truth of the 
conspiracist ideas they are presenting,  critical debates over the nature of 
conspiracy thinking (e.g. whether or not a conspiracy theory is ‗true‘or justified) 
are usually dismissed in favour of research which can elevate the conspiracy from 
the realms of theory to those of ‗fact‘. Most conspiracy theorists realise that, in 
order for their conspiracist ideas to be accepted as factual by the public, they must 
be presented as possessing some degree of plausibility or credibility in accordance 
with the standards of rational thinking and scientific fact that form the basis for 
mainstream perceptions of social reality. As several scholars of conspiracy theory 
have noted, classical conspiracy theory thus relies heavily on techniques of 
‗pseudo-scholarship‘ (Hofstadter 1966: Pipes 1997: Barkun 2003). As with the 
arguments presented in this study regarding conspiracy theorists appropriation of 
alternative media frameworks as a means of legitimating their ideas in relation to 
the public sphere, conspiracist practices of pseudo-scholarship can be seen to 
revolve around the appropriation of frameworks associated with mainstream 
scientific and academic research in order to convey the impression that the 
conspiracy theory in question is, at best, ‗true‘, or, at least, a warranted 
explanation given the nature of the events involved. 
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     In these respects, the Internet can be seen to incorporate a variety of technical 
features well-suited to conspiracist practices of researching and presenting 
evidence. Two such practices that I found ubiquitous in online conspiracism were 
what I term ‗information saturation‘ and image analysis. Information saturation 
practices revolve around the substitution of quantitative factors for qualitative 
ones in the presentation of evidence. Here conspiracy theorists marshal vast 
amounts of different pieces of data from online sources to present a weight of 
evidence that superficially suggests that the conspiracy theory in question is true. 
The actual quality of the information is rarely called into question. As already 
illustrated by the likes of the Swinney article in chapter 4, section 4.22, much of 
the online evidence presented on conspiracy sites derives from the completely 
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 An example of such a ‗warranted explanation‘ is the idea that the destruction of the WTC 
buildings in the 9/11 attacks could have been a controlled demolition undertaken by conspiratorial 
groups within the US government, in light of the observation that the WTC collapse looked like a 
controlled demolition, and in light of public knowledge of the US government‘s geopolitical 
machinations that formed the background to the attacks (as delineated in Michael Moore‘s 2003 
documentary Fahrenheit 9/11). 
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speculative ramblings of fellow conspiracy theorists or quotes and data ‗cherry-
picked‘ out of the wider context of mainstream information such as news reports. 
Such information is, by mainstream standards, low quality because it is highly 
subjective and/or distorted through its decontextualised nature. These information 
practices represent a distortion of one of the principles of scientific research, in 
which repeated observations of activity related to a particular subject can be 
presented as a cumulative body of data that helps confirm the validity of a 
hypothesis regarding the nature of that subject. The presentation of vast quantities 
of information as evidence for the conspiracy theory in question is taken as 
qualitative proof that the conspiracy theory is conspiracy fact.  
     The hypertextual capacities of the Internet are also central to these information 
saturation practices in that they enable conspiracy theorists to back up their ideas 
with multiple references to other online conspiracy sources. By enabling non-
linear linkages between content on different conspiracy websites, conspiracy 
theorists can present the impression that there is a vast weight of evidence for 
their ideas in the form of other online references about the particular conspiracy 
topic in question. This gives their arguments a formal sheen of credibility in 
accordance with mainstream standards of scholarship, in which a researcher 
references other scholars work as a means of validating their own argument. This 
perspective reflects a distinctively technologically deterministic logic at work. 
Because the Net is perceived as a medium that enables information to be 
presented and organised in ways that are better than those available in other media 
(e.g. the simplicity and speed of hypertext links), so the actual content of these 
‗pieces‘ of online information is perceived to be of a innately high qualitative 
standard. In this respect, to merely have information presented on the Internet  can 
be seen as a marker of information quality. An invaluable discursive framework 
for legitimating this pseudo-scholarly information saturation approach is the 
cyber-cultural configuration of the Net as a digital library (see chapter 5, section 
5.22).  
     Image analysis refers to the ways in which conspiracy theorists use the multi-
media capacities of the Net to analyse images for details that constitute evidence 
for particular conspiracy theories. There are three main areas of practice here. The 
first is related to the digital library view of the Net outlined above. The Net 
provides a ready-made resource base in terms of archiving large amounts of news 
and documentary footage and images from all sorts of sources, such as 
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mainstream news channels, scientific organisations, and academic institutions. 
Such material is generally not restricted or copyrighted due to the Net‘s status as a 
‗free‘ information environment. Conspiracy theorists can therefore source a wide 
variety of images and then subject them to their own analysis and interpretation.  
     The second is based upon the convergent nature of the Net with other digitally-
based technologies. Conspiracy theorists are able to use software designed for the 
presentation and manipulation of digital images as a means of ‗dissecting‘ images 
in order to uncover their conspiratorial secrets. A key technique here is that of 
digital enhancement of images and soundtracks, such as magnification of 
particular elements within an image; checking differences in contrast and colour 
to check for evidence that images may have been manipulated; or using filters to 
remove distortion, such as audio crackle. These techniques are used by conspiracy 
theorists to bring out ‗hidden details‘ which are then used as evidence for 
conspiratorial interpretations. Such techniques are staples of conspiracy sites on 
subjects such as the JFK assassination (analysis of the Zapruder film to prove the 
existence of multiple shooters); extraterrestrial life (analysis of NASA images of 
the Moon and Mars to show existence of alien artefacts on the surfaces of both 
bodies); and 9/11 (analysis of footage of the WTC attacks and collapse to show 
that the collapse was a ‗controlled demolition‘ and therefore proof that the attacks 
were an ‗inside job‘ by the US government). 
     A third practice of conspiracist image analysis is conspiracy theorists‘ use of 
the multimedia and convergent capacities of the Net to create their own images in 
the form of online documentaries on conspiracy topics. To return to ideas 
discussed in chapter 7, section 7.32, the Net not only enables conspiracy theorists 
to appropriate footage from online sources but also to combine this footage with 
material they have created themselves using convergent equipment such as digital 
video cameras and digital film-making software. The Net also provides a ready-
made network for the distribution and reception of such conspiracist images, in 
form such as the ubiquitous audio-visual file-sharing site YouTube. In such 
respects the Net enables conspiracy theorists to adopt one of the most persuasive 
forms of communication available to the mainstream media (documentary) and 
disseminate such material to potentially vast numbers of users whilst bypassing 
the structures of the mainstream media which delimit documentary filmmaking 
(e.g. researchers who fact-check documentary content to avoid lawsuits, aesthetic 
codes  of objectivity etc). These online conspiracy documentaries have become 
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staples of online conspiracy culture and can be argued to have been central in the 
increased visibility of some conspiracist theories within contemporary Western 
culture, as suggested by the on and offline discussion of documentaries such as  
the 9/11-themed Loose Change and the religious/banking/NWO themed Zeitgeist. 
     These arguments relating to conspiracy theorists‘ use of the Net‘s 
technocultural capacities to produce conspiracist content are also bound up with 
cyber-cultural debates regarding the blurring of boundaries between professional 
and amateur information, a position touched on in the discussion of online citizen 
journalism as part of the alternative media ethos (see chapter 7, section 7.31). An 
example of this is that sites such as YouTube blend professional and amateur 
content together, so that conspiracist documentaries are presented alongside 
documentaries from established or professional media sources. Given that the Net 
presents an information environment free of the cultural and institutional 
distinctions that distinguish amateur from professional content in other media (e.g. 
the expert status accorded to mainstream journalists or academics), it can be 
argued, in relation to these ideas of production, that the Net empowers conspiracy 
theorists by enabling them to present their conspiracist ideas online as being 
qualitatively equivalent to mainstream content. In these respects, the cyber-
utopian concept that the Net is a more genuinely democratic medium because of 
its emphasis on user-generated content can be seen to be translated into a 
legitimating framework for conspiracy theory.   
 
9.32 The Internet and the development of conspiracy communities 
     Theories of online community have become staples of discussions of 
cyberculture within fields such as media studies and sociology (e.g. Swiss 2000; 
Mossberger et al 2008). The basic premise of these discussions is that the 
technocultural capacities of the Internet, such as its ability to transcend the 
temporal and geographical limitations that traditionally separate people in the 
physical world, will facilitate individuals and groups joining together to form new 
socio-cultural communities online based upon a shared adherence to particular 
types of beliefs and behaviours (e.g. Dean in Swiss 2000: Holmes 2005). 
     These critical discourses of online community were discussed in relation to the 
the arguments presented in chapters 6-8 regarding configurations of the Net as an 
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alternative medium which empowers conspiracy theorists and helps legitimate 
their ideas in relation to the alternative public sphere, such as Atton‘s notion of 
citizen journalism in which alternative news producers are affiliated with 
particular radical groups or causes (chapter 7, section 7.31). However, theoretical 
notions of conspiracist cyber-communities and their relationships with real-world 
social and political activity constitute a vast subject area in their own right that 
would make a fascinating subject for future research. A key starting point in this 
regard is the function of online conspiracy sites as literal meeting points for 
conspiracy theorists. A site like the NZ conspiracy news site Uncensored could be 
seen to facilitate the development of a virtual conspiracy community, in both a 
local and international sense, because it provides a supportive environment for the 
reinforcement and development of conspiracist beliefs. The news and commentary 
presented on the site collect together a wide range of material from across the 
conspiracist websphere so as to make the site a central information source for 
conspiracy-minded users; while the comments features serve as a means for local 
and international conspiracy theorists to swap information with each other and 
affirm their identity, in the face of online critics, as self-styled ‗radical 
truthseekers‘ or ‗investigative journalists‘ rather than adherents to extremist and 
fantastical conspiracist beliefs. The articulation of online conspiracy theory as a 
distinctive, radically-committed community that operates on the margins of 
mainstream society can be seen to legitimate classical conspiracy beliefs further 
as acceptable forms of politically ‗alternative‘ thought.  
     The capacities for conspiracy theorists to use the Internet to mobilise fellow 
conspiracy theorists into real-world socio-political action, in the manner of 
alternative activists using sites such as Indymedia to organise protests against the 
World Trade Organisation and other globalist bodies made up of powerful 
economic and political interests, is another topic related to notions of online 
community particularly pertinent to an understanding of contemporary conspiracy 
culture. As noted in chapter 7, section 7.32, the 9/11 truth movement is a 
community of international activists who use the Net to exchange information and 
organise political activity such as demonstrations, (in America at least), regarding 
their conspiracist beliefs that the 9/11 terror attacks and the collapse of the WTC 
buildings were ‗inside jobs‘ by forces within the US government.140  The 
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 Some good examples include: The website 911blogger.com which keeps track of 9/11 activist 
events around the world: and the group ‗Architects and Engineers for 911 Truth‘ which sent 
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crossover between online and offline community activity, as discussed in a 
conspiracist context, also has significance regarding the future development of the 
Internet. For example, recent claims in America that increased state regulation and 
surveillance of the Net are needed to prevent extremist groups, whose worldviews 
are predicated in classical conspiracy beliefs, from organising their real-world 
activities online, pose a major affront to the civil libertarian ethos that was 
outlined in chapter 5, section 5.3, as an integral aspect of American cyber-culture. 
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9.33 Online conspiracy theory, entrepreneurialism, and 
libertarianism 
     It can be argued that the technocultural capacities of the Internet are conducive 
to the commodification of conspiracy culture. Many conspiracy websites have a 
commercial agenda alongside their ostensibly core practice of presenting 
conspiracist information. The two most common manifestations of this are 
advertisements for conspiracy-themed products (e.g. ‗survivalist‘ equipment) and 
the sale of conspiracist goods and services, such as books, DVDs, subscriptions to 
conspiracist radio broadcasts, or tickets to lecture tours by conspiracy theorists. 
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architect Richard Gage on a 2009 international lecture tour promoting the idea that the WTC 
buildings were destroyed in a controlled demolition (Gage spoke to a full house in the lecture 
theatre at Te Papa, New Zealand‘s national museum in Wellington): http://www.ae911truth.org/ 
accessed 16/07/2010. 
 
141
 For example, Cass Sunstein, an Obama White House official dealing with information society 
matters, suggested in early 2010 that the federal government should actively spy on conspiracy 
groups for concerns that the proliferation of online conspiracism could translate into domestic 
terrorist activity (shades of the 1995 Oklahoma City bombing). See, for instance, Arthur 
Goldwag‘s article ‗Cass Sunstein‘s Thought Police‘ at alternative news site The Huffington Post: 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/arthur-goldwag/cass-sunsteins-thought-po_b_453562.html , 
accessed 15/09/2010. 
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 Prime examples here include :  
- American conspiracy theorist Alex Jones, who aggressively presents himself as a conspiracy 
‗brand‘ via a mini-empire of online media (websites, radio and television broadcasts, online 
documentaries) and merchandise (DVDs, T-shirts, baseball caps) – see his websites Alex Jones‘ 
Prison Planet http://www.prisonplanet.com/ and Alex Jones‘ InfoWars http://www.infowars.com/   
- American conspiracy theorist Jeff Rense, whose website is full of conspiracy-related advertising: 
see http://www.rense.com/  and case study in chapter 8. 
- British conspiracy theorist David Icke, who regularly publishes conspiracy books and undertakes 
international lecture tours, both of which are heavily promoted on his website: 
http://www.davidicke.com/index.php / , all sites accessed 16/07/2010. 
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     Much of this commercialism appears predicated upon purely technical aspects 
of the Internet. The multi-media and convergent capacities of the Net provide the 
means for conspiracy theorists to produce, promote, and sell conspiracy-themed 
goods. For example, conspiracy theorists like Alex Jones make use of news 
footage available through Net sources to make their own conspiracist 
documentaries; make use of websites such as YouTube to promote these DVDs 
through trailers and downloads; and make use of virtual transaction functions such 
as PayPal to enable people to buy DVD versions of these documentaries whilst 
bypassing the economic and legal structures that would affect the sale of such 
products through conventional means such as mainstream retail stores (e..g 
copyright issues involved in the use of corporate news footage). 
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     An investigation of the ways in which the technocultural capacities of the Net 
enable conspiracy theorists to commercialise their conspiracy beliefs would 
constitute an interesting extension of the arguments presented in this study 
regarding the Net as an empowering medium for conspiracy theory. This topic is 
also interesting in that it suggests further development of the arguments mooted in 
chapter 5, section 5.3, regarding the American libertarian ethos that informed the 
cyber-cultural configurations of the Internet as a site of information freedom as a 
significant point of connection with the American libertarian principles which also 
underpin classical conspiracist thought. Libertarian ideologies of individual 
freedoms and distrust of government also form the basis for the free-market 
principles that are quintessential to the history of American capitalism as one of 
the pillars of American national identity. 
144
 As cyber-commentators like Richard 
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 As on the Alex Jones Infowars shop page: http://infowars-shop.stores.yahoo.net/index.html , 
accessed 15/09/2010. 
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 As these ideologies have been imposed on countries around the globe over the last 30 years in 
the guise of  neo-liberalism, it could also be argued that they have been an influence on the 
articulation on fin-de-siecle conspiracism in countries outside the USA. Certainly the NZ 
libertarian right, in forms such as the ACT party, has actively promoted  conspiracist discourses of 
the sort advocated by American libertarians in relation to issues such as global warming.  
     See, for example, the article ‗Don‘t Hide your love away: Don Brash, climate and a very 
particular kind of coup‘ on the NZ global warming news site Hot Topic: 
http://hot-topic.co.nz/dont-hide-your-love-away-don-brash-climate-and-a-very-particular-kind-of-
coup/ accessed 18/09/2011. A prominent player  in ACT party history is Trevor Loudon. As an 
acolyte of John Birch Society style anti-Communist conspiracies from the 1970s to the present, 
Loudon presumably finds the libertarianism of the ACT party complementary to his classical 
conspiracist worldview. See the article ‗Anyone more normal?‘ by Russell Brown, posted on the 
NZ news site Public Address: http://publicaddress.net/hardnews/anyone-more-normal/, posted 
28/3/2006. Also Loudon‘s own website, the NewZeal blog: http://trevorloudon.com/, accessed 
18/09/2011.  
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Barbrook have argued, the American cyber-utopian perspectives which have 
shaped Western conceptions of the Internet have actually combined these two 
major forms of American libertarianism. The articulation of the Net as an 
expression of the libertarian freedoms of the American frontier mythos has not 
only manifested in the civil libertarian emphasis on radical democratic activity 
online and lack of government regulation, but also in a free-market emphasis on 
online entrepreneurialism as an articulation of one‘s democratic liberties and 
rights (see Barbrook & Cameron 2001: Barbrook 2007). In this context the online 
entrepreneurism of American conspiracy theorists such as Alex Jones can be seen 
as not just brazen hucksterism but as an ideological affirmation of the Net as a site 
of the American libertarian 'freedoms' the conspiratorial forces are trying to 
suppress – the constitutional rights of US citizens and laissez-faire capitalism. The 
Net therefore provides an environment free of government and market regulation 
in which Amerocentric conspiracy theorists can exercise their libertarianism 
through the presentation of conspiracy content critical of the government  and the 
packaging of this content as 'commodities' within the 'free market' of cyberspace.  
 
9.34 Search engines and online conspiracism 
     Search engines such as the omnipresent Google are arguably the closest thing 
the Internet has to a ‗centre‘, in that they are designed to serve as the main base 
for most user‘s engagement with the Net because they organise the vast amounts 
of information available online according to the requests of the user. They are also 
one of the pivots of the Net‘s socio-cultural configuration as a ‗democratic‘ or 
‗amateur‘ medium, in that search results are organised from first to last according 
to popularity – how many times the site has been accessed by users  from across 
the Net. In this respect search engines reflect the blurring of boundaries between 
information quantity and information quality that is typical of the technologically 
deterministic ethos of the Internet. There is no indication to search engine users 
that the information contained within the websites that rank high in search engine 
listings has been evaluated as the best quality information on a particular topic. 
Rather, it is assumed that because so many people have accessed a particular site 
and therefore given this site a high ranking within the search engine scale, such 
popularity must be indicative of the quality of information contained within the 
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site in question. Quantitative measurements of the amount of times users have 
accessed specific websites are thus configured as a democratic endorsement of the 
quality of information contained on these specific sites. 
     This emphasis on popularity as synonymous with quality is an aspect of Net 
culture that can be considered particularly significant in relation to online 
conspiracy theory. Conspiracy websites often rank highly on the likes of Google 
in relation to searches on specific subjects of conspiratorial significance, such as 
9/11 and the moon landings, 
145
 or searches for alternative media, enabling the 
poor-quality information on conspiracy sites to achieve a significant degree of 
visibility and influence within the wider culture due to their presentation as the 
most popular/most qualitative sites on particular subjects. Search engine rankings 
may therefore be configured as another way in which the technocultural capacities 
of the Internet empower conspiracy theorists. Several possible lines of future 
research can be suggested here to investigate the apparent influence of search 
engines on conspiracy culture. One of these may be an examination of which 
types of subjects have a heavy conspiracist element to their search engine results. 
For example, are conspiracy sites represented in search rankings in response to 
topics of obvious conspiracist interest, or is their influence more widespread 
across a wide variety of topics? Another approach, that would possibly be more 
difficult to research, but possibly more informative regarding the relationship 
between search engines and conspiracy theories, could be to examine the socio-
cultural factors that are involved in the popularity of conspiracy websites. For 
example, conspiracy websites may be accessed by users for a variety of reasons. 
Some topics may have a particularly active online ‗conspiracy community‘ 
operating around them which will boost the rankings of relevant conspiracy 
websites (e.g. the 9/11 ‗truther‘ movement – conspiracy sites dealing with 9/11 
ranking higher than official sites on the subject). The controversial, spectacular, or 
bizarre nature of other conspiracy theories may also lead certain conspiracy sites 
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For example, a Google search on the subject of ‗9/11‘ (30/08/2011) brings up the following sites 
as their top 8 on the subject: 
1 - September 11 attacks – Wikipedia 
2 - The 9/11 Truth Movement – 911truth.org 
3 - September 11 News.com 
4 - September 11 2001 Video – YouTube 
5 - 9/11 (TV2002) – IMDb 
6 -  9-11 Research: An Independent Investigation of the 9-11-2001 Attack 
7 - September 11 Digital Archive 
8 - 9/11Watch Free Documentaries Online 
Out of the 8 sites listed, numbers 2, 3, and 6 are conspiracy websites. 
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to be rated highly on topic searches (e.g. claims that global warming is a 
conspiratorial plot rather than scientific fact, as controversially addressed in 
mainstream media such as newspapers and television, may induce a level of 
public curiosity that leads to global warming ‗denial‘ sites rating highly in net 
searches on the subject).  
 
9.35 Relationship between psychology of conspiracy theorists and 
Net culture 
      The relationship between conspiracy theory and certain psychological and 
personality traits has been a major focus of many popular and academic studies of 
conspiracy theory (e.g. Hofstadter 1966: Graumann & Moscovici 1987: Showalter 
1997: Parish & Parker 2001: Swami et al 2009: Aaronovitch 2009). My online 
examinations of conspiracist writings and conspiracist practices, such as the 
interactions between conspiracy theorists and skeptics in the comments pages of 
both mainstream and conspiracist websites,  has indicated recurrent tendencies in 
both conspiracist thought and expression which suggest  that conspiracy theorists 
are something of an identifiable psychological and personality type. Perceived 
aspects of a conspiracist psychology include, obviously, a paranoid world view 
(the conspiracy theorist is under threat by the conspiratorial ‗other‘); 
autodidacticism (conspiracy theorists have educated themselves in particular 
topics, which means they consider themselves more knowledgeable than the likes 
of academics who operate within education systems controlled by conspiratorial 
forces); and narcissism (conspiracy theorists are prone to present themselves as 
‗special‘ individuals in possession of ‗special‘ knowledge about the ‗true‘ 
conspiratorial nature of reality. Activities such as debunking, which threaten the 
conspiracy theorists‘ exalted self-image, are likely to be met with extreme and 
aggressive responses).  
     In this respect, another potentially interesting point of inquiry regarding the 
relationships between conspiracy theory and the Internet may be to consider how 
the technical features of the Net facilitate the communication of ideas in modes 
that are resonant with, or beneficial to, such aspects of the ‗conspiracist 
personality‘. The virtual nature of Net communication appears to be a key focus in 
this regard. Where conspiracy theorists may have their ideas – and personalities – 
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challenged and critiqued in real-life social situations or mainstream media such as 
newspapers and television, the technocultural capacities of the Net may enable 
conspiracy theorists to control communication to their own psychological 
advantages. For instance, conspiracy theorists can set up their own websites to 
promote their ideas within a web sphere of fellow conspiracy theorists who 
engage in mutual reinforcement of each others beliefs. Conspiratorial ideas, such 
as holocaust denial, that would result in social opprobrium for  conspiracy 
theorists in real-world/mainstream contexts, can be presented on the Net 
anonymously or from a distance, protecting conspiracy theorists from direct social 
repercussions. The views of critics and sceptics can be ignored within the 
information wash of the Net or attacked with impunity within the virtual realm of 
online forums and comments pages.  
     The decentered nature of the Net could also be seen to be significant in this 
regard in that it enables conspiracy theorists to present their ideas as equivalent to, 
or better than, those of mainstream thinkers in a notably narcissistic and self-
aggrandising manner. A typical example of this is the tendency of New Age 
conspiracy theorists to develop ‗revolutionary‘ new paradigms in fields such as 
physics and biology in order to validate the existence of the fantastical or occult 
elements, such as UFOs or ‗interdimensional intelligences‘, that constitute the 
basis of their worldviews. In so doing such conspiracy theorists present 
themselves as scientific geniuses who are misunderstood or conspired against by 
the scientific establishment because of the  paradigm-shattering brilliance of their 
discoveries. 
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9.4  Further discussion of critical ideas presented 
    The main ideas presented in this study touch on a variety of  themes and issues 
regarding the subject areas of both conspiracy theory and the Internet. I will here 
discuss further what I think are some of these relevant areas of wider debate, and 
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 Good examples include the writings of American New Age conspiracists Val Valerian 
(http://www.trufax.org/)  and Laura Knight-Jadcyzk  (http://www.sott.net  ), both of whom present 
superconspiracy histories of the world based upon New Age pseudoscientific precepts such as 
‗quantum multidimensionality‘.  New Age thought (and the conspiracy theories derived from this) 
is particularly noteworthy for its conceptualisation of  an entire alternative science paradigm 
predicated upon the combination of  discredited early modern theories of vitalism and occult 
extrapolations of quantum theory. The eccentric or cranky ideas of scientists such as Nikola Tesla 
and Wilhelm Reich are central pivots of such ‗alternative science‘. 
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consider some of the problems and counter-arguments related to these debates and 
the ideas discussed in the study.  
     In this study I feel I have effectively argued that there is a ‗special relationship‘ 
between classical conspiracy theory and the Internet, with the Net serving as a 
legitimating system for conspiracy ideas within the wider culture, particularly in 
relation to the Net‘s perceived cultural status as an alternative public sphere. The 
main theme that I would like to discuss as a conclusion to the arguments presented 
in the body of the text is the idea that conspiracy theorists can be seen as prime 
exponents of and believers in technologically deterministic discourses of the 
Internet as a radical socio-political ‗paradigm shift‘. I present this discussion as 
conclusion for several reasons. Firstly, to indicate an awareness of the possible 
criticisms and ripostes related to the conspiracy-Internet arguments that formed 
the basis of this study. Secondly, to indicate the complex and problematic nature 
of the Internet as an object of study, and to simultaneously signal my awareness of 
the larger critical debates that surround the technocultural capacities of the 
Internet.  Thirdly, to acknowledge my own critical scepticism regarding the 
subject areas of the Internet and conspiracy theory that has developed over the 
course of this project. I regard this informed scepticism as one of the major 
outcomes of my research, and as the prospective basis for future work examining 
the relationships between the Internet and society.   
     The central idea which I perceive as underlying the problematic aspects of the 
conspiracy-Internet relationship is that of the Internet‘s cultural status as a 
‗revolutionary‘ medium. The central premise of this study is that the ways in 
which conspiracy theorists conceptualise and utilise the Internet (as with their 
appropriation of the alternative public sphere ethos) are shaped by technologically 
determinist cyber-cultural discourses which articulate the Net as a ‗revolutionary‘ 
force in 21st century Western society. To recap arguments presented in the main 
body of the study, the technocultural capacities of the Net which constitute its 
revolutionary potential for cyber-theorists and academic commentators (as with 
discourses of the second media age and frameworks of alternative media) are also 
those regarded as ‗revolutionary‘ by conspiracy theorists. Because these capacities 
(such as the decentered and unregulated nature of the Net that has developed due 
to its organisation as a digital network rather than a broadcast medium) empower 
the information practices of conspiracy theorists – practices which they perceive 
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as politically revolutionary in terms of the conspiracist beliefs they are 
disseminating – so those same technocultural capacities can be seen as effectively 
synonymous with conspiracist notions of ‗revolution‘. Thus, from a conspiracist 
perspective, the communication of conspiracy theories via the Internet is truly 
revolutionary in that it melds the ‗radical‘ socio-political messages of conspiracy 
theory with the ‗paradigm-shifting‘ impact of the Internet on almost all spheres of 
Western social, cultural, and political life. The technologically deterministic logic 
of the Internet is entwined with the logic of classical conspiracy theory.  
     In this respect, it could be argued that online conspiracism symbolises a kind 
of apotheosis of the technologically deterministic discourses which frame the 
Internet. Underlying the online activities of conspiracy theorists is a ‗cyber-
mythic‘ belief that by the mere act of communicating information via the Internet 
particular results will eventuate – in terms of conspiracy theory, the ‗awakening‘ 
of the populace as to the conspiratorial ‗truth‘ of the social and political reality in 
which they live.  In this regard, conspiracy theorists can be seen as proselytisers 
for the technologically determinist myths that the information revolution of the 
Internet is also the major driver for social and political revolution. As articulated 
in relation to the discursive framework of the ‗digital sublime‘, the technical 
aspects of the Net are regarded as making conspiracy theories more visible, more 
appealing, and more potent to the public. The Net‘s ‗sublime‘ status as a medium 
which transcends the limitations of the mainstream media is perceived as 
endowing conspiracy theorists with the ability to transcend the conspiratorial 
structures of everyday society within which they are generally marginalized and 
denigrated in respect of their beliefs. This sublime relationship between the Net 
and conspiracy theory is underpinned by a technologically determinist logic in 
which the quantitative capacities of the Internet to store and make accessible large 
amounts of information are conflated as being equivalent with qualitative 
assumptions about the power and significance of the information content 
presented via the Internet.  
      This conspiracist belief in the revolutionary or transcendent powers of the 
Internet means that conspiracy theorists fail to consider the technocultural 
limitations of the medium. As argued above, the Net‘s status as a ‗revolutionary‘ 
medium is irrevocably bound up with the ways in which its technical features 
enable communication by facilitating the abilities of individuals to create and 
distribute their own content and to access information outside of the limitations of 
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traditional media. Such perspectives usually overlook or ignore the myriad ways 
in which the technical features of the Net can also disable said processes of 
communication and information. A major area in which the limitations of the 
Internet may be said to influence the ideas and practices of online conspiracism is 
that pertaining to reception - the ways in which online content is received and 
interpreted by audiences. An important factor in terms of ideas of reception is that 
the diverse nature of media audiences presupposes a diversity of possible 
audience responses to media content. An implicit assumption of conspiracy 
theorists, and commentators on conspiracy culture (particularly those in the 
pathological mode – see chapter 2, sections 2.2 – 2.22) is that audiences will take 
online conspiracy content at face value – that the conspiracist ideas presented will 
be received in seriousness and interpreted literally by audiences. Such a position 
reflects technologically deterministic logic at work. The systems of information 
organisation and presentation that mark the Internet, such as access to vast 
reserves of hyperlinked information and the ability for conspiracy theorists to 
present evidence in multi-media forms, are perceived by conspiracy theorists as 
means for making their ideas more credible and convincing to audiences.
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     Underlying this technologically deterministic assumption that conspiracy 
theories are somehow more potent by virtue of their presentation via the Internet 
is the sense that online conspiracy theorists are writing in relation to an idealised 
concept of a Net user and conspiracy site reader. The implicit sense evoked of 
such a user is someone who combines a conspiracist suspicion of political and 
social authority with a ‗cyber-libertarian‘ belief in the personally and socially 
liberating potentialities of the Internet. Such ideal conspiracy Net users are using 
the opportunities the Net provides for the expression of information and 
interpersonal interaction outside of the channels of mainstream media to empower 
themselves through an online education in ‗alternative‘ (i.e. conspiracist) ideas 
against the conspiratorially-controlled political and social norms.  This 
conspiracist image of the Net and Net users is therefore one of utmost seriousness. 
The Net is not some frivolous site of mere entertainment and expression but a 
‗serious‘ information resource in which ‗serious‘ people, deeply concerned with 
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 The alternative media arguments presented in the main body of the study are an attempt to 
critically articulate the possible appeal of online conspiracism beyond this technologically 
deterministic position. Online conspiracy theories are discussed as possessing more potential 
credibility and believability with Net users, not merely because of the technical features of the Net, 
but because of the ways in which the Net is articulated within the wider culture as a socio-political 
information space that constitutes an alternative to the structures of mainstream media 
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social and political issues, can access ‗serious‘ information about such matters in 
the form of online conspiracy content.  
     However, as investigations within fields such as media studies and sociology 
have argued, the ways in which audiences (both individually and as groups) 
receive and interpret media content is highly complex (e.g. Ruddock 2001: Curran 
& Morley 2006).  The diverse factors that constitute an individual as a distinctive 
entity within a society are also regarded as shaping that individual‘s reactions to 
media content when they are part of a media audience. Thus it cannot be assumed 
that Net users who frequent conspiracy websites necessarily accept the 
conspiracist ideas presented or adhere to the implicit conspiracist image of the 
ideal Net user. Leaving aside totally negative standards of reception, such as 
audiences ignoring conspiracy material altogether, several modes of audience 
reception could be postulated as applying to online conspiracy theory in ways that 
challenge and compromise the mythic notions that the Internet empowers and 
enables conspiracy theorists.  
     One significant perspective is that audiences may engage with conspiracy 
material online for entertainment purposes. Many individuals may find classical 
conspiracy theories unbelievable on political and logical grounds, yet still find 
them interesting on a cultural level because the extreme and bizarre nature of the 
conspiracist material presented is culturally and politically ‗spectacular‘ in 
relation to the cultural and political ideas that typify mainstream culture and 
thought. Such a position may be considered in relation to critical discussions of 
spectacle and sensationalism as key modes of contemporary Western media 
culture (e.g. Lull & Hinerman 1997: Kellner 2003). In such perspectives, 
spectacle – the presentation of subject matter considered culturally excessive, 
aesthetically sensational, and/or morally controversial – is discussed as a standard 
practice within mainstream media systems such as television and newspapers, 
because it is usually guaranteed to attract the attention of audiences – attention 
which can then be converted into commercial gains such as ratings and sales. 
Since this spectacular mode is one that constitutes one of the norms of Western 
popular culture (e.g. the excessive emphasis on political and celebrity scandals, 
murders and disasters in the mainstream news media), audiences habituated to this 
norm may naturally be drawn to spectacular and sensational subject matter when 
engaging with the Internet. Online conspiracy content may therefore be appealing 
to many Net users because of its excessive and unusual nature, with users 
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checking out conspiracy sites for entertainment reasons – ―hey man, check out 
this crazy conspiracy shit!‖ – rather than a desire to ‗seriously‘ consider the 
political and ideological ideas presented.  
     Such presentation of conspiracy theories as spectacular cultural discourses is 
compounded by the excessive usage of conspiracist themes and subject matter in 
millennial popular culture. American popular culture has made conspiracist 
themes highly visible in Western mainstream culture through successful 
entertainment media such as the television show The X-Files (1993-2002) or films 
such as Conspiracy Theory (1997).  Since audiences are used to the presentation 
of conspiracy theories as forms of popular entertainment, then they may also 
engage with online conspiracist material in a similiar fashion. A variation of this 
entertainment framework is that users may also be attracted to online conspiracy 
content because the unregulated nature of the Net provides easy access to content 
that may be restricted or forbidden in mainstream media systems due to its subject 
matter. Users may check out online conspiracy content because of personal and 
cultural curiosity regarding its subversive or taboo status in relation to the values 
and standards of ‗normal‘ society and mainstream culture. Again, this does not 
mean that such audiences are believing conspiracist ideas wholesale.
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     Another, more generous perspective may be that Net users are selective in their 
responses to online conspiracy material, finding certain conspiracy theories 
appealing or believable whilst rejecting others for a variety of political, social, and 
cultural reasons. For example, many commentators have noted that 9/11 
conspiracy theories which argue that the 9/11 attacks were a ‗false flag‘ operation 
undertaken by sinister elites within the US government are particularly prominent 
on the Net, a prominence that has helped them become highly visible within 
American popular and political culture (e.g. Sargeant 2006: Bratich 2008). I 
would suggest here that the visibility of 9/11 conspiracy theories is not merely due 
to conspiracy theorists‘ abilities to use the technical capacities of the Net to 
present particularly convincing ‗evidence‘ (e.g. the hype surrounding  the online 
9/11 conspiracy documentary Loose Change (2006: revised editions 2006 - 2010), 
but to the historic nature of the 9/11 attacks in relation to American political and 
cultural traditions, and its apparent plausibility in terms of popular conceptions of 
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 This notion of  the Internet as a repository for ‗taboo‘ content is reflected in the adage, readily 
trotted out in popular discussion of the Net, that the two most popular forms of online content are 
conspiracy theories and pornography (although both of these have probably been well surpassed in 
the last few years by social networking sites). 
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the activities of the US intelligence institutions. The spectacular and traumatic 
nature of the 9/11 attacks and its radical impact on US social and political life (via 
consequences such as the neo-conservative‘ war on terror‘ and invasion of Iraq) 
rendered 9/11 an event of great resonance to most Americans and, given 
America‘s hyperpower status, the world as a whole. Conspiracy theories involving 
the US government may therefore seem understandable to American citizens and 
people in other countries as a response to the ‗paradigm-shifting‘ nature of the 
9/11 attacks. Such theories are also informed by a popular awareness of the 
sinister activities of US intelligence agencies. Through vehicles such as 
investigative journalism and the Freedom of Information Act, American citizens 
in the late 20th century were confronted with revelations that branches of the 
government had engaged in clandestine and anti-democratic political activity in 
accordance with the ideological beliefs of small groups of people who occupied 
positions of political power (e.g. the Iran-Contra scandal in the 1980s and the 
controversy surrounding the Gulf of Tonkin incident that was the catalyst for the 
Vietnam War) (Knight 2001: Knight 2003: McConnachie & Tudge 2005).  
Knowledge of such prior governmental subterfuge has loaned an air of credibility 
or plausibility to conspiracy theories that the 9/11 terror attacks were an ‗inside 
job‘.  
     However, the seeming popularity and visibility of 9/11 conspiracy theories 
online is no indication that Net users who engage with online conspiracy material 
will take all such material seriously. Audiences who accept 9/11 conspiracy 
theories for reasons such as those discussed above may not necessarily accept the 
likes of David Icke‘s superconspiracy thesis that the human race is being 
collectively conspired against by an elite group known as the Illuminati, whose 
members are interdimensional ‗reptilians‘ that can shapeshift in and out of human 
form, because the bizarre, science-fiction nature of Icke‘s premises strains 
credulity and plausibility to the utmost. The diversity of opinion and belief 
amongst conspiracy audiences can be seen on websites such as the conspiracy 
forum Above Top Secret.com, where the existence of 9/11 conspiracies is 
generally accepted but figures like Icke are the subject of intense debate between 
correspondents. 
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 For example,  the thread entitled ‗David Icke is a liar‘: 
http://www.abovetopsecret.com/forum/thread585555/pg1, accessed 09/07/2010.  
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     To recap, this discussion of ideas of audience reception in relation to online 
conspiracy material is intended as an acknowledgment of the inadequacies of the 
technologically deterministic logic that informs much of the conceptualisation of 
online conspiracy culture. The area of audience reception offers significant 
challenges to this technologically determinist logic. The responses of Net users to 
online conspiracy material are not shaped by the technologically deterministic 
mythos of the Net, but by a wide variety of interlocking social and cultural 
factors. In combination with these factors, the Net may serve to disable 
conspiracy theory – in relation to the ways in which users interpret and relate to 
conspiracist ideas – as much as enable it. 
     Obviously I am not trying to argue that the Internet has no effect upon the 
political, social and cultural visibility and impact of conspiracy theories. As this 
study has theorised, for example, configurations of the Internet as an alternative 
public sphere can be seen to be particularly influential in affecting the ways in 
which conspiracy theories are perceived in the wider culture. Rather, my 
arguments here are against the tendency, implicit in the ethos of online 
conspiracism and in some of the mainstream and academic discussions of 
conspiracy theory, to attribute too much influence to the Internet as the ostensible 
‗driving force‘ behind the ostensible ‗rise‘ of conspiracy theory within millennial 
Western culture. As illustrated by the brief discussion of different possible ways 
in which Net users may relate to and interpret online conspiracy material, the 
cultural status of the Net as a ‗revolutionary‘ medium should be considered one 
amongst many factors shaping conspiracy theory as a significant aspect of 
contemporary political, social, and cultural life. This basic point is worth 
explicating in detail because it is often forgotten or overshadowed by the 
technologically determinist perspectives that dominate discussions of the 
significance of the Internet on contemporary conspiracy culture.  
     As the above statements indicate, these arguments against the technologically  
deterministic view of the Internet as a ‗revolutionary‘ medium are informed by a 
socio-historical approach to media technologies,  such as that typified by Winston 
(1998). This approach is a skeptical riposte to the technologically deterministic 
perspectives that dominate discussions of new media. I will here discuss some of 
these ideas as a conclusion to the skeptical perspectives on the conspiracy/Net 
relationship outlined above, and as concluding thoughts on the main themes of 
this study overall. Winston argues that the development of new media 
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technologies should be more accurately understood in terms of socio-historical 
evolution rather than revolution. New media technologies are not systems that 
operate extrinsic to society and which bend society to their own ends – a position 
which forms the dominant subtext to much contemporary cyber-theory – but are 
systems which are created and develop in relation to particular historical 
conjunctions of social, political, economic, and technological forces. This 
historical overview also illustrates how all new media technologies (such as the 
telephone and television) are integrated into society through similar cycles. The 
first is a phase in which the new medium is regarded in technologically 
deterministic terms as a revolutionary force that will radically change society on 
numerous levels. This ‗paradigm-shifting‘ phase eventually recedes as the 
medium is gradually assimilated into existing socio-cultural frameworks.
150
 To 
put it in cyber-cultural terms previously used in this study, this historical 
framework of media development proposes that the digital sublime of the Internet 
will gradually transform into the digital mundane.  
     Contemporary Western culture can still be seen to be firmly ensconced within 
a digitally sublime phase. The revolutionary potential of the Internet to radically 
change society for the better in areas such as community, politics, and journalism 
is reflected in both popular and academic promotion of Net-centric paradigms 
such as social networking, digital citizenship, and alternative media (e.g. Chayko 
2008: Mossberger, Tolbert & McNeal 2008: Gilmor 2004). However, the Internet 
has now become so well-ensconced within the social fabric that its technocultural 
limitations are also becoming readily apparent, leading to a burgeoning culture of 
popular and academic cyber-skepticism (e.g. Lanier 2010: Barbrook 2007). These 
sceptical and critical perspectives on the Net are perhaps indicative of the 
beginnings of a shift away from the digital sublime to the digital mundane.  
     In relation to this socio-historical view of the Net, I would argue that a digitally 
sublime perspective is likely to typify conspiracist attitudes towards the Internet 
indefinitely because this perspective is so empowering in relation to the 
conspiracist worldview.  My observations of online conspiracy culture indicated 
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 While this is often expressed in progressive terms, this revolutionary potential is often 
considered as a negative influence on existing social structures. For example, the cyber-utopian 
view of the Net as a site of information freedom is countered by cyber-dystopian perspectives 
which perceive the Net as the instigator of various ‗moral panics‘ (e.g. cyber-stalking, online 
pornography) and/or potential abuses of power (e.g. corporate and government surveillance). This 
latter perspective is, of course, most interesting in relation to conspiracist conceptions of the Net as 
a medium outside of the ‗information control‘ of other media: see chapter 4, section 4.22. 
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that conspiracy theorists often acknowledged the limitations of the Internet as an 
information system, but ascribed these limitations to conspiratorial machinations 
rather than factors intrinsic to the Net as a medium in its own right. For example, 
discussions of Internet censorship or as the Internet as a tool of government 
surveillance were a common topic on conspiracist sites.
151
 However, none of these 
conspiracist discussions  considered that the use of the Net as a site of 
surveillance, censorship and the like is, in many respects, unavoidable, given that 
the Net is a product of society and as such is subjected to the same social, 
political, economic and cultural forces that shape most other areas of 
contemporary life. Changes to the Internet were not seen as the natural or 
expected result of the Net‘s position as a part of existing socio-political structures, 
but  deliberate efforts by conspiratorial forces to neutralise the power of the Net as 
an information system that, because it exists ‗free‘ of established social and 
political structures, represents a challenge and a threat to those power structures 
and the conspiratorial forces which control them. I would argue that this is 
because conspiracy theorists are ideologically and psychologically invested in 
digitally sublime configurations of the Internet as an infallible and omnipotent 
information system which operates as a radical alternative to mainstream society.  
     In this respect the ‗digital sublime‘ can be seen to facilitate a mythic 
perspective of the Internet that also operates as an idealised projection of the 
classical conspiracist mentality. The Internet and conspiracy theorists are both 
‗outsiders‘ – positioned beyond the mainstream structures and institutions of 
society, and rendered both omnipotent and infallible in their awareness of the 
truths of that society by virtue of the vast amounts of information at their 
command. The psychological and emotional resonance that has been established 
between the Internet‘s technocultural status as a ‗revolutionary‘ medium and the 
ethos and beliefs of classical conspiracy theorising suggest to me that Western 
conspiracy culture will, in a dogged and perverse fashion, continue to function as 
one of the major cultural forces upholding the cyber-utopian perspectives which 
typified the initial establishment of the Internet in the face of ongoing 
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 For example: 
- ‗Internet Threatened by Censorship, Surveillance, Laws‘ by Stephen Lendman: posted at 
Rense.com http://www.rense.com/general85/net.html, 22/05/2009; 
- ‗Google in bed with U.S. Intelligence‘ by Michael Hampton, posted at 911Review.org: 
http://911review.org/Alex/reference/google_and_CIA.html, 22/02/2006; 
- ‗The Pentagon‘s War on the Internet‘ by Mike Whitney, posted at Information Clearing House 
http://www.informationclearinghouse.info/article11901.html, 13/02/2006. 
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reconstitution of the Net as a predominantly domestic, social,  and commercial 
medium – the ‗digital mundane‘.  
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APPENDIX 1 
CONSPIRACY TERMS AND CONCEPTS 
________________________________________________________ 
 
A1.1 Conspiracy theories – terminology 
     
Conspiracy theories are intimately concerned with ideas of politics and power. 
The association between conspiracy theory and politics is rooted in the etymology 
of the word ‗conspiracy. As constructed from the Latin roots ‗con‘ (together) and 
‗spire‘ (breathe),  ‗conspiracy‘ means ‗breathe together‘. To ‗breathe together‘ 
suggests a group of people  engaging in some form of mutual, intimate activity 
(‗breathing‘ as a particularly vital/personal function that is performed close to the 
body: the image evoked is of a group of people in close proximity to each other 
sharing their breath). In an abstract sense, the image evoked is one of many people 
acting as one, both in terms of what they are doing (the physical activity of 
‗breathing‘) but also how they are thinking (individual volition being required to 
make oneself breath in concert with others). These connotations can readily be 
transposed into a political context in which ideas of power are of central 
importance. To ‗conspire‘ suggests individuals coming together to form a group 
based on some sense of mutual interest or common identity, with  the members of 
this group having an intimate or insider connection to each other that positions 
them as distinct from others in various capacities. This ‗insider‘ position suggests 
that the group seeks to further their interests in a manner benefiting them at the 
expense of those who are ‗outsiders‘, thereby establishing their intentions as 
‗sinister‘ in relation to non-members of the group. ‗Sinister‘ here equates with the 
pursuit of power in the interests of the group in question, and the manipulation of 
power already possessed by such group as a means for extending its reach and 
influence.  The sinister nature of the groups‘ intentions also connotes a high level 
of secrecy in order that such intentions may be enacted without the awareness of 
outsiders who will undoubtedly oppose such intentions.  A working definition of 
the term ‗conspiracy‘ can therefore be regarded as incorporating the following 
elements:  ‗a course of action of sinister intent, determined by a group acting in 
secret‘, within an interpretive framework of politics.  
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     ‗Theory‘ is a term taken from scientific research which refers to a possible 
explanation for something based upon the interpretation of particular facts 
pertaining to the event or idea in question. A ‗conspiracy theory‘ can therefore be 
considered as a hypothesis as to the ‗true‘ or ‗real‘ events and meanings that are 
being kept hidden by a particular conspiracy. Key elements of the ‗truth‘ include 
uncovering the identity of the people involved in the conspiracy: their motives and 
intentions for carrying out the conspiracy; and the means by which the conspiracy 
is put into operation. Such theorising involves putting together a picture of the 
‗truth‘ from various facts and other pieces of evidence. In a socio-cultural context, 
a ‗conspiracy theory‘ can be conceived here as a hypothesis that seeks to explain 
the conspiratorial inter-relationships or connections between particular people and 
particular events in relation to social and political power structures. A ‗conspiracy 
theorist‘ is someone who develops and disseminates such hypotheses. 
     In this study I am using the terms ‗conspirator‘ and ‗conspiratorial‘ to refer to 
the individuals or groups that are believed to be involved in the operation of a 
particular conspiracy theory, and the term ‗conspiracist‘ as an adjective for the 
modes of thought and practice considered typical of conspiracy theory. My use of 
the term conspiracist is therefore a neutral one, and should not be considered as 
congruent with the pejorative use of the term in the work of scholars such as Pipes 
(1997).
152
  Pipes uses the terms ‗conspiracist‘ and ‗conspiracism‘ as shorthand for 
his equations between conspiracy theory and other destructive political ‗isms‘ 
such as communism and fascism (see comments in Bratich 2008: 4-5). I also 
make use of the phrase ‗conspiracy culture‘ in reference to the distinctive 
epistemological and cultural milieu associated with  classical conspiracy beliefs 
and practices. 
 
 
A1.2 Conspiracy theories – conceptual structures  
 
     I will here outline of some of the major thematic and conceptual aspects of 
conspiracy theories. These are delineated in relation to the central idea of 
                                                 
152
 Pipes uses the terms ‗conspiracist‘ and ‗conspiracism‘ to connote conspiracy theories as 
destructive political ideologies such as communism and fascism (see comments in Bratich 2008: 
4-5).  Writing from an American neo-conservative perspective, Pipes also provocatively associates 
conspiracism with socialism and Islam (Pipes 1997).  
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conspiracy as a political concept – that historical and political events are 'caused' 
by the sinister machinations of an ideologically-unified group acting in secrecy to 
preserve or extend their ‗power‘. This outline is based upon discussions of the 
epistemological structures of conspiracy theory presented in Hofstadter (1966) 
and Barkun (2003) along with my own research observations.
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A1.21 Nature and organisation of the conspirators 
 
     The conspiracy is usually conceptualised as  a  hierarchical structure that 
operates in a  ‗pyramidical‘ manner. At the apex is a small select group of 
conspirators who possess the abilities to enact the conspiracy down through ever 
larger ‗layers‘ of society. Those at the bottom of the pyramid are generally 
regarded as the ‗masses‘ who are being controlled by the conspiracy; those on 
higher layers of the pyramid represent the institutional forces through which the 
elites exercise their plot, members of which may also be ‗in on‘ the conspiracy to 
some degree.  Areas of society that may seem to occupy quite distinct spheres of 
influence from each other, such as health and education,  are thereby positioned 
as being interconnected with each other as part of the all-encompassing embrace 
of the master conspirators at the apex of the pyramid. 
     The conspiracist template of a small, central group whose conspiratorial 
influence extends to encompass and connect wider fields of society  is often 
envisaged in metaphors such as ‗tentacles‘, ‗webs‘, or ‗matrixes‘154. The core 
group of conspirators is often referred to as an ‗elite‘, ‗cabal‘, or ‗secret society‘. 
The application of these terms often appears related to the ideological slant of the 
conspiracy theorist involved. For example, conspiracy theorists with a 
predominantly political worldview may interpret the conspirators as a political 
‗cabal‘; those with a populist/nationalist angle may favour the connotations of the 
term ‗elites‘; those  rooted in religious fundamentalisms may use ‗secret society‘ 
for it‘s cultic/heretic implications.  
 
                                                 
153
 The use of ideas from Hofstadter and Barkun does not mean that I share their particular 
theoretical takes on conspiracy theory as subject area – see chapter 2.  
 
154
 A classic example here is the 1980s conspiracy theory of international skullduggery by US 
intelligence agencies  known as ‗the Octopus‘. See McConnachie & Tudge  2005: 128-130. 
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A1.22 Identity of the conspirators 
 
     The conspirators are usually identified in relation to certain identity positions. 
These positions are in turn assumed to be central to the motivations of the 
conspirators in carrying out a conspiracy in the first place. Standard 
conspiratorial suspects include those individuals who occupy major positions of 
institutional power or authority, such as politicians and business leaders, and 
specific institutional bodies of  great political and economic influence, such as 
the UN, the EU, and the Federal Reserve Bank (McConnachie & Tudge 2005). 
More often, however, conspiracy theorists link these professional/institutional 
identity positions with specific socio-cultural identity positions which are of 
particular significance to their ideological beliefs or worldview.  Typical socio-
cultural identity positions include: 
 
- nationality:  e.g. New World Order conspiracy theories. The United Nations is 
part of a New World Order plot against American autonomy and hegemony. 
- ethnicity: e.g. anti-Semitic conspiracy theories. People of Jewish heritage are 
inherently 'evil' and seek to dominate and control other peoples, particularly 
those of Anglo-Saxon descent. 
- class: e.g. the populist element in conspiracist thinking. The rich naturally 
conspire against poorer members of society. 
- religious affiliations: e.g. anti-Catholic conspiracy theories. Catholicism is a 
'false faith' opposed to the ‗true faith‘ of Protestantism. 
- political affiliations: e.g. anti-Communist conspiracy theories. Communists (in 
the dictatorial Stalinist tradition) seek to takeover the capitalist USA/West and 
make them  totalitarian socialist societies. 
 
Most conspiracy theorists identify the conspirators in relation to multiple identity 
positions. For example, contemporary American anti-Semitic conspiracy theories 
usually identify Jewish people as not only ethnically ‗other‘ regarding nativist 
ideals of ‗Americans‘ as of Anglo-Saxon heritage, but also as threats to 
Christianity due to their different interpretations of the Bible; as class villains due 
to the stereotypes of Jewish people and big business; as anti-patriotic due to their 
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perceived  allegiance to Israeli over American political interests; and as 
intellectual purveyors of 'un-American' ideas such as Communism and 
Freudianism (as developed by Jewish intellectuals such as Marx and Freud) 
(Perry & Schweitzer 2002).  
 
 
 
A1.23 Motivations of the conspirators  
 
     The conspiracy is regarded as motivated by the conspirators‘ desire for power, 
particularly of an absolutist or totalitarian sort.  This desire is usually related back 
to the identity positions of the conspirators. For example, Communist 
conspirators are regarded as seeking to fulfil the socialist teleology of Marxist 
theory by overthrowing capitalism and organised religions such as Christianity 
on a global scale. Through their positions of power,  the conspirators are 
regarded as seeking to exercise 'total' control over the lifestyles, behaviours, and 
thoughts of citizens so that citizens are rendered unaware of the existence of the 
conspiracy or ineffectual in their ability to challenge it and thus threaten the 
conspirators' power.  
     This desire for control is usually expressed in relation to three main spheres of 
human experience. Firstly, culture and society. The power of the conspirators is 
maintained by their control over almost all aspects of society - politics, 
economics, education, medicine, science, media, etc. Secondly, geography. The 
conspirators are regarded as desiring power on a global scale. The conspiratorial 
‗takeover‘ of the USA, for example, is regarded as a stepping stone towards the 
conspirators control of the entire world. Thirdly, history. The complexities 
involved in gaining total control over all aspects of society and all nations are 
such that the conspirators plans are conceived as operating on a trans-historical 
scale across long periods of time. Past and present events are interpreted in 
accordance with the workings of the conspirators: these are often used to make 
predictions as to future conspiratorial events. The historical scale is dependent on 
the particular conspiracy beliefs in question. For example, communist 
conspiracies for global domination are often regarded as operating on a timespan 
of decades across the latter half of the 20
th
 century; anti-Semitic and Illuminati 
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conspiracies posit their groups respective attempts at world domination as being 
carried out over the course of centuries.  
 
 
A1.24 Scale of the conspiracies 
 
     Some conspiracy theories may be small-scale, focussing  on a specific 
political event in a specific country; others large-scale, in which the conspiracy is 
implicated with almost all aspects of society and culture, all nations of the world, 
and all of world history.  I  here present the conspiracy 'schema' developed by 
Barkun (2003) as a useful descriptive outline of the major types of scale typical 
of conspiracist thought.  
 
Event conspiracies. Here the conspiracy is held to be responsible for a 
limited, discrete event or set of events. The best-known example in the recent 
past is the Kennedy assassination conspiracy literature, although similar 
material exists concerning the crash of TWA flight 800, the spread of AIDS 
in the black community, and the burning of black churches in the 1990s. In 
all of these cases, the conspiratorial forces are alleged to have focused their 
energies on a limited, well-defined objective. 
 
Systemic conspiracies. At this level, the conspiracy is believed to have broad 
goals, usually conceived as securing control over a country, a region, or even 
the entire world. While the goals are sweeping, the conspiratorial machinery 
is generally simple: a single, evil organization implements a plan to infiltrate 
and subvert existing institutions. This is a common scenario in conspiracy 
theories that focus on the alleged machinations of Jews, Masons, and the 
Catholic Church, as well as theories centred on communism or international 
capitalists. 
 
Superconspiracies. This term refers to conspiratorial constructs in which 
multiple conspiracies are believed to be linked together hierarchically. Event 
and systemic conspiracies are joined in complex ways, so that conspiracies 
come to be nested within one another. At the summit of the conspiratorial 
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hierarchy is a distant but all-powerful evil force manipulating lesser 
conspiratorial actors. These master conspirators are almost always…groups 
both invisible and operating in secrecy. Superconspiracies have enjoyed 
particular growth since the 1980s, in the work of authors such as David Icke, 
Valdamar Valerian, and Milton William Cooper (Barkun 2003: 6).  
 
 
A1.25 Abilities of the conspirators 
 
      The conspirators are perceived as possessing omnipotent powers of agency in 
order to successfully carry out their plans. Conspiracy theorists assume that the 
conspirators have the political, economic, and technological power necessary to 
mobilise the material and logistical resources needed to carry out  the conspiracy 
in question. Key resources include labour (workers/agents who physically 
undertake the tasks required to ‗pull off‘ the conspiracy); technology (specialised 
types of equipment or large-scale employment of existing technology being 
required for the conspiracy to work); and financing (large amounts of money 
being necessary to pay for/implement conspiratorial  applications of labour and 
technology). For example, the 9/11 truther movement posits US government 
agents as being able to secretly plant demolition charges in the WTC buildings – 
some of the busiest office space in the centre of America's biggest city – with 
thousands of other people – police, rescue workers, public officials et al – 
secretly enlisted as part of the cover-up. 
    The nature and scale of these resources and the degrees of omnipotence 
possessed by the conspirators is also related to the nature and scale of the 
conspiracy theory involved. For example, contemporary conspiracy theories 
about the Illuminati conspiracy to develop a New World Order/‗one world 
totalitarian government‘ requires the Illuminati to possess abilities that are 
basically godlike in their power. Not only do the Illuminati secretly control entire 
governments, along with most of the world‘s major finance institutions and big 
business corporations, but they have also developed advanced technologies for 
the purposes for controlling the minds of mass populations to prevent 
challenge/change to the conspiratorial agenda, or for killing them off as part of a 
strategy of depopulation to preserve the earth‘s dwindling resource base for those 
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in power. The many conspiracy theories relating to the Illuminati/New world 
order plot thus present a panoply of exotic hardware that endow the conspirators 
with omnipotent power. These include spyplanes that spray pandemic-causing 
chemtrail clouds, orbiting spacebases made from back-engineered alien 
technology,  and technologies derived from the works of scientific eccentrics and  
iconoclasts such as Nikola Tesla and Wilhelm Reich that are based in occult 
views of physical reality and are thus unverifiable by acceptable scientific 
standards.   
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APPENDIX 2  
INTERNET TERMS AND CONCEPTS 
__________________________________________________________________ 
 
A2.1 Internet terms 
 
     There are three terms that are particularly pertinent to understandings of the 
Internet. On a macro-level there is the notion of cyberspace, the ‗information 
realm within which the internet is positioned. Then there is the medium of the 
Internet itself. Finally, on a micro-level, the World Wide Web as a specific 
content space within the Internet.  
 
 
A2.11 Cyberspace 
 
     The term ‗cyberspace‘ can be used in both a technical and a cultural sense. On 
a technical level, cyberspace refers to the realms of information transfer and 
storage associated with digital information and communication technologies 
(ICTs) such as the Internet. Such realms are ‗virtual‘ in that the elements within 
them are not material objects but pieces of electronically generated code – 
information - that communicate recordings or representations of material reality. 
‗Cyberspace‘ can be used to refer to the information realm specific to individual 
ICTs, such as the Internet, ATM machines, or faxes, and the collective 
information realm created from the digital convergence of ICTs into integrated 
networks and systems (Dodge & Kitchin 2001: 1). In a cultural sense, cyberspace 
―is a metaphor that conjures up an image or an idea of the potential of information 
and telecommunication networks‖ (Shields in Swiss 2000: 66) to create virtual 
environments with their own distinctive technocultural codes.  Cyberspace is 
therefore popularly used to designate the experience of the Web, for example, as a 
―distinct plane of reality‖ within the hardware of the computers and the Internet 
itself (Shields in Swiss 2000: 68).  
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A2.12 Internet 
 
     The Internet is the name given to the medium formed by ―a global network of 
computers‖ (Dodge & Kitchin 2001: 2),  linked together by hardware (e.g. 
computer terminals, cables, wireless transmitters and receivers) and software (e.g. 
communication protocols to enable one computer to connect up with another for 
the purposes of transmitting information) (Whittaker 2004: 18). As a networked 
medium, the Internet is concerned with the open ―flow and exchange‖ of 
information between computers, rather than information being sent to different 
computer terminals from a centralised source, as with traditional broadcast media 
such as television (Lister et al 2003: 165). Within the Internet there is a wide 
range of content, including Email;  news groups and Bulletin Board systems in 
which users engage in on-line discussion with each other via collective ‗postings‘ 
of commentary and content; chat rooms in which individual users engage in live 
conversations with each other; ‗imaginary environments‘ such as text-based 
multi-users domains (MUDS) or 3-D visual worlds such as Second Life; and 
websites on the World Wide Web that present multi-media extensions of existing 
media forms (such as television, magazines etc.)  
 
 
A2.13 The World Wide Web  
 
     The World Wide Web is the collective term given to a specific type of 
information system that forms the most dominant type of content to be found 
within the broader network structure of the Internet. Web content is generally 
defined as ―multimedia data (mostly text and static graphics but also sound, 
animation, movie clips and virtual spaces) which are stored as hypermedia 
documents (documents that contain links to other pages of information)‖ (Dodge 
& Kitchin 2001: 3). Interactive communicative practices are also central to the 
operation of the Web. Internet forms such as email and bulletin boards require 
‗active conversation‘ in the form of writing and reading text-based messages; 
while websites also feature such text-based/conversational components, much of 
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their content is visual-based and involves users ‗selecting‘ certain pieces of 
information from elements provided on the site by clicking on hyperlinks that 
access new pages of content within the website or from different ones (Lister et al 
2003: 182). The multimedia and interactive capacities of Web content enable 
users to create and access  vast amounts of different forms of information (text, 
video, music, graphics), create their own information (such as blogs),  or navigate 
through online information resources according to their individual prerogatives 
(unlike the likes of newspapers and television where content is preselected and 
prepackaged for audiences). Such factors have led to Web becoming the most 
popular ‗mode‘ of Internet content, to the extent that the term ‗Internet‘ is now 
synonymous with the Web and it‘s contents (Lister et al 2003: 182).  
     Despite the vast amount of information content available on the Web, the 
cultural practices that help shape web content have led to certain formats 
becoming established as  identifiable online 'genres'. I will here refer to  Burnett 
& Marshall's (2003) summary of the four major types of website:  
1 - search engines/webportals. These types of sites help users navigate through 
the vast amount of information available online and select/organize specific 
pieces of information. Search engines such as Google serve as a ‗channel‘ for 
users to search for and access specific types of Web content: webportals such as 
Yahoo! help ‗organize a user‘s relationship to online information‘ within the 
categories and features provided on a personalized homepage (Burnett & Marshall 
2003: 91).  
2 - media sites. These come in two forms. Firstly, websites that are connected to 
offline media forms, such as online versions of newspapers or television news 
shows, or promotional/fansites connected to films/TV shows etc. Secondly, Web-
based forms of traditional media. Notable examples of these include Web 
radio/music –download sites, or on line magazines (Burnett & Marshall 2003: 92-
93) 
3 - commercial sites. Major forms of these include: company/corporate websites, 
in which existing businesses set up a website as an extension of their commercial 
practices and for advertising/PR purposes; commercial trading sites that operate 
solely online, such as the booksellers Amazon.com; institutional sites, such as 
those set up by national/local government departments to provide 
information/services for citizens (Burnett & Marshall 2003: 94).  
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4 – personal websites. Websites developed by individual Web users according to 
their own needs and interests. Major subforms here include fansites and ‗topic 
sites‘ (information/interaction relating to specific cultural products such as 
television shows, or knowledge areas such as paranormal phenomena); weblogs 
(individual cultural/political commentary); and diary sites (presentations of 
individual users personality and activities). (Burnett & Marshall 2003: 95).  
      
 
A2.14 The Internet as collective term 
 
     As stated above, the ‗Internet‘ and the ‗World Wide Web‘ are terms which 
technically refer to different aspects of the same medium. The Internet refers to 
the overall medium or information system; the World Wide Web refers to a 
particular type of information content within that system. Although, in this study, 
I have examined conspiracy content that is presented on websites, I have used the 
term ‗Internet‘ rather than the more specific ‗Web‘ for two main reasons.  
     The first, and most significant, reason is that the Web - as the most dominant 
system of content within the Internet – is effectively synecdochal for the 
technocultural capacities of the Internet as a medium.  How users present and 
interact with Web content is reflective of broader technocultural configurations of 
the Net as a whole. The information practices of conspiracy theorists – as made 
visible through conspiracy websites – can therefore be taken as indicative of 
conspiracy theorists conceptualisations of the Internet as a medium predicated 
upon mythic ideas of ‗information freedom‘ (see chapter 5). The term ‗Internet‘ 
therefore signifies not only the technological aspects of the Internet as a specific 
medium, but also connotes the conceptual frameworks within which the Internet 
is configured as one of the features of contemporary Western social life, such as 
ideas of ‗new media‘ or technologically deterministic arguments that the Net is a 
socially and politically ‗revolutionary‘ medium. The second reason is one related 
to writing. It is easier for the purposes of writing and reading to use one term, 
such as ‗the Internet‘, as a signifier for arguments relating to both the Net and the 
web, rather than alternate between both terms in a manner that may be more 
technically correct but is likely to become confusing  or cumbersome in terms of 
the flow of prose.  
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A2.2 New Media – concepts 
 
     The Internet and other digitally based ICTs are usually discussed in critical and 
popular literature as as forms of ‗new media‘. The phrase ‗new media‘ 
encapsulates a variety of technocultural concepts and characteristics that are seen 
to distinguish these digital technologies from those established media that are 
based upon analogue and  broadcast technologies and practices. The following 
sections will delineate some of the major characteristics typical of the Internet as 
a ‗new medium‘.      
     As Lister et al discuss, 'new media' as  a general concept encompasses 'changes 
in media production, distribution, and use‖, changes that are not only 
technological but aesthetic (in the way 'texts' are created and developed in 
cyberspace) and cultural (in relation to the practices by which people engage with 
such media and the meanings it comes to have in relation to broader 
social/cultural contexts) (Lister et al 2003: 13). In such an understanding new 
media is not something external to society that then casts its influence upon it, but 
something deeply implicated within the myriad structures of social life. Specific 
types of technology are developed and applied within society by a variety of 
groups with differing ideological perspectives: the cultural practices that develop 
around such technologies create a feedback effect suggesting further avenues for 
development. For example, the Web was developed as an application within the 
Net within a particular cultural milieu – scientists wishing to facilitate the 
exchange of technical data. This application was then developed throughout the 
1990s by largely amateur networks of computer users into a global 'information 
commons' of user-driven content (Murphy: 2002), which has in turn  been 
appropriated within the drives for commodification typical of late capitalism. 
While the term ‗new media‘ connotes ICTs such as the Internet as media that are 
radically different from existing media systems, it is more accurate to 
conceptualise new media in terms of an extension of existing media systems and 
cultural practices. Although forms of communication that could be considered to 
be unprecedented have been developed in relation to the technocultural capacities 
of the Internet (such as 'immersive' gaming/virtual reality environments, or social 
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networking sites such as Facebook), much of the content presented on the Net can 
be considered remediated versions of earlier media forms, particularly print media 
such as magazines and newspapers (Bolter & Grusin 1999). Regardless of these 
debates, connotations of the Internet as a ‗new‘ medium are central to the mythic 
discourses that have influenced socio-political conceptions of the Internet within 
contemporary western society (see chapter 5 section 5.21).  
     The sections below will delineate the major technical and cultural 
characteristics of the Internet that form the basis of its status as a ‗new‘ medium.  
      
 
A2.21 Technical aspects of new media  
 
      A long history of developments in the fields of communication technologies 
(and the media industries based upon such technologies) converged in the 
1980s/1990s in the form of large-scale shifts in the ways in which information 
content could be produced, distributed and used.  The most significant of these 
developments in terms of ideas of new media was digitalisation - the shift from 
analogue to digital or computer-based communication technologies. Analogue 
media refers to media that ―exist as fixed physical objects‖, the communication of 
information ―dependent upon transcriptions from one physical state to another‖ 
(Lister et al 2003: 16). Such technologies include those requiring film stock (e.g. 
cinema, photography), printing presses (newspapers, books) and magnetic tape 
(music, TV shows). Digital media content may also ―exist as analogue hard 
copy‖, but can also exist in a virtual non-material form ―as a mutable string of 
binary numbers stored in a computer‘s (or other chip-based technologies) 
memory‖ (Lister et al 2003: 16). In such ‗virtual‘ forms, large amounts of 
information content is able to be stored in a very small space (e.g. chips and hard 
drives); accessed ―at very high speeds and in non-linear ways‖(e.g. any computer 
terminal with modem offers potential access to the Web); and manipulated by 
producers and users in ways different from the physical limitations of analogue 
technologies (e.g. CGI manipulation of pixels within a digital image rather than 
physical modification of photographic emulsion) (Lister et al 2003: 16). As 
argued by Lister and other cyber-theorists,  these shifts to digital forms of 
information ―storage, access, and manipulation‖ have in turn led to major changes 
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in the way information is produced, formed, received, and used (Lister et al 2003: 
16).  
     The changes to information storage, access, and manipulation are readily 
identifiable in relation to certain defining features of the Net/Web as 'new media' 
forms. I will here delineate these features in relation the to the schema of new 
media characteristics presented in Lister et al (2003).  
 
A – Dispersal.  
     Dispersal refers to the 'decentralised' nature of information production and 
distribution on the Net. ‗Old‘ media, such as television and radio, operate on 
broadcast models, in which content is generally produced at a central source (such 
as a studio) and distributed in a relatively linear 'one to many' fashion to 
audiences across large geographical areas through electronic signals from central 
transmitting points  (such as aerials). By contrast, information on new media such 
as the Net can be digitally produced within a wide variety of places (such as the 
home computers of Net users)  and transmitted  in a lateral fashion between and 
across sites or nodes of transmission and reception. Information sent from one 
source may travel a variety of routes between 'nodes' – not just one route, as with 
a broadcast model - before it is received by another computer. The key 
technological development here is the computer server, a device to which other 
computers can connect in a network fashion (as per the term 'internet'), which can 
both receive information (input) and send information (output), and which is 
connected to other servers as a node in a overall web of servers with multiple 
input/output connections between them (hence the term 'World Wide Web') 
(Lister et al 2003: 31). (It is important to remember, however, that such dispersed 
communication makes use of hardware networks set up for broadcast 
technologies, particularly the intercontinental networks of fibre-optic cables and 
satellite linkages set up to enable international telephone communication).   
     Such dispersed distribution of information is integral to new media shifts in 
modes of information storage and access. Dispersal affords opportunities for 
audiences  to engage with media information in ways previously limited by the 
technological structures of broadcast or print media. In terms of information 
access, ―many different users can access many different kinds of media at many 
different times around the globe using network-based distribution‖ in terms 
(Lister et al 2003: 31). In terms of information manipulation, such improved 
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access means that ―consumers and users are increasingly able to customise their 
own media use to design highly individualised menus that serve very particular 
and specific needs‖ (Lister et al 2003: 31). 
 
B – Hypertextuality. 
     Hypertextuality refers to the connectivity between elements that typfies the 
way information is organised within Internet forms such as websites. As defined 
by Lister et al, a hypertext is ―a work which is made up from discrete units (or 
'nodes') of material in which each one carries a number of pathways to other 
units‖. These pathways serve as both entrances and exits for signals to connect up 
to – or 'link' with – other nodes. The overall effect of this nodal structure, with 
multiple possibilities for units of information to connect with each other, is to 
create the work or text in question as a 'web' of information units that can be 
engaged with in a lateral/associative, rather than linear/causal, fashion. In relation 
to websites, navigational aids, such as icons or highlighted words, operate as the 
actual hypertextual links between different pages on the one website or to other 
websites themselves (Lister et al 2003: 24).  
     Hypertextuality works concomitantly with principles of dispersal in 
establishing new media forms of accessing and manipulating information content. 
For instance, units of information may be dispersedacross different websites or 
different pages within a particular website. Hypertext software, such as the 
'navigational aids' outlined above, enable users to link between these dispersed 
units.   In this regard hypertextuality becomes integral to conceptions of new 
media cultural practices by enabling audiences to control the ways in which they 
interact with online content. This marks a significant point of departure from the 
ways in which audiences experience texts in traditional media systems.  Films, 
television programmes, and books present narratives which are designed to make 
sense in a linear sequence, from a start to an end point (obviously audiences do 
not have to follow this pattern – for example, on DVD one can watch chapters of 
a film out of sequence – but the meaning of the narrative as a linear sequence of 
events is disrupted in doing so). The hypertextual capacities of new media such as 
the Net enable audiences to experience the information content of a 'cyber-text' 
such as a website in a lateral or 'multi-linear' fashion. Generally there is no set 
sequence as to how audiences should access the pages of information contained 
within a website, the individual Web 'user' choosing specific pages according to 
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the amount of hypertextual links contained within the website, all of which make 
possible multiple ways of sequencing content. Hypertext therefore can provide 
audiences with the ability to choose how they experience a given text outside of 
the traditional autonomy of the ostensible author/creator (lister et al 2003: 27).  In 
this regard hypertextuality serves as one of the main bases underlying the 
interactive nature of Net communication and the socio-political associations 
between interactivity and the ‗empowerment‘ of the Net user (see chapter 5, 
section 5.21).  
 
C – Interactivity. 
     Interactivity refers to the increased capacities provided by new media 
technologies for users to more directly engage with information content. Old 
media are regarded as 'passive' in the sense that audiences can only engage with 
content from the level of experiencing discrete 'texts' created by somebody else 
(e.g. films, TV shows, books, recorded music) or choosing between content 
options already preselected for them (such as the likes of TV programmes) 
without being able to modify or select such content according to their tastes or 
needs. The technical attributes of new media afford audience members active 
engagement with media content: the ―ability to directly intervene in and change 
the images and texts that they access‖ (Lister et al 2003: 20). The term 'user' – 
with it's connotations of utility and productivity (using something as a tool to 
produce something) – has therefore developed as a term distinguishing audiences 
of interactive new media from the more passive 'readers' and 'viewers' of old 
media forms (Lister et al 2003: 21).  Lister et al identify the following technical 
features as being central to the interactive capabilities of the Net: 
hypertextual navigation – although already discussed above, it is worth noting 
that hypertext navigation involves an explicit degree of physical interactivity in 
that the computer user manually manipulates a specific accessory, such as a 
mouse, in order  to direct a cursor to 'click' on a hyperlink, often portrayed in a 
highly visible form as header or icon. To reiterate the ideas outlined in the 
previous section, such features afford each user to interact with the information 
contained within a website in a distinctly individualised fashion (albeit restricted 
by the scale of the website and the amount of hyperlinks it contains) (Lister et al 
2003: 21). 
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registrational interactivity – this refers to users ability to provide 'input' to a 
particular website after registering as a user. Grades of input can vary from 
merely providing one's credit card details to purchase something from a 
commercial website to contributing content in such forms as comments, posts, or 
essays. Such input ―then becomes part of the text‖ (of the website or webpage in 
question) and is usually ―made available to other users‖ of the site (Lister et al 
2003: 21-22).  
interactive communication – alongside the distanced interaction between users 
of registrational interactivity, various Net forms offer the ability for directly 
reciprocal communication between individuals and/or groups and organisations. 
Here communication between users is considered in approximation to norms of  
face-to face communication but with the technological capacity for transcending 
the temporal and spatial limitations of such norms. E-mail, bulletin boards and 
chatrooms all enable users from different geographical locations to communicate 
and respond to  each other in various 'real time' capacities.  
 
D – Virtuality. 
     The cumulative effect of digitality, dispersal, hypertextuality, and interactivity 
is to create a distinct sense of user engagement with new media that may be 
termed virtuality.  I am not concerned here with the dominant notion of virtuality, 
which is the construction of digital environments that invite degrees of 
verisimitudinous immersion from users, as with virtual reality or gaming 
technologies, but in the use of the term as a signifier for ―imagining the invisible 
space of communication networks‖ (Lister et al 2003: 35). In this respect I am 
conceiving virtuality here  as referring to the nature of the Net as a distinct  
information or media space that is constructed from a global network of home 
computers and servers. Such a space is virtual in the sense that the content has no 
physical form outside of a mass of electronic computer code, yet enables forms of 
user engagement analogous with cultural activity in the real world, such as 
interactive conversations with other users or the hypertextual facility for users to 
select particular pieces of content according to their own criteria.  
     The virtual nature of the Net enables users to manipulate not only the 
information presented on specific Net formats but their very presence in 
cyberspace. As a virtual voice online, users are presented with possibilities to 
change or transcend the limitations of the physical/social self by adopting 
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―markers of identity that differ from their identities as constituted in the physical 
and everyday social world‖ (Lister et al 2003: 36). Users can construct identities 
and act out behaviour in virtual environments (such as chat rooms or bulletin 
boards) that may be considerably different from their 'real world' personalities. 
Alongside changing perceptions of individual identity, the virtual nature of the 
Net facilitates new kinds of collective interaction amongst users, ―the possibility 
of forming new kinds of association and community which are not dependent 
upon spatial location and which can transcend geographical, social, and political 
boundaries and divisions‖(Lister et al 2003: 36). Virtuality, interpreted here as the 
collective 'resonance' of other new media shifts in information storage, access and 
manipulation, can also be taken as a signifier for the shifts in subject positions, 
such as the blurring of the roles of user/creator and disembodied collectivity, that 
are regarded by many cultural theorists as indicative of new media cultural 
practices (e.g. Poster 1997). 
 
 
A2.22 Cultural aspects of new media 
 
     As outlined earlier, conceptualisations of 'new' media are not predicated 
merely on technical differences between digitally-based ICTs and established 
broadcast/analogue media, but on how these technical characteristics translate into 
significant changes in the aesthetics of media content and the cultural practices by 
which audiences engage with such content. Lister et al (2003) provide the 
following summary of major aesthetic/cultural shifts related to the establishment 
of new media technologies such as the Net/Web:   
 
new textual experiences: new kinds of genre, textual form, entertainment, 
pleasure and patterns of media consumption (computer games, hypertexts, 
special effects cinema). 
new ways of representing the world: media which, in ways that are not 
always clearly defined, offer new representational possibilities and 
experiences (as in immersive virtual environments, screen-based interactive 
multimedia). 
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new relationships between subjects (users and consumers) and media 
technologies: changes in the use and reception of image and communication 
media in everyday life and in the meanings that are invested in new media 
technologies. 
new experiences of the relationship between embodiment, identity and 
community: shifts in the personal and social experience of time, space, and 
place (on both local and global scales) which have implications for the ways 
in which we experience ourselves and our place in the world. 
new conceptions of the biological body’s relationship to technological 
media: challenges to received distinctions between the human and the 
artifical, nature and technology, body and (media as) technological protheses, 
the real and the virtual. 
new patterns of organisation and production: wider realignments and 
integrations in media culture, industry, economy, access, ownership, control 
and regulation. (Lister et al 2003: 12).  
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CONSPIRACY THEORY WEBSITES 
__________________________________________________________________ 
 
These are the conspiracy websites which I examined during my researches into 
online conspiracy culture. While only a few of these sites are directly referred to 
in the thesis (e.g. Rense.com), observations of all of these sites was important to 
the development of my ideas about the relationships between conspiracy culture 
and the Internet. Although no doubt only a small amount of the total conspiracy 
themed-sites operating on the Net, the sites listed below should give some 
indication of the variety and breadth of online conspiracism. While most of the 
sites deal with classical conspiracy theory, there are some examples of 
‗realpolitik‘ conspiracy theory also (e.g. Lobster).  
 
 
911 Mysteries Guide.com 
http://www.911mysteriesguide.com/ 
 
9-11 Review: A Resource For Understanding the 9/11/01 Attack  
http://www.911review.com/index.html 
 
A-Albionic Research 
http://a-albionic.com/ 
 
AboveTopSecret.com: Conspiracy Theories, UFOs, Politics, and Many Other 
―Alternative Topics‖ 
http://www.abovetopsecret.com/ 
 
AE911Truth.INFO: Answering the questions of Architects & Engineers for 9/11 
Truth 
http://ae911truth.info/wordpress 
 
The Arctic Beacon – the Last Frontier of Truth! 
 http://www.arcticbeacon.com/greg/  
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Alex Constantine‘s Anti-Fascist Research Bin 
http://alexconstantine.blogspot.com/ 
 
Alex Constantine‘s Blacklist 
http://aconstantineblacklist.blogspot.com/ 
 
Alex Jones‘ Infowars.com – There‘s a War on For Your Mind! 
 http://www.infowars.com/  
 
Alex Jones‘ Prison Planet.com 
http://www.prisonplanet.com/ 
 
American Deception.com: Uncovering the Deceptively Hidden Truth 
http://www.americandeception.com/index.php?page=home 
 
The Anomalies Network: Find the Truth 
http://www.anomalies.net/page/home 
 
Armageddon Online.org 
http://www.armageddononline.org/ 
 
Assassination Science 
http://www.assassinationscience.com/ 
 
The Atlantean Conspiracy 
http://www.atlanteanconspiracy.com/ 
 
BenAbraham.com 
http://www.benabraham.com/ 
 
Blacklisted News – Independent Media For Independent Minds 
http://www.blacklistednews.com/ 
 
Coast To Coast AM with George Noory 
http://www.coasttocoastam.com/ 
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Conscious Media Network: Interviews, articles and More on Consciousness, 
Enlightenment, and Human Potential 
http://www.consciousmedianetwork.com/home.htm 
 
Conspiracy Bomb 
http://conspiracybomb.com/ 
 
Conspiracy Digest: Real News That Connects The Dots 
http://www.conspiracydigest.com/hoodwinked.html 
 
Conspiracy Planet – The Alternative News and History Network 
http://www.conspiracyplanet.com/  
 
Conspiracy Science  
http://www.conspiracyscience.com/ 
 
Conspiracy World.com: We Know Conspiracy! 
http://www.conspiracyworld.com/ 
 
The Corbett Report 
http://www.corbettreport.com 
 
Core Of Corruption 
http://coreofcorruption.com/ 
 
Cutting Through the Matrix with Alan Watt 
http://www.cuttingthroughthematrix.com/ 
 
Data4Science.net: Dedicated to exploring phenomena that mainstream science 
often ignores… 
http://www.data4science.net/index.php?project=book&view=samples 
 
David Icke Website 
http://www.davidicke.com/index.php/ 
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Educate-Yourself.org 
http://educate-yourself.org/ 
 
End Game Now – What Mainstream Media Won‘t Tell You 
http://endgamenow.com/ 
 
The Enterprise Mission 
http://enterprisemission.com 
 
Etheric Warriors: A grassroot movement fighting tyranny with orgonite devices 
http://www.ethericwarriors.com/ip/forum.php  
 
The Excluded Middle 
http://www.excludedmiddle.com/ 
 
FemaCamper: Destroyer of Disinformation 
http://femacampr.wordpress.com/ 
 
The Forbidden Knowledge 
http://www.theforbiddenknowledge.com/ 
 
Foundingfather1776 
http://www.foundingfather1776.com/ 
 
FourWinds10.com 
http://www.fourwinds10.com/siterun_data/ 
 
Freedom Force International 
http://www.freedom-force.org/ 
 
The French Connection 
http://iamthewitness.com/index.html 
 
GlobalWarming.org 
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http://www.globalwarming.org/ 
 
The Good News About God 
http://www.goodnewsaboutgod.com/ 
 
The Gunny ―G‖ Blog & E-Mail 
http://gunnyg.wordpress.com 
 
Henry Makow.com – exposing feminism and the new world order 
http://www.savethemales.ca/ 
 
Hour Of The Time 
http://www.hourofthetime.com/hott.htm 
 
Illuminati Archives 
http://www.illuminatiarchives.org/ 
 
Illuminati Conspiracy Archives 
http://www.conspiracyarchive.com/ 
 
Information Clearing House- news you won‘t find on CNN 
http://www.informationclearinghouse.info/ 
 
The Information Underground: Truth-Honour-Fortitude-Resolve 
http://theinfounderground.com/forum/index.php 
 
International Center for 9/11 Studies 
http://www.ic911studies.org/Home_Page.html 
 
Jeff Rense Program  
http://www.rense.com/  
 
Jordan Maxwell‘s Homepage 
http://www.jordanmaxwell.com/ 
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The Konformist 
http://www.konformist.com/ 
 
Leading Edge International Research Group  
http://www.trufax.org/  
 
Lobster: Journal of Parapolitics, Intelligence and State Research 
http://www.lobster-magazine.co.uk/ 
 
MadCow Morning News 
http://www.madcowprod.com 
 
Mars Anomaly Research: in the pursuit of Planetary Truth 
http://marsanomalyresearch.com/ 
 
Media Underground 
http://www.media-underground.net/home.htm 
 
The Medusa File: save democracy and freedom from conspiracy by the Illuminati 
http://wwwmedusafile.com/index/htm 
 
Metapedia: The Alternative Encyclopedia 
http://en.metapedia.org/wiki/Main_Page 
 
Michael Tsarion.com 
http://www.michaeltsarion.com 
 
Montalk.net – Transcending the Matrix Control System 
http://www.montalk.net/ 
 
Morph City – trashing failed paradigms, ushering in sanity 
http://www.morphcity.com/ 
 
Mysterious New Zealand (NZ) 
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http://www.mysteriousnewzealand.co.nz/ 
 
NameBase Book Index 
http://www.namebase.org/ 
 
National Prayer Network 
http://www.truthtellers.org/index.html 
 
The New Enlightenment 
http://www.hermes-press.com/ 
 
News With Views.com – Where Reality Shatters Illusion 
http://www.newswithviews.com/  
 
OpposingDigits Vlog 
http://opposingdigits.com/vlog/ 
 
openUReyes – Alternative news headlines: free minds for freedom (NZ) 
http://www.openureyes.org.nz/link.html 
 
Open Your Minds Eye 
http://openyourmindseye.blogspot.com/ 
 
Outside The Box:  Your Source For News You Can Trust 
http://alexansary.com/links.html  
 
Paranoia – The Conspiracy & Paranormal Reader 
http://www.paranoiamagazine.com/index.html 
 
Policestateplanning.com 
http://www.policestateplanning.com/ 
 
Propaganda Matrix.com: Exposing the Fourth Reich of the Elite and Government        
Sponsored Terrorism 
http://www.propagandamatrix.com/ 
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Radio Liberty 
http://www.radioliberty.com/ 
 
Red Ice Creations – Explore – Observe – Be Here Now 
http://www.redicecreations.com/ 
 
The Ruthless Truth blog 
http://theruthlesstruth.com/wordpress/ 
 
Serendipity: Information and commentary not to be found in the mainstream 
media 
http://www/serendipity.li/index.html 
 
Signs of the Times News 
http://www.sott.net/ 
 
Steamshovel Press. All Conspiracy. No Theory.  
http://www.steamshovelpress.com/  
 
Surfing The Apocalypse  
http://www.surfingtheapocalypse.com/  
 
Survive 2012: Ancient Mayan Doomsday, Pole Shift, and Evolution 
http://survive2012.com/ 
 
Three World Wars – Tracking the Progress of the Planned World War Three 
http://www.threeworldwars.com/ 
 
Terrorism and the Illuminati – A Three Thousand Year History 
http://www.terrorism-illuminati.com/ 
 
Total Information Analysis 
http://www.total411.info/ 
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Truth Radio << The T.R.U.T.H. Project 
 http://thetruthproject.us/truth-radio/  
 
True Conspiracies, the Illuminati and One World Government 
http://www.trueconspiracies.com/  
 
Truth Gone Wild 
http://truthgonewild.blogspot.com/ 
 
Unbent 
http://unbent.wordpress.com/ 
 
Uncensored Magazine (NZ) 
http://uncensored.co.nz/  
 
The Universal Seduction 
http://theuniversalseduction.com/ 
 
Joan Veon – The Women‘s International Media Group 
http://www.womensgroup.org/ 
 
Viewzone Magazine  
http://www.viewzone.com/VIEW.ZONE.html  
 
The Vigilant Citizen 
http://vigilantcitizen.com/ 
 
Wake Up From Your Slumber/The Truth Will Set You Free 
http://wakeupfromyourslumber.com 
 
Web Of Evidence: What They Don‘t Want You To Know (NZ) 
http://clareswinney.wordpress.com/ 
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Whale 
http://www.whale.to/ 
Whole Truth Coalition: Free Minds Building a Better World 
http://www.wholetruthcoalition.org 
 
WINDS – World Internet News Distributary Source 
http://www.apfn.org/THEWINDS/index.html 
 
Wing TV – World Independent News Group 
http://www.wingtv.net/  
 
Wise Up Journal 
http://www.wiseupjournal.com/index.php 
 
Zionist Conspiracy 
http://zioncon.blogspot.com/  
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WEBSITES CRITICAL OF CONSPIRACY THEORIES 
__________________________________________________________________ 
 
These are websites that are either concerned with debunking specific conspiracy 
theories or which regularly feature material critical of conspiracy culture from a 
variety of perspectives (e.g. political/scientific/academic). Such websites offer 
much useful background information on specific conspiracy theorists and 
conspiracy theories, and often contain interesting theoretical observation and 
commentary regarding conspiracy culture and its wider socio-political 
ramifications.  
 
911 Cultwatch 
http://www.911cultwatch.org.uk/ 
 
The Committee for Skeptical Inquiry (CSI) 
http://www.csicop.org/ 
 
Conspiracy Bomb 
http://www.conspiracybomb.com/ 
 
Conspiracy theory logical fallacies 
http://warp.povusers.org/grrr/conspiracytheories.html 
 
Contrail Science 
http://contrailscience.com/ 
 
Counterknowledge: Exposing conspiracy theories, cults, quack medicine, bogus 
science, and fake history  
http://counterknowledge.com/ 
 
Crank Dot Net: Cranks, crackpots, kooks and loons on the Net 
http://www.crank.net/index.html 
 
Denialism blog: don‘t mistake denialism for debate 
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http://scienceblogs.com/denialism/ 
 
Disinformation Station: A blog for paranoids and the people out to get them 
http://texasbuddha.wordpress.com/ 
 
Forgetomori: Extraordinary Claims. Ordinary Investigations.  
http://forgetomori.com 
 
Fringe Reporter: exploring the edges of Internet culture 
http://fringereporter.blogspot.com/ 
 
Fundies Say the Darndest  Things 
http://www.fstdt.com/Default.aspx 
 
Hot Topic: Global warming and the future of New Zealand 
http://hot-topic.co.nz/ 
 
IdiotWars – Cracking the Nuts of the Lunatic Fringe 
http://www.fontcraft.com/idiotwars/?page_id=2 
 
International Journal of Inactivism 
http://frankbi.wordpress.com/ 
 
Leaving Alex Jonestown 
http://leavingalexjonestown.blogspot.com/ 
 
Mating Hedgehogs 
http://earonmouse.blogspot.com/ 
 
Neurodiversity.com – Conspiracism links page 
http://www.neurodiversity.com/conspiracism.html 
 
New Yorkers Against Religion-based Bigotry 
http://nyarbb.com/index.html 
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Public Eye.org - The Website of Political Research Associates 
http://www.publiceye.org/index.php 
 
Reading the Maps 
http://readingthemaps.blogspot.com/ 
 
Respectful Insolence 
http://scienceblogs.com/insolence/ 
 
Screw Loose Change: Exposing the lies, distortions and myths of the 9-11 
―Truthers‖ 
http://screwloosechange.blogspot.com/ 
 
Swallowing the Camel 
http://swallowingthecamel.blogspot.com/ 
 
The Amateur Scientist: a sceptical look at science, politics, and religion 
http://www.amateurscientist.org/ 
 
The Uncritiqued: a blog about the many conspiracies which  underlie just about 
anything and everything you can possibly think of 
http://theuncritiqued.blogspot.com/ 
 
Watching the Deniers: throwing a spotlight on climate change scepticism 
http://watchingthedeniers.wordpress.com 
 
What‘s the Harm in believing in conspiracy theories? 
http://whatstheharm.net/conspiracytheories.html 
 
 
